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nally, upgrades of both the injector complex and the LHC to guarantee efficient exploitation and to
maximize the total integrated luminosity over the life-time of the LHC have been reviewed.
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PRECONDITIONS FOR OPERATING AT 5TEV IN 2010 
A.Siemko and M.Zerlauth, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
The magnet powering system of the LHC has been 
commissioned in 2009 to the 1.2TeV equivalent to allow 
for initial beam operation and first collisions during 
November and December 2009. As part of this Hardware 
Commissioning campaign, a huge effort has been 
undertaken to increase the knowledge on the status of the 
interconnection splices through at warm and cold 
measurements. The results and lessons learnt with the 
different equipment system and the enhanced QPS system 
are summarized and an outlook is given on the necessary 
consolidation and additional commissioning which will 
have to be done to safely reach higher energies and 
intensities in 2010. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the second half of 2009 and following the repair 
and consolidation of the LHC after the 2008 incident, the 
LHC magnet powering system has been fully re-
commissioned in 2009. While the main magnets were 
only commissioned to 2kA for the initial months of 
operation, they are currently being commissioned to reach 
6kA, allowing for operation at 3.5TeV in 2010. This 
requires for a first time the extended QPS system to be 
fully operational to protect the magnet interconnection 
splices, which have been measured using this system for 
the first time with great accuracy in the whole machine.  
Similar to the beam energy (and magnet current), the 
beam intensity was kept very low for first operation in 
2009, which allowed however gaining very valuable 
experience with first beam commissioning while still 
operating with safe beams.  
  
 
Figure 1: HWC in 2008 and 2009 
As for the magnet protection system this flexibility will 
be lost for other equipment and machine protection 
systems when moving to higher energies and intensities, 
therefore it is of vital importance to fully understand and 
apply the lessons learnt during initial operation end of 
2009.    
HWC IN 2009 AND BEYOND 
Despite the increased complexity of the protection 
systems following the introduction of the nQPS system, 
the Hardware Commissioning campaign in 2009 went 
very smooth, and the overall time could be reduced by 
almost 50% as shown in Figure 1 (keeping in mind that 
the main circuits have only been commissioned to the 
1.2TeV equivalent for initial beam operation).  
This increased efficiency was mainly a result of 
increased parallel commissioning (up to 5 sectors in 
parallel) and increased automation of the performed tests 
and their analysis.  
Efficiency can however be further increased in several 
areas to achieve a re-commissioning of the whole 
machine in 4-5 weeks during future campaigns. 
Preparations for future hardware commissioning should 
be started soon in order to update the commissioning 
procedure and to allow for the timely definition and 
implementation of further improved tools.   
INTERCONNECTION SPLICES 
The current knowledge of the interconnection splices is 
of primary importance in order to determine the energy at 
which the machine can be operated safely prior to the 
upcoming consolidation program (aiming at mitigating 
splice defects as they have been observed in the machine 
and which are illustrated in Figure 2). Large efforts have 
therefore been undertaken during the HWC campaign in 
2009 to measure the splice resistances, both at warm and 




Figure 2: Interconnection splices with and without 
defects 
Splices at cold (i.e. in the superconducting state) have 
been measured in the whole machine with great accuracy 
and did not show any excess resistance above 4nΩ. An 
excess resistance above 2nΩ does not pose any problems 
under normal operation but might suggest a structural 
problem or a problem with the soldering procedure and 
their evolution over time should thus be observed closely.  
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Splices at warm (i.e. measurements of the continuity of 
the copper stabilizer) have been measured everywhere but 
in sectors 78 and 81 and extrapolated using statistical 
methods to the whole machine. While the worst measured 
splice shows a resistance of 60µΩ, this extrapolation 
leads to the assumption of a ‘worst case splice’ of around 
90 µΩ existing in the machine.  
Based on the calculations of A.Verweij (revealing a 
value of 80µΩ as the worst acceptable splice resistance 
for safe operation at 3.5TeV) the current knowledge of the 
interconnection splices leaves no margin for operation at 
3.5TeV and running at 5TeV is not recommended without 
major repairs after a warm up. Additional methods have 
been proposed which would allow to further increase the 
knowledge of the interconnect splices, a low current 
method that can measure the RRR of the busbars and a 
high current method (the Thermal Amplifier) which is 
sensitive to the worst splices in all bus bar segments. 
ENHANCED QPS SYSTEM  
To assure the protection of the interconnection splices, 
additional electronics and the related cabling has been 
installed during early 2009 and addition steps for its 
validation have been included in the commissioning 
program. This nQPS system represents an increase of 
around 1/3 with respect to the existing system and 
consists of around 440 additional crates, 4000 detection 
boards and 900 power packs, interconnected with more 
than 240 km of additional cables and 7800 connectors. 
With this system the voltage across interconnections of 
LHC main magnets is permanently monitored and 
interlocked at 300µV/10s for nominal operation at 12kA 
(for 3.5TeV a threshold of 500µV, 10s is sufficient). In 
addition aperture symmetric quenches can be detected 
which will become an essential functionality for magnet 
training up to nominal current. The symmetric quench 
detection system serves as well as back-up for the existing 
system to detect also ‘normal’ quenches.  
During the hardware commissioning campaign the 
nQPS design has been successfully validated and 
commissioned in passive mode (i.e. not yet connected to 
the interlocks and quench heaters) up to a current of 2kA. 
After verification of the signal integrity and compensation 
adjustments at these moderate currents the nQPS system 
is connected into the interlock chain before proceeding 
the commissioning with higher current values. The new 
hardware allowed as well to establish for the first time the 
complete mapping of all superconducting interconnection 
splices for the 24 main circuits (as shown for the main 
quadrupole circuits of sector 12 in Figure 3). Despite the 
moderate current of 2kA the obtained resolution of 
~400pΩ allowed to confirm the conformity of all 
superconducting splices after the recent consolidation 
program.      
While most sectors where operated in 2009 still without 
the nQPS connected, sector 12 was already fully activated 
and allowed gaining first encouraging operational 
experience. The system proofed to be reasonably stable 
with the exception of a few EMC problems which were 
observed in the sector (originating in the pulsing of the 
nearby transfer line magnets).     
 
 
Figure 3: Splice mapping for main quadrupole circuits 
RQD/F.A12 as obtained end of September 2009  
In order to reach energies beyond the 3.5TeV range no 
major additional commissioning is needed for the QPS 
system apart from the installation of additional ‘snubber’ 
capacitors on the energy extraction systems. A further 
extension of the nQPS system to the individually powered 
quadrupole/dipoles and inner triplet circuits is currently 
being prepared and a potential problem related to the 
radiation weakness of the latest version of the field-bus 
chip is being addressed [1]. 
HOW TO SAFELY REACH HIGHER 
INTENSITIES AND ENERGIES 
The LHC Machine Protection System has been 
commissioned in 2009 for low intensity and low energy 
beam operation. During this period interlocks were 
activated step by step and masking of channels was one of 
the means used to improve the commissioning efficiency 
by allowing for the needed flexibility. Still a large 
majority of the interlocks were already tested and 
activated, without contributing in a significant way to the 
downtime of the machine. A few more tricky issues 
remain to be resolved for 2010 related to the reliability of 
some safe machine parameter flags and ‘cross-talk’ 
shower signals and saturation issues of BLMs at over-
injection.  
Beams where however very modest (the stored energy 
did not exceed 30kJ) and as intensity and energy are 
increased this flexibility will be lost as the machine has to 
be protected at all times. It is therefore essential that all 
protection functionality is commissioned beforehand at 
low intensity. Intensity and energy must then be increased 
progressively, and every new step in energy or optics 
must be performed at low intensity.  
In order to safely reach the targets for 2010 (with stored 
beam energies starting to exceed the MJ range) , the 
machine will require a very careful setup for unsafe 
beams, a well established operational cycle, good 
diagnostics and a reliable control system.  
Machine Development phases interleaved with standard 
operation are a potential threat and should be limited to 
the absolute minimum as settings might be changed and 
interlocks masked without being restored at the end of the 
MDs. 
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EARLY BEAM OPERATION OF THE 
BEAM LOSS MONITORS 
The beam loss monitors (BLMs) have shown a very 
satisfactory performance, whereas it has to be noted that 
only very few monitors where actually connected into the 
Beam Interlock System at the beginning of the 2009 run. 
At the end of the run the LHC was though operating with 
most of the channels unmasked.  The passage to unsafe 
beams will be an important step for the BLMs as it will 
require reaching the full protection level and the 
validation of the applied thresholds. The noise and offset 
on the monitors is hereby a very important factor 
determining the availability of the system (i.e. the number 
of false dumps). An effort to exchange long cables has 
allowed to reduce the noise by a factor of 2 on these 
monitors already, future installations of single pair 
shielded cables will further improve this by a factor of 5 
(during a  future shut-down only). Secondary Emission 
Monitors have hereby shown a higher percentage of large 
noise than Ionization chambers (detailed cause of this 
effect is currently under investigation).  
Until now only four quenches have been observed (all 
on main dipole magnets) which all occurred right after 
injection of the beam but which already allowed 
validating the accuracy of the related thresholds levels 
(see Figure 4). However, the MB magnets are typically 
not protected by BLM. All other magnet types (which are 
protected by BLM) need dedicated beam test to validate 
the thresholds. Also, the steady state loss thresholds need 
dedicated beam tests. Full application of the BLM system 
tests and system change procedures will be enforced. A 
few known BLM system limitations persist but they look 
compatible with the current LHC schedule (i.e. higher 
thresholds on some warm elements which are limited by 
the dynamic range and higher thresholds for TDI and 
triplet regions). No additional limitations have been found 
for energies up to 5TeV. The collimation cleaning looks 
already very promising, the injection losses observed 
during the 2009 run were however very high and need to 
be substantially reduced for 2010. 
 
 
Figure 4: Analysis of BLM signals for the four magnet 
quenches of main dipole magnets after beam injection 
 
Additional Beam tests have been proposed at the 
beginning of the 2010 run in order to determine safe 
settings of threshold values. 
WHAT ELSE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO 
REACH 5 TEV AND BEYOND 
Apart from additional commission steps for the LHC 
magnet powering and machine protection systems, a 
number of consolidation activities have to be performed 
before the energy can be increased to 5TeV. The values of 
the energy extraction resistors for the main dipole and 
quadrupole circuits which have been increased for the 
3.5TeV runs will have to be decreased again to avoid 
exceeding the voltage ratings of other elements in the 
electrical circuit and overheating of the dump resistors. 
Additional snubber capacitors will have to be installed to 
reduce the amplitude of the voltage wave which might 
inhibit the extinction of the arc during the opening of the 
energy extraction switches. 
Several magnet non-conformities will have to be 
revisited, e.g. the MCBYHS5.R8B1 [2] and MCBXH/V 
magnets are required to generate the crossing angle and 
the present non-conformities introduce an additional 
constraint on the possible physics scheme.  
The vacuum leak in the middle of the arc 34 still 
persists (with ~ 2mbar l s-1) but thanks to two additional 
turbo pumps this is deemed acceptable for operation in 
2010. Additional consolidation of the gas flow control 
valves should be foreseen as they might impact the 
overall reliability of the cryogenic system. 
CONCLUSION 
During the 2009 HWC campaign the LHC magnet 
powering system has been commissioned to the 1.2TeV 
equivalent to allow for initial beam operation. Large 
efforts have been undertaken to increase the knowledge of 
the interconnection splices in order to determine 3.5TeV 
as the energy at which the machine can be operated safely 
prior to a large scale consolidation program. Prior to 
operation at 3.5TeV the nQPS system will have to be 
commissioned to the equivalent current of 6kA in the 
main circuits and a large number of machine protection 
tests will have to be completed at low beam intensity 
before increasing the intensity above the safe limit. Apart 
from the well defined test program, only a very careful 
setup for unsafe beams, a well established operational 
cycle, good diagnostics and a reliable control system will 
allow to safely reach the targets for 2010 with beam 
energies exceeding the MJ range. 
REFERENCES 
[1] J.Serrano: Chamonix 2010, Session 6 - Radiation to 
Electronics, “Is the WorldFIP a reliable Rad-hard 
Fieldbus on long term?”, these proceedings 
[2] Y.Thyrel et al. : ”Analysis of the RCBYHS5.R8B1 
circuit”, EDMS Doc Nr. 105397 
analyzed (opposite beam equipped)                        analyzed 
highest IC saturation                                 MB not equipped 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
3
SUMMARY OF SESSION 2 –
MAGNETS AND SPLICES CONSOLIDATION SHUTDOWN 2010/2011
F. Bertinelli, H. Prin, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
Session 2 aims to highlight issues to be faced before 
7 TeV operation can be achieved, specifically concerning
superconducting magnets, interconnection and internal 
splices and closely related systems. This was initially 
intended to be the object of the next shutdown starting 
December 2010 and extending into 2011.
INTRODUCTION
In this session five presentations were given related to 
superconducting splices and one related to the quench 
behaviour of dipoles observed in sector 5-6 during the 
2008 hardware commissioning:
? Overview of all superconducting splices in the LHC 
machine: N. Catalan Lasheras
? Minimum requirement for 13 kA splices: A. Verweij
? Status of splices in 13 kA circuits: P. Fessia
? Status of splices in 6 kA circuits: J.-P. Tock
? Scenarios for consolidation intervention: F. Bertinelli
? Dipoles retraining for 7 TeV: E. Todesco
In summarising the session the order of presentations is 
not followed.
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR 13 KA 
SPLICES
Different types of defects were described, used for both 
modelling (as single sided) and for FRESCA tests.
FRESCA tests have been performed on three samples 
with purposely built in defects. The thermal runaway time 
is measured for different currents. These tests allow to 
estimate the effective heat transfer factor, then used to 
model the LHC machine. Note - specifically for the 
design of the new insulation - that LHe cooling gives 
about 1-2 kA improvement over an adiabatic model.
Conservative assumptions in modelling are made for 
the copper RRR of cable, busbar, U-piece and wedge, 
lower values than in previous models.
Updated results for the maximum additional resistance 
Raddit were presented:
? 3.5 TeV:
? RB: max. Raddit = 76 ??
? RQ: max. Raddit = 80 ??
The previous (statistical) estimate of the maximum 
resistance still present in the machine is 90 ????The 
current state of the machine just allows for 3.5 TeV 
operation, since it is considered extremely unlikely that 
all critical conditions (high warm resistance, low cable 
and busbar RRR, single sided defect, poor cooling) 
occur simultaneously. Ongoing RRR measurements at 
25K should be pursued to provide further information 
on busbar copper.
? 5 TeV:
? RB: max. Raddit = 43 ??
? RQ: max. Raddit = 41 ??
Operation at 5 TeV will require to previously localise 
and repair those splices above these values.
? 7 TeV:
? RB: max. Raddit = 11 ??
? RQ: max. Raddit = 15 ??
A better knowledge of copper RRR will not change 
these numbers.
Also to be considered is that the soldered joints may 
have a resistance degrading in time (fatigue, shocks) and 
that their measured room temperature resistances may not 
systematically be representative of their resistance at cold.
In conclusion for 7 TeV operation it is recommended to 
repair the worse splices and systematically add a shunt to 
all 13 kA splices. This is dimensioned to a 16 x 2 mm2
cross-section, to be tested in FRESCA.
STATUS OF SPLICES IN 13 KA CIRCUITS
The complex sequence of activities associated to a 
splice consolidation was presented, highlighting the main 
issues to be solved in the ongoing development work.
The worse splices will be repaired (high SC resistance, 
high R8, misalignments). Samples were made with 
varying overlap between cables and their SC resistance 
measured: a 2 n??????????esistance - such as measured in 
the LHC machine with the nQPS – will have only a few 
mm overlap. Together with electromagnetic forces 
between cables tending to separate them, this is 
considered to represent a mechanical risk for the machine. 
Other possible explanations for this excess resistance are 
oxide layers or overheated SC cable. 
The soldering and QC process were improved in the 
2008-09 shutdown, as well as our understanding 
(positioning of inductor) with potential for further 
progress (filling voids with copper, shape of inductor).
The shunt requirements were listed, and a potential 
design presented. It is planned to solder the shunt with 
lower melting point eutectic Sn-Pb. Different heating 
technologies will be evaluated. A mechanical clamp will 
be added.
A new insulation will be required that shall also provide 
transversal restraint.
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SCENARIOS FOR CONSOLIDATION 
INTERVENTION
It is estimated that ~15-20% of the splices will require 
repair for 7 TeV operation. This is based on the limited 
experience with R16 measurements in the 2008-09
shutdown. Unfortunately diagnostics methods do not 
allow to localise these splices. It will therefore be 
necessary to systematically open all interconnects (open 
W bellows, remove thermal screens, cut M sleeves, 
remove insulation) for local, invasive resistance 
measurements. In addition to the repair, the shunt and 
clamp will be systematically added.
In addition to this splice consolidation program, there is 
a considerable volume of further work associated to 
magnets, splices and related systems already known (e.g. 
DN200 pressure relief nozzles, etc.).
The duration of a shutdown is estimated considering
past series experience. “Duration” is intended as the time 
between the first W bellows opening and the last W 
bellows closed, including testing of the insulation 
vacuum: times for cryogenic warmup, pressure tests, 
cooldown, final ELQA and commissioning need to be 
added.
The resources to be used for the main splices
consolidation work alone are estimated ~100 persons, of 
which ~45 present at CERN, the rest to be integrated.
Different scenarios were considered for the main 
splices consolidation work. With a throughput of 50 
interconnections / week for critical activities (an 
ambitious value), the first sector would have a duration of 
14 weeks, the second would be finished 5 weeks later etc.
Larger throughputs (more resources working in 
parallel) will considerably increase quality risk, affecting 
in particular supervision, coordination and Quality 
Control and are not recommended.
Different scenarios can be discussed by considering the 
workload distributed over one or more shutdowns. 
Important issues to be evaluated are the impact to the 
physics program, radioprotection/ALARA, the amount of 
additional work, the possibility for diagnostics to localise 
splices to be repaired for 5 TeV.
A consolidation of all sectors will have a duration of 
one year. Possibilities have been considered of two and 
three shorter shutdowns.
A Task Force was setup by the LHC Machine 
Committee to review all superconducting splices in
preparation for 7 TeV operation.
STATUS OF SPLICES IN 6 KA CIRCUITS
Failures in splices occurred at Tevatron (fatigue in the 
magnet leads) and in a cusp joint at Hera. This experience 
has forced specific attention on the “praying hands” 
splices of the 6 kA circuits in the Individually Powered 
Quadrupoles and Dipoles.
An inventory of circuits was presented with currents for 
3.5 TeV up to ultimate operation. Within the same circuit, 
e.g. Q7L2, at least 5 different splice geometries exist, 
including praying hands inside the cold mass.
First measurements at cold of the busbar and 
interconnection splices were performed in one area (DS 
L2). It is recommended to perform this splice mapping 
measurement systematically before increasing energy 
above 3.5 TeV.
It is also recommended to implement a nQPS in 2010 to 
protect busbar and magnets separately.
The geometry of the praying hands was presented, the 
assembly process used and its traceability, stress 
computations, FRESCA fatigue tests. While there seems 
to be no showstopper, the ongoing work will continue: 
evaluate other design options, further structural 
calculations, FRESCA tests with fracture analysis, use of 
tomography in the tunnel, etc.). In some cases (sector 7-8) 
it may be required to open and inspect some 
interconnections that were the first to be assembled and 
were not fully documented.
OVERVIEW OF ALL 
SUPERCONDUCTING SPLICES IN THE 
LHC MACHINE
The full inventory of machine superconducting splices, 
both inside magnets and interconnecting them, amounts to 
over 100 000 cases. The magnetic energy stored in the 
circuits, MIITs and hot spot temperatures were computed.
Results from the 2009-10 powering campaign were 
presented. While there is no showstopper, some circuits 
will require further investigation: some Line-N 
interconnections in sector 7-8. RCO, RQ6, some existing 
non-conformities, inner triplets. Work will continue to 
perform a risk analysis considering multiple failures and 
Maximum Credible Incident scenarios.
Work priorities and resources may need to be defined 
considering the large workload.
DIPOLES RETRAINING FOR 7 TEV
Sector 5-6 was trained up to 6.6 TeV: several Firm3
dipoles (representing 55% of the dipoles present in this 
sector) showed a slower training than expected.
Different estimates of training times were presented. 
The MonteCarlo method based on surface SM18 data 
gives 50 quenches per octant to reach nominal.
The extrapolation of hardware commissioning data 
gives 110 ± 35 quenches per octant.
The relation of this performance to production data is 
being investigated: there is no correlation with storage 
time (neither of cold masses nor cryodipoles), but other 
factors are being studied (elastic modulus of coils, 
collars).
Some additional SM18 cold testing could be 
performed, but only on the small available samples: they 
could investigate if quenches occur in the straight part or 
in the collar heads, and what happens after successive 
thermal cycles.
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avoided.  This session was therefore dev
optimisation of interventions in cold parts 
Topics covered the range from cleaning the b
pipe to exchanging a magnet without warm
2.8 km sector. 
CAN WE OPTIMISE THE CLE
PROCESS FURTHER? 
(Vincent Baglin, TE.VSC) 
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worst case of pressure development and pr
such an event. 
The flow rate is estimated by the sound vel
the escaping helium through the slits for
magnet laminations.  The slit area is 
(0.2 mm gap per 6.2 mm length, 10 mm hol
there are around 161 slits per metre length.  
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NOT for repairs on beam vacuum or circ
valves (line c’,k,e,x,y).  The scenario was d
LHC Project Report 60, Sept 2000, wher
sectors had to be warm-up, one where the 
had to take place and one on each side to serv
buffers to prevent condensation on vacuu
Figure 2 shows the principle. 
Figure 2: principle of local warm-up as per b
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Figure 3: Principle of warming-up the first 
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adjacent sector in nominal cryogenic operation and while 
preserving the redundancy of the two cooling plants 
available at each point. 
Requirements for the interventions on one sector are 
coming from safety aspects (sector must be locked-out 
from pressure and gas flow) and from cryogenic operation 
aspects (protect cold valves from air and moisture 
condensation).  This is achieved today by having for each 
circuit 2 valves with a helium gas buffer in between (at 
room temperature and 1 bar).  This solution is applicable 
for all circuits except header B (gaseous He pumping line, 
15 mbar, 4K). 
Two options are proposed to improve the decoupling of 
adjacent sectors.  The first option is to add a DN250 valve 
on header B which would allow safe intervention on any 
sector while keeping the adjacent one cold.  However the 
redundancy of the two cooling plants in one point is lost 
during intervention.  The two sectors have to be warmed-
up to install this additional valve.  The second option is to 
add a new valve-box with 6 cryogenic valves on the 
junction region of the QRL.  This second option restores 
the redundancy of the cryoplants in addition to allow for 
safe interventions.  As for the first option, the two sectors 
have to be warmed-up to install this additional valve-box.  
Figure 5 gives a schematic of the He distribution circuits 
and the possible options. 
 
Figure 5: schematic of the He distribution in a typical 
site 
There are possibilities to improve the cryogenic 
decoupling of two adjacent sectors, but they both require 
a validation of the design and a thorough integration 
study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The incident in sector 3-4 created a lot of secondary 
damage, among them the pollution of the beam vacuum 
system with debris and soot.  The cleaning campaign 
required careful inspection to evaluate the extent of the 
contamination.  Specific tooling was built and used in the 
tunnel, allowing cleaning the 4.8 km of beam pipes and 
the interconnecting modules (PIMs) to a level deemed 
acceptable by all concerned parties.  The protection of the 
beam vacuum system was scrutinised and can probably be 
improved with the addition of fast closing valves and 
protection shells on the bellows. 
But the incident also triggered a number of new ideas to 
minimise the consequences in terms of intervention time, 
cost and risk should such an incident happen again.  
Limiting the number of sub-sectors to warm-up for an 
intervention, changing a magnet with a local warm-up and 
improving the operational separation between adjacent 
cryogenic sectors count among these new ideas.  They are 
all worth further study and validation. 
Finally, the basic hypothesis to evaluate the most 
credible incident (MCI) in case the beam perforates the 
helium enclosure in a magnet have been defined and can 
now be used to build-up credible scenarios. 
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SAFETY FOR PERSONNEL UNDERGROUND – HE EVACUATION 
 
D. Macina and S. Weisz, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This session reviewed the status of Personnel Safety 
Underground and in particular the measure taken after the 
September 19th - 2008 accident. Looking forward, the 
presentations described the Safety organisation during 
future shutdowns and the evolutions of Safety measures 
as the LHC will gain in intensity. There were a total of 7 
presentations that can be grouped in 5 subjects: 
− Follow-up of the recommendations of the Task Force 
on Safety of Personnel in LHC Underground Areas 
(Ralf Trant and Sylvain Weisz) 
− Safety in the Experiments (Olga Beltramello and 
Christoph Schaefer) 
− Safety organisation in the LHC during shutdown 
work (John Pedersen and John Etheridge) 
− Radiation risks during LHC operation and 
requirements for maintenance and repairs (Doris 
Forkel-Wirth) 
− LHC ventilation system (Mauro Nonis) 
This paper presents the key points of the talks and the 
questions that were raised.  The main messages are 
regrouped at the end. 
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND 
STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
Ralf Trant recalled the mandate of the Task Force and 
listed the recommendations that were issued and endorsed 
by the Management. Most recommendations were 
implemented or are being addressed, and all safety 
measures required for the 2009/10 run have been 
completed. There are still two open questions: the sealing 
of machine specific underground service areas and the 
study of alternative options for guided release of 
overpressure and helium to the surface in case of a 
Maximum Conceivable Incident (MCI). The additional 
recommendations of the External Advisory Committee 
are also open issues and must be implemented.  
The separation between the LHC tunnel and the 
experimental underground premises was a priority to 
allow accessing the experimental caverns while powering 
the magnets. The release of overpressure and helium to 
the surface uses presently the access shafts. This situation 
has important drawbacks: the air of the tunnel can mix 
freely with the air of the machine service galleries, and it 
does not insure best practice for radio-protection, ODH 
and fire hazard mitigation; the risk of ODH in the access 
shafts puts strong constraints on the access matrix when a 
sector is in powering phase. Sylvain Weisz exposed the 
strategy to pursue with the recommendations of the Task 
Force: the sealing of the LHC tunnel towards other 
underground areas is the first priority for the next long 
shut down. Implementation of alternate release paths from 
the LHC tunnel to the surface is of second priority since 
the present paths fulfil all safety requirements. 
The separation of LHC service areas from the tunnel 
requires the sealing of ducts with power cables whose 
heat loads must be carried away by some air flow: Freddy 
Bordry enquired on how to do that. The idea is to install 
tight boxes with a specific blower to insure a flow from 
the service areas (UA) to the tunnel (RA), the solution 
should be extensively validated before implementation.  
SAFETY IN THE EXPERIMENTS 
Olga Beltramello reviewed the safety organisation of 
the experiments and the safety standards in place. She 
detailed how the experimental caverns have been pressure 
protected and sealed. She gave precisions on the Alarm 3 
systems, that are operational and under maintenance 
control, on the collaboration with the CERN Fire Brigade 
and on the Radioprotection strategy that has been set up 
with DGS/RP. She described the role of the SLIMOS who 
is present 24/24h-7/7d during beam operation: the 
SLIMOS desk is the contact point for all matters 
regarding safety. 
The situation of the survey galleries around Point 5 was 
the subject of a discussion: access to these survey 
galleries is actually very cumbersome, but there is no 
safety problem. The situation should be corrected during 
the next shutdown. Concerning the SLIMOS, it was asked 
if he has a paper version of his handbook in case of 
network failure: it is indeed the case, but it is not as well 
updated as the online version.  
Christoph Schaefer exposed the remaining safety 
concerns of the experiments and the actions that must be 
pursued. These include: 
− The assessment of the safety relevant functions of the 
ventilation system, in normal and in degraded mode; 
− The assessment of the safe underground areas 
(structure and ventilation); 
− The need for a public address system in the 
underground experimental premises; 
− The evacuation paths and their signalization, 
including  indication of the paths that are not useable; 
− The development of a specific safety system  
dedicated to execute automatic actions  for the level 3 
alarm; 
− The need for magnetic field resistant RP portable 
devices. 
Doris Forkel-Wirth commented about the last point, 
recalled that such instrument does not exist on the market 
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and that a special in-house technical development is 
required. 
Roberto Saban expressed his worry about the amount of 
resources required to do everything asked. We should first 
have a risk analysis to define priorities, and then the 
experiments and machine must collaborate on the 
consolidation program.   
SAFETY ORGANISATION IN THE LHC 
DURING SHUTDOWN WORK 
The EN Department took over the territorial safety 
responsibility for the machine, as a follow-up of the 
restructuration beginning of 2009. However, the beam 
related safety (e.g. radiological aspects and access 
control) will still be handled by BE who will continue to 
supervise the safety during operation, with or without 
beam. John Pedersen underlined that the hand-over of 
responsibility at the beginning/end of a shutdown is a new 
exercise and that some open questions still need to be 
clarified (Ex transition phase with HW commissioning 
tests in part of the LHC). He also underlined that safety 
rules must be enforced, appropriate training will be 
provided and a strong support of the Management is 
expected in case of non respect of the rules. He finally 
commented on the need for a new procedure to trace and 
control all activities, linked to the LHC access 
authorization during shutdown: the Avis d’Execution de 
Travaux (AET) will merge the AOC and ADI 
functionalities, Julie Coupard gives a detailed description 
in her presentation in the next session on Access System 
and Radiation Monitors. 
John Etheridge commented on the evolution of Safety 
Coordination in the field and on its added value. He 
insisted for an early involvement of the Safety 
Coordination, already at the conception stage; they should 
also be consulted if there are major modifications to be 
carried out. The feed-back of last year is quite positive 
and the number of requests for joint inspections has gone 
up.  
A question was raised about the capacity to respond to 
all demand on the entire site with only 4 safety 
coordinators. It is clear that it is sometime difficult to 
respond as fast as requested and that a 5th coordinator 
would greatly help to extend the service CERN wide. 
RADIATION RISKS DURING LHC 
OPERATION AND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS 
The release of radioactivity by air or water into the 
environment will become a growing concern. Doris 
Forkel-Wirth recalled that CERN committed to limit its 
release to insure an ambient dose equivalent to the public 
< 10 µSv/y: the present situation appears acceptable for 
the 2010 run, but it must be confirmed by measurements. 
She insisted on the separation between the tunnel and all 
other underground areas that must be completed when the 
luminosity and/or the energy will increase. Monitoring 
must be improved: two additional stations to measure the 
release of radioactivity by air into the environment need 
to be installed during the next shut-down in Pt4 and Pt6; 
Cooling water and infiltration water will get activated and 
regular sampling campaigns will be organized by RP. 
The work conditions in the tunnel and the repair of 
machine elements will have to comply with radio-
protection measures as: 
− Only radiation workers are allowed to access the 
LHC and/or to work on radioactive equipment; 
− Any destructive work (machining, cutting, drilling, 
etc.) on beam line components and tunnel 
infrastructure will require a risk assessment by DGS-
RP: Grinder and similar “dirty” devices are not 
permitted;  
− Maintenance and repair work  in areas like collimator 
regions, inner triplets, TAN, TAS or beam dump 
areas will become subject to CERN’s formal 
approach to job and dose planning (ALARA): a 
Dossier d’Intervention en Milieu Radioactif (DIMR) 
will systematically need to be prepared; 
− All material that had been in the LHC tunnel or in the 
operational zone of the experiments during beam 
operation and that will leave the LHC needs to be 
controlled by DGS-RP. LHC Material traceability 
must be improved;  
− All radioactive material needs to be maintained or 
repaired in appropriate workshops. There are few 
workshops available and they will probably not allow 
to absorb the work load: compensatory measures are 
very costly in man-power, time and budget for all 
parties involved; 
There was a question about the status of CERN 
installations versus INB regulation and changes expected 
when the tripartite agreement with Swiss and French 
authorities enter into force. CERN is only assimilated to 
an INB facility and we can develop our own rules tailored 
to our need, the only restriction is that they must 
correspond to good practice and as such acknowledged by 
Swiss and French authorities. The tripartite agreement 
will avoid duplication of inspections. It is now at the 
government’s level for approval: under this agreement, 
none of the host state has the authority to shutdown 
CERN installation and it becomes possible to transport 
nuclear waste across the borders.  
LHC VENTILATION SYSTEM 
Mauro Nonis reviewed the requirements of the HVAC 
system concerning confinement, filtering and smoke 
extraction. The safety standard for Nuclear Facilities is 
ISO17873 and most of its guidelines are fulfilled.  The 
LHC ventilation system does not fully comply with 
ISO17873since it is not on the secured network and some 
functions are not ensured during abnormal or accidental 
situations: this is not a safety issues in our case since 
underground access is forbidden when the machine is in 
operation. The situation is different for the experimental 
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areas at Points 1 and 5 where the ventilation system is on 
a secured powering system.  
The ventilation flux in the different sectors is within the 
0.5-1.5 m/s range, pressure differences between the 
various underground premises at Points 1 and 5 are within 
the tolerances fixed to limit any uncontrolled release of 
radioactivity to the environment. Still, the overpressures 
at Points 2 and 8 are not stable and the work foreseen for 
the next shutdown should improve this situation: it 
concerns the tight separation of the different ventilation 
sector and the installation of additional sensors to monitor 
the air conditions and the overpressures. 
Mauro also recalled that a vast consolidation program 
has been approved for the cooling and ventilation 
facilities, covering the years 2010-2017. 
A question addressed the requirement for positive 
pressure difference between US85 and the LHCb cavern 
UX85: the reason is that UX85 sees the beam and US85 
does not, hence the air, if any, should flow from the US to 
the UX. 
MAIN MESSAGES 
− The  sealing of the LHC tunnel toward the service 
galleries to insure radiation, fire and ODH protection 
is a priority for the next shut down; 
− Risk analysis and safety assessments of the cryogenic 
system, the ventilation , the safe areas should be 
systematically reviewed with regard to the latest 
experiences; 
− The hand-over of safety responsibility between BE 
and EN departments at the beginning/end of a 
shutdown is a new exercise, some open questions still 
need to be clarified; 
− The Safety Coordination can and should be involved 
from the conception stage of new equipment; 
− RP considerations  will modify the working 
conditions: need to monitor, to organize interventions 
according to ALARA, to trace material coming from 
the LHC tunnel and to maintain/repair  all equipment 
in dedicated workshops; 
− Additional monitors to control the air speed, 
temperature and pressure, together with differential 
pressure sensors, will be installed during the next 
shut-down; 
− A consolidation program for the cooling and 
ventilation facilities is on-going, how far to go in an 
approach to fully comply with the ISO178773 
referential must be assessed. 
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ACCESS SYSTEM AND RADIATION MONITORS SUMMARY 
M. Gruwé, T. Ladzinski, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This session was devoted to the LHC Access System 
and the Radiation Monitors of the LHC and its injector 
chain. The session was composed of six presentations. 
The objective of the first three talks was to assess the 
current system [1] as well as to present and discuss the 
hot topics [2],[3] that could result in modification 
proposals. Two following presentations addressed the 
impact of the potential future modifications and discussed 
the possible improvements of access control stability and 
efficiency [4],[5]. Finally, the last talk presented the 
current status of the radiation monitors and its possible 
impact on the LHC availability [6]. This paper does not 
summarise each of the presentations individually, but 
rather presents the key points of the talks. Furthermore, 
significant points of the session discussions are presented. 
ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES 
Access coordination responsibilities 
The responsibility and coordination of both the 
activities requiring access as well as safety in the LHC is 
shared by two departments: Beams and Engineering. In 
the Shutdown and Technical Stop periods, the EN/MEF 
group is responsible for planning and coordination. In the 
Commissioning phase the EN/MEF maintains the general 
overview of planning while BE/OP plans the detailed 
actions and coordinates the activities. The preparation for 
Beam Operation and the Operation itself is planned and 
coordinated by the BE/OP group. The BE DSO is 
responsible for safety matters in the LHC during the 
Technical Stops, Commissioning and Operation periods, 
while the EN DSO steps in during the Shutdown period. 
The TSOs and site coordinators from EN/MEF group 
assume their responsibility regarding access all the time. 
The Patrol and Restricted modes, which are used in the 
Technical Stop, at the end of the Shutdown period, in the 
Commissioning phase and during the preparation for 
Beam Operation, require manning the access console. The 
BE/OP group might need more help from people trained 
and habilitated to give access while the LHC is not in 
Beam Operation.  
Avis d’Exécution de Travaux 
The EN/MEF group proposed the introduction of a new 
tool to help coordinate and plan activities requiring access 
to the LHC. It is planned that the new tool will be put in 
place before the next shutdown and will replace the 
current ADI (“Avis d’Intervention”) and AOC (“Avis 
d’ouverture de chantier”) thus streamlining the process of 
preparing underground interventions and providing means 
of controlling who is supposed to enter the LHC at any 
moment in time. This single document should include 
links to other safety related documents of interest for the 
given zone and time window (VIC, DIMR, locking out of 
equipment, hot works permits etc.). The document shall 
include specific list of people that will intervene in the 
LHC. It should be possible to edit the list of personnel 
after the approval of the document.  In the discussion that 
followed it was stressed that for zones where the DIMR 
(“Dossier d’Intervention en Milieu Radioactif”) is needed, 
the AET should be prepared well in advance [7]. Certain 
activities in the Shutdown period take long time and 
require a large number of personnel, thus it might be hard 
to monitor access with the tool as very big teams might be 
registered with the AET [8]. 
The visits of the VIPs will in principle not be covered 
by the AET mechanism [9], as there is a special procedure 
for them [10]. Furthermore, their needs are different and 
the visitors do not have the necessary training [11],[12]. 
SECTORISATION 
Current Sectorisation 
The term “sectorisation” refers to the division of the 
LHC into smaller entities, called sectors. The access 
sectorisation is the most visible one, as the sectors are 
delimited with physical barriers and restrain free 
movement underground. The current access sectorisation 
fulfils the safety functions for which it has been designed: 
it helps protect the personnel from ionizing radiation.  
Circulation through the inter-site doors 
Circulation through the inter-site doors is only possible 
when the two adjacent tunnel zones are in the General 
mode. This is a severe constraint for the personnel 
intervening in the tunnel while the machine is in the 
Restricted mode. The Restricted mode used in the 
Commissioning phase (powering) precludes the passage 
through the doors in order to keep track of the exact 
number of people in each zone. This information is 
important for the Fire Brigade in case of an evacuation 
alarm [13],[14]. The access control system cannot give 
fully reliable information regarding the number of people 
inside a zone, because of the number of evacuation exits. 
Only when the LHC is patrolled and in the Restricted 
mode, the count of delivered safety tokens (the restricted 
access keys) is fully reliable [15]. 
The door positions could be readjusted, but only in a 
minor way, as their emplacement was chosen with the 
radioprotection constraints in mind. Recently all position 
drawings [16] have been formally approved [17]. 
Furthermore, once the operation starts, some tunnel zones 
risk being almost inaccessible and hardly ever in General 
mode (e.g. the collimator areas in points 3 and 7). 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
13
Access sectors versus ventilation sectors 
Following the “Task Force on Safety of personnel in 
the LHC underground areas” recommendations [18], a 
number of overpressure doors have been installed to 
protect the personnel from the risks of major helium 
release. The access system has not been redesigned and a 
need to readjust the access sectorisation to the ventilation 
sectorisation becomes apparent. Especially, the current 
situation imposes strong access restrictions during the 
Powering Phase II (e.g. while Powering Phase II takes 
place in LHC sector 5-6, no access is permitted from 
inter-site door R37 to R74) [19].  A possible solution to 
this problem would require adding more access points. 
However, the current postulates are biased by the recent 
sector 3-4 repair experience; long term needs should be 
studied [14] and risk analysis performed. 
The re-adjustment of the ventilation sectorisation was 
discussed during the Workshop [3],[4]. Opinions 
converged as to the need for sealing of cable passages 
between the tunnel and service areas and the addition of a 
ventilation door next on the tunnel side of access points 
leading from the service to the tunnel zones. 
INTERLOCKS 
The LHC Access Safety System (LASS) protects the 
personnel from radiation hazards. Increasing its scope to 
protect people from other risks was a subject of 
discussion during the Workshop. Today, some of the 
access system signals are used in the Software Interlock 
System (SIS) [1]. This system is a support tool for the 
operator, helping to enforce the absence of personnel 
during the Powering Phase II [20]. It prevents powering 
above the Phase I current limit when people are in the 
zone and stops the power converters of the relevant zone 
in case of an intrusion. The implementation uses the SIS 
to generate the necessary logic between the access 
conditions and the current read in the power converters 
and to send commands to the power converters via the 
Power Interlock Controller (PIC), notably a slow power 
abort in case of an intrusion. The reading of the signals 
from the access system to the SIS is done via a long chain 
of different software modules supplied by the GS/ASE 
and BE/CO groups. In order to pass from a support tool to 
a full-fledged interlock system [21] a direct hardware link 
would be needed between the LASS and the converters. 
An alternative in the form of a LASS-PIC interlock would 
require a thorough risk assessment. 
Other areas of interest for access interlocks include 
fresh air supply and the new overpressure doors. Again, 
risk analysis is required in order to proceed any further. 
ACCESS SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
Electromechanical issues with EIS-access 
In 2009 several electromechanical problems were 
encountered with a number of Elements Important for 
Safety (EIS) devices - access point elements & doors. 
They were particularly visible during the Hardware 
Commissioning phase, when the areas are patrolled and a 
malfunctioning device may cause a patrol drop and lead 
to the costly re-patrolling of an area. The most significant 
problem was with the personnel access device where two 
issues were identified: possibility of simultaneously 
opening of both internal and external doors and faulty 
contact readings resulting in the access safety system 
seeing both doors open (and consequently dropping a 
patrol), while the access control system sees one of the 
doors closed. The first was corrected by a software patch 
applied just in time for Beam Operation, while the second 
issue has not been completely solved so far. 
Electromechanical problems were also identified with the 
restricted access key distributor modules. The impact in 
2009 was blocking the possibility of switching from the 
access mode to the beam mode after a short stop with 
interventions requiring access. 
LHC Access Safety System 
Only a few minor modifications were applied in the 
new version deployed in 2009. From the users’ 
perspective a new way of treating the connection with the 
EIS-beams of SPS injection chains by the LASS was 
considered a big improvement. No spurious triggering of 
the evacuation alarms in Points 2 and 8 was observed 
following the modification. Improved connection with the 
LHC EIS-beams in order to allow the necessary EIS 
testing flexibility is currently being studied [4]. 
Improving Access Fluidity 
The number of access requests has put a lot of pressure 
on the CCC access console operators. During the last 6 
months (1.08.2009 – 31.01.2010) more than 180’000 
accesses in the LHC took place. Out of these ~ 33’500 
were in Restricted mode, requiring operator intervention. 
This gives more than 190 restricted access transactions 
per day, with a peak on January 14th, when 670 tokens 
(restricted access keys) were given. A subjective analysis 
by one of the console operators [5] showed that an 
experienced operator may reach a performance of treating 
one call per minute (thus allowing no more than 60 
persons to enter per hour). However, on busier days the 
time required to treat one call can easily reach five 
minutes. In 2009 most of the time was spent asking the 
person requesting access the ADI number and verifying it. 
Not surprisingly, one of the improvement postulates is the 
introduction of an automatic filter using the new AET 
mechanism. This would filter out all the access requests 
originating from people whose interventions have not 
been scheduled and fully authorised.  
In addition, correction of a few persistent bugs and new 
ergonomics of the console windows to allow ease of 
treating in parallel several access requests is being 
considered. Introduction of biometry data on the token 
chip and thus eliminating dependency on the network was 
also proposed. In 2009 several network related problems 
were observed with the access control system. 
The much used Restricted mode has also been 
reviewed. One of the improvement possibilities would be 
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the introduction of a token-less (the token only protects 
from accidental beam operation) Restricted mode. 
However, since the token can also be used e.g. as a 
protection from the Powering Phase II risks, efforts shall 
rather be put into improving the rapidity of the token 
delivery. The enhancement of the Restricted mode 
procedure would allow multiple keys distribution for a 
group entering together, i.e. a separation between the 
safety token delivery and the Personnel Access Device 
(PAD) entry cycle. 
Material Access Device 
The detection of people trespassing through the 
Material Access Device (MAD) has been a major 
challenge in the recent years. Although accessing through 
this device is strictly forbidden, technical methods of 
enforcing this restriction are deemed necessary in order to 
avoid accidental and unnoticed entrance. The current 
improved, camera based micro-movement detection 
algorithm has reached a point of equilibrium between the 
desired sensitivity versus rate of false detections. This 
equilibrium is fragile as the process is prone to external 
environmental condition variations, clearly visible on the 
surface (natural light, equipment wet or covered with 
melting snow etc.). We are currently at the limit of what 
is possible with the approach taken. The imminent 
introduction of a fail-safe mechanism for the detection 
software (no usage of the MAD, should the software 
encounter internal errors) will further decrease the 
availability of the device. 
A change in the strategy might imply searching for a 
different technological solution to replace or complement 
the existing one (technological redundancy). However, 
the market does not offer off-the-shelf products suitable 
for the LHC environment. It might therefore be desirable 
to extend the approach taken by the LHC experiments and 
introduce either a remote (from the control room) 
operator video control in order to open one of the MAD 
doors or have guards on site. 
RADIATION MONITORS 
Currently two systems are in use at CERN. The 
RAMSES system for the LHC and the Arcon system for 
the LHC injectors [6].  
RAMSES has proved to be reliable; it was designed 
using the industry standards to match SIL 2 requirements. 
It is decentralised and autonomous, equipped with 
internal batteries. The detector-alarm units continue to 
operate even if the rest of the system fails. All the LHC 
areas are well covered with monitor stations. In case of a 
channel failure, radiation monitoring is ensured by the 
remaining channels. 
The Arcon is an old technology system. In case of 
failure several channels are affected and a whole area 
remains without radiation monitoring. Spare parts are a 
major issue. For the injector chain the spare parts could be 
obtained from the experimental areas. Continuing with 
Arcon causes a major operational risk, as a faulty 
equipment results in a beam stop of 1-3 days. 
The Arcon system is to be phased out and replaced by 
RAMSES. The first phase (RAMSES-light) for the LHC 
injectors is planned to take place before the end of the 
next shutdown. 
CONCLUSIONS 
No blocking problems with the personnel safety have 
been reported during the session. The availability is an 
issue both with the access system as well as with the 
radiation monitors. Arcon should be phased out of the 
injector chain. The presentations and discussions of this 
session have helped identify areas to be corrected before 
the next LHC shutdown period in order to enhance access 
fluidity, secure the MAD etc. Several topics related to the 
access system are only identified, but need further 
elaboration of long term needs and risk analysis by the 
LHC Access Working Group (sectorisation changes, 
additional interlocks).  
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SUMMARY OF THE CHAMONIX 2010 ON RADIATIONS TO ELECTRONICS* 
V. Vuillemin, F. Faccio, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
REVIEW OF CRITICAL RADIATION AREAS FOR 
LHC ELECTRONICS AND MITIGATION 
ACTIONS - RADIATION MONITORING AND 
FIRST RESULTS 
The R2E Study Group presentation included a 
summary of the 2009/2010 activities, as well as the status 
of possible mitigation options. Based on the expected 
evolution of LHC intensity and integrated luminosity, an 
update of the radiation levels in the critical LHC areas 
was given. The most critical areas were pointed out, 
emphasizing that even though radiation levels are to be 
expected low for 2009 operation, the LHC milestone of 
reaching a 1% of nominal luminosity and 15% of nominal 
intensity by the end of 2009 could imply first problems in 
the most critical areas.  
During the shutdown 2008/2009 shutdown several 
improvements for radiation monitoring and their analysis 
were already put in place by the R2E Study Group. 
Furthermore, certain shielding improvements (e.g., 
UJ23/87 and the US85 safe-room) could be implemented 
before 2009 LHC start-up. These activities were already 
reported in several LMC meetings, references were given 
and thus not further described during the presentation.  
With respect to monitoring and the radiation field in 
the LHC critical areas, several new FLUKA calculations 
were performed. This allows not only for an almost 
complete summary, but also provides a first analysis for 
the risk of low-energy neutrons. It was shown that for 
certain critical areas it is expected to have up to 100-200 
times more low-energy neutron fluence as compared to 
the respective high-energy contribution. With possible 
failure cross-section ranging from two to three orders 
below up to, and even exceeding the high-energy one, 
makes it clear that the risk of low-energy neutrons must 
not be neglected. Early LHC and CNGS measurements 
shall further focus on this subject in order to provide a 
better knowledge during 2010.  
The R2E Study Group could further prove the good 
agreement between FLUKA simulations and observed 
radiation levels (examples were given for RA/UA63/67 
and UJ88/87). What concerns the radiation sensitivity 
however, the knowledge of expected equipment failure 
cross sections remains limited. 2009 CNGS tests focusing 
on LHC tunnel electronics (highest risk of failures), the 
equipment installed in critical areas mainly consists of 
components of the shelf (COTS), thus does not allow for 
a coherent characterisation. The multitude of different 
equipment and components make it impossible to give 
reliable estimates for failure cross-sections of all 
components, or respective failure rates to be expected for 
certain radiation levels. Early LHC measurements and a 
2010 CNGS measurement campaign are suggested in 
order to provide possible lower or upper failure 
thresholds, but it must be kept in mind that these can give 
general indications only. It was further emphasized that 
only regular monitoring and immediate analysis can allow 
optimizing envisaged mitigation solutions. 
R2E mitigation options range from shielding 
improvements, relocation possibilities, radiation tolerant 
design to civil engineering requirements, as well as the 
study of alternative approaches like changes to the 
collimation system to super-conducting links. Whereas 
certain medium-term improvements can be implemented 
in a direct way (limited cost and time requirements), it 
was pointed out that for most long-term solutions for 
critical areas only an intensive consolidation program can 
lead to sustainable results. In a first detailed analysis, the 
R2E Study Group compared the various options for each 
critical area and performed a detailed analysis of their 
respective requirements, limitations and improvements.  
It was shown while shielding can improve the 
situation in many areas, with increasing 
luminosity/intensity radiation levels would still exceed 
expected ‘safe’ thresholds for most of the areas. In 
addition, relocation being a possibility for many areas, 
requiring an important amount of preparation and 
implementation time, it still leaves certain equipment 
almost impossible to relocate (e.g., power-converters), as 
well as faces severe space limitation in certain areas (e.g., 
P1). For the latter, only re-design, possible super-
conducting links or severe civil-engineering can then lead 
to a long-term solution. Further alternative solutions were 
analyzed for the collimation areas, where phase-II 
collimation or a temporary move of the betatron 
collimation to IR3 was studied. In this respect, it was 
pointed out that most of the long-term solutions require a 
combination of mitigation actions in order to minimize 
the risk of radiation induced electronics failures.  
Many of these solutions implying not only high 
costs, but also important lead and installation times, thus 
require possibly long shutdown periods. During the 
discussion it was pointed out that further details are 
required for essential mitigation decisions to be drawn. A 
follow-up workshop was proposed for April/May 2010 
where all concerned stakeholders are requested to provide 
the required details and conclusion of their analysis. To 
give a detailed overview of the R2E project and further 
clarify these requirements, an extended R2E seminar will 
be organised, followed by detailed iterations through the 
R2E Study Group. The result of this workshop shall then 
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lead to a planning proposal on how to mitigation LHC 
radiation induced electronic failures in the long-term.  
To reach the above, it was strongly emphasized, that 
an increased effort must be made available as soon as 
possible and with respect to all R2E requirements 
(monitoring, testing, equipment inventory and relocation 
constraints, integration studies, study of mitigation 
options, planning requirements, etc…). Mitigation 
solutions can not be optimized nor fully compared to each 
other if related resources are not sufficiently freed during 
the coming months. This requires that respective activities 
reach a high priority for all concerned departments, 
groups and sections. 
 
REVIEW OF EXPOSED EQUIPMENT IN THE 
LHC: A GLOBAL VIEW 
An overview of equipment exposed to radiation in 
critical LHC areas has been presented and the most 
critical systems are high-lighted with respect to system 
criticality and operational impact in case of failure, as 
well as to the expected estimated radiation sensitivity in 
the different LHC points (see Tables in related Paper). 
Systems have been tested in terms of:  
• Single Events Soft Errors (recoverable) 
• Single Event Upset (SEU) 
• Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) 
• Single Event Transient (SET) 
• Single Event functional Interrupt (SEFI) 
• Hard Errors (non recoverable) 
• Single Event Latch-up (SEL) 
• Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) 
• Single Event Burn-out (SEB) 
• Total Dose 
• Displacement damage 
Tests have been realized at the CNGS facility where 
the quantities such as Dose (SiO2), Hadron>20 MeV 
fluence and 1 MeV neutron equivalent fluence have been 
measured. A one week irradiation correspond to 1.0 e18 
protons on target, and the hottest area in the TSG45 zone 
to 3 years of LHC operation (10Gy/year) in the arcs. Most 
of the equipments installed in LHC tunnel have been 
tested in CNGS, although the equipment in critical areas 
need more dedicated tests. Other test facilities have also 
been used such as PSI [p, 60/250 MeV], CEA [n], UCL 
[Heavy Ions], NRI [Thermal n], IRA [Co60]. 
System criticality is analysed in terms of failure 
consequences, while for equipment sensitivity, 
assumptions have to be made since a large fraction of 
LHC electronics is based on industrial equipment for 
which no reliable data for radiation tolerance exists. The 
equipment inventory is done by Priority [full list available 
in talk]: 
• Priority 1: Personnel and Machine safety  
• Priority 2: Long downtime  
• Priority 3: Beam quality degradation  
• Priority 4:Monitoring or no immediate impact on 
the machine  
In most cases relocation, shielding, plus partial 
redesign along with HW/FW modifications. In summary: 
• Cryogenics: ok, with soft reset and shielding 
• BIC/PIC: ok, shielding and relocation 
• BLM:  ok 
• BPM:  ok with mitigation 
• QPS:  not ok, but with reset of WorldFIP 
• CL heaters: not critical, shielding will help 
• Survey: ok 
• WorldFIP: development of NanoFIP 
• Power Converters:some critical  
 
LHC POWER CONVERTERS – THE PROPOSED 
APPROACH 
TE-EPC is confident that LHC60A-08V Power 
Converter including its digital controller FGC, both 
originally designed to be rad tolerant, will work 
adequately for LHC operation purposes. Less than 1 
recoverable failure every 3-5 days is expected, when 
several converters could be lost without losing the beam. 
Tests under radiation done on digital controller FGC 
indicated that it could also be compatible with other 
standard converters installed in critical area like RR point 
1, 5, 7, or UJ point 1 and 5. One destructive latch up was 
encountered only when testing the FGC, considered then 
as an isolated case. 
 LHC600A-40V Power Converters being located in 
UJ76 will be safe thanks to the relocation on-going in 
TZ76. 
 Situation on other standard Power Converters is 
especially unclear and uncertain since Power Part has 
never been tested under radiations on LHC120A-10V, 
LHC600A-10V or LHC4..8kA-08V. 
- If LHC120A-10V Power Converter is CERN 
internal design and then can be modified for being 
more rad-tolerant, other converters are complex 
external designs. 
- Some synergy with Inner Triple Upgrade could be 
found for the 600A-10V Power Converter in case a 
redesign is the solution chosen for these Power 
Converters. 
- Case of LHC4..8kA-08V is the most critical, since 
a redesign is not really feasible. 
 TE-EPC with help of R2E will organize a Radiation 
Power Converter Day to better evaluate the current 
situation: 
- Analyzing the components being used in the actual 
design and trying to quantify the risks 
- Checking what to redesign and evaluating partial 
redesign if possible to limit the redesign work 
- Trying to evaluate cost an manpower needs of 
proposed solution 
- Giving the limits of re-location taking in account 
the Power Converter constraints (In case of 
relocation, cable losses have to be taken in account 
to be still compatible with current design) 
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IS THE WORLDFIP A RELIABLE RAD-HARD 
FIELDBUS ON LONG TERM? 
The WorldFIP fieldbus was chosen to cover 
communication needs of critical LHC systems needing 
determinism and radiation tolerance. It is heavily used in 
LHC with over 450 km of cables, more than 12’000 
nodes, and in many critical LHC subsystems such as 
cryogenics, QPS, Power Converters, beam 
instrumentation, radio-frequency and Radmon.  
WorldFIP slaves use the MicroFIP chip produced by 
Alstom along with the FielDrive transceiver and 
associated magnetics. After Alstom announced a 
progressive decline in support of WorldFIP technology, 
BE-CO decided to start a technology in-sourcing program 
in order to guarantee local support of this strategic 
technology during the lifetime of LHC. The first phase of 
this program consists in designing an FPGA-based 
alternative to MicroFIP, called NanoFIP. In addition, the 
last generation of MicroFIP chips was manufactured 
using a newer process with reduced feature sizes and 
there are serious concerns about its radiation tolerance.  
The NanoFIP development is therefore now 
considered a critical part in the global strategy of 
providing a radiation-tolerant solution to WorldFIP users. 
A brief overview of the architecture of WorldFIP as 
presently deployed in the LHC is given in the related 
paper. Part of the project is to identify the critical devices 
in terms of radiation tolerance, and show how NanoFIP 
will provide a solution in the close future. The NanoFIP 
project is intended for the time being to be ready in 
2011.Long-term plans for the overall WorldFIP 
technology insourcing in BE-CO could also consider as a 
backup an ASIC version (MicroFIP3) in collaboration 
with the electronic group of the PH Department. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE 2009 IRRADIATION TESTS 
AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE TESTS AND 
FACILITIES 
Most of the electronics systems located in the LHC 
tunnel and only few systems from the LHC alcoves were 
tested in the CNGS TSG4 area and in various external 
facilities in 2009. 
The overview of the results from the CNGS 
campaign was presented and put in contrast to the 
expected radiation levels in the exposed areas. By 
applying a best guess scaling of the expected 
development of the respective LHC radiation levels, 
failure rates were estimated for both the initial operation 
in 2010 (assuming 0.5fb-1, 200days of operation and 
1/40th of nominal losses in the LHC tunnel) and for the 
nominal operation. 
The errors resulting from cumulative effects were 
translated into the device lifetime estimations. The 
statistics of the single event errors was translated into the 
corresponding failure rates taking into account the total 
number of devices in the critical areas. 
Mitigation actions were identified for the systems 
with too low lifetime or high failure rate. Many systems 
will profit from the radiation level reduction thanks to the 
foreseen shielding to extend their lifetime beyond 20 
years. Several groups implemented firmware or hardware 
modifications mostly allowing for automatic resets. 
Many systems suffer from the WorldFIP client card 
errors, which aggravated by at least two orders for the 
new batch used in the nQPS layer. The mitigation of the 
SEE induced crashes of the FGC in the power converters 
should be further studied. 
The tests in CNGS TSG4 will continue in 2010 and 
will include mostly the potentially very sensitive systems 
from the LHC alcoves. At the same time many test 
facilities are available outside CERN for component or 
system tests. If necessary, n_TOF and HiRadMat could 
provide dedicated electronics test areas, however the 
respective need would have to be brought forward in the 
RadWG. 
 
EXPERIENCE WITH THE ATLAS RADIATION 
TOLERANCE POLICY 
ATLAS developed a policy on radiation tolerant 
electronics, outlined in the document ATC-TE-QA-0001, 
with the following goals: 
• Reliability of the experiment with respect to 
radiation. The estimated lifetime of components 
must cover foreseen lifetime of LHC experiments, 
or at least a large fraction of it 
• Mandatory for each sub-system of the experiment 
• Coherent approach with the same rules for every 
sub-systems  
• Based on recognized test methods 
Including a design/procurement strategy: 
• Whenever possible limit electronics in radiation 
environment  
• Radiation tolerant COTS: determine the Radiation 
Tolerance Criteria (using safety factors when 
needed), pre-select generic components (radiation 
tests), purchase batches of pre-selected generic 
components, qualify batches of components 
(radiation tests) 
Necessary steps to enforce such policy have been defined: 
• One dedicated person to the subject, defining a 
reference point for the designers  
• The support of the ATLAS management was 
mandatory 
• Radiation hardness important part of the reviews 
• A lot was done to make people aware of the 
problems with tutorial sessions  
• Tools to make sure that the RTC were properly 
computed 
• Organization of common irradiation campaigns 
(also with RD49) 
The policy was discussed and approved by the 
ATLAS Executive Board. The person in charge of it 
participated in all the design reviews, bothering people to 
make sure that tests were properly done. He also followed 
the work outside the reviews 
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SESSION 7 – FUTURE UP
P. Collier and V
Abstract 
The programme of session 7 was d
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LP-SPL/PS2 
One aim of the LP-SPL and PS2 is to double the 
beam brightness (with margin) that could be 
delivered to the SPS and hence the LHC.  This 
increased brightness could either be in the form 
of a higher intensity, or a reduced transverse 
emittance.    At the same time it is argued that 
the replacement of the ageing PSB and PS 
would increase the reliability of the complex.  
Finally the method used to generate the 25ns 
beam for LHC could be significantly simplified 
by direct production using a chopper, rather 
than production via bunch splitting in the PS, as 
at present.  
The LP-SPL study is for a superconducting 
linac, approximately 430m long with an exit 
energy of 4GeV. The beam would then be 
transported via a transfer line parallel to the 
present TT10 to the entrance of the PS2.  
The PS2 machine has a circumference of 1346m 
(approximately twice that of the present PS) and 
would be built at the same level as the SPS, i.e. 
approximately 50m underground.  A new 
connection to the SPS with an upgraded 
injection region would be needed to take the 
50GeV beam from PS2 and inject it into the 
SPS.  
Cost and Timeline 
 The overall cost of the LP-SPL/PS2 upgrade 
has been estimated to be around 900MCHF and 
require approximately 1500MY in manpower.  
In addition an upgrade of the SPS would be 
needed in order to benefit from the increased 
brightness of the beams.  A rough estimate of 
65MCHF for material cost was given for this. 
An advantage of the LP-SPL/PS2 upgrade 
would be that the construction and 
commissioning could be achieved 
independently of the operation of the existing 
machines.  Two significant shutdowns would 
still be required; one to connect SPL to Linac4 
and the other for the connection of PS2 to the 
SPS.  
It should be noted that this upgrade would be 
problematic for ions.  This has been studied; the 
solution would be to upgrade the energy of the 
present LEIR machine and make a direct 
transfer into PS2 via the present TT10 line.  
Special, large tuning range cavities would then 
be needed in the PS2 to capture and accelerate 
ions as well as the protons.   
The timeline for the LP-SPL and PS2 projects 
has been estimated.  Given an approval in mid-
2012 the connection to the SPS and start of 
operation of the complex could be envisaged in 
2020.   This aggressive schedule is based on a 
significant investment before the approval for 
preparatory work on an impact study and civil 
engineering drawings.  If this preparatory work 
is not done in advance, the start date could slip 
to 2022. 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE EXISTING 
INJECTOR COMPLEX 
Even if LP-SPL and PS2are built, the existing 
machines will have continue to to run for 
around 15 years.  This would allow an overlap 
in case of slippage in the construction schedule 
of the new machines.  On the other hand, if PS2 
and LP-SPL were not built, these same 
machines would have to run for 25+ years, the 
presumed lifetime of the LHC.  In consolidation 
terms there is little  difference between these 
timescales;  both indicate a long term 
commitment to consolidation.  Additional 
resources must therefore be set aside to allow 
this to happen. 
A consolidation programme already exists for 
the injectors covering the mid-term;  this must 
be supplemented by the longer-term 
consolidation issues raised during the session.  
A preliminary look at the consolidation needs 
over the next 20 years indicates an approximate 
cost of 15MCHF/year, although this covers 
much more than the LHC injector chain itself.  
The next step in this process is to incorporate all 
long-term requests into the present 
consolidation plan.  Here, a clear separation 
between the injector chain and the experimental 
facilities of the injector complex must be 
established and a risk analysis be made to set 
priorities correctly.  
LIFTING THE LIMITATIONS IN THE 
PRESENT INJECTOR CHAIN 
The present state of studies shows that the SPS 
is the limiting machine in the injector chain;  yet 
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it is the only machine that would remain if the 
LP-SPL and PS2 are built.  The present 
limitation on the intensity in the SPS is around 
1.2x10+11 protons per bunch (ppb), far below the 
‘ultimate’ intensity that could be required by the 
LHC before a major upgrade of that machine.  
On the other hand the PS and the PSB have 
achieved the necessary 1.7x10+11 ppb.  A 
significant upgrade of the SPS is therefore 
required under either hypothesis.  
SPS Upgrades 
At present there are three areas in the SPS that 
limit the intensity significantly.   For each case 
the SPS upgrade studies working group has 
identified possible mitigating measures and 
upgrades [2].  These three areas are: 
• Electron cloud instabilities.  This is a 
multi-bunch effect due to the build-up of 
secondary electrons in the vacuum chamber.  
It is strongly related to the bunch spacing 
and the intensity per bunch.  Feedbacks 
could be used to limit the impact on the 
beam, but the optimum solution would be to 
avoid the electron cloud build-up by coating 
the vacuum chamber of the whole machine.  
Investigations so far have indicated that an 
amorphous carbon coating of the chambers 
appears to be best suitable.  
• Transverse mode-coupling instabilities.  
This is mainly a single-bunch intensity 
effect and is driven by impedances in the 
machine.  During the preparation of the SPS 
as LHC injector a campaign of impedance 
reduction was launched – principally the 
shielding of the vacuum pumping ports to 
combat longitudinal microwave instabilities.  
Since then additional impedance sources 
have been added to the machine, notably 
additional kickers for the extraction to the 
LHC.  As well as perturbing the beam these 
impedances can heat the kicker cores and 
lead to outgassing. Since their initial 
installation one kicker has been removed 
and 3 have been fitted with impedance 
reducing stripes; 5 kickers remain to be 
treated. 
• The 200MHz RF power limitations. It has 
been seen that with the present arrangement 
of the RF cavities the amount of power 
available for the beam will eventually limit 
the intensity. A better arrangement of the 
travelling wave cavities (TWC) into a larger 
number of shorter structures would allow 
this power limitation to be lifted.  It is a 
peculiarity of the TWC system that more, 
shorter structures would also lead to a 
reduction in the impedance.  
 
Tackling these three areas should allow the 
LHC bunch intensity to reach, or even exceed 
the ‘ultimate’ value of 1.7x10+11.  This will be 
necessary before the fundamental limits of the 
SPS machine can be explored.   
One fundamental limitation in a circular 
machine is the space-charge tune shift at 
injection.  The exact value is different for each 
machine but it should normally be a least -0.2 
(for PS Booster and PS it is -0.3).   If the space-
charge tune-shift limit is reached, the only 
solution would be to increase the injection 
energy of the machine.  For the SPS, this was 
part of the argument for the LP-SPL/PS2 
upgrade.  However, with the ‘ultimate’ intensity 
LHC bunches in the SPS the value of the tune-
shift is -0.07.  Experiments with lower energy 
single bunches in the SPS have demonstrated 
that a space-charge tune shift of -0.2 is possible.  
PS Booster Energy Upgrade 
Linac4 will raise the intensity limit in the PS 
Booster by approximately a factor 2.  This is 
achieved by increasing the booster injection 
energy from 50MeV to 160MeV, giving a factor 
2 increase in βγ2. 
A similar limitation exists in the PS machine at 
injection.  Presently the injection energy of the 
PS is 1.4GeV.  This was chosen during the 
preparation of the PS complex for LHC as the 
energy that would allow the production of the 
‘ultimate’ beam. Raising the injection energy of 
the PS (by increasing the extraction energy of 
the PS Booster) would allow this limit to be 
increased further.  
The PS Booster was originally designed as an 
800MeV machine.  It was later upgraded to 
1GeV, then a second upgrade to 1.4GeV was 
made in preparation for the LHC.  A 
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preliminary study shows that there is further 
room for increase and extraction at 2GeV 
appears feasible.   This would increase the 
intensity limit in the PS to >2.7x10+11 ppb in a 
25ns LHC beam.  
Clearly, other limitations and instabilities may 
arise in the PS once the intensity is increased; 
these can be studied and solutions proposed 
once the very high intensity beam is available. 
Other Partial Upgrades of the Injector Complex 
Instead of increasing the energy of the PS 
Booster other solutions could be found by 
replacing completely this machine.  A variety of 
machines could be envisaged to provide the 
bridge between Linac4 and the PS.  A short 
study has been done to look at these 
possibilities.  Parameters for an RCS, an FFAG, 
or a super-booster were investigated.  In each 
case an extension to Linac4 would be required 
to reach 500-1000MeV for injection.  An 
extraction energy of around 2.5GeV would 
provide the possibility of generating beams 
having a brightness equivalent to that proposed 
for LP-SPL/PS2.   Some of the options look 
interesting, but the cost of construction would 
be relatively high compared with the cost of 
upgrading the present PS Booster (although 
considerably cheaper than LP-SPL/PS2).  In 
addition the performance gain would not be 
very high and it is presently not clear that it 
would be needed for the LHC.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The present injector complex will have to be 
capable of providing high intensity, high quality 
beams reliably to the LHC for many years.  A 
consolidation plan to allow this, combined with 
upgrades to relieve the bottlenecks in the 
present injector chain, will be needed.    
At present the lowest known limits on the LHC 
beam are in the SPS.  Several upgrades have 
been proposed to lift these limits.  A technical 
study must be launched with the aim of making 
proposals for actual upgrade projects in the near 
future.  At the same time the main limitation in 
the pre-injector complex could be removed if an 
upgrade of the energy of the PS Booster to 
2GeV can be achieved.  A separate study on this 
possibility should also be launched.   These two 
upgrades of the present complex should be 
achievable over the next 5-6 years.  At this point 
the injectors should be capable of delivering 
intensities to LHC in excess of 1.7x10+11 ppb; 
how much in excess will depend on what is 
discovered once the present limitations in the 
SPS are removed.  
The alternative upgrade scenario – to replace the 
present PS Booster and PS with new machines 
is rather expensive. The resources required for 
this construction would be in direct competition 
with those needed for the consolidation and 
upgrade of the present complex, which needs to 
be carried out anyway.  The beam brightness 
that would be possible with such an upgrade 
seems to be far in excess of what the LHC will 
actually ever require (see session 9), provided 
the SPS will be able to deliver it to the LHC.  If 
the maximum 25ns bunch intensity in the LHC 
is limited to around 2.3x10+11 ppb, then the 
present injector chain should be capable of 
delivering it after some upgrades.  
The beam parameters associated with the 
upgrade of the LHC towards sLHC need to be 
determined; this should drive the choices made 
for the injector chain.    
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SUMMARY OF SESSION 8 
O. Brüning, P. Fessia, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
Session 8 of the 2010 LHC performance 
workshop in Chamonix addresses all planned 
activities for the first upgrade intervention 
which is currently planned for the 2014-2015 
shutdown. The goal of this first upgrade 
campaign for the LHC is to consolidate the 
nominal performance of the LHC and to open 
the door for routine operation with ultimate 
beam parameters and a peak luminosity above 
2 1034 cm-2 sec-1. The interventions foreseen in 
this first upgrade phase include: the connection 
of LINAC4 to the PSB and the related upgrade 
of the injection region in the PSB, upgrade of 
the LHC collimation region with Phase2 Cu 
collimators and additional absorbers in the 
dispersion suppressors of the main cleaning 
insertions, the installation of new triplet and D1 
magnets (including the DFBX electrical feedbox 
for the triplet magnets), the installation of 200 
MHz capture cavities and additional transverse 
damper kickers.  
SESSION ORGANIZATION 
Session 8 featured 7 presentations: 
• Overview of the IR upgrade plan and 
summary of the scope and goals for this 
first upgrade intervention for the LHC by 
Ranko Ostojic. 
• Summary of the upgrade plans for the 
LHC injector complex (e.g. LINAC4 and 
its connection to the PSB) by Maurizio 
Vretenar. 
• Summary of the optics challenges for the 
IR upgrade in the LHC by Stephane 
Fartoukh. 
• Summary of the Hardware challenges and 
limitations for the LHC IR upgrade by 
Stephan Russenschuck. 
• Planned upgrade activities for in IR4 by 
Edmund Ciapala. 
• Summary of the collimation upgrade plans 
by Ralph Assmann. 
• Integration issues in the tunnel and impact 
on general LHC systems by Sylvain 
Weisz. 
OVERVIEW OF THE IR UPGRADE 
SCOPE AND CHALLANGES 
Ranko Ostojic describes the Phase 1 IR 
upgrade within the general goal of the long term 
upgrade plans for the LHC as laid out by the 
sLHC project and aiming at a steady increase of 
the LHC performance over its operation period. 
In this context it is worthwhile highlighting that 
the first proposals for an LHC IR upgrade were 
articulated as early as 1999 and that first 
proposals for large aperture NbTi triplet 
magnets were made in 2005 when it was 
assumed that the LHC might reach a 
performance level corresponding to the end of 
the lifetime of the existing nominal triplet 
magnets (ca. 300 fb-1 to 500fb-1) by 2015. 
Within this context the Phase 1 IR upgrade 
goals are to: 
• Provide more flexibility for focusing of 
the LHC beams in the ATLAS and CMS 
insertions,  
• Enable reliable operation of the LHC at 
2 1034 cm-2s-1. 
These goals are meant to be achieved while 
leaving unchanged the interfaces between the 
ATLAS and CMS experiments with the machine 
and the existing cryogenic capacity and 
infrastructure in IR1 and IR5. The upgrade 
interventions focus on a replacement of the 
triplets quadrupole with large aperture NbTi 
magnets and includes upgrades of the D1 
magnets (the existing warm magnets will be 
replaced by more compact superconducting 
dipole magnets), their electrical feed boxes 
(DFBX) and the insertion absorber and 
protection devices TAS and TAN.  The upgrade 
of the Phase 1 optics design aims at an increased 
flexibility for the machine operation and 
protection while leaving the matching sections 
(MS) of the IR1 and IR5 insertions unchanged. 
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The Phase 1 IR upgrade project started in 
January 2008 and delivered a Conceptual 
Design Report (CDR) by end 2008. A Technical 
Design Report (TDR) and first magnet 
prototypes are foreseen for end 2010 leading to 
a pre-series production of the triplet magnets by 
mid 2011 and the followed by the series 
production of the triplet magnets from 2011 to 
2014. The triplet magnets will be tested in 2014 
in dedicated test string prior to assure readiness 
for installation by the end of 2014. The 
ambitious planning schedule is made possible 
by the use of the existing spare LHC dipole 
cables for the triplet magnet production. All 
components of the Phase 1 IR upgrade are 
designed for a lifetime corresponding to an 
integrated luminosity of 1000 fb-1. First 
integration studies for the new triplet 
installations indicate that the available space 
underground is extremely limited, imposing 
tight constraints for the powering of insertion 
magnets. Additional underground caverns could 
considerably ease the equipment installation and 
maintenance.  
Ranko Ostojic highlights that the Phase 1 IR 
upgrade project is tightly integrated in 
international collaborations including the sLHC 
PP within the European FP7 framework 
featuring CEA, CERN, CIEMAT, CNRS, STFC 
as the key collaborators, special French 
contributions to the CERN White Paper 
initiatives for 2008 to 2011 via CEA and CNRS, 
and the American APUL construction and 
USLARP R&D frameworks. 
 
Questions at the end of the presentation: 
• Laurent Tavian remarks that sector 4-5 is the 
most cryogenically loaded of the LHC 
cryogenic sectors, but there are 3 good new 
about the cryogenic requirements in sector 
34: 
o The static heat loads are lower than 
expected 
o The whole package of electrical 
splices dissipates energy as foreseen 
or even less.  
o The estimation of heat load due to 
electron cloud effects have been 
reduced. 
• Lucio. Rossi asks: Do you plan to move the 
matching section elements during the Phase 
1 IR upgrade? Ranko Ostojic replies that it 
could be done but it is not planned and not 
integrated in the cost and manpower needs. 
• Ezio Todesco remarks the proposed tight 
planning limits the possibilities for feedback 
for the magnet production from the 
prototype development. 
• It was remarked that the proposed upgrades 
only affect the proton physics program 
without a clear view on the ion physics 
program. 
• Steve Myers comments one year has been 
lost for the Sector 3-4 repair and the people 
required for the triplet magnet production 
are the same that will be involved in the 
splice consolidation. 
• Oliver Brüning remarks that if we are 
limited to a smaller than nominal luminosity 
during the coming years, then the life of the 
present triplet could extend till 2020. 
LINAC4 
Maurizio Vretenar explains that the LINAC 4 
project is composed of 3 main parts: 
1. Construction and commissioning of the 
new linac (up to the LINAC4 dump). 
2. Construction of the transfer line with 
connection to the existing LINAC2 
transfer line and upgrade of the 
measurements lines (up to PSB wall and 
LBE dump). 
3. Modification of the PSB injection region 
for H- injection at 160 MeV and the 
commissioning of the new installations. 
The PSB modifications imply an 8-month 
stop of proton operation for the LHC. 
However, during part of this intervention 
time the LHC can still be operated with Pb 
ion beams. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main performance 
differences in the PS complex between the old 
LINAC2 and the new LINAC4 injector. In 
addition to the performance gain, LINAC4 will 
remove the problems related to the maintenance 
and repair of the aging equipment of the 
LINAC2 installation.  
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The current planning foresees readiness for 
the LINAC4 connection to the PSB by end 
2013. However, the planning for the LIANC4 
project provides some flexibility for the final 
connection of the linac to the PSB. The initial 
commissioning of LINAC4 is done stand-alone 
without connection to the PSB and the final 
connection to the PSB could be delayed until 
the 2014-15 shut down while the LINAC4 
commissioning continues off line from the 
nominal LHC operation.  
 
Questions at the end of the presentation: 
• It was remarked that LINAC4 will require 
improvement of the diagnostic in PS and in 
particular in the bunch measurements near 
the RF system. 
• Davide Tomassini comments that to fully 
profit of the LINAC4 installation, other 
upgrades are necessary in the LHC injector 
chain.  
• Lucio Rossi asks what will happen if the 
LINAC4 budget will be cut? He comments 
that should the budget be cut, the year 
gained and reserved for commissioning will 
be required for real assembly work. 
• Gianluigi Arduini recommends that the 
actual limits in the SPS should be studied in 
more detail. 
HARDWARE CHALLENGES AND 
LIMITATIONS FOR THE IR UPGRADES 
Stephan Russenschuck highlights that even 
though the triplet magnet design is already far 
advanced and even though the use of the 
existing LHC dipole cables can speed up the 
final magnet production, there are still a large 
number of issues that need to be addressed and 
resolved before the final magnet production can 
be launched. Stephan Russenschuck underlines 
that past experience has shown that 5 years are 
normally needed from the end of the magnet 
design to production. With several components 
of the Phase 1 upgrade still requiring significant 
design efforts (e.g. nested dipole corrector 
magnets and horizontal collaring of long 
quadrupole magnets) the current schedule with a 
planned production of the triplet magnets by 
2014 seems therefore to be very ambitious. 
However, if the component and tooling 
procurement starts at the beginning of 2010 a 
readiness for installation during the 2014-15 
shutdown still seems possible. 
 
Questions at the end of the presentation: 
• Vladimir Shiltzev asks if one can give an 
evaluation for present delays? 
OPTICS CHALLENGES & SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE LHC INSERTIONS UPGRADE 
PHASE I  
Stephane Fartoukh that the Phase 1 IR 
upgrade implies a global new optics design for 
the LHC that goes well beyond the design of the 
insertion region optics. A lower gradient and 
longer than nominal triplet design requires not 
only larger triplet magnet apertures as compared 
to the existing triplet magnets, but also implies 
larger chromatic aberrations inside the triplets 
due to the increased peak beta-functions inside 
the triplet magnets and a larger than nominal 
number of long-range beam-beam effects over 
the common part of the beam pipes. The 
increased number of long-range beam-beam 
interactions implies a larger crossing angle as 
for the nominal LHC IR design and the 
maximum acceptable peak beta-function inside 
the triplet magnets is not only limited by the 
available aperture of the triplet and matching 
section magnets but also by the chromatic 
aberrations induced by the triplet magnets and 
the available strength of the arc sextupoles to 
correct them (2 arcs of lattice sextupoles are 
needed for correcting the chromatic aberration 
of one single triplet at beta* = 30 cm). A range 
of optics solutions is available for the Phase 1 
IR upgrade, ranging from beta* values between 
0.3 meters and 0.4 meters and full crossing 
angles between 410 microradian and 560 
microradian. The optics solution with beta* = 
0.3m provides on paper a slightly larger peak 
luminosity than the beta* = 0.4 solution but 
does not leave any operational margins and 
flexibility for the optics and sextupole 
correction circuits. The solution with beta* = 
0.4m yields a slightly smaller peak performance 
but still leaves some operational tolerances. In 
any case, due to the required large crossing 
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angle, the luminosity gain due to a smaller beta* 
value is to a large part lost again by the 
geometric luminosity reduction factor and 
partially and both solutions provide peak 
luminosity values of the order of 2 - 3 1034 cm-2 
sec-1 with ultimate beam intensities. In order to 
assure a maximum overall operational flexibility 
it would clearly be beneficial to take a more 
general upgrade approach that includes a 
revision of the remaining matching section 
magnets, the dispersion suppressor design and 
the arc correction circuits.   
 
Questions at the end of the presentation: 
• Steve Myers asks what we really gain with 
this upgrade? Stephane Fartoukh replies: 
dynamic aperture, 3 sigma in long range 
beam-beam separation and one can reach a 
luminosity level of 2 1034 cm-2 sec-1 which is 
not possible with the nominal triplet. 
• Lucio Rossi asks, when the present triplet 
will become the machine bottleneck? 
Stephane Fartoukh replies when β* will get 
smaller than 1 m. 
•  Ezio Todesco asks: you mentioned the 
bottleneck on the dynamic aperture. What 
margin do we have? Stephane Fartoukh 
replies the used field error estimates are 
based on scaling from the present LHC 
triplet magnets. 
• Jean Philippe Tock comments that the 
requirement to shift the position between the 
D1 and QDXS will make the service module 
much more complicated. 
PLANNED UPGRADE ACTIVITIES IN IR4 
FOR THE 2014/15 SHUTDOWN 
Ed Ciapala summarises the potentially required 
interventions in IR4 during a long shutdown in 
2014-2015: 
• Installation of 200 MHz normal conducting 
capture cavities (ACN).  
• Installation of additional transverse dampers 
(ADT). 
• New cryo power plant in point 4 to establish 
RF cryogenic autonomy from sector 4-5 and 
make equal cryogenic capacity between 
sector 3-4 and 4-5. The upgrade would 
provide a significant benefit for operation. 
• Other upgrade options include the 
installation of Crab cavities & higher 
harmonic RF system. 
Ed Ciapala underlines that it is not clear yet if 
the ACN cavities are really required.  An 
upgrade of the 200 MHz RF system in the SPS 
might be better solution. It is also not yet clear if 
the additional transverse dampers are actually 
required for the LHC operation. A final decision 
on these upgrade options requires more 
operational experience with beam in the LHC 
and can probably not be given before the 
beginning of 2012. For the moment the space 
required for these installations remains reserved 
in the IR4 layout with a planning for installation 
during a longer shutdown in 2014-2015, parallel 
to the LINAC4 connection to the PSB. 
However, if the operational experience in the 
LHC shows that the CAN and ADT installations 
are not required for the LHC operation, this 
reserved space could be used for the installation 
of a global crab cavity implementation or a 
higher harmonic RF system. 
 
Questions at the end of the presentation: 
• Steve Myers comments that the important 
upgrades are the cryogenic plant at point 4 
and the SPS 200 MHz cavities. 
SUMMARY OF THE COLLIMATION 
UPGRADE PLANS 
Ralph Assmann underlines that impedance 
issues with the Carbon reinforced Graphite 
collimator jaws and the cleaning inefficiency to 
off-momentum particle losses in the dispersion 
suppressors of the cleaning insertions are very 
likely performance limitations for the current 
LHC installation. Ralph Assmann illustrates 
that, based on the operational experience from 
existing and past collider projects; one can 
project a performance limitation between 10% 
and 40% of the nominal LHC beam intensities. 
Exploiting the full LHC performance potential 
therefore requires two upgrade modifications of 
the LHC cleaning insertions: the installation of 
low-impedance secondary collimator jaws and 
the installation of dedicated collimator jaws 
inside the dispersion suppressors (so called 
‘cryo-collimators’) for the capture of off-
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momentum particles that are produced by the 
proton impact on the collimator jaws in cleaning 
insertions. The first upgrade requirement is 
facilitated by already prepared plug-in modules 
for additional secondary collimators and 
benefits from an advanced design of rotatable 
Cu collimators within the USLARP 
collaboration.  Two prototypes of this rotatable 
collimator design are due to arrive at CERN in 
2010 and will be tested in the SPS during the 
2010 – 2011 operation. The installation of 
‘cryo-collimators’ inside the dispersion 
suppressors of the cleaning insertions still 
requires a significant amount of design work. 
However, Ralph Assmann is confident that 
solutions can be ready for installation during a 
long shutdown in 2012.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of the performance reach with the old LINAC2 and the new LINAC4 injectors 
 
 
Questions at the end of the presentation: 
• Would the optics change due to the 
modification of the DS in case of the 
installation of the cryo collimators? 
Ralph Aassmann replies: No, because 
only one quadrupole magnet will be 
moved.  
• How can one manage the impedance of 
the machine? If one needs to reduce it by 
a factor 4 then the main points would be: 
o With the collimation upgrade, the 
impedance is improved but not 
by a large enough factor. 
o the transverse dumper system 
could be utilised. 
o the margins provided by the 
larger triplet aperture could be 
used for the Phase I upgrade 








Original proposal, 1997 
Nominal 
Original proposal, 1997 
Ultimate   
PSB out  
( ε *≤ 2.5 μm) 
ppr   1.62 x1012 (1bunch/ring)  
↓
 






(6 bunches, h=7) 
1.05 x1012 (1bunch/ring) 
↓
 
(8 bunches, h=8) 
1.8   x10 12   (1bunch/ring)  
↓
 
(8 bunches, h=8)  
PS out, per pulse ppp  9.72 x1012 10.8 x1012 8.4 x1012 14.4 x1012 
PS out, per bunch  
(ε * ≤ 3 μ m)  
ppb  1.35 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓
 
15% loss  








1.7 x1011 (84 bunches)  
↓ 
 
no loss  
SPS out   ppb  1.15 x1011 1.27 x1011 1.0 x1011 1.7 x1011   
 
LHC INJECTORS 
WITH LINAC4  
 Nominal LHC  





Single batch + PS h=14,  
 12 bunches scheme 
 
PSB out 
(ε *≤ 2.5 μ m)  
ppr  3.25 x1012 (2bunch/ring) 
↓ (6 bunches, h=7) 
3.6 x1012 (2bunch/ring) 
↓
 
(6 bunches, h=7) 
1.8 x10
12
 (1bunch/ring)  
↓
  
(6 bunches, h=7) 
3.6 x1012 (3 bunch/ring) 
↓
  
(12  bunches, h=14) 
 






 (scaled 1998 
limit, 206ns bunches) 
14.4 x1012  (larger ΔQ in 
single batch)  
PS out, per bunch  
(ε * ≤ 3 μ m)  
ppb 1.35 x10
11




1.5 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ <15% loss 
1.7 x10
11








SPS out   ppb 1.15 x1011 >1.3 x1011 1.37 x1011 1.6 x10 11 
Goal:   Nominal intensity in single 
batch: shorter filling time, 
lower losses and emittance 
growth.  
  Potential for ultimate 
intensity out of PS
 
in 
double batch . 
Potential for > ultimate with 
a new PS scheme (in PSB: 
new recombination kicker, 
new RF gymnastics).  
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• What is the potential for Crystal 
collimators? It is a newly developed 
technique and real gains still need to be 
demonstrated.  
• Lucio Rossi asks: what about reducing the 
impact of the cryo collimators using shorter 
and stronger magnets? Ralph Assmann 
replies this would be a very interesting 
option.  
INTEGRATION ISSUES IN THE TUNNEL 
AND IMPACT ON GENERAL LHC 
SYSTEMS   
Sylvain Weisz summarizes the logistical and 
coordination challenges for the large number 
planned activities during the 2014-2015 
shutdown and underlines that an overall 
shutdown planning is required for all 
interventions prior to the planned 2014-2015 
shut down for the LHC upgrade (Phase 1 IR 
upgrade, LINAC4 connection, RF upgrades and 
Collimation upgrade) so that some of the 
required work can already be implemented 
during the preceding shorter shutdowns. At the 
moment it is not yet clear how many of the 
required interventions can be performed in 
parallel. Several activities require teams of the 
same expertise and therefore compete for 
existing teams at CERN (e.g. triplet installation 
and magnet movement in the dispersion 
suppressors for the installation of cryo-
collimators). Sylvain underlines again that the 
underground space is very limited and that 
additional underground alcoves could facilitate 
significantly the installation of the triplet 
upgrades. However, with the given time line and 
planned installation during the 2014-2015 
shutdown, the creation of additional 
underground alcoves seems rather ambitious. 
SUMMARY 
The discussions of Session 8 evolved around 
the following main questions: 
• Is the Phase 1 upgrade still a reasonable 
option in 2015 given the current delays 
(Sept 19 incident in 2008 & splice 
consolidation) and the projection of reaching 
‘only ’ 50 fb-1 by 2014 compared to a triplet 
lifetime of 300 fb-1 ? 
• Can the injector complex deliver ultimate 
beam intensities in time for the planned 
Phase 1 upgrade in 2014/2015? 
• Can / should we revise the planning for 
installation by 2014 / 2015? 
• If yes for what parts of the Phase 1 upgrade 
(LINAC4, Collimation, RF, Triplet, civil 
engineering) should be rescheduled? 
• To what extent will a long shutdown for the 
splice consolidation impact on the Phase 1 
upgrade planning (only 1.5 years of 
operation between 2 long shut downs)? 
 
The discussions at Chamonix concluded with 
the creation of 5 task forces: 
• One for re-evaluatiomg the scope and 
planning for the Phase 1 IR upgrade. 
• One for analyzing the options and potential 
for delivering ultimate beam intensities with 
LINAC4 and an upgraded PSB. 
• One for analyzing the upgrade requirements 
and planning for the SPS. 
• One for planning the interventions for a long 
shut down in 2012. 
• One for evaluating the overall consolidation 
needs of the LHC injector complex over the 
length of the LHC exploitation. 
The task forces will report back to the director 
of Accelerators by mid 2010. Their input will 
provide the basis for the shutdown planning 
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SUMMARY SESSION 9 – ADDITIONAL LHC UPGRADE SCENARIOS  
R. Bailey, F. Zimmermann  
 CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
Session 9 of the 2010 Chamonix LHC Performance 
Workshop addressed “alternative” LHC luminosity 
upgrade scenarios. It covered the parameter space 
beyond nominal, implications of higher intensity, crab 
cavities, luminosity optimization and levelling, requests 
and wishes from the experiments, and a comparison of 
integrated luminosity evolutions for different upgrade 
scenarios. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 9th session featured 6 talks, on parameter space 
beyond 1034 cm-2s-1 by Frank Zimmermann, 
implications of higher intensities in the LHC by Ralph 
Assmann, crab cavities by Rama Calaga, luminosity 
optimization and levelling by Jean-Pierre Koutchouk, 
“what do the experiments want?” by Marzio Nessi, and 
comparison of integrated luminosities by Mike Lamont. 
In the following we report a few highlights from each 
presentation and we summarize the subsequent 
discussions. 
 
PARAMETER SPACE BEYOND 1034 
Frank Zimmermann explored the parameter space for 
luminosities beyond 1034 cm-2s-1 [1]. The most 
important parameters are IP beta function, crossing 
angle, normalized emittance, bunch intensity, number 
of bunches, longitudinal bunch profile (Gaussian or 
flat), number of collision points, and turn-around time. 
Constraints include the total beam-beam tune shift, the 
long-range beam-beam effect imposing a crossing 
angle, the arc cooling capacity, the IR layout and optics 
limiting β*, the event pile-up in the detectors and the 
luminosity lifetime.  Beam intensity has been identified 
to be the most important parameter for higher 
luminosity. Reducing β* does not significantly change 
the average luminosity unless it is complemented by 
crab cavities or by smaller emittance.  Two strategies 
for levelling were presented, keeping either the 
luminosity or the beam-beam tune shift constant during 
a physics store. 
 
Discussion: 
Frank Zimmermann highlighted that a reduction of 
β* might lower the maximum intensity, e.g. due to its 
impact on the collimator cleaning efficiency, collimator 
impedance effect, chromatic aberrations, or the long-
range beam-beam interaction. 
Roland Garoby pointed out that low emittance is an 
alternative to crab crossing. 
Steve Myers asked about the beam-beam limit. All 
scenarios presented assumed a total beam-beam tune 
shift of 0.01 from two high-luminosity interaction 
points. This was a conservative value from the SPS 
collider, and less than half the value reached by the 
Tevatron. 
Stephane Fartoukh commented that β∗ could be 
further reduced with a beam of lower emittance. Frank 
Zimmermann asked if β* was not limited by the 
chromatic aberrations as well as by aperture, and he 
argued that the former limit was not improved by the 
smaller emittance. Stephane Fartoukh replied that the 
22 cm minimum value of β* for Nb3Sn assumed that 
the lattice defocusing sextupoles cannot exceed 600 A 
while their short sample limit is around 900A and while 
some of them have been tested mechanically up to 
about 700 A by industry. It assumes as well that one 
cannot use the b3 spool piece to assist the defocusing 
sextupoles. Using the b3 would degrade the situation in 
the horizontal plane but there is still more margin on 
the focusing sextupoles (these sextupoles are twice as 
efficient as the defocusing ones because the dispersion 
at the QF is twice higher). This limit also does not take 
into account that using IR2/8/4/6 we could envisage 
generating huge beta-beat to “simulate” or support the 
up and down excitation scheme of the sextupoles 
corresponding to the strategy he had presented for 
phase-I (but which will certainly require to re-equip 
IR4 and IR6 with a Q6 and a Q7). This list represented 
a series of measures amongst possibly others where 
creativity could help in pushing the β* limit (contrary 
to the limit set by the aperture). Then, at the “not yet 
known matching section aperture limit” the gain in 
luminosity would be “2-fold” with β*=1/ε and with one 
over the luminosity loss factor (working at the also “not 
yet known beam-beam limit”). In this respect halving 
the emittance instead of doubling the bunch charge 
might be preferable (but of course not both which 
would be a “PS3” or an “SPL2”) 
Steve Myers asked about the limit on the total beam 
intensity. Frank Zimmerman replied that a major limit 
came from the limited cooling capacity of the beam 
screens and the pertinent heat load due to resistive-wall 
impedance, synchrotron radiation, electron cloud and 
luminosity debris (if the IR cryogenics would not be 
separated from the arc).  
Oliver Brüning remarked that a turnaround time of 5 
or 6 times the minimum value has been reached at 
other machines after years running [2]. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHER 
INTENSITY IN THE LHC 
Ralph Assmann surveyed the various intensity limits 
in the LHC [3]. After recalling the history of 
luminosity forecasts for the LHC, he demonstrated that 
the ultimate intensity is already challenging for the 
LHC. At ultimate intensity many systems are at the 
technological limits with little or no margin. He 
stressed that with regard to machine protection and 
damage survival, higher intensity and smaller emittance 
are nearly equivalent. Intensity limits around ultimate 
bunch charge come from a multitude of systems, such 
as the LHC RF, the beam dump, cryogenics, vacuum 
system, etc. Quench margin and radiation damage of 
magnets are other important constraints, as are 
protection devices and collimation. A coherent 
intensity upgrade plan should also address the LHC 
system limits. Beam tests in the new HiRadMat facility 
will give a clearer picture, e.g. with regard to machine 
protection and radiation protection. 
 
Discussion: 
Lucio Rossi asked if the underlying assumption for the 
collimation limit was that the loss fraction remained the 
same. Ralph Assmann confirmed the basic assumption 
that relative losses are constant. 
Vladimir Shiltsev commented that the loss models 
and the scenario presented indicated that the LHC 
beam intensity might be limited well below nominal. 
He recommended developing a strategy to get the 
maximum integrated luminosity in such a case. Steve 
Myers commented that at the moment the design 
parameters were still being considered. One would 
adapt the strategy later. Jean-Pierre Koutchouk 
emphasized that in case the intensity was limited below 
nominal one could reduce β* to recover luminosity, 
which had indeed been one of the justifications for the 
IR upgrade phase I. 
CRAB CAVITIES 
Rama Calaga discussed the use of crab cavities [4]. 
The crossing angle reduces the luminosity. This 
geometric luminosity loss can be recovered by opposite 
deflection of the bunch head and the bunch tail, which 
may be achieved by so-called RF crab cavities, frst 
proposed in 1988 and in operation at KEKB since 
2007. Rama Calaga addressed the two motivations for 
crab cavities in the LHC, the requirements, the concept 
and merits of compact crab cavities [4]. For a β* of 
about 0.25 m, the gain in peak luminosity through the 
crab cavities is of order 50%. For the nominal LHC the 
gain is 10-15%. The main open issues are impact on 
collimation efficiency (which looks OK for a first 
implementation stage [5]), the effect of crab RF noise 
on the beam transverse emittance, impedance, and 
machine protection. Installation possibilities are 
“global” conventional crab cavities in IR4 or compact 
“local” cavities in IR1 and 5 based on a new 
technology. After the LHC-CC09 [5] workshop in 
September 2009, the LHC crab cavity advisory board 
issued a number of guidelines, which included the 
statements that following the success of KEKB, CERN 
must pursue the use of crab cavities for the LHC, since 
the potential luminosity increase is significant; that a 
final crab cavity implementation for the LHC has not 
yet been settled; with both “local” and“global” 
crabbing schemes still being under consideration; that 
future R&D should focus on compact cavities which 
are suitable for both schemes; and that one possible 
showstopper has been highlighted: machine protection, 
which is critical for the LHC. In particular, crab 
cavities can increase the LHC luminosity without an 
accompanying increase in beam intensity, thereby 
avoiding negative side effects associated with high 
intensity and high stored beam energy. 
 
Discussion  
Oliver Brüning commented that additional studies 
would be needed for the beam-beam interaction with a 
finite crab RF frequency. 
Jean-Pierre Koutchouk asked if one could correct the 
second order chromaticity in case a horizontal-
horizontal crossing scheme would be adopted for 
“global” crab cavities. Stephane Fartoukh commented 
that for such scheme and this purpose one would 
require a phase advance between IP1 and IP5 of about 
π on one side of the ring, and π/4 on the other side, 
which would constrain the tune to values close to the 
quarter integer. Jean-Pierre Koutchouk concluded that 
the simple global crab-cavity scheme is not likely to 
work. 
Oliver Brüning commented on the doglegs in IR4 
that could be prepared for a crab-cavity installation. 
Rama Calaga confirmed that with proper preparation 
global crab cavities could be installed in IR4 during a 
short stop.  
 
LUMINOSITY OPTIMIZATION AND 
LEVELING 
Jean-Pierre Koutchouk discussed complementary 
measures [7]. At a luminosity level of 1035 cm-2s-1, 
whatever the scenario, the luminosity lifetime becomes 
close to operations “time constants” (cycling and 
filling, travel time to remote buildings and repairs…). 
Hence, luminosity levelling could be raised as a 
requirement for all scenarios. Levelling is also useful 
for the machine: peak energy deposition, beam-beam 
effect, operation efficiency. Accordingly, the 
performance goal of Phase II would become <L> ∼ 5-
6x1034 cm-2s-1, almost constant over the run (event 
multiplicity ∼ 100 for 25 ns spacing). Turn-around 
time and machine availability are two important 
parameters. As for the turnaround time, Jean-Pierre 
Koutchouk suggested that perhaps one should not use 
data from other places (ISR is a good example that 
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short turnaround is possible). Levelling is possible by 
varying β*, or the crossing angle (with the side effect 
of reducing the luminous region), or the bunch length. 
The beam-beam effect requires special attention. The 
beam-beam tune shift varies during the store when 
levelling with the crossing angle [1,7]. In addition, the 
optimum tunes for head on and long-range collisions 
are not the same, as had been illustrated by a 2009 SPS 
MD result [8].  
Levelling via the crossing angle appears to have the 
best potential (performance, complexity) but requires 
unexplored solutions (Crab Crossing) or some 
interference with detectors (Early Separation).  
Levelling via the bunch length is worth a detailed study 
to understand its feasibility. Levelling by β* has an 
inherent performance limit, is probably complex to 
implement, but it is cheap. 
The long-range beam-beam compensation addresses 
a fundamental LHC performance limit; it appears 
effective and robust from several simulations, 
experiments and one implementation in DaΦne. It is 
mature for implementation at the LHC. An early dc 
implementation would allow the study of the beam-




Stephane Fartoukh commented that the preferred 
location for the wire shifted towards D2 for the phase-I 
upgrade. Jean-Pierre Koutchouk replied that this might 
be uncritical. Stephane Fartoukh observed that one 
could also do levelling by varying the beam-beam 
separation, either longitudinally or transversely.   
Massimiliano Ferro-Luzzi asked for the location of 
the wire compensator and an electron lens. 
Jean-Pierre Koutchouk answered that the wire would 
be installed between D1 and D2, not close to the 
experiment proper; the same would be true for the 
electron-lens if used for long-range beam-beam 
compensation. 
Lucio Rossi asked for the compatibility of the early-
separation scheme with the experiments. Jean-Pierre 
Koutchouk responded that a strategy was needed for 
this point; the experiments would prefer crab cavities 
because these are outside the detector. 
 
WHAT DO THE EXPERIMENTS WANT? 
Marzio Nessi reviewed the requirements from the 
experiments [9]. The ultimate goal is to accumulate 
3000 fb-1 on tape, 100 fb-1 for LHCb, and 10 nb-1 with 
PbPb collisions for ALICE. A luminosity evolution 
forecast was presented, and detector limitations 
discussed.  Some detectors will age at a given 
integrated luminosity between 200 fb-1 and 1000 fb-1 
(different case by case). Some detectors will become 
inefficient or problematic at a given peak luminosity, 
between 1 and 3x1034 cm-2s-1. Detector simulations 
assume certain evolutions of the accumulated dose, and 
of the peak luminosity. The first change for ATLAS 
would be the installation of new forward beam pipes. 
An additional pixel layer for ATLAS would be ready in 
2014. The ATLAS forward calorimeters are sensitive 
to the peak luminosity, and would need to be replaced 
some time later. Then both ATLAS and CMS would 
request a long shutdown (>18 months), after ~600-700 
fb-1 has been collected, to install new inner detectors. A 
large fraction of the front-end electronics and trigger 
electronics will need to be upgraded before going to 
sLHC Luminosity. For a pile-up of 400 events, the 
inner tracker gets 15,000 tracks per bunch crossing, and 
trigger considerations become ever more important. 
The experiments require a detailed base plan & 
scenario for the shutdown and beam periods. The 
compatibility between running CMS and ATLAS at 
sLHC and at the same time colliding at point 2 and 8 
should be urgently clarified. At the time of the sLHC, 
LHCb would like to operate at 5x1033 cm-2s-1 (after 
2020). Full compatibility of the LHC and LHC-IR 
upgrades with the LHCb plan should be ensured. 
ALICE would request low luminosity <5x1031 cm-2s-1. 
Important conclusions were summarized. The 
experiments are strongly behind the idea of luminosity 
leveling. The machine experiment interface should 
have a proper level of organization and visibility. 
 
Discussion 
Oliver Brüning asked if the upgrade schedule is 
driven by luminosity or by collaboration timing. 
Marzio Nessi replied that it was driven by a 
combination of the two, and by a risk assessment. 
John Jowett asked if from a certain date onward, 
ATLAS & CMS would not require heavy ion 
luminosities anymore. Marzio Nessi answered that this 
had not yet been discussed. 
Ralph Assmann asked what determined the goal of 
3000 fb-1. Marzio Nessi answered that going from 1000 
to 3000 fb-1 would increase the discovery reach for 
heavy “objects” by about 0.5 TeV. Above 3000 fb-1 
further gain would not be significant. 
Caterina Biscari inquired if there was a request for 
running at lower energy. Marzio Nessi replied that 
indeed there was another discussion ongoing on the 
energy for the nearer term, aimed at optimizing the 
discovery reach for the next couple of years. 
Vladimir Shiltsev asked if the maximum acceptable 
number of events/crossing depends on the bunch 
spacing. Marzio Nessi answered that 200 was the 
number of events selected per second; some of the sub-
detectors are working with longer integration times 
(60-80 ns instead of 25 ns). 
Simon Baird commented that it was not only the 
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COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED 
LUMINOSITIES 
Mike Lamont reviewed the luminosity forecast [10]. 
Three hours was the absolutely minimum possible 
turnaround time.  At LEP the best turnaround time had 
been 1 h compared with a theoretical minimum of 20 
minutes. Assuming 60% machine availability and 4 h 
turnaround time, the luminosity forecast was 1 fb-1 at 




Tiziano Camporesi asked if the forecast was optimistic. 
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SCOPE AND RESULTS OF HARDWARE COMMISSIONING TO 3.5 TEV 
AND LESSONS LEARNT 
M.Solfaroli Camillocci, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
After the incident of the 19th September the LHC has 
been initially re-commissioned to operate at 1.18TeV. 
Compared with the previous year, the 2009 
commissioning campaign took much less time to prepare 
the machine for operation. This was mainly possible 
thanks to the reduced energy level and the increased 
working time. While the preparation of the machine for 
operation to 3.5 TeV will require “only” one further step 
in the commissioning of the main circuits, the 5 TeV 
energy commissioning will require more tests of the 
different circuits and a deep analysis of the obtained 
results. An overview of what has been achieved is 
presented with a particular attention to the encountered 
(solved and remaining) non-conformities. 
 
COMMISSIONING TO 1.18TEV IN 2009 
After the incident occurred on 19th September 2008, the 
LHC machine was repaired then commissioned to 
1.18TeV in 2009. Due to the reduced level of energy of 
the first run, the commissioning of the new layer of the 
Quench Protection System was not mandatory. For this 
reason it was only commissioned partially then set in 
monitoring mode in one sector to check its behavior and 
functionalities. The complete commissioning of the 
system was delayed to the first months of 2010. 
A study of the difference in the commissioning of 2008 
and 2009 campaigns was established in order to point out 
possible ways of improvement in view of the future. 
2008/2009 Commissioning efficiency 
The efficiency can be defined as “the ability to 
accomplish a job with a minimum amount of time and 
effort”. 
The first attempt to compare the 2 commissioning 
campaigns was done by looking at the global time of the 
commissioning (reported in Tab. 1). 
 





Total number of days 164 89 
Total number of shift 251 222 
Tab. 1: Commissioning time 
 
The commissioning campaign of 2008 took 164 days 
and 251 shifts while the 2009 one took only 89 days even 
though 222 shifts, as the number of shifts per day was 
increased from 2 to 3.  
The LHC machine was then commissioned in 29 shifts 
and 74 days less resulting in a 88% of shift but almost 
54% of the time. 
At the Hardware Commissioning day, organized on 19th 
March 2009 to improve and review procedures and tools 
for the coming campaign, the Hardware Commissioning 
Coordination team presented a plan on which it was 
foreseen to prepare the machine for beam operation in 98 
days (14 weeks). Comparing it to the value shown in 
Table 1 it’s important to remark that the evaluation was 
well done. The capability of estimating the time needed 
for the commissioning is a very important ingredient for 
the success of the future campaigns. 
The LHC machine is divided in 8 sectors which could 
be commissioned independently. In 2008 powering tests 
were executed in each sector in average in 43 days with a 
minimum time of 19 for the last sector. In 2009 the 
average time of commissioning one sector was 32 days 
with minimum time of 16 days. 
From the numbers shown so far it’s clear that between 
the two commissioning campaigns there has been a big 
improvement on procedures, tools, knowledge and skills. 
Nevertheless, some not negligible differences have to be 
taken into account before any conclusion. In fact, many 
factors or strategies adopted helped to speed up the 
commissioning, such as: 
• More automated and powerful SW tools; 
• Many circuits had been already commissioned in 
2008 so that few (~4%) test steps had been deemed 
not necessary to be carried out once more; 
• The commissioning energy level was decreased 
from 5TeV to 1.18TeV for dipoles and quadrupoles 
circuits (resulting in a reduction from 8600A to 
2000A for the commissioning current) and to 
3.5TeV for the individually powered quadrupoles 
and dipoles. Consequently, the probability of quench 
and problem was diminished; 
• A strategy of lowering the nominal current of 600A 
circuits after 2-3 training quenches (compatibly with 
the requirements for 3.5 TeV (the circuits have been 
commissioned to 5 TeV)) was adopted; 
• A campaign of rationalization of the operational 
parameters for the 600 A circuits based on the 2008 
experience was performed before the 
commissioning with the result that some of them 
were relaxed; 
• A very big improvement was achieved on the  
stability of cryogenic system; 
On the other hand some effects played on the opposite 
direction having the effect of increasing the time of the 
commissioning: 
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• The new layer of the Quench Protection System 
(symmetric quench detection and splice monitor) 
had to be partially commissioned; this was a totally 
new system; 
• After the incident of 19th September 2008 the 
procedure for commissioning the RB, RQD/F 
circuits had been reviewed and some more steps had 
been added; 
• More constraints were added to the personnel safety 
measures; this had a large impact on the possibility 
of parallel work because no high current powering 
tests where allowed in a sector even with people 
working in adjacent sectors; for more details [1]. 
To evaluate the improvement on the commissioning, 
another number can be taken into account considering 
that the efficiency can be also defined as number of 
successful test steps over the total number of executed test 
steps. This number slightly increased from 81.5% to 
82.1%. 
In conclusion, it is important to remark that the time for 
commissioning the LHC globally dropped from 164 to 89 
days. Despite of all different aspects, in fact, the LHC has 
been commissioned for operation with beam in 2009 
within much less time than in 2008. 
Possible improvements are discussed in the next 
paragraph together with the implications they could have 
on LHC schedule. 
Possible improvements 
Two different ways have been identified as possible 
improvements on the LHC commissioning time schedule: 
• Reduction of number of tests to be executed; 
• Increase of the number of sectors to be 
commissioned in parallel. 
 
 
Fig.1: Example of LHC schedule 
 
Depending on circuit history, indeed, it could result not 
necessary to test all functionalities by carrying out again 
all the commissioning test steps. If no intervention has 
been done on a given power converter, for example, and 
the corresponding powering subsector has been kept at a 
temperature lower than 120K, it could be avoid to 
perform again the test aimed to calibrate the power 
converter as well as the ones at very low current. 
Consequently, a careful study of the circuit history could 
reduce the time of the commissioning of one sector. 
Considering the time achieved in 2009 of 32 days for a 
sector, reducing the tests to be performed by 30% would 
bring to about 20 days per sector. Nevertheless, if the 
time of commission of all sector would be singularly 
reduced by a factor 30%, the gain on the general LHC 
schedule would be 30% of the last sector (about 10 days) 
as at that moment the other sectors would have been 
already commissioned. Looking at the schematic LHC 
planning shown in Fig.1, it’s clear that the gain on the 
general schedule would be only given by the gain on 
sector 56. 
On the other hand, the increase of the number of sectors 
commissioned in parallel would be more powerful on the 
goal of reducing the total time of commissioning the 
LHC. If, ideally, all 8 sectors could be commissioned 
together, the picture shown in Fig.1 would drastically 
change and the red boxes representing the powering tests 
would move in the same time slot; as a result, the 
powering phase would last only 3 weeks for the whole 
LHC. Clearly that is an ideal situation, but this exercise is 
important to show the way the LHC commissioning can 
be improved and the level of time gain which could be 
achieved. Unfortunately, at present different aspects 
prevent the sectors to be ready for powering at the same 
time. The Electrical Quality Assurance tests cannot be 
performed in parallel in all sectors because of limited 
resources both in equipment and manpower. The cool-
down phase from 300K to 80K cannot be carried out in all 
sectors at the same time because of the limited amount of 
nitrogen which can be delivered from the market. CERN, 
indeed, doesn’t have the possibility of nitrogen stockage. 
The second phase of the cool-down, on the contrary, will 
not have problems neither technical nor from resources on 
being done in all sectors in parallel from 2011 when the 
He stockage will be made possible. As a last aspect on the 
cryo system it’s important to remark that the 
parallelization of the cryotuning (which normally last 
between 1 and 2 weeks) strongly depends on the problems 
encountered. The number of protection experts should 
also be increased to allow the sectors to be commissioned 
in parallel and the software tools must be further 
developed (form more information please refers to [2]). 
Comparing the two commissioning campaigns 
performed in 2008 and in 2009, an improvement on this 
aspect it’s clearly visible. On 2008, indeed, the maximum 
number of sector being commissioned together was 4 and 
most of the time only 1 or 2 sectors per day were being 
commissioned. In 2009 the situation highly changed and 
most of the time 3 or 4 sectors were commissioned in 
parallel with a maximum of 5 sectors for few days. 
Despite of all it is clear that an increased parallelization 
of the commissioning between the sectors is the best way 
to further reduce the time on the LHC schedule.  
 
COMMISSIONING TO 3.5TEV 
At the end of 2009 the operation with beam started on 
the LHC with energy of 1.18TeV. The RB, RQD, RQF 
circuits were commissioned up to 2000A, current at 
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which the new layer of the Quench Protection System 
(nQPS) is not necessary as the circuits are already safe. 
On January 2010 a technical stop has been decided to 
allow the nQPS system to be commissioned so that the 
LHC could be operated at higher energy. 
nQPS Commissioning situation and LHC 
general schedule 
The commissioning of the nQPS consists in repairing 
about 4000 connectors, performing a low voltage test to 
check the continuity of the circuit, a high voltage test to 
ensure the solidity of the repair and finally powering test 
of the 13kA circuits to check all nQPS functionalities. 
At the time of writing all connectors have been already 
repaired and the low voltage test has been done in 6 
sectors out of 8. The high voltage test is also well 
advanced having been carried out already on 4 sectors. 
At the time of writing the activities being performed are 
well in advance with respect to what foreseen on the 
general schedule (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2: The LHC Schedule 
 
Phase II of powering tests (red boxes) already started in 
Sector 12 (as planned) and in Sector 23 and powering 
phase I (light red boxes) started in sector 34 and 45 earlier 
than scheduled. 
Non Conformities 
During the LHC commissioning campaign of 2008, 
many Non Conformities (NCs) were open due to 
deviation of performances of the system from design or 
from the specifications. 
On September 2009, a campaign to review the NCs was 
done. At the beginning there were 817 NCs opened with 
different status and attached to different systems: 
• 562 on cryomagnets; 
• 29 on survey; 
• 73 cryostats; 
• 13 on Electrical Quality Assurance; 
• 41 on interconnection quality assurance; 
• 69 on cryogenic system; 
• 9 on interconnections; 
• 8 on vacuum system; 
• 6 Magnet manufacturers. 
 All of them have been analyzed and closed but 35 
which are planned to be repaired in the next shutdown. 
None of them is critical to reach 5TeV. 
Some NCs still prevent from raising the energy to 5TeV 
such as splice performance, risk of arching of the energy 
extraction switches due to reduced dump resistance and 
weak quench heater strips on RQX.R1 circuit. For more 
details refer to [3] [4]. 
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ENHANCED QPS – PERFORMANCE, COMMISSIONING AT 3.5 TEV, 
OUTLOOK TOWARDS 5 TEV 
R. Denz on behalf of the QPS team, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
During the shutdown of the LHC in 2009 the protection 
system for superconducting elements in the LHC QPS has 
been submitted to a substantial upgrade.  
The newly introduced layers of the QPS allow the 
monitoring and protection of the electrical 
interconnections between superconducting magnets with 
very high precision and extend the capability of the 
system to the timely detection of so-called aperture 
symmetric quenches in the LHC main magnets. 
In addition the immunity of the QPS with respect to 
powering failures has been improved by feeding all 
quench heater based protection systems by now two fully 
redundant UPS. 
FUNCTIONALITY OF THE ENHANCED 
QPS 
The upgrade of the QPS in 2009 extended the 
functionality of the existing system by adding a dedicated 
system for the protection of the electrical interconnections 
between superconducting magnets as well as for the 
detection of so-called aperture symmetric quenches in the 
LHC main magnets [1]. 
Splice Protection System 
The splice protection system type DQQBS permanently 
monitors and interlocks the voltage across the 
interconnections between LHC main magnets. 
The determination of the required detection threshold is 
based on simulations and tests [2] and has been set to 
UTH = 300 μV with10 s evaluation time at nominal current 
I = 12 kA. For operation up to 3.5 TeV, i.e. currents up to 
I = 6 kA a threshold voltage of UTH = 500 μV with 10 s 
evaluation time is regarded as sufficient.  
Apart from the interlock functionality the new system 
provides data for the enhanced diagnostics of the 
superconducting circuits via the QPS supervision. 
 Dedicated powering cycles the so-called “Mexican 
pyramids” allow the measurement of the splice resistance 
with a resolution of ΔR < 1nΩ. The evaluation of data 
recorded during coasting can be used to trace the 
development of splice resistances in time. 
Symmetric Quench Detection System 
The symmetric quench detection system type DQQDS 
extends the functionality of the existing protection system 
in order to detect timely aperture symmetric quenches. 
The design detection threshold is UTH = 200 mV with 20 
ms evaluation time.  
The new system detects also “normal” quenches and 
serves as a back-up of the existing system. This feature 
has been used for the implementation of the now fully 
redundant UPS 230 V AC powering scheme including 
power supplies and electrical distribution lines. 
 The symmetric quench detection system will become 
essential for the training of the superconducting magnets 
up to nominal current, where a significant amount of 
aperture symmetric quenches due to quench propagation 
after the occurrence of a primary training quench is 
expected. 
COMMISSIONING OF THE ENHANCED 
QPS 
Up to currents I = 2 kA, where the circuit protection is 
fully ensured by the standard QPS, the enhanced QPS can 
be commissioned and qualified in passive mode e.g. not 
connected to interlocks and quench heaters. The 
commissioning comprises the verification of signal 
integrity and completeness, tracing of wiring errors, 
assessment of noise levels and the adjustment of device 
parameters such as threshold and filter settings. 
Commissioning of the Splice Protection System 
The splice protection system needs to compensate the 
apparent inductive voltage across a bus-bar splice during 
a ramp; the corresponding compensation coefficients have 
to be deduced from data acquired during current ramps up 
to I = 2 kA. 
A first bus-bar splice mapping during commissioning 
allows the identification of potential problems at 
moderate currents. 
Commissioning of the Symmetric Quench 
Detection System 
The symmetric quench detection system is based on a 
multichannel evaluation logic supervising three magnets. 
In LHC due to the relatively long discharge time 
constants of the main circuits the system has to be active 
in all phases of a powering cycle. The selected detection 
scheme ensures a very reliable detection of quenches but 
it is potentially vulnerable to false triggers especially 
during fast current discharges of the circuit. In order to 
avoid such triggers adaptive filters, which are only active 
during the transition from ramping or coasting to current 
discharge are implemented in the numerical detection 
algorithm. The proper setting of these filters has to be 
verified during the commissioning. 
In addition snubber capacitors for the energy extraction 
systems will be needed for LHC operation at energies 
higher than 3.5 TeV [3]. 
The check of the immunity of the symmetric quench 
detection with respect to fast discharges is a mandatory 
test to be repeated each time the energy is increased. 
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Activation of interlocks and final verification 
Once successfully commissioned up to I = 2 kA the 
new system has to be connected to the interlock chain and 
the link of the symmetric quench detection system to the 
quench heater circuits of the protected magnets be 
enabled. As a final verification step current ramps up to 
I = 2 kA have to be performed before using the by then 
fully operational system at higher currents. 
For the final commissioning up to 3.5 TeV the false 
trigger immunity of the symmetric quench detection 
systems during activation of the energy extraction has 
carefully to be checked at I = 4000 A and I = 6000 A. The 
splice mapping has to be performed at I = 5000 A 
profiting from the improved signal to noise ratio at higher 
currents. 
PERFORMANCE OF THE ENHANCED 
QPS 
Splice mapping and inductive compensation 
Fig. 1 shows the results of splice mapping up to 
I = 2 kA in the dipole circuit of sector 7-8. The 
measurement is conducted fully automatically and is 
combined with the internal splice mapping of the 
superconducting magnets using the so-called snapshot 
method developed for the existing QPS. One splice 
mapping campaign, which can be conducted 
simultaneously for the three main circuits of a sector, 
takes about 3 hours.   
 
 
Figure 1: Splice resistance measurement in sector 7-8. 
The compensation of the apparent inductive voltage 
across a bus-bar splice has been successfully tested and a 
procedure for the determination of coefficients and 
download to the protection device developed. An example 
of a run with a fully compensated system is shown in Fig. 
2.  
 
    
Figure 2: Resistive voltage during ramp and coasting 
after fine tuning of the inductive compensation values 
in sector 8-1. 
Symmetric quench detection 
One of the challenges of commissioning of the 
symmetric quench detection system is to ensure its 
immunity to false triggers during fast current discharges. 
Fig. 3 shows the recording of the diagnostic buffer of a 
symmetric quench detection board during such a 
discharge.  Without the use of adaptive filters the system 




Figure 3: Activation of energy extraction systems at 
I = 4 kA in sector 1-2 and data recorded by a 
symmetric quench detection board (dump of 
diagnostic buffer). 
Experience in sector 1-2 during the 2009 run 
Sector 1-2 has been the only sector during the 2009 run 
with the enhanced QPS being fully activated and 
interlocked. The new system, which is adding about 500 
hardwired interlock channels per sector (total number will 
increase from 7700 to 11500), showed a good stability 
during LHC operation with beam and apart from the 
transfer line magnets no interference by other LHC 
equipment (BLM’s, kicker magnets …) has been 
observed.  
The crosstalk from the LHC beam transfer lines is 
giving problems to a limited number of splice protection 
systems to operate with a threshold voltage of 
UTH = 300 μV. The threshold for the 2010 run being set to 
UTH = 500 μV solves temporarily the problem until a long 
term solution becomes available. 
The new system has been fully integrated into the QPS 
supervision requiring a substantial effort by the controls 
groups to handle the significantly increased data flow. 
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In addition dedicated tools for the data analysis like the 
splice resistance monitor [4] have been successfully 
validated; the development of specialist tools for device 
diagnostics and maintenance has been started and will 
continue.  
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
ENHANCED QPS 
Extension to insertion region magnets 
An extension of enhanced QPS covering the insertion 
region magnets and the inner triplets will be ready for 
installation during the next shutdown. The necessary 
additional signal cables have been already installed in the 
LHC tunnel. These upgrades serve basically diagnostic 
purposes as the concerned circuits are already now fully 
protected by the present system [5].  
Radiation tolerance 
Several radiation test campaigns have been conducted 
throughout the year 2009 (at PSI and CNGS) confirming 
the design approach of the enhanced QPS. A potential 
problem is however related to the radiation weakness of 
the latest version of field-bus chip used in all QPS 
systems. Affecting only supervision and not protection a 
reliable replacement is nevertheless required. Until a 
more radiation tolerant version of this chip is available [6] 
a temporary workaround verified within the CNGS test 
campaign can be applied to affected QPS circuit boards.  
SUMMARY  
The commissioning of the enhanced QPS in 2009 
resulted in the complete mapping of the interconnection 
splices in the LHC main circuits for the first time.  
The design of the enhanced QPS has been successfully 
validated and theexploitation of the system during the 
LHC run in 2009 did not reveal any showstoppers so far. 
The re-cabling campaign has been successfully 
completed end January 2010 and the electrical tests 
performed afterwards have been successfully concluded.   
At the time of writing the full commissioning of the 
enhanced QPS up to 3.5 TeV is being completed and no 
major commissioning steps will be required for LHC 
operation at higher beam energies.  
The main constraint with respect to the overall 
dependability (= reliability + availability + safety) of the 
QPS system is the large equipment number. 
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DO THE SPLICES LIMIT US TO 5TEV – PLANS FOR THE 2010 RUN 
M. Koratzinos, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
There are about 10000 main circuit splices in the LHC. 
Each one needs to conform to certain specifications 
regarding its resistance at cold and the integrity of its 
surrounding copper stabilizer. We review the results of the 
(warm) copper stabilizer measurements, the results of the 
splice measurements at cold and the allowed space for 
these variables as a function of LHC energy. It emerges 
that the limiting factor for operating safely at high 
energies is our knowledge of copper stabilizer resistances. 
The principal methods at our disposal for addressing this 
problem are then reviewed.  
SPLICES 
Types of splices 
The main circuits of the LHC (RB, RQD, RQF per 
sector) have about 24000 splices. Out of these there are:  
• 10170 interconnect splices and  
• 13796 magnet splices 
Magnet splices are protected by the magnet diodes (so 
that in case of problems they have to deal only with the 
energy stored in that specific magnet and not the whole 
string of magnets in the same circuit). Interconnect splices 
are not protected by diodes and have to deal with the full 
current of the circuit at all times. The nominal 
interconnect splice resistance is 300pΩ at cold 
(essentially the resistance of the solder material, SnAg), 
whereas at warm the resistance is 10μΩ (the resistance of 
the copper stabilizer). For the LHC to operate safely at a 
certain energy, there is a limit to how big a splice 
resistance can be, both at cold and at warm. 
Individual splices are measurable only with invasive 
methods. Under non-invasive conditions, we are limited 
by the amount of voltage taps available. What we can 
measure between successive voltage taps is a busbar 
segment. A typical bus bar segment for the RB bus 
contains 2 or 3 splices, whereas a typical bus bar segment 
for the RQ bus contains 8 splices. Non-invasive methods 
at non-superconducting temperatures measure the 
resistance of the splices but also the resistance of the bus 
bar segment. Busbar excess resistance is the resistance of 
a busbar minus its nominal resistance. 
 
Measurements at cold 
Motivation for measuring splice resistances comes from 
the 19 September 2008 accident. The calorimetric 
analysis of test PLI3.a2 done on 15 September 2008 
yields the following value for the excess resistance of a 
splice in the vicinity of magnet C24R3: R 23R3-16R3, excess = 
234 ± 15 nΩ. This is three orders of magnitude higher 
than the nominal value. This prompted us to measure the 
resistance of as many splices as we could in a variety of 
ways: 
Calorimetry: using the superfluid properties of helium, 
together with he very small heat capacity of the system at 
1.9K, the cryogenic system is able to measure the 
resistive heat released by a high-resistance splice. 
Resistive power as low as 1Watt in one cryogenic 
subsector (16 magnets, 350t of cold mass, 250m long) can 
be detected using this method. The temperature rise is 
1mK/hour/watt. This means that excess resistances of as 
low as 40nΩ can be detected using this method. 
We have also performed (ad hoc) measurements using 
the old QPS system which covers 6 out of 7 magnet 
splices (RB) and 6 out of 10 splices (RQ). Using both 
methods, two significant excess resistances were found: 
• B16R1 (MB2334) (100nΩ) 
• B32R6 (MB2303)  (50nΩ) 
Much more accurate results are expected from the 
nQPS campaign of 2009/2010. 
Using the nQPS system as a series of accurate 
voltmeters, we can measure the resistance of a bus bar 
segment to <1nΩ. Hardware commissioning test PLI2.s1 
(the so-called “Maya pyramid” test) comprises a series of 
current plateaus with a top current plateau of 2000A 
(lasting 30+ minutes) resembling a Maya pyramid. The 
results are much more accurate than the previous 
measurements and have yielded no excess resistance 
above 4nΩ anywhere in the machine. The highest 
significant splice resistances found above 2nΩ are: 
• 2.87±0.14 (RQ circuit, sector 23) 
• 2.32±0.14 (RB circuit, sector 34) 
• 2.05±0.52 (RQ circuit, sector 34) 
It should be noted that an excess resistance at cold of 
2nΩ poses no problems under normal operation; however 
it might suggest a structural problem or a problem with 
the soldering procedure which might be more serious (See 
[1]. Therefore, the time evolution of such a resistance 
would need to be followed closely. Also, the excess 
resistances found are natural candidates to be checked by 
the new X-ray tomograph when it becomes operational. 
 
Measurements at warm – non-invasive 
A copper stabilizer with no continuity coupled to a 
superconducting cable badly soldered to the stabilizer 
limits the maximum safe energy of the machine [2]. Such 
a bad joint manifests itself as a splice with higher than 
nominal resistance at warm. Measuring such a resistance 
is challenging, with only the measurement at 300K for the 
RB bus being relatively easy. For measuring the RB 
copper stabilizer resistances at 80K we need to control the 
temperature and the RRR of the busbar segment to a very 
good degree. Measuring the RQ at 300K is on the limit of 
accuracy, whereas measuring the RQ at 80K is very 
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difficult. The table below shows the factors 
resistance measured at warm, together with
resistance of a segment and of a defect that w
to measure. Column 4 shows the effect of a
change in the segment by 1K. Column 5 sho
of an increase in the cross section of the copp
whereas the last column shows the effect of
the busbar segment increasing from 100 to 15
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CONSTRAINTS 
A. Verweij [2] has updated his calculations of what is 
the worst splice we can tolerate as a function of energy: 
For 5.0TeV (energy extraction time constant for the RB 
75sec and for the RQ 15sec, RRR=100):  
• RB: 43 μΩ  
• RQ: 41 μΩ  
For 3.5TeV (energy extraction time constant for the RB 
50sec and for the RQ 10sec, RRR=100):  
• RB: 76 μΩ  
• RQ: 80 μΩ  
If the RRR is 200, we can add 10 μΩ to the above values 
for both RB and RQ. Conversely, if the RRR in increased 
from 100 to 160, we gain 0.3TeV per beam. 
OPTIONS 
Regarding our options on increasing our knowledge of 
the main circuit splices that would allow safe running at a 
higher energy, I have tried to concentrate on options 
applicable this year, that is, relatively simple methods that 
would not need a huge infrastructure effort. I will also 
assume that the time available for major repairs in the 
machine this year will be minimal. Therefore I will focus 
on how we can increase our knowledge without running a 
major repair campaign. There are three broad categories 
of options during 2010: 
1. Warm up and measure (with selective repairs) at 
300K 
2. Measure splices using low currents (RRR 
measurements) 
3. Measure splices using high currents (Thermal 
Amplifier) 
Option 1 
This is conceptually the simplest method: warm up the 
three sectors we have not measured at warm, measure the 
busbar resistances, repair, and cool down again. (At the 
same time and in the shadow we can repair the 4-5 worse 
splices in the rest of the machine). The advantages are 
that this is something we know how to do. On the other 
hand, this is the option with the longest intervention and 
heavy re-commissioning will be needed. Another 
disadvantage is that our knowledge of the RQ bus in the 
sectors already measured (where we know it is not good 
enough) will not improve.  
The time needed for such an option would be roughly 
three and a half months.  
The probable gain would be that the highest resistance 
for the RB bus will go down from 90μΩ to 60μΩ. 
Option 2  
This option is motivated by the fact that currently the 
RRR measurements of the copper stabilizer of the 
machine are not very accurate and plagued by systematic 
errors. This has led us to take the conservative approach 
to assume a RRR value of 100 for the whole machine. A 
method has been proposed to measure the RRR with a 
precision of a few percent using the nQPS system by 
injecting a low current (20-30A) to the three main circuits 
of a sector. A type test has been reformed at the end of 
January 2010.  
The advantages of such a method are that it uses low 
current so it is safe, and the moderate increase of 
temperature needed (we only need to go to 15K for a 
measurement)  makes the test rather fast.  
The disadvantage of this method is that it cannot 
measure excess resistances. The time needed for such a 
test would be of the order of 6 days. The possible gain 
after performing this measurement on all sectors would be 
to get confidence that the lowest RRR of the machine is 
higher than the currently assumed 100, allowing either a 
higher safe energy or more margin at 3.5TeV. 
Option 3 
This is the most involved method discussed here. It 
originates from an idea of H. Pfeffer and has been refined 
by A. Verweij, who also kindly provided the results of his 
calculations. The idea behind the technique is the 
following:  A high current pulse warms up selectively the 
bad joints in a circuit “Thermal Amplifier”, in a highly 
non-linear way. Low current is used for reading out 
voltages using the nQPS system and hence identify areas 
where the temperature (a tell-tale sign of high resistance) 
has increased the resistance of the copper. The method is 
safe as the high current pulse will be applied in steps (to 
about 3000A and with a maximum duration of about 10 
seconds). The beauty of the method is that it is a before-
after measurement, meaning that various parameters that 
affect the resistance (for example RRR, geometry, etc.) 
cancel out. Also, the method is sensitive to the highest 
resistance in a segment, not to the sum of all splice 
resistances as in the other methods. In the following 
example, a ‘typical’ defect of 52μΩ has been introduced 
in the simulation. 3000A is passed from the circuit for 3 
seconds. The circuit chosen for this simulation is the RB, 
and the temperature of the test has been chosen to be 80K. 
Very little energy is stored in the circuit as the power 
supply should ignite the diodes, therefore bypassing the 
high inductance magnets. With such a defect, the 
temperature of the joint after 3 seconds has already started 
running away and reaches 320K. After the three seconds, 
the current pulse of 3000A is switched off, leaving only 
40A for the rest of the measurement. In the following 
figure, the solid line is the voltage of the bus bar segment 
in the case of no defect. There is a small difference before 
and after the pulse due to the fact that the bus bar segment 
warms up a little. However, the rise in voltage is much 
more pronounced in case of a defect (dashed curve).  
Actually, the voltage in case of a 52μΩ defect rises 
sharply and decays (with a time constant of about 5 
seconds) to a new level higher than before (this will 
eventually decay with a much longer time constant). This 
(medium term) offset is what can be measured using the 
nQPS system. 
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Figure 2: Thermal Amplifier method: voltage rise after a 
current pulse is case of a perfect joint and of a joint with 
at 52 μΩ defect. 
 
The simulation of the method was run with different 
values of initial temperatures, plateau durations, and 
defect sizes. In the case of a 52 μΩ defect and an initial 
temperature of 80K, the voltage difference (before and 
after the pulse) is 120uVolt in case of no defect, and 
400uVolts in case of a 52μΩ defect. The difference of 
280uVolts makes this very easy to detect, as the nQPS 
system used for reading out the voltages has a noise level 
of 5-10μV for 10 seconds. If we attempt the same 
measurement at lower initial temperatures we can go as 
low as 50K provided we now extend the pulse for 
10seconds instead of 3. There our discriminating power 
(voltage difference of no defect vs voltage difference of 
52μΩ defect) is as high as 430uVolts. The method fails to 
work at 40K, whereas for the RQ bus the effect is a factor 
of 4 smaller.  
The method has a few engineering challenges. An 
important ingredient is the power supplies needed for 
such a measurement whose voltage requirements are as 
follows: 
• RB at 50K: a power supply able to deliver at 
least 190 Volts will be needed. This is just above 
the capabilities of the current RB power supply 
of 180V/13000A 
• RQ at 50K: total voltage needed here is 
110Volts.  
The requirements for the RB are just beyond the voltage 
available, whereas for the RQ circuit, the RB power 
supply will be sufficient. A small ‘igniter’ power supply 
will be needed to open the diodes in the RB case. With a 
bit of fine tuning the existing RB power supplies might 
suffice for this option.  
The advantages of option 3 are as follows: It is 
sensitive to the worst splice in the segment. This is 
particularly interesting for the RQ bus where there are 8 
splices in a bus bar segment and all other methods are 
sensitive to the sum of all excess resistances. It is also 
quick to perform once the infrastructure is there. 
It is not without its disadvantages, however: 
Interlocking issues due to the high current level would 
need to be addressed, and there are engineering and 
integration issues. We estimate that the time needed to 
perform this method in a sector (a number of sectors can 
be done in parallel) is three weeks.  
The possible gain is that using this method we can find 
all splices larger than 50μΩ and if none are above, say, 
60μΩ this would enable us to run safely between 4-
4.5TeV . A type test before more can be said about this 
method is imperative.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Splices at cold (in the superconducting state) have been 
measured with excellent accuracy and do not pose a 
problem. 
Splices at warm (an indication of copper stabilizer 
continuity) have been measured in part of the machine 
and extrapolated to the whole machine using statistical 
methods. 
• worse splice measured: 60±1μΩ  
• worse splice known to exist in the machine: 
53±15μΩ  
• worse splice extrapolated: 90μΩ  
The current knowledge of the interconnect splices 
excludes 5TeV operation without major repairs after a 
warm up. Even the operation at 3.5TeV leaves no margin.  
Two methods have been proposed to increase our 
knowledge of the interconnect splices 
• A low current method that can measure the 
RRR of the busbars  
• A high current method (the Thermal 
Amplifier) that is sensitive to the worst splices 
in all bus bar segments 
Using any of the above methods would allow us to 
either run at a slightly higher energy (around 4TeV) or get 
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Abstract
Results from the 2008 and 2009 operation of the LHC
BLM system are presented with respect to the depend-
ability (reliability, availability and safety) of the system.
Known limitations and measures taken are discussed. The
accuracy of the beam abort thresholds with respect to the
magnet quench levels are examined. Threshold levels at
different energies are compared to the noise levels and the
limits of the readout electronics. An extrapolation from the
measured loss profiles (injection losses as well as betatron
cleaning and momentum cleaning losses) toward the ex-
pected loss profiles at higher intensity is given. It is verified
whether they are expected to stay below quench and dam-
age levels (respectively the currently enforced abort thres-
holds).
INTRODUCTION
The commissioning of the LHC Beam Loss Measure-
ment (BLM) system (2008, 2009 and beginning of 2010
beam operation) is advancing in parallel with the beam
commissioning of the LHC. Up to now the performance
of the BLM system has been very satisfying. No safety
related issues have been discovered.
In order not to compromise the machine availability dur-
ing commissioning, the machine protection functionalities
of the BLM system are being phased in. The input to BIS
(Beam Interlock System) from individual monitors (ap-
proximately 4000) is being switched from masked to un-
masked in stages. Every single unmasked monitor channel
is removing the beam permit in case it measures a loss sig-
nal above the pre-set threshold values. At the end of the
2009 run the LHC was operating with most of the chan-
nels unmasked. The continuous (during beam operation)
acquisition system self tests became operational during the
2009 run [1, 2]. A failure of the test on a single channel re-
moves the beam permit. The regular (between beam oper-
ations) BLM system tests are to become operational before
the 2010 run. These tests are driven by the LHC sequencer.
A failure of one of the channels or the non-execution of the
tests within 20 hours inhibits the beam injection [2].
In order to allow the injection of beam with damage
potential (above SBF, Safe Beam Flag, limit of 1 × 1012
protons at 450 GeV), or to allow the acceleration of fewer
protons up to damage level [3], the BLM system has to
reach full protection level. The mayor objectives are: The
completion of all technological tasks before 2010 start-
up [1]; validation of the threshold settings [4] (requiring
beam tests for threshold calibration, operational experience
and in depth performance analysis); the performance of all
defined MPS (machine protection system) tests [5]; the rig-
orous application of all procedures for system changes as
defined in [6]. The above points are mostly not covered
in here. The paper will concentrate on the limitations en-
countered during the run and the proposed solutions. It
will be discuss whether possible additional limitations on
energy and intensity have to be deduced from the 2009




Individual channel noise and offset values are important
for the availability, as too high values could cause unnec-
essary beam dumps. Nearly daily checks of all channels
allow to detect in time the onset of a problem. The prob-
able cause (cable noise, card non-conformity, etc.) can be
identified as well. Long cables (up to 800 m) have been
identified as largest noise sources. By changing cables (still
multi wire twisted pair cables, but higher quality) a noise
reduction by a factor of two could be achieved. It is fore-
seen to install single pair shielded cables at critical loca-
tions (especially around IP3) during the next shut-down.
This is expected to yield an additional noise reduction by
a factor of five. In parallel, a new radiation tolerant (up to
kGy) ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) read-
out electronics is being developed within a PhD thesis by
Giuseppe Venturini. It is planned to be installed in the long
straight sections of the LHC in order to avoid any long ca-
bles and reduce the noise levels.
Fig. 1 top row shows the noise single channel frequency
distribution for 40 µs integration time over 9 hours for two
channels. On the left a low noise channel with a short
cable and on the right a high noise channel with a long
cable. Fig. 1 bottom row shows the maximum noise fre-
quency distribution (for 40 µs integration time) of the Ion-
ization Chambers (IC) on the left and the Secondary Emis-
sion Monitors (SEM) on the right. There are approximately
3600 ICs and 300 SEMs in the LHC. A SEM is always in-
stalled next to an IC. It is less sensitive by factor of 70000.
Channels which have a maximum noise reading above the
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Figure 1: Noise single channel frequency distribution on the top and maximum noise frequency distribution on the bottom
(see text).
vertical line (300 bits) will be repaired. 300 Bits corre-
spond to 0.027 Gy/s and 1898 Gy/s on the IC and SEM
40 µs integration time respectively.
SEMs have a higher percentage of high noise channels.
Whether this effect is (only) caused by the typically much
longer cables on the SEMs is under investigation.
Dependability (Reliability, Availability and
Safety)
No safety related issues have been detected on any of the
system components (hardware, firmware, software or sys-
tem parameters). Concerning the availability, it is too early
to define hardware failure and intervention rates. All hard-
ware items which had given problems during the run, had
already been detected beforehand. During approximately
one month of beam operation no issue had newly devel-
oped. False dumps were caused by three different hardware
problems: two of them were not considered urgent before
the run (optical fiber, tunnel card); one had only been de-
tected intermittently during the 2009 shutdown (mezzanine
surface card).
Accuracy of Thresholds
Fig. 2 shows the four beam induced quenches. All
quenches occurred with injected beam on a dipole magnet
(MB), while the most likely loss locations with circulat-
ing beam are the quadrupole magnets. The two quenches















1.5 fit to data
Geant4
Figure 3: Second quench GEANT4 simulations compared
to measurements.
in 2008 have been analysed. The BLM signals could be
reproduced by GEANT4 simulations to within a factor of
1.5 (see Fig. 3). Consequently, the thresholds on the cold
magnets had been raised by approximately 50% [7]. It is
proposed to proceed with the beam induced ‘recovering
quench’ (or quench) tests on the different magnet types,
as defined in [5] at the very beginning of the 2010 run. For
fast transient losses (tested with injected beam) the recov-
ering quenches can be detected with a special version of the
nQPS (new Quench Protection System). The nQPS voltage
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Figure 2: The four beam induced quenches. The first and second quench occurred at an MB which was equipped with
BLMs (for the first quench only the opposite beam side was equipped). During the third quench the IC with the highest
signal saturated. The fourth quench happened at an MB after the MQ, which is not equipped with monitors.
difference detection level will be set to 50 mV (a factor four
below QPS and factor two below nQPS limits). These tests
are similar to a 2009 MPS test, where a (slowly increased)
local bump was used together with reduced threshold le-
vels to induce beam dumps. The analysis of these tests
show, that the conditions of the bump are well understood
and reproducible (see Fig. 4). The transverse beam posi-
tion reproducibility is estimated to 150 µm peak to peak.
The nQPS tests will most likely not cause a real magnet
quench and they should be perfectly safe for the machine.
For steady state losses (tested with circulating beams) it
might be possible to detect the recovering quenches with
the magnet temperature monitors.
Known Limitations
Over-injection: Over-injection is an operational pro-
cedure by which the already circulating pilot beam bunch
is sent on the TDI when injecting the first higher inten-
sity bunch(es). Two problems have occurred during over-
injection in 2009. The signal for short integration times in
the two ICs at the TDIs is above the electronic measure-
ment limit. For the 2010 run one of the ICs (per TDI) has
been equipped with a R-C (resistor-capacitor) filter. The
peak signal of fast transient losses is reduced by a factor of
175 and the signal length is increased by the same amount.
The upper end of the dynamic range for shortest integra-
tion time (40 µs) is increased from 23 Gy/s to 4 kGy/s. The
threshold values for the TDI monitors will be set according
to beam measurements. The additional signal delay will
be taken into account. The second IC on the TDI is not
equipped and serves as a reference measurement for low
losses. It will not be connected to BIS (Beam Interlock
System), as no thresholds can be set.
The second problem occurred only when over-injecting
beam 2 in IP8. An IC protecting the triplet magnet
from losses of beam 1 (BLMQI.03R8.B1I30 MQXA) went
above threshold (see Fig. 5). Measurements and beam tests
confirm that radiation from the TDI reaches the monitors
at the triplet magnets from the outside (through the tunnel).
This IC had been installed with a non-standard vertical po-
sition (due to space conflict with a RAMSES - Radiation
Monitoring System for the Environment and Safety - mon-
itor). For the 2010 run, the monitor in IP8 was moved up by
about 30 cm (conform with the equivalent monitor in IP2).
Simulation studies would be needed to clarify whether the
difference in position (and some differences in the tunnel)
can explain the factor of 10 difference in signal between
IP2 and IP8, and how to best shield this IC from the over-
injection showers as a possible long term solution. Should
the problem persist in 2010, the applied thresholds of this
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
46
dcum [m]













Oct 8, 7:36:27 UTC
Oct 8 ,8:34:15 UTC 
Oct 8, 8:20:39 UTC
Oct 6, 22:39:42 UTC
bump size [mm]
























Figure 4: Position and detection reproducibility of four
beam tests. Three test (October 8) were done on the same
magnet with beam 2. The fourth one (October 6) on the
top plot is a superimposed mirror image of a beam 1 test
on a different magnet. The plot shows the last position
measured, which corresponds to beam permit inhibit by the
BLM system.
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Figure 5: Over-injection in IP2 and IP8.
IC will be increased for the short integration times to al-
low for over-injection (but still kept below the calculated
quench levels for the triplet magnets).
Triplet magnets at collision: Simulation studies [8]
show that debris from the interactions yield a BLM sig-
nal of similar magnitude as the one of a critical beam loss.
The proposed long term solution is to develop new moni-
tors for these locations which are integrated with the new
triplet magnets and placed close to the coil. No problem
with the current set-up is expected up to a luminosity of
1033 cm−2s−1.
Dynamic range: Ionization in air on a 1 cm long piece
of non-insulated signal wire caused a spurious signal on
certain SEM channels. It has already been corrected by
adding a new insulation. The remaining high noise le-
vels on some of the SEMs (up to approximately 2000 Gy/s
for short integration time) leads to an ambiguity for short
losses in the gap between the IC (up to 23 Gy/s) and the
SEM dynamic range. Also due to this noise, thresholds
cannot be set in SEM. The installation of the new radiation
hard analogue electronics should solve the noise problem.
A partial activation of the beam abort functionality is not
possible. The design of the electronics does not foresee to
set thresholds partially in SEM and partially in IC.
Two options exist, depending on requirements, to bridge
the gap between the IC and the SEM on a short time scale:
the installation of additional R-C filters to spread the signal
over a longer time; or the installation of a new monitor type,
LIC (Little IC), which is 30 times less sensitive than an
IC (approximately 56 monitors could be installed in 2010).
The first LIC prototype has been installed in the LHC for
test measurement. It has the same design as a SEM, but
instead of being under vacuum, it is filled with nitrogen
gas at 1.1 bar.
THRESHOLD LEVELS COMPARED TO
DYNAMIC RANGE
At the lower end of the dynamic range it has to be en-
sured, that the lowest threshold levels are still safely above
the channel noise, not to cause unwanted beam aborts.
Threshold values (expressed in dose rate) decrease with the
beam energy and with the length of the integration time
window. The analysis per channel for 40 µs and 1.3 s inte-
gration times (the longest one which was logged in 2009)
for energies up to 3.5 TeV shows that there is at least a fac-
tor of 10 between the lowest threshold and the highest noise
value measured over 10 days (see Fig. 6). For 5 TeV, due
to a change in threshold calculations for the second mon-
itor on MQM, MQY and MQML in 2010, at the moment
there are approximately 12 monitors with a factor between
5 and 10 between threshold and noise. This remains to be
investigated.
The theoretical thresholds of certain elements at short
integration times are above the dynamic range of the (elec-
tronics of the) ICs. In the functional specification it was al-
ready foreseen that the shortest running sums on cold mag-
nets at injection energy are limited by the dynamic range
of the BLM system. The shortest integration times for the
highest thresholds on cold magnets is a maximum of a fac-
tor of three above the dynamic range. Table 1 [9] gives the
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Figure 6: Maximum noise versus threshold value for 40 µs integration time; one entry per channel and energy.
factor missing between the upper end of the IC dynamic
range and the theoretical threshold value at 450 GeV and
40 µs integration time (worst case). The problem reduces
with higher energies and integration times. On tungsten
collimators (TCT, TCLA) the theoretical threshold values
are all within the dynamic range of the ICs.
Table 1: Factor missing between the upper end of the IC dy-
namic range and the theoretical threshold value at 450 GeV
and 40 µs integration time (worst case).
TCP IP3 TCP IP7 TCSG IP3 TCSG IP7
TCLI TCLP
1’611 97 161 8
For warm magnets as well, the theoretical threshold val-
ues for short integration times and low energies are above
the dynamic range of the ICs. With the exception of the
TDI no limitation had stemmed from this lack of dynamic
range. Higher beam energies will not cause a limitation ei-
ther. In the next section it will be examined whether the




This section discusses the preliminary analysis of six
data sets. The data sets had previously been presented and
discussed ([10] for collimation losses and [11] for injection
losses). The analysis assumes that only the beam intensity
increases, and all other conditions remain unchanged. The
purpose of this analysis is to estimate whether additional
limitations on intensity have to be deduced from the 2009
data. In each case the most-critical elements - i.e. the ele-
ments whose beam loss monitors are closest to thresholds
(will first take away the beam permit) - are identified.
Beam Cleaning
For the collimation cleaning, data at 450 GeV 1.3 s inte-
gration time (the longest integration time logged in 2009)
are compared to 84 s threshold values (the lowest threshold
values). The elements with the longest minimum lifetime
(at which the BLM thresholds are reached) are identified
(most-critical elements). Beam 1 and beam 2 longitudinal
cleaning (RF detuning), beam 1 vertical cleaning and beam
2 horizontal cleaning (crossing of vertical/horizontal third
integer resonance) was analysed. The results are scaled to
nominal beam intensity (3×1014), and the minimum beam
lifetime at which the losses reach the threshold values are
calculated. Table 2 shows the beam lifetime at threshold
for the three most-critical elements for horizontal and lon-
gitudinal cleaning, and the two most-critical collimators,
the most-critical warm magnet and the most-critical cold
magnet for the vertical cleaning of beam 1.
For transverse cleaning, the first limiting elements are
collimators of the opposite beam. The signals seem to be
caused by ‘crosstalk’ particle showers: Fig. 7 shows hori-
zontal cleaning of beam 2. Systematically, the first beam 1
monitor downstream of a beam 2 collimator loss location
shows a high signal. For horizontal cleaning of beam 2, the
most-critical cold element is in IP6, it is only a factor 3.4
further away from threshold than the ‘crosstalk’ collima-
tors. For vertical cleaning of beam 1, the first cold element
is only on position 17, 6 × 10−3 times further away from
threshold than the first collimator.
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Figure 7: Horizontal cleaning of beam2, losses in IP7.
For longitudinal cleaning of beam 2, the most-critical el-
ement is a cold dipole. For beam 1, the cold dipole is within
a factor of two to the collimators. The longitudinal losses
are localized in IP3, the first element in IP7 is a factor 10
lower than IP3. Cleaning for beam 1 is mirror-symmetric
to beam 2: The corresponding collimators get the signals
closest to threshold; the MBs with the highest signals are
next to each other.
The cleaning performance is not limited by the BLM
dynamic range, as all long integration time thresholds are
within the dynamic range of the BLM system. The phi-
losophy for setting thresholds in the LHC is local damage
protection. But a monitor cannot distinguish between a lo-
cal loss on the collimator it is protecting (danger of damage
above a certain limit) and a broad particle shower coming
along the tunnel (which, at the same signal height, will cer-
tainly not cause damage to the collimator it is protecting).
With the exception of beam 1 vertical cleaning (by far the
less critical one) the ‘crosstalk’ issue does not seem to sig-
nificantly limit the cleaning performance. It should be in-
vestigated, whether the thresholds for the collimators could
still be increased while staying safely below damage limit
at the same time.
The required minimum beam lifetime at injection and
ramp is 0.1 h (during 10 s) and 0.006 h (during 1 s) respec-
tively [12]. The beam intensities foreseen for 2010 are up
to 3− 6× 1013. For the 2010 intensities a cleaning perfor-
mance as the one analysed would already be sufficient for
injection. The vertical cleaning of beam 1 even fulfills the
requirements for the ramp. A factor of 17-50 of improve-
ment would be required to reach the requirements for the
ramp for the worst case (beam 2 horizontal cleaning).
Injection Losses
For injection losses, 40 µs loss data are compared to
40 µs thresholds. Beam 1 and beam 2 cleanest injections
in 2009 were analysed. Scraping in the SPS was used
and the TCDI were set to 6 σ horizontal and 4.5 σ verti-
cal. The injected beam intensity at which the threshold
Table 2: Elements whose beam loss monitors will first take
away the beam permit at nominal beam intensity 3× 1014.
The uncertainty is estimated from the uncertainty in the





Beam 1 vertical cleaning
BLMEI.05R7.B2I10 TCSG.B5R7.B2 1 - 1.5
BLMEI.06L7.B2I10 TCLA.B6L7.B2 0.06 - 0.09
. . . . . .
BLMEI.06L7.B1E10 MBW.B6L7 0.03 - 0.05
. . . . . .
BLMQI.01R2.B1I20 MQXA 0.006 - 0.009
Beam 2 horizontal cleaning
BLMEI.06R7.B1E10 TCLA.B6R7.B1 62 - 86
BLMEI.06R7.B1E10 TCLA.A6R7.B1 26 - 37
BLMQI.04L6.B2I10 MQY 18 - 24
Beam 1 longitudinal cleaning
BLMEI.05L3.B1I10 TCSG.5L3.B1 13 - 18
BLMEI.05R3.B1I10 TCLA.A5R3.B1 7 - 10
BLMEI.08R3.B1I23 MBB 7 - 10
Beam 2 longitudinal cleaning
BLMEI.08R3.B2I30 MBA 22 - 31
BLMEI.05R3.B2E10 TCSG.5R3.B2 7 - 10
BLMEI.05L3.B2E10 TCLA.A5L3.B2 5 - 7
level would be reached is calculated and the most-critical
elements are identified. The nominal beam intensity for in-
jection in 3 × 1013 and the injection intensity foreseen for
2010 is 4× 1012.
Table 3 shows the number of injected protons at thres-
hold for the most-critical element of each category (col-
limator, warm magnet and cold magnet) for beam 1 and
beam 2. Numerous elements (collimators, cold and warm
magnets) yield similar limits. For beam 1, 16% of the 38
most-critical elements are cold magnets. For beam 2 injec-
tion (which was 4.4 times further away from threshold than
the one of beam 1), 55% of the 27 most-critical elements
are cold magnets. The critical elements spread over several
IPs, the losses are not loccalised to the insertion region.
IC thresholds (40 µs) in warm elements (collimators and
warm magnets) are limited by the BLM dynamic range.
But losses at cold magnets are about equally close to thres-
hold. Hence, injection losses need to be reduced further,
and scraping in the SPS seems crucial. It is possible to
increase thresholds on primary and secondary collimators
and on warm magnets (by additional R-C filter or installing
small ICs). But most likely the limit for the injection are
the losses in the cold magnets and not the dynamic range
of the BLM system.
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Table 3: First element of each category (collimator, warm
and cold magnet) whose beam loss monitor will first take





Coll. BLMEI.06L7.B1E10 TCP.A6L7.B1 1.5 · 1011
Warm mag. BLMEI.06L7.B1E10 MBW.B6L7 5.5 · 1011
Cold mag. BLMQI.08L2.B1E30 MQML 6.7 · 1011
Beam 2
Coll. BLMEI.06R7.B2I10 TCP.C6R7.B2 3.4 · 1012
Warm mag. BLMEI.06R8.B2E10 MSIB 9.8 · 1012
Cold mag. BLMEI.04R8.B2E10 MBXB 3.9 · 1012
SUMMARY
The crucial task for the BLM system in the beginning of
the 2010 run is to reach full protection level. Beam tests
are needed to determine the safe threshold settings. Full
application of the BLM system tests and system change
procedures will be enforced. The known BLM system lim-
itations and the foreseen upgrades seem compatible with
the LHC schedule. Typically, warm elements should have
higher thresholds for short integration times. The locations
which need higher thresholds in order not to limit the per-
formance of the LHC can be equipped with an R-C filter or
with new LICs. Alternatively, a different monitor location
could be chosen or shielding installed. No additional limi-
tation had been identified for energies up to 5 TeV. The first
(preliminary) analysis of collimation cleaning data shows
that the 2010 requirements for 450 GeV where already ful-
filled by the 2009 set-up. (Cleaning losses during ramp will
have to be investigated.) The (preliminary) analysis of in-
jection losses shows that they will have to be reduced for
the 2010 intensities, especially for beam 1. Various cold
magnets are affected by injection losses, and the BLM sys-
tem does not seem to be the limiting factor.
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HOW       TO          SAFELY      REACH     HIGHER     ENERGIES     AND     INTENSITIES
J. Wenninger, CERN, Geneva
Abstract
The LHC Machine Protection System has been commis-
sioned in November and December 2009 for low intensity
and low energy beam operation. During this period in-
terlocks were activated step by step and masking of chan-
nels was used regularly to improve the commissioning ef-
ficiency. As intensity and energy are increased this flexi-
bility will be lost as the machine has to be protected at all
times. It is therefore essential that all protection function-
ality must be commissioned at low intensity. Intensity and
energy must be increased progressively, and every new step
in energy or optics must be performed at low intensity. The
steps that must be performed at the various stages will be
outlined. The issues related to masking of interlock chan-
nels will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
During the second half of 2009, and in particular in No-
vember and December 2009, a large majority of interlocks
were tested and activated. Despite the presence of close to
20’000 interlocks capable of stopping the beams, the LHC
could be operated without significant problems due to the
Machine Protection System (MPS) [1]. No magnet was
quenched with circulating beam thanks to an excellent col-
limation setup, with cleaning efficiencies well above 99%.
The frequently predicted ”with so many interlocks it will
never work” scenario did not occur thanks to the excellent
preparation, see Fig. 2 for an overview of all systems feed-
ing into the LHC Beam Interlock System (BIS).
It must however be noted that the beams were modest
compared to design: the maximum stored energy was 30 kJ
see Fig. 1, a factor 10000 to go, and no beam made it above
the Setup Beam Flag (SBF) limit [2].
The 2010 plans for the LHC imply World record stored
energies, approximately 10 times larger than TEVATRON,
to be reached on the time scale of a few months !
MPS IN 2009
MPS tests without beam were almost entirely completed
(some test were not required for low intensities). Follow-
ing the stop in January and February 2010, some tests must
be repeated (equipment changes or upgrades, in particular
for the LBDS). Concerning MPS tests with beam, approxi-
mately 2/3 of individual system beam tests were completed.
Global setup and tests were performed for injection energy.
Collimators and absorbers were set up (for injection only a
Figure 1: Setup Beam Flag limit as a function of beam en-
ergy. The green area indicates the region that was explored
in 2009. The dashed region indicates the stored energy area
for operation with 156 bunches at half-nominal bunch in-
tensity.
partial setup was made). Global setup and tests must be re-
peated at all energies and β∗ values. A major item missing
in 2009 was the abort gap cleaning; it was tested, but was
not made operational (for beam 1 the undulator was not
commissioned) and not interlocked. This will become crit-
ical at high(er) intensity and smaller β∗ (aperture limited
by triplet, quenches of Q4 in case of excessive gap popula-
tion).
A few issues have been uncovered during the 2009 oper-
ation of the LHC MPS.
• Safe Machine Parameters (SMP) System: reliabil-
ity issues on the Safe Energy were observed before
startup with beam. This resulted in the transmitted
beam energy being set to 7.86 TeV. It must be noted
that this value is the SAFE state. This issues affects
the machine availability (false dumps), but not the ma-
chine safety. The Setup Beam Flag (SBF) and Beam
Presence Flag (BPF) had reliability issues related to
the data transmission from the LHC BCTs. Solutions
will be in place in 2010 to address the safety issues:
the energy value and transmission will be surveyed
with the Software Interlock System (SIS [3]), the SBF
will be forced FALSE if needed. The SMP system
specification and design will be reviewed in 2010.
• BLM signal cross-talk and saturation was observed
mostly in the injection region (TDI and TCDI colli-
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Figure 2: Schema of the LHC Machine Protection System with all its clients.
mators). BLMs on the injection dumps (TDI) were
saturated for short time scales already with a single
pilot bunch. Losses on the TCDI transfer line colli-
mators induce large signals on LHC ring BLMs due
to the close distance between the collimators and the
BLMs that are protecting the LHC super-conducting
magnets. Shielding of the BLMs from the TCDI may
be a longer term solution, but simulations are required
to evaluate if sufficient shielding can be installed in
the crowded injection region. Due to the TCDI-ring
BLM shower cross-talk, scrapping in the SPS was
mandatory already for very small intensities. Injection
of a pilot bunch on the IP8 TDI (required for over-
injection) triggered a dump on a BLM installed on the
D1 magnet to protect the triplet (Q3). Possible solu-
tions to the problem will be evaluated. Despite those
issues the performance of the BLM system proved to
be remarkable and the diagnostics (1 Hz data stream)
proved to be excellent, Remarkable
MOVING TOWARDS UNSAFE BEAMS
MPS operation at 3.5, 5 or 7 TeV is essentially equivalent
(splices are not considered). There are differences due to
the emittance, the minimum β∗, the collimator settings and
the quench level. Collimators and absorbers must be set up
at every energy. The quench level decreases with energy,
see Fig. 3, which makes collimator more and more critical
as the energy is increased.
Figure 3: Estimated magnet enthalpy as a function of the
energy for 3 different models (Courtesy M. Sapinski).
A certain number is conditions must be fulfilled to oper-
ate with unsafe beam:
• All MPS system test steps must be completed (with
and without beam).
• Collimators and absorbers must be in place, in partic-
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ular during the stable beams periods.
• Global protection tests must be completed. This in-
cludes triggering powering failures to ensure that the
beam is dumped in due time, inducing low lifetimes
to very the quality of the collimator positioning.
• Injection protection will only be required when unsafe
beams are injected directly.
• Beam diagnostics must be working reliably, in partic-
ular the for BPMs and BLMs.
• The Post-mortem diagnostics must be adequate [4].
More and more online analysis must be developed
with experience.
• The optics must be known and reproducible.
• The orbit must be reproducible at the level of at least
one rms beam size.
• The operational cycle must be established.
The systems that are part of the MPS monitor equipment
and beam parameters and aim to safely extract the stored
energy in case of failure. The safety levels of those systems
are either unknown or estimated from reliability analysis.
Dry operation is used to verify some reliability estimates
(see for example the LBDS and BIS reliability runs). A
critical point for such safety level estimates concerns com-
mon cause and correlated failures leaving the machine un-
protected in some situations. For certain failure cases, pro-
tection redundancy based on a diversity of systems reduces
the likelihood and impact of correlated failures, but redun-
dancy does not exist for all cases. Careful performance
monitoring of the MPS during operation may reveal issues
before they are the cause of incidents. Confidence in the
safety is mostly obtained by running the system and moni-
toring it carefully: this unfortunately takes time!
The control system also plays a role in operating with un-
safe beams. Errors due to operational mistakes or controls
issues may trigger dangerous situations that could have dra-
matic consequences in case of a coincidence with another
failures (failure coincidence).
The beam is a another complex variable in the MP game.
Both beam shape and position must be well controlled.
Tail populations and distributions are an issue at the LHC:
the tails of a high intensity LHC beam constitute an un-
safe beam. The available reaction time to certain failures
depends strongly on tail properties, which can vary sig-
nificantly depending on the operating conditions (beam-
beam).
MD periods
During standard physics operation sequences and set-
tings can be frozen to ensure best possible protection, even
if so far only orbit correctors settings are surveyed.
Machine Development (MD) phases interleaved with
standard operation are a potential threat since the experi-
ments may involve interlock masking. Settings changes in-
troduced during MDs can potentially break the collimator-
absorber hierarchy. To provide more safety, one MD par-
ticipant must be responsible to restore machine conditions.
Separation of settings for MD and for regular operation is
a simple means to avoid undesired settings changes. The
scope of ”end-of-fill” MDs (at the end of a stable beams pe-
riod) will be severely limited because the beams will most
likely be unsafe. Squeeze, crossing angle, etc experiments
can only be performed if they have been tested previously
at low intensity.
Interlock masking
Interlock and signal masking at the LHC is strongly de-
pendent on the system.
• BIS inputs: for maskable channels the possibility to
mask is conditioned by the SBF. The SBF reliability
depends on the LHC BCTs, and more experience is
needed to decide if the safety is sufficient. For regu-
lar physics fills the SBF will be forced to FALSE (at
the start ramp). Beyond a certain intensity one might
consider forcing permanently the SBF to FALSE. An
expert would in that case unforce the SBF for MDs.
• SIS inputs: masking of tests is conditioned by RBAC
and limited to EICs and SIS experts.
• BLMs: disabling a BLM is only possible by following
an approved procedure. There are strict rules for dis-
abling a loss monitor to avoid creating local ’holes’
in the protection by disabling to many monitors of a
region.
• PIC (electrical circuits/magnets): masking of circuits
is only possible by the PIC expert. This is evidently
also limited to uncritical circuits since the LHC can-
not operate without the main elements (RB, RQ, IPQ,
IPD IT). Depending on the circuit it may be more ef-
ficient to repair than to perform a low intensity ramp
to check ramp ing a circuit may be more efficient that
rechecking ramp and squeeze. Faulty orbit correctors
could become an (efficiency) issue. MCBX
Post-mortem
The Post-mortem (PM) system holds all the essential in-
formation to diagnose beam dumps (programmed or emer-
gency). A careful analysis of the data must be performed to
validate the performance of the MPS, and to detect anom-
alies that could lead to severe incidents before it may be too
late.
A PM analysis team must check all the beam dumps, and
develop automated tools to perform as much diagnostics as
possible online. In 2010 the EICs will have to acknowledge
every beam dump, and SIS will inhibit injection as long
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Phase kinjb kb Nb Estored Step L Comment
(1010 p) (kJ) (Hz cm−2)
1 1 4 0.5 11.2 4.2 ×1027 pilot collisions
2 1 4 2 44.8 4 6.8 ×1028 ≈3 times above SBF limits
3 1 4 5 112 2.5 4.2 ×1029
4 1 8 5 224 2 8.4 ×1029
5 4 16 5 448 2 1.7 ×1030 Injection of 4 bunches
6 4 32 5 896 2 3.4 ×1030
7 4 43 5 1204 1.3 4.6 ×1030 Standard 43×43
8 6/12 48 5 1344 1.1 5.1 ×1030 50 ns trains of 6 or 13 bunches
Table 1: A possible scenario for the intensity increase in 2010 up to about 1 MJ. k b is the total number of bunches, k injb
the number of injected bunches. The injected intensity remains below the SBF limit at injection up to phase 7. Train
operation is started with short trains of 6 or 12 bunches.
as the last beam dump is not acknowledged. A database
of beam dumps must be established for later analysis, and
operation must be stopped if an abnormal event is detected.
STARTUP 2010
Initial operation will be performed with ’safe’ beams (in-
tensity below SBF limit). At 3.5 Tev 4 pilot bunches beam
are just are just at the SBF limit (3E10 p) and the risk is
very limited. The first commissioning steps:
1. Establish stable beams at 3.5 TeV with β∗ of 11 m.
2. Establish stable beams at 3.5 TeV with β∗ of 2-3 m.
The commissioning of the β∗ squeeze should be done in
parallel to operating for physics with β ∗ 11 m. There will
be no intensity increase in this period. Quiet beams periods
will be banned in 2010.
Increasing intensity
Decisions to increase the beam intensity will be based
on the performance of the MPS and on operational stabil-
ity. For the MPS, the decision will involve beam losses
(all machine phases), analysis of the Post-mortem system.
Green light for an intensity increase will be given by MPP
for machine protection performance and MP3 for magnet
performance (quenches). The intensity steps should not be
larger than a factor f = 2-4, with f a decreasing function of
intensity. The ratio luminosity to stored energy should be
maximized through the bunch charge: increase bunch in-
tensity first, then increase number of bunches. A long(er)
stable running period should be planned for a stored en-
ergy of 1 MJ which corresponds to present state of the art.
This is also the stored energy where by experience vacuum
chambers and magnet coils are damaged by uncontrolled
beam loss. A possible progression of stored energy and lu-
minosity is indicated in Table 1 up to a stored energy of
1 MJ. The progression above 1 MJ is difficult to predict, as
it depends on many factors, some of them not necessarily
related to MP (cleaning efficiency, beam-beam etc).
MPS setup and global MP tests must be repeated when
when β∗ is changed, when crossing angles are switched
on and when the operating energy is changed. To gain ef-
ficiency the number of MP setups should minimized. It
is recommended to select 1-2 β∗ values and then stick to
them (as much as possible). At any given time there will be
a well defined operation envelope:
• Total intensity




In 2010 the LHC will hopefully operate (highly) unsafe
beam: it may be possible to reach sufficient stored energy
to shutdown the LHC for some months in case of severe
incident. The MPS commissioning must be finished, and
some parts must be repeated (for example global tests).
A careful commissioning planning will avoid repetition of
MP testing. The operational cycle must be established to
switch to unsafe beam, and intensity increases must be
gradual. Careful analysis of losses and post-mortem data
will be used to validate machine safety. Finally great care
must be used during MD periods not to jeopardize safety
of regular operation.
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WHAT ELSE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO REACH 5 TEV AND BEYOND, 
CONSOLIDATION AND COMMISSIONING OF ESSENTIAL 
 MAGNET POWERING SYSTEMS 
W. Venturini Delsolaro, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
In this miscellaneous contribution the engineering 
changes introduced after the September 19 incident 
are revisited, in the light of a possible 5 TeV physics run, 
and beyond.  Some of these measures need consideration 
as they were adapted to, or only commissioned for the 
initial low energy run. Also, the non conformities that 




The title of this paper might look odd when thinking 
that the LHC was designed and built to accelerate protons 
up to 7 TeV. The reason why we have now to consider 
what needs to be done to reach 5 TeV is twofold. After the 
accident of 19th September 2008, several hardware 
modifications were introduced in order to prevent such 
events to repeat themselves, or to mitigate the 
consequences of eventual new accidents. These 
modifications are, in some cases, adapted to the initial 
low energy, and cannot be maintained unchanged to 
higher energies. 
On the other hand, in the course of hardware 
commissioning campaigns, a number of non conformities 
to the performance specified in the design were found to 
affect several elements of the machine. Some of these 
may be critical to reach higher energies. 
Among the engineering changes, those that can be 
relevant in this respect are:  
• the installation of DN200 safety valves, or 
better, the fact that it was not completed 
• the deployment of a new QPS to monitor and 
protect splices and to detect symmetric 
quenches  
• the change of dump resistors to accelerate 
energy extraction from the main circuits 
The discussed non conformities concern magnet 
circuits, vacuum and cryogenics. 
ENGINEERING CHANGES 
DN200 
The missing safety valves (in the sectors that were not 
warmed up) do not constitute a showstopper to run at 
higher energies. Of course the risk of collateral damage in 
case of rupture of the insulation vacuum will remain 
higher in the non equipped sectors. However this is 
acceptable because the probability of the primary events 
is considerably reduced, among other things, by the 
nQPS. 
Dump resistors 
In order to gain some margin on the tolerable joint 
resistances which are left in the machine, the values of the 
dump resistors for the main circuits were increased, as 
summarized in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: dump resistors parameters 




τ old (s) τ new (s) 
RB 73 146 104 52 
RQF/RQD 8.4 28.4 31.3 9.2 
 
This option becomes possible because the machine will 
initially run at lower energies, so that faster time constants 
can be obtained while still meeting the voltage ratings of 
the switch and of other systems. Actually, along with clear 
advantages, the faster energy extraction has drawbacks 
which are related to the peak di/dt and to the extraction 
voltages. As an example the switch arc chambers, which 
must blow off the arc at switch opening, are rated at 1 kV 
for the RB. Limitations on the values of the dump 
resistances, coming from various systems, are discussed 
in [1]. At higher energies the increased extraction voltages 
will not allow keeping the same time constants, and we 
will have to roll back to smaller dump resistances. 
At 5 TeV the time constant will have to be at least 68 s 
for the main dipoles (provided that the common mode 
limit can be raised by 4 % [1]) and 15 s for the 
quadrupoles. 
nQPS 
The new quench detection and protection systems (the 
extended bus bar detector system and the symmetric 
quench detectors) are the biggest engineering change 
introduced after the incident and should ensure that it will 
never happen again. However they also represent possible 
threats to the machine availability, as they add a large 
number of channels, each capable to pull powering 
interlocks and, for the symmetric quench detection, to fire 
quench heaters.   
The extended bus bar detector will trigger a fast power 
abort if any of the signals goes above the threshold of 500 
µV. To buck out the inductive voltage on the bus bar 
segment and its measurement cabling, a measurement of 
the current ramp rate must be available, and is derived 
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from the measured inductive voltage of the
dipole and from the dipole inductance. T
inductance of the dipole due to the saturati
(1% between 2 and 9 kA) will only margina
the detectors (by adding, at 10 A/s, about 2
voltage on the signals).   
The larger dump resistance enhances th
electrical disturbances at switch op
transmission line effects and transient apertu
in the dipoles, both of which can trigger the 
QPS bridges. Immunity from these perturba
developed to reach high operation efficiency
SNUBBER CAPACITOR
Voltages perturbations over magnet cha
extraction switches are opened can be mitiga
of capacitors installed in parallel to the d
(snubber capacitors). 
 The installation of capacitors in the main 
LHC is foreseen before running above 3.5 T
The voltage limits of the extraction sw
from the initial phase of the commutation p
the arc must be extinguished: once the switc
can withstand much higher voltages. T
conduct during the transient and delay the v
later time, when the arc is already sp
commutation process is a plasma dynamics 
simulations are difficult and laboratory mea
essential to the sizing of the capacitors. Thes
carried out in parallel with the next beam run
The installation of the snubber capacit
about 2 days per sector, it is incompatib
hardware commissioning activities on the 
but can be done in parallel in different sector
MAGNET NON CONFORMI
Weak 120 A orbit correctors 
Since the first commissioning campai
number of dipole correctors of the MCBY
type were found to quench on the flat t
beginning of the ramp down when the abso
the magnetic field is reduced. Fig.1 shows th
voltage recorded during the fault.  
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the findings is in [2]. 
The approach adopted so far has 
nominal current, or the nominal ram
most critical case is RCBYHS5.R8B1
30 A, while 48 A would be neede
possible optics at 5 TeV.  
Some of these circuits participate 
the crossing schemes, so the issue m
on the physics options of the LHC. It 
as long as the cause of the problem i
risk of an irreversible degradation ca
is therefore recommended to envisag
warm replacements for the most critic
 
Other 600A issues 
Some types of 600A correctors su
on the current ramp and acceleration
legacy of the chosen quench detecti
some cases voltage spikes, genera
converter when crossing zero, add to 
to spurious triggers of the QPS.  
One of the most sensitive c
(synchrotron light undulator); but 
problems as it is not needed to ramp it
 Particularly sensitive are also the 
also because, besides the QPS pro
leads need careful tuning due to a pec
latter was implemented after it had b
the initial design choice, which w
meters, would not be available. The 
the temperature at the top of the 
variable, and the location of the temp
the tuning process quite challenging. A
leads could be stabilized in all the – r
space, which is now only constra
mentioned QPS issues. However, also
the ALARA principle, it is recomm
reconsider the known alternatives
implemented regulation. 
Concerning the QPS sensitivity t
measure which consists in forcing 
detectors before starting a pre cycle 
already in the next beam run at 3.5 Te
Should these limitations become c
operations, the possibility of rela
protection thresholds could be conside
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in order to qualify the reconfigured circuit for higher 
energies.   
LEAK IN INSULATION VACUUM IN S34 
A vacuum leak of the order of 2 mbar l s-1 developed in 
the insulation vacuum in the middle of arc 34 before the 
start of beam operations. The vacuum level was stabilized 
around 10-4 mbar by adding two turbo-molecular pumps, 
thereby using all available ports. As a consequence of the 
degraded insulation vacuum, an additional heat load of 
about 200 W insists on the concerned subsector. This is a 
clear weakness as we rely on the additional pumping 
speed to keep the heat load to a sustainable level. A 
detailed record of the problem and of the measures taken 
is in [4].  
 The situation could be maintained throughout the 2009 
beam run to 1.2 TeV. The local static heat loads do not 
depend on energy, therefore in this respect the situation 
should not change at higher energy. There will be still 
about 70 W cooling power available at the leaky 
subsector. Concerning the dynamic heat loads, the heat 
deposited during the ramp by eddy currents will of course 
be larger. However this load is by design taken by the 
superfluid He enthalpy, so, as long as the temperature 
increase is limited below 2.17 K there is no real-time need 
of cooling power. The design values for the temperature 
increase (50 mK for the nominal ramp) turns out to be 
very conservative because the quantity of liquid helium 
involved was underestimated. Calorimetric measurements 
showed that the temperature increase is 10 mK for a ramp 
to 7 kA. The heat load during a fast discharge will also be 
larger, but in this case there should as well be no problem, 
as after the energy dump the cryogenics system will have 
time to re-cool the subsector.  
CL REGULATION VALVES 
Gas flow regulation valves on current leads have given 
in some cases mechanical problems (hysteresis, blocks) 
leading to the loss of the cryogenics interlocks. The 
phenomenon was aggravated by the change of regulation 
algorithm from ON-OFF to PID which took place in 
2009. In principle the situation will not change at higher 
currents, and it will still represent a potential limitation to 
the machine availability.  
The problem can be tackled by changing valve design, 
or by just replacing the faulty items and those which are 
deemed likely to fail. The first solution is a long term 
enterprise, as the number of valves is huge. For the time 
being the second approach is being pursued. A new 
campaign of preventive maintenance should be foreseen 
for the next shutdown.  
QUENCH LINES 
Quench buffers at odd points cannot be used due to 
non-conform pipe work: the sliding points, which should 
allow the thermal shrinkage (about 300 mm in total) when 
the lines are operating, are in reality fixed, and some 
integration problems have arisen on top of that. With 
halved quench buffers with respect to design, in case of a 
big quench the excess helium would be released in the 
atmosphere, putting the inventory at risk. Solutions are 
under study, but not likely to be implemented in 2010.  
SUMMARY 
Most of the issues identified are not real showstoppers 
for running at higher energies, but rather impact on the 
machine availability. 
Leaving aside all splice considerations, running at 5 
TeV will require to  
• Bring the main circuits from 6 to 8.5 kA 
• Bring MQY circuits from 1.9 kA to 2.7 kA 
• Bring MQM circuits from 2.8 kA to 3.85 kA 
•  Assessing RQX.R1 protection  
• Install snubber capacitors 
• Increase the RB time constant to 68 s 
• Increase the RQF-D time constant to 15 s 
 
The time constants indicated are minimum values.   
The installation of snubber capacitors should take at 
least 2 weeks per sector.  
Consolidation works, to improve machine availability 
and flexibility shall include: 
• Repairing the leak in sector 34 
• Changing the regulation process for the gas 
cooled current leads of the inner triplet 
correctors 
• Consolidating the gas flow regulation valves 
of the current leads 
• Reviewing and relaxing when possible QPS 
thresholds 
• Predisposing warm spares for weak RCBY 
and RCBC magnets 
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HARDWARE COMMISSIONING 2010 AND BEYOND  
R.Schmidt, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
For the years to come, extensive re-commissioning of 
the superconducting circuits is expected. In order to 
reduce the time and resources required for the 
recommissioning, ideas how to improve the efficiency are 
discussed. Some of the steps during the re-commissioning 
can be optimised. Reducing the number of interfaces 
between different teams is suggested. The different 
software tools can be improved and partially combined, in 
order to better follow up the evolution of a circuit and to 
optimise the coordination between different teams.  
Personal safety is vital, and rationalising the safety 
procedures is proposed. 
Another important aspect is the general organisation, 
including the definition of responsibility for the 
commissioning and the transition between shutdown, 
hardware commissioning and beam operation. The 
preparation for the next commissioning campaign should 
start soon, since it will take some time to implement 
upgraded tools. 
WHY HARDWARE COMMISSIONING IN 
THE FUTURE? 
For several years, extensive re-commissioning of the 
superconducting circuits is expected, after total or partial 
warm up of the LHC sectors. Warm-up will be required 
for adding relief valves, for consolidation of splices and 
for other activities. Hardware commissioning will also be 
needed to prepare the LHC for operation at 5 and 7 TeV. 
To go to 7 TeV, an extensive training of the magnets is 
required. 
Upgrade and modifications of power converters, 
powering interlock system and QPS (e.g. for example 
replacement with radiation tolerant electronics) will 
required some recommissioning. Most plans for other 
upgrades would also imply some recommissioning. 
It is worth to invest time and effort into further 
optimisation of hardware commissioning since this would 
reduce time and resources.  
There are several questions that should be addressed: 
• What needs to be done? (Does it really have to be 
done?) 
• What can be improved? 
• What can be automated 
• Resources – what is required? 
As a long term objective it is proposed to set an 
ambitious objective: perform the powering tests in three 
weeks. 
WHAT IS HARDWARE 
COMMISSIONING? 
Hardware commissioning includes many different type 
of activities. Part of the activities are planned and then 
performed by the different teams in the underground 
areas: 
• Lock off power converters 
• Disconnect the power cables to current leads 
• ELQA at warm 
• Start monitoring main circuits during cool down 
• Cool down and cryo tuning 
• Stop monitoring main circuits during cool down 
• ELQA at cold   
• Connect the power cables to current leads 
• Unlock power converters 
 
Other activities are coordinated from the CCC, partially 
done remotely, partially requiring access underground: 
• Preparation of QPS (charge quench heaters, close 
interlock loops and prepare QPS system for 
powering) 
• Powering tests 
ORGANISATION OF HARDWARE 
COMMISSIONING 
It is proposed to coordinate activities underground by 
EN-MEF (shutdown coordination team). This would 
include cool down and ELQA at cold. 
Activities driven from CCC (mainly powering tests), 
interleaved with planned and unplanned activities 
underground would be coordinated by operation with the 
support of experts. It is understood that during this period 
major contributions from several groups in TE and EN are 
required. 
The system with four “point owners” to follow up the 
detailed progress in the LHC underground areas worked 
well and should be retained. One point owner taking care 
of two sectors is appropriate. It could be envisaged to 
have point owners from EN-MEF, BE-OP and TE. 
WHAT WENT WELL  
• The procedures were ready in time. 
• Operation in powering in phase I (low current) and II 
(high current) was complex, but the split in the two 
phases allowed to progress with powering at low 
current in parallel to activities in adjacent sectors. 
• Shifts during 7 days, with 3 shifts per day were 
essential as soon as several sectors are available for 
powering. 
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• Grouping accesses on Tuesday (and possibly 
Wednesday) during the morning for the different 
teams was useful. As during 2009, for giving access, 
the operations group needs help during working days, 
between 7:00 and 18:00. 
• The support from MP3 and from QPS experts is 
essential.  
• The powering test pages are essential for following 
up progress. 
• Superlocking of circuits with an issue, and simple 
locking of circuits worked well (some ideas for 
improvements, see below). 
• Software tools are in general very good. 
• Automatic analysis for PIC tests – good experience, 
can be extended to more tests and other systems, 
reducing the need for experts. 
WHAT SHOULD BE IMPROVED 
For the DFB there are too many interfaces and a 
reorganisation will lead to simplification. As an example, 
there is a team for performing ELQA, a team for 
connection and disconnection of cables, a team for 
cryogenic interventions (valves, …) and a team for 
locking / unlocking power converters. In case of problems 
with the water cooled cables another team is required. 
The organisation will become even more complex with 
additional systems (such as an interlock on the current 
lead temperature). 
It is proposed to have only one team for all electrical 
interventions on DFBs. This is being tried out during this 
technical stop. Since this is additional work for the ELQA 
team, the organisation and resources need to be 
addressed. 
During the period with many activities in the tunnel, it 
would be helpful to open doors in the centre of a sector 
(see presentation of Julie Coupard). 
The existing software tools are very performing. The 
automatic analysis should be extended to other tests. 
Powering phase I and II: the RB circuit can be powered 
at 110 A in phase I, for starting the circuits and for 
checking interlocks. It has been shown successfully in 
December 2009 that the RB can operate at 100A. 
Whenever access to the underground areas was given, 
all circuits were locked using the powering interlock 
system. The restart off all the systems causes frequently 
trouble. It is suggested to ramp down all circuits to 
injection current, and the RB circuit to 110A. The energy 
stored in the circuits is below 100kJ and the risk for 
massive helium release negligible. A mechanism is 
proposed to prevent an accidental increase of the current 
in a circuit at the level of the FGC during access. 
Safety for people and simplicity for operation: a 
hardware link between the access system and the 
powering system, possibly via the powering interlock 
system, should be studied. 
The access matrix should be reviewed, in light of the 
operational experience and of further improvements of the 
sealing between the sectors, in order to allow access in 
one sector while performing powering tests in the 
adjacent sectors. 
Powering tests require many experts in CCC. One 
expert for the operation of the magnet powering system 
mastering the QPS system and the question related to the 
magnet system should be appropriate. This requires 
training and improved tools. 
ELQA  
The ELQA procedures are already well optimised, 
however, some ideas: 
• Avoid warming up to above 80K 
• Review what needs to be repeated 
• Is it possible doing it differently? 
• Is it possible to further automating the tests?   
The number of test systems should be increased to 
avoid any limitation by the number of such systems. The 
ELQA test could be done in a shorter time window if 
more resources would be available. Therefore test 
systems should require little training is to perform tasks 
by non experts. We still will rely on help from outside 
collaborators, but more help from inside CERN could also 
be envisaged. It must be stressed that qualified personnel 
is required.  
Non conformities take a long time to understand and to 
repair. It is better to invest time before into quality 
control, for example during cabling campaigns, to avoid 
non conformities. Members of the ELQA team should be 
involved from the moment when equipment is designed 
that needs to withstand high voltage.   
MP3 
MP3 is responsible for writing the procedures together 
with the hardware commissioning coordination team. 
Ideas for future re-commissioning should be worked 
out – what needs to be redone? This depends on the 
circuit history (warm up to room temperature to 
80K,…..). 
The procedures need to be cleaned up and made 
coherent starting soon, and not some weeks before the 
next commissioning campaign. Clear responsibilities need 
to be defined – who should drive this effort? 
Simplifying retesting groups of circuits (test of main 
interlock functionalities) should be considered. 
QPS  
Further consolidation of the QPS system will lead to 
less test steps failing. Non conformities take a long time 
to understand and to solve. 
The nQPS commissioning procedures needs to be 
integrated into the general RB and RQF/D commissioning 
procedures. 
Monitoring during cool down to detect problems: can it 
be extended using the nQPS system? 
A system similar to the nQPS to measure the bus bar 
resistance for individual powered magnets needs to be 
developed. This will require new steps in commissioning. 
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The QPS is very complex, and the expert knowledge 
needs to be spread to more colleagues. 
It is suggested to merge MP3 and QPS operation 
support teams. This is also considered as a long term 
commitment to keep the competence. 
POWERING INTERLOCK SYSTEM AND 
POWER CONVERTERS 
The resources required for the tests of the powering 
interlock system did substantially decrease from 2008 to 
2009, due to the automation of the analysis. Automation 
can be extended, further reducing the resources required 
during commissioning. 
This is similar for the tests of power converters, some 
further automation of the analysis is possible. 
One test that always takes long time is cutting the water 
of the RB and RQF/D circuits, since someone needs to go 
to the underground area to close the valve. The remote 
operation of the valves for these circuits is recommended. 
 
CRYOGENICS SYSTEM  
There was a remarkable improvement of the stability of 
the cryogenic system between 2008 and 2009, and very 
little downtime during hardware commissioning due to 
the cryogenic system in 2009. 
Frequent replacement of the valves for 600A circuit 
were an issue, and took quite some time and effort from 
several teams. This requires locking off the entire DFB, 
could a procedure be defined that does not require the 
locking? 
Cryo tuning is one of the limiting factors before starting 
powering (such as boil-off, etc.).  Does it have to be 
repeated? Can it become more automatic and possibly 
faster? 
Sometimes it is required to force a parameter related to 
one circuit (such as a temperature of a lead or a valve) to 
provide power permit for a powering subsector, thus 
allowing operation of many other circuits. In this case, 
only one circuit cannot be operated. A link between the 
supervision of the cryo system and the powering interlock 
system should be considered that allows cryo experts to 
superlock the circuit, not relying on exchange of emails. 
TRACKING CIRCUITS: ONLY ONE 
ENTRY  
Several tools are being used today to track the 
commissioning progress for one circuit. One tool for 
tracking all aspects during the life of a circuit is suggested 
that includes information on: 
• power converter locked off / unlocked 
• circuit ready for ELQA (cryo start and cryo 
maintain) 
• cable connected / disconnected 
• ELQA at warm and at cold 
• connection and disconnection of monitoring 
systems before start of cool down (for main 
circuits) 
• QPS individual system tests finished (heaters 
charged, other conditions, …) 
• powering test steps (powering tests pages) 
Having all information in one tool would lead to more 
safe commissioning (less error prone), to improved 
tracking of the progress (faster), and to simpler 
communication between teams (less errors, faster). 
LONG TERM OBJECTIVE: POWERING 
TESTS IN THREE WEEKS  
As a summary, the main proposals: 
Organisation: Coordination by TE-MEF before 
powering, and BE-OP when powering starts. Retain the 
system with four “Point Owners”.  
DFBs: Define responsibilities and reduce the number 
of  interfaces. 
Tools: Prepare one tool (or at least on entry into the set 
of tools) for the status of the circuits. 
In order to be more efficient, the preparations must start 
soon. A team should prepare future hardware 
commissioning with the mandate to: 
• propose improvements of tools, follow  up the 
development   
• follow up updating of the commissioning 
procedures 
• get new people involved into this activity 
 
The team should include members from BE (OP, CO), 
EN (MEF, ICE), TE (MPE, Cryo, MSC, EPC) and 
MP3/QPS. 
As a milestone, it is suggested to organise a workshop 
and write a report later this year. 
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OVERVIEW OF ALL SUPERCONDUCTING SPLICES IN THE LHC 
MACHINE 
N. Catalan Lasheras, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland.
Abstract 
In the past year, the quality of the superconducting 
splices of the LHC circuits has drawn considerable 
awareness. While most of the attention is put into the 
main arc quadrupole and dipole circuits, lower energy 
circuits, like orbit and optics correctors are considered 
safer due to the lower energy stored in them. As part of 
the task force for splice consolidations, we ought to 
examine the status and potential electrical risks of all 
circuits in the LHC machine. This paper addresses mainly 
the 600 A and inner triplet circuits, reviews the known 
facts, and introduces the working plan for the next 
months.  
INTRODUCTION 
A task force for splice consolidation has been created to 
“To review the status of all superconducting splices in the 
LHC machine and prepare the necessary consolidation 
actions for 7 TeV operations” [1]. The case of the high 
current splices (6 and 13kA) will be addressed in 
following contributions of this session. In this report, we 
will review mostly the facts and status on the “low” 
energy circuits (correctors in his majority) and on the 
inner triplet circuits. A large part of the material discussed 
in this report has been already presented and reviewed 
during the construction of the magnets and their 
installation inside the LHC tunnel [2].  
First of all, when attempting to make a survey of all the 
superconducting splices in the LHC, we need to consider 
splices made inside the magnets at the manufacturer 
premises as well as splices made during their 
interconnection in the tunnel. Table 1 displays an 
inventory of the number of splices for every type of 
circuit and current rating.  The total number of 
superconducting splices is larger than 105. We observe 
that the number of internal and interconnection splices if 
very similar. A better quality can however be expected 
from the internal or magnet splices because they have 
already been tested at cold, either during manufacturing, 
or during SM18 reception tests at CERN. On top of this, 
their mechanical restrain is better than the one of 
interconnection splices. Nevertheless, the protection of 
these circuits follows a completely different philosophy 
than those of the main magnets. The lack of 
instrumentation does not allow distinguishing between 
internal and external splices.  
 
Table 1: Inventory of Superconducting Splices 





RB M3 9856 3372 13 kA 
RQF, RQD M1, M2 3940 6744 13 kA 
Inner Triplet  80 112 13 kA 
IPQ, IPD N’ 1644 532 6 kA 
Spool pieces M1, M2 30860 33920 600 A 
Correctors N 27006 16000 600 A  
IT correctors  704 480 600 A 
 
In the first part of this paper, we will try to prioritize the 
circuits with respect to their stored energy and hot-spot 
temperature in order to reveal their criticality.  In the 
following section, we will describe the interconnection 
splices done in 600 A circuits and summarize the results 
obtained on electrical measurements during the hardware 
commissioning. The last section provides a short 
description and status of the interconnection splices in the 
inner triplet circuits.  
CRITICALITY 
The magnetic energy stored in the LHC superconducting 
circuits ranges from 1MJ on the smallest circuits, like the 
octupole spool pieces, to more than 1000 GJ for one of 
the eight arc dipole circuits. For comparison, the energy 
stored in the beam at nominal conditions and 7 TeV is 
360 MJ. Figure 1 shows the energy stored in single 
circuits of the LHC in decreasing order. In the full vertical 
axis scale, only the RB and RQ circuits would be visible 
with 1100 and 200 GJ respectively. Other lattice magnet 
circuits like the inner triplet or individually-powered 
quadrupoles (IPQs) correspond to 0.2 and 8 GJ. The 
energy stored in most of the corrector circuits remains 
within the MJ range. 
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Figure 1: Energy stored on each supercondu
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independent of the number of splices in the circuit below 
2-4 µOhms which provides the noise floor given by the 
voltage reading resolution. (a few mV). The measurement 
can be considered as significant only above 4 µOhms. 
The measurements obtained in the RCO circuits seem to 
have a higher average resistance per splice than other 
circuits. It is indeed the case for the RCO magnets which 
are expected to have a resistance between 4 and 6 nOhms 
compared to 4 nOhms for all other circuits. Besides, the 
resistance measurements for these circuits are performed 
at lower current as the nominal value is only 100 A, thus 
the accuracy is much lower what is also seen as a large 
spread in the measurements.  
 
Figure 3: Total resistance of the 600 A circuits in lines N 
and M as measured during the hardware commissioning. 
The number of splices per circuit is shown in the right 
axes as a joint line. 
The average resistance per splice is plotted in Figure 4 
and was used to qualify the circuits during hardware 
commissioning. The RQ6 circuits in IP3 and IP7 show a 
systematic excess of average resistance for a moderate 
number of splices. Indeed, the internal splices in these 
magnets which consist of six MQTLs together in the same 
cold mass are indeed made following a different process 
which may explain the higher resistance. We observe 
three other circuits (red dots in the figure) for which the 
resistance value is excessive. The measurements will be 
repeated in 2010.  
 
Figure 4: Average resistance per splice for 600 A 
circuits. For circuits with more than 200 splices, the 
average resistance drops down to nominal values. 
In order to identify potential weak points like splices or 
unprotected bus-bars, a thorough analysis of the 600 A 
circuits from the bottom of the current leads is ongoing. 
The first circuit chosen for this purpose is the MCD as it 
stores the maximum energy on the M line close to the 
quadrupole bus-bars.  
INNER TRIPLET 13 KA CIRCUITS 
Feeding current into the three quadrupoles of the inner 
triplet is done trough two separate bus-bars of 5 and 8 kA 
respectively. As for the 600 A correctors, the protection 
of the bus-bars splices and the magnets is done together 
using a resistive voltage threshold of 100 mV. The 
connection between superconductors is brazed together 
with full copper cables interleaved between the 
superconducting cables (see Figure 5). The resulting 
splices are then insulated by a glass fibre tape. The 600 A 
correctors inside the inner triplet are also brazed together 
and hold on top of the main bus-bar by a composite piece.  
A detailed map of the splices in these circuits, the cable 
and bus-bar geometry, as well as the location of the 
voltage taps used for protection is ongoing.  
Calorimetric measurements done in the inner triplet 
cryostat to detect an excessive resistance were not 
conclusive. Dedicated electrical measurements to estimate 
the resistance of the interconnection splices are planned 
either through the QPS system or by a special 
measurement device as part of the electrical quality 
assurance.  
 
Figure 5: Cross section of the bus-bar interconnection 
inside the inner triplet.  
CONCLUSIONS AND WORKING PLAN 
Corrector circuits in lines N and M have been 
controlled during hardware commissioning for very bad 
splices but the monitoring of single splices is not possible 
due to the lacking instrumentation.  
End to end maps of the electrical circuit from current 
lead to current lead are still necessary for all circuit types 
to identify weak points and possible risks. This is 
especially important for the inner triplet circuits for which 
the information is more scattered. The work has already 
started for the 600 A circuits. 
The calculations used for defining the circuit 
parameters and setting the QPS thresholds are based on 
normal operation of each circuit separately. It is advisable 
to consider the interactions of several circuits together as 
well as combined failure modes.  
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MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 13 KA SPLICES FOR 7 TEV 
OPERATION 
A.P. Verweij, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
In many 13 kA splices in the machine there is a lack of 
bonding between the superconducting cable and the 
stabilising copper along with a bad contact between the 
bus stabiliser and the splice stabiliser. In case of a quench 
of such a defective splice, the current cannot bypass the 
cable through the copper, hence leading to excessive local 
heating of the cable. This may result in a thermal runaway 
and burn-through of the cable in a time smaller than the 
time constant of the circuit. Since it is not possible to 
protect against this fast thermal run-away, one has to limit 
the current to a safe value below which such a burn-
through cannot occur, taking into account the size of the 
defect, the characteristics of the splice, and the cooling. In 
this paper this safe current is presented based on 
simulations which are validated by means of experiments 
on three defective splice samples. Conclusions are given 
for running at 3.5 TeV and 5 TeV. Safe operation at 7 
TeV is only possible by repair of the all the 13 kA splices, 




At the Chamonix 2009 workshop [1] a quench scenario 
of the 13 kA splices was presented that could not be 
protected and that could lead to burn-through and arcing 
of the splice, similar to the incident on 19 Sept. 2008 [2]. 
Such an unprotectable burn-through could occur in case 
of a quench in a splice with a lack of bonding between the 
superconducting cable, the bus stabiliser, and the splice 
stabiliser. During the repair of sector 3-4 several defective 
splices were found by means of gamma-ray pictures, see 
for example Fig. 1, and by means of so-called R8 or R16 
measurements [3]. In the next section several types of 





Figure 1: Gamma-ray picture of a defective splice 
[courtesy J.-M. Dalin]. 
 
Following these findings, a large measurement 
campaign was conducted in 5 sectors in order to map the 
defective splices [4]. However, since there are no voltage 
taps directly around the splices, the resolution of the 
measurements was limited. Some of the larger defects 
have been detected and repaired, but many defective 
splices are still in the machine. The effect of the presence 
of these defects on the maximum safe operating current 
Isafe is simulated using the code QP3 [5], and presented at 
the end of this paper. These calculations are validated 
through an experimental program in FRESCA, where 
three quadrupole bus splices with built-in defects have 
been tested. The calculations are performed for worst case 
RRR values, but otherwise no safety margin is added. 
Furthermore, the code is validated by comparing it for a 
benchmark case with a 1D model [6] and a 2D/3D model 
[7]. 
In the next section a brief overview of the different 
RRR values in the bus and splice is given. Then the 
calculations of the safe current versus additional stabiliser 
resistance (Raddit) are presented for liquid and gaseous 
helium conditions. Conclusions are given for operation at 
3.5, 5, and 7 TeV. 
The maximum allowed defect size to run at 7 TeV is so 
small that opening of all the M1, M2, and M3 lines in the 
machine is required to inspect all the 10,000 splices. 
Considering as well possible degradation of the splices, 
due to thermal and electromagnetic cycling, it is shown in 
the last part of the paper that an additional shunt is 
required on all splices. Requirements for these shunts 
from a thermo-electrical point of view are given. 
 
 
TYPES OF DEFECTIVE SPLICES 
 
The joint between the two superconducting (SC) cables 
is 120 mm long, and soldered while being compressed 
between a 120 mm long copper wedge and a 155 mm 
long  copper U-profile. In the following the wedge and U-
profile together are referred to as ‘splice stabilizer’. The 
splice is insulated by means of two U-shaped kapton 
pieces with a length of 240 mm and a thickness of 
0.125 mm, and two U-shaped G10 pieces with a length of 
190 mm and a thickness of 1 mm. More details on the 
splice can be found in [8]. 
In a good splice the resistance between the two SC 
cables should be less than 0.6 nΩ, so that, even at ultimate 
current of 13 kA, the heating is less than 0.1 W. 
Furthermore, the splice stabilizer and the bus stabilizer 
(on either side of the splice) should work as a continuous 
electrical shunt to the cables. This is achieved when the 
solder fills all the voids in and around the splice (see 
Figure 2), as well as the thin slots between the bus 
stabilizer and the splice stabilizer. Finally, a good splice 
should be mechanically strong enough to cope with the 
mechanical and electromagnetic forces acting on it. 
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SnAg between bus stabilizer 
and joint stabilizerSnAg inside the bus
SnAg inside the joint/bus extremities
Good soldering between 
the 2 SC cables
Good electrical and thermal contact
between joint and stabilizer  
 




Several types of defects are schematically shown in 
Fig. 3. Defect type A represents an unsoldered splice with 
bad bonding between cable and U-profile and wedge, and 
probably a high resistance between the two SC cables. 
This defect is most likely the one that has caused the 
incident in 2008. Similar defects will now be detected 
with the nQPS, having a resolution of a few nΩ. 
Furthermore the 300 μV (or 500 μV below 6 kA) 
threshold on the nQPS will trigger before the resistive 
heating will cause the SC-to-normal transition. 
 







Figure 3: Schematic view of four different types of 
defective splices: a) Non-soldered, b) Soldered with 
outside void, c) Partially soldered with inside void, d) 
Badly soldered with void and some SnAg solder in 
between the bus stabiliser and the splice stabiliser. 
 
 
Defect types B, C, and D can be single-sided or double-
sided. The length lNSBC of the Non-Stabilised Bus Cable 
(NSBC) is often 15 mm or more, due to the intrinsic 
design of the splice. Defect type B represents a defect for 
which part of the SnAg has flowed out of the bus. Defect 
type C represents a badly soldered splice, for which not 
all the SnAg reached the melting temperature. For defects 
B and C the additional stabiliser resistance at about 300 K 
is linear to the length of the NSBC, so: Raddit= RNSBC= 
1.3lNSBC (with R in μΩ and l in mm). 
Defect type D is the predominant defect in the machine, 
since in most cases at least some contact exists in the 
vertical gap between the bus stabiliser and the splice 
stabiliser. The resistance of this contact is denoted by 
RCu-Cu, and therefore Raddit=RCu-CuRNSBC/(RCu-CuRNSBC). In 
case of a quench the current will flow partially through 
the copper of the cable, and partially through the Cu-Cu 
contact. Two important comments have to be made: 
1) The Cu-Cu contact can degrade in time, due to 
electromagnetic and thermal cycling, and possibly 
due to thermal and pressure shocks during a quench. 
So: Raddit can increase during the lifetime of the LHC, 
implying a reduction of the safe operating current.  
2) If RCu-Cu is small as compared to RNSBC and if 
RRRCu-Cu<<RRRNSBC then the room temperature 
measurement of Raddit could give a somewhat 
underestimated Raddit at cold and hence an 
overestimated value of Isafe.    
 
 
SAMPLES FOR VALIDATION OF THE 
CODE QP3 
 
Several RQ bus splices with on-purposely built-in 
defects have been made and measured at the cable test 
facility FRESCA in B-163. The main purpose of these 
tests is to validate the calculation code QP3, and obtain an 
empirical value of the heat transfer from the bus to the 
helium through the kapton insulation. 
 The characteristics of the three samples are given in 
Table 1, and gamma-ray pictures are shown in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the three FRESCA samples. 
 
Sample ID 1 2A 2B 
Measured in: Oct 2009 Nov 2009 Nov 2009 
Interconnect 








Length NSBC 47 mm 27 + 35 mm 35 mm 
R
addit
  61 μΩ  32 + 43 μΩ  42 μΩ  
RRR bus ≈300 ≈270 ≈290 
RRR cable ≈180 ≈130 + 100 ≈160 
Splice insulation 
2 mm G10 
+ glue Machine-type 
Eff. cooled 
surface  25-60% ≈60-70% 
Field Self-field (+ applied field) 
Current profile Constant current 
Helium 
environment Liquid helium 
Enclosure Vertical  tube with diameter 72 mm




















Figure 4: Gamma-ray pictures of: a) sample 1 (Raddit=61 
μΩ), b) sample 2A left side (Raddit=32 μΩ), c) sample 2A 
right side (Raddit=43 μΩ),  d) sample 2B (Raddit=42 μΩ).  
 
 
These samples are made as similar as possible to the 
splices in the machine but there are still some important 
differences, especially: 
• The samples have high RRR of the bus (RRRbus), 
while there can be locally lower values in the 
machine (see also lateron). 
• The cooling surface in the machine is higher than 
for the samples, mainly because one large face of 
the samples is covered by heaters. 
• The length of the samples is limited to 1.5 m, 
requiring boundary conditions of T<TC at both ends, 
resulting in a larger longitudinal heat drain than in 
the machine. 
 
Furthermore, the samples are RQ type, are tested in liquid 
helium, are tested at constant current, and have a limited 
range of Raddit between 30 and 60 μΩ. The main purpose 
of the tests is therefore to validate the calculation code 
QP3. Once validated, the code can be used to simulate 
real scenarios that occur in the machine, namely RB and 
RQ, liquid and gaseous helium, exponential decaying 
current, and any value of Raddit, RRRbus, RRRcable, and heat 





VALIDATION OF THE CODE 
 
The tests in FRESCA are carried out at constant current, 
see Fig. 5. A quench is created over a length of about 
30 cm (about 15 cm on both sides of the defect), using 
two heaters glued to the copper stabiliser.  The typical 
power required to quench the cable is 0.5-1 W per cm of 
bus. Once a normal zone is created, the heaters are 
switched off. Depending on the current level, cooling and 
sample characteristics, three scenarios can occur: 
• The normal zone reduces to zero, and the 
superconducting properties of the cable recover. This 
scenario usually happens at smaller currents.  
• The normal zone and the temperature distribution 
along the length become stable. In this case the 
generated resistive heating is equal to the heat 
transfer to the helium. In order to avoid warming up 
of the helum bath, the current is ramped down to 0 A 
after about 30 s. 
• The local heating in the defect is much larger than the 
cooling and the NSBC enters a thermal runaway. As 
soon as the voltage over the defective splice reaches 
the threshold (typically 100-200 mV) the power 
converter is switched off, and the current is  down to 
0 A in about 100 ms, in order to avoid a burn-through 
of the splice. The time between the start of the 
normal zone and the switch-off of the converter is 



































Current  between 2-20 kA
tTR (typically 2-50 s)
1-3 s
<100 ms
Stable U and T 
(heating = cooling)




Figure 5: Schematic test sequence in FRESCA with three 




The QP3 code is validated by comparing the measured 
and calculated voltage signals, and by comparing the 
measured and calculated tTR as a function of the current. 
An example of the good agreement in voltage signals is 
shown in Fig. 6. Comparison of tTR for the three samples 
is shown in Fig. 7. For comparison the adiabatic 
calculation is also depicted, indicating that helium cooling 
considerably increases the thermal runaway time for a 
given current. 



































Figure 6: Example of the typical measured voltage 
signals (solid lines) and simulated voltage signals (dashed 





























Sample 1, sim., adiabatic
Sample 1, sim., with He cooling
Sample 2-A, exp.
Sample 2-A, sim., adiabatic
Sample 2-A, sim., with He cooling
Sample 2-B, exp.
Sample 2-B. sim., adiabatic
Sample 2-B, sim., with He cooling
 
Figure 7: Comparison between measured (markers) and 
calculated (solid lines) tTR curves. The calculated curves 
for adiabatic conditions (dashed lines) are shown as well. 
 
 
A scaling factor FHT, associated with the effective heat 
transfer to helium through the kapton bus insulation and 
the kapton/G10 splice insulation, is used as a fitting 
parameter in order to get good agreement between 
experimental data and calculations. This resulted in 
FHT=1.8 (sample 1), FHT=1.6 (sample 2A), and FHT=0.89 
(sample 2B). These variations can be due to variations in 
the winding tightness of the insulation, or due to 
simplification of the cooling model in the calculation 
code, or can be indirectly due to small variations in other 
parameters (RRR, wetted surface, heat flow from the 
heaters into the bus). These three different coefficients of 
FHT have been used to calculate the safe current Isafe for 
the following two ‘machine-type’ cases: 
• Case 1: RQ circuit, single-sided defect type B with 
Raddit=67 μΩ, exponential decay with τ=10 s. 
• Case 2: RQ circuit, single-sided defect type B with 
Raddit=26 μΩ, exponential decay with τ=20 s. 
Both cases are calculated for RRRcable=80, RRRbus=160, 
and a wetted bus surface of 90%. The results (see Table 2) 
show that the variation in Isafe is less than ±0.5 kA. One 
can therefore conclude that the results of the calculation 
code QP3 are in good agreement with experimental 
results, and that the incertainty in FHT causes a relatively 
small error in Isafe. For all calculations of Isafe versus Raddit 
in the following sections the worst heat transfer 
coefficient is assumed, i.e. the lowest value for FHT.  
 
 
Table 2. Calculation of the safe current for two ‘machine-
type’ cases, and for three different scaling factors that 
were deduced from the FRESCA experiments. 
 
FHT 1.8 1.6 0.89 
Isafe for case 1 7.13 kA 7.03 kA 6.95 kA 
Isafe for case 2 11.95 kA 11.48 kA 11.06 kA 
 
 
RRR VALUES USED FOR THE 
CALCULATION OF THE SAFE CURRENT 
 
The RRR of the cable, the copper bus stabiliser, and the 
copper wedge and U-profile play an important role in the 
stability of a defective splice and will be discussed in the 
following three subsections. 
 
RRR of the cable. 
Facts: 
? RRR of the virgin cable (i.e. after production) is 70-
100 [9]. 
? Data from the FRESCA tests give RRRcable of 100, 
130, 160 and 180 (see Table 1). 
? RRRcable increases to about 130 and 200 when the 
cable is heated during 4 minutes to 222 °C (SnAg 
melting temperature) and 270 °C (nominal soldering 
peak temperature) respectively (using 100 °C/min) 
[10]. 
Conclusion:  
RRRcable is probably >150 in a well-soldered joint. 
However, in a defective joint, especially of types A and C, 
the cable has probably not been subject to a high 
temperature (>200 °C) and the RRRcable enhancement due 
to the soldering process is small. The calculations of Isafe  
are based on the worst case scenario RRRcable=80.  
 
RRR of the bus. 
Facts: 
? ‘Biddle’ data in many segments of the machine show a 
large spread in RRRbus from 50-400 [11], see Fig. 8. 
However it is very likely that the ‘Biddle’ data are 
unreliable in the measured range (10-20 μV).  
? A few ‘Keithley’ data from sector L2 show RRR 
values of 200-300. 
? There is no evidence that different sectors contain 
copper from different production batches. 
? Data from FRESCA tests show RRRbus>250 (see 
Table 1). 
? Data on four RB and four RQ bus samples show 
RRRbus of 220-300 [12]. 




For the worst case scenario RRRbus=100 is assumed. 
Additionaly, results will be given for RRRbus=160 in order 
to see the increase in safe current. The latter can be useful 
if more accurate measurements in the machine become 
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RRR of the U-piece and wedge. 
Facts [13]: 
? All U-pieces used before 2009 are produced by hot 
extrusion. 
? RRR measurements on 8 U-profiles from several 
sectors in the machine show RRR of 250-300. 
? The RRR of the U-pieces of the 2009 production 
(machined from OFE Cu sheet) and the RRR of all 
wedges have a lower RRR of about 130, as deduced 
from the correlation between the ‘Vickers hardness’ 
and the RRR. 
Conclusion:  
For all calculations of Isafe versus Raddit in the following 
sections it is assumed that RRRU_piece and RRRwedge are 




The safe current is calculated for two scenario’s: 
 
A) Quenches in liquid helium (LHe), that can occur: 
? due to mechanical movement of the NSBC. This 
is not very likely below 7 kA, because all sectors 
have already been powered (several times) up to 
7 kA.  
? due to global beam losses. 
? due to normal zone propagation through the bus 
from an adjacent quenching magnet. This is not 
possible below 6 kA (RQ) and 8 kA (RB). 
The calculations are done assuming the worst heat 
transfer coefficient as deduced from the FRESCA 
tests (see before). For comparison, calculations under 
adiabatic conditions are given as. 
 
B)  Quenches in gaseous heloum (GHe), that can occur 
due to warm helium from an adjacent quenching 
magnet. This is very unlikely below about 5 kA, and 
almost certain above 9 kA. The time between the 
magnet quench and the interconnect quench is 
denoted by tprop and depends mainly on: 
• the current,  
• the number of magnets that are quenching,  
• the position in the cryogenic cell. 
• the setting pressure of the quench relief valve. 
At present there is quite some experimental data 
about magnet-to-magnet propagation times [14], but 
none about magnet-to-splice propagation times. For 
the calculations no cooling to helium is assumed and 
a propagation time of: 
•    tprop=10 s for high current quenches (I>11 kA),  
•    tprop=20 s for intermediate currents (7-9 kA).  
 
The calculations of Isafe versus Raddit are given in Figs. 
9-12, for the RB and RQ circuits for the LHe and GHe 
scenario’s.  
Note that operation at 13 kA requires decay time 
constants of 100 s (RB) and 20 s (RQ), whereas at 3.5 
TeV they are half. It is assumed for all calculations that 
Raddit=RNSBC and that RRRNSBC=RRRcable. 
 
The maximum allowed Raddit for both types of circuits, 
can be obtained from these figures for both scenarios, 
namely LHe (with and without cooling) and GHe (with 
tprop=10/20 s). In the following three subsections 
conclusions are given concerning these maximum values 


























tau=100 s, RRR_bus=100, no He cooling
tau=100 s, RRR_bus=100, with cooling
tau=100 s, RRR_bus=160, no He cooling
tau=100 s, RRR_bus=160, with cooling
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=100, no He cooling
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=100, with cooling
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=160, no He cooling
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=160, with cooling
Arjan Verweij, TE-MPE, 22 Jan 2010
7 TeV
5 TeV




Figure 9: Maximum safe current as a function of Raddit 
for a defective RB splice in LHe conditions. RRRcable=80, 
RRRbus=100/160, τRB=50/100 s. The adiabatic case 
(dashed lines) is given for comparison only. 
 

























tau=20 s, RRR_bus=100, no He cooling
tau=20 s, RRR_bus=100, with cooling
tau=20 s, RRR_bus=160, no He cooling
tau=20 s, RRR_bus=160, with cooling
tau=10 s, RRR_bus=100, no He cooling
tau=10 s, RRR_bus=100, with cooling
tau=10 s, RRR_bus=160, no He cooling
tau=10 s, RRR_bus=160, with cooling
Arjan Verweij, TE-MPE, 22 Jan 2010
7 TeV
5 TeV




Figure 10: Maximum safe current as a function of Raddit 
for a defective RQ splice in LHe conditions. RRRcable=80, 
RRRbus=100/160, τRQ=10/20 s. The adiabatic case (dashed 


























tau=100 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=10 s
tau=100 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=20 s
tau=100 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=10 s
tau=100 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=20 s
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=10 s
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=20 s
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=10 s
tau=50 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=20 s




RB joint in GHe, RRR_cable=80, no helium cooling. Single-sided defect B
 
 
Figure 11: Maximum safe current as a function of Raddit 
for a defective RB splice in GHe conditions. RRRcable=80, 


























tau=20 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=10 s
tau=20 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=20 s
tau=20 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=10 s
tau=20 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=20 s
tau=10 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=10 s
(tau=10 s, RRR_bus=100, t_prop=20 s)
tau=10 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=10 s
(tau=10 s, RRR_bus=160, t_prop=20 s)




RQ joint in GHe, RRR_cable=80, no helium cooling. Single-sided defect B
 
 
Figure 12: Maximum safe current as a function of Raddit 
for a defective RQ splice in GHe conditions. RRRcable=80, 
RRRbus=100/160, τRQ=10/20 s, tprop=10/20 s. The curves 




Safe operation at 3.5 TeV (6 kA) 
 
The maximum allowed values for Raddit are given in Table 
3. Since the LHe case without cooling is not realistic, one 
can see that safe operation at 3.5 TeV requires that all 
Raddit are smaller than 76 μΩ (RB) and 80 μΩ (RQ) 
respectively. A statistical approach based on 
measurements of Raddit in 5 sectors has given a maximum 
expected value of 90 μΩ [4]. One can therefore not 
declare that 3.5 TeV is 100% safe. However, burn 
through of a splice will only occur in the very unlikely 
event that a splice quenches that has a high Raddit, and at 
the same time a low RRRcable, a low RRRbus, and a small 
heat transfer to helium. Furthermore, the defect should be 
single sided, which is unlikely for high values of Raddit 
(PS: a double sided defect of 45+45 μΩ is much more 
stable than a single-sided defect of 90 μΩ). Knowing also 
that normal zone propagation in LHe is not possible 
below 6 kA, one can conclude that the possibility of a 
burn-through of a defective splice at 3.5 TeV is extremely 
small, even when operating LHC for several years.  
 
Table 3. Max. allowed Raddit for safe operation at 3.5 TeV. 
The worst case realistic scenario is given in bold. 
 τ [s] Condition Maximum Raddit 
RRR=100 RRR=160 
RB 50 
GHe with tprop=10 s 80 87 
GHe with tprop=20 s >100 >100 
LHe without He cooling 58 65 
LHe with He cooling 76 83 
     
RQ 10 
GHe with tprop=10 s >150 >150 
GHe with tprop=20 s >150 >150 
LHe without He cooling 74 80 
LHe with He cooling 80 84 
 
Safe operation at 5 TeV (8.5 kA) 
 
For operation at 5 TeV decay times of 75 s (RB) and 
15 s (RQ) are assumed. The maximum allowed values for 
Raddit are given in Table 4. The LHe case without cooling 
is not realistic, as well as thermal propagation at 9 kA 
with tprop=10 s. Safe operation at 5 TeV therefore requires 
that all Raddit are smaller than 43 μΩ (RB) and 41 μΩ 
(RQ) respectively.  
 
 
Table 4. Max. allowed Raddit for safe operation at 5 TeV. 
The worst case realistic scenario is given in bold. 
 τ [s] Condition Maximum Raddit 
RRR=100 RRR=160 
RB 75 
GHe with tprop=10 s 34 37 
GHe with tprop=20 s 46 51 
LHe without He cooling 23 28 
LHe with He cooling 43 48 
     
RQ 15 
GHe with tprop=10 s 71 75 
GHe with tprop=20 s >120 >120 
LHe without He cooling 35 40 
LHe with He cooling 41 47 
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Splices with Raddit up to 60 μΩ have been observed in 
the machine; it is known that there is still one splice with 
Raddit=51±15 μΩ, and Raddit has not been measured at 
warm in 3 sectors. 
One can therefore conclude that operation at 5 TeV 
implies a non-negligable risk that a splice will burn 
through if it quenches. 
For confident operation at 5 TeV, the remaining three 
sectors should be measured at warm, and all “outlier” 
splices should be repaired. Unfortunately, the resolution 
limit of warm Raddit segment measurements is about 20-
50 μΩ. Operation at 5 TeV remains therefore risky, unless 
it can be proven that RRRbus and RRRcable are everywhere 
much larger than assumed, and that Raddit does not degrade 
in time. Additional information concerning operation at 5 
TeV can be found in [15]. 
 
Safe operation at 7-7.5 TeV (12-13 kA) 
 
The maximum allowed values for Raddit are given in 
Table 5. The LHe case without cooling is not realistic. 
Safe operation at 13 kA therefore requires that all Raddit 
are smaller than 11 μΩ (RB) and 15 μΩ (RQ) 
respectively. Note that an increase of tprop from 10 s to 
20 s, or an increase of RRRbus from 100 to 160 has only a 
small effect on this maximum allowable value, which in 
any case will stay below 20 μΩ.  
 
 
Table 5. Max. allowed Raddit for safe operation at 13 kA. 
The worst case realistic scenario is given in bold. 
 τ [s] Condition Maximum Raddit 
RRR=100 RRR=160 
RB 100 
GHe with tprop=10 s 11 12 
GHe with tprop=20 s 13 14 
LHe without He cooling 8 9 
LHe with He cooling 15 21 
     
RQ 20 
GHe with tprop=10 s 18 22 
GHe with tprop=20 s 34 39 
LHe without He cooling 13 14 
LHe with He cooling 15 17 
 
 
It is important to note that: 
• Proper quench protection is usually based on an 
adiabatic approach which further decreases the 
maximum Raddit to 8 and 13 μΩ. One can be sure that 
there are many hundreds of defects with larger Raddit 
in the machine.  
• Due to the intrinsic design of the splice an internal 
void of 15 mm is often present, resulting in 
RNSBC=20 μΩ. This means that one has to rely on the 
RCu-Cu contact to keep Raddit below 11 μΩ. However, 
due to thermal and mechanical cycling RCu-Cu and 
hence Raddit may degrade during the lifetime of the 
LHC.  
• Especially for small values, the measured Raddit at 
300 K may not be representative for Raddit at 10 K, 
because the RRR of the Cu-Cu contact can be low. 
•  ‘Segment’ measurements at warm (or any other 
temperature) are not accurate enough to detect above 
given small values. 
• “High current pulsing” seems no option given the 
large number of defects, but might eventually be 
useful for a final in-situ qualification test of the 
circuits. 
 
The conclusion is therefore that a shunt has to be 
added on all 13 kA splices, also on those with small 
Raddit, in order to guarantee safe running up to 13 kA. 
Splices with high Raddit or splices with large visual 




For good electro-thermal functioning of the splice the 
shunt should fulfil the following requirements: 
• Both sides of the splice should be shunted. Of course, 
for redundancy and an increase of margin it would be 
beneficial to have two shunts on each side.  
• The shunt should preferably be made of high RRR 
copper. 
• The shunt should have a good electrical and thermal 
contact with the bus stabiliser and the splice 
stabiliser 
The cross-section of the shunt depends on the distance lwc 

























lwc = Distance between contact [mm]
Safe operating current for a shunted RB joint, assuming an infinitely long non-





Arjan Verweij, 18/1/2010  
 
Figure 14: Safe operating current for a RB splice under 
adiabatic conditions for an exponential current decay with 
τRB=100 s. 
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Assuming RRRshunt=100, RNSBC=∞, lwc=8 mm, and 
adiabatic conditions, then a section of 20 mm2 is 
sufficient (see Fig. 14). Of course a safety margin has to 
be added. The mechanical design, requirements, and 




The calculation code QP3 is validated by means of 
three FRESCA tests on 13 kA splices with built-in 
defects. A different effective heat transfer to helium is 
needed per sample in order to have very good quantitative 
agreement. This difference causes an uncertainty of about 
±500 A in the calculated safe current. 
The FRESCA tests have clearly demonstrated the 
susceptibility of a defective 13 kA splice to thermal 
runaway and eventually burn-through. 
Actual calculations of the safe current as a function of 
Raddit are based on conservative values for RRRcable and 
RRRbus. No other safety margin is added. An overview of 
the maximum allowable Raddit for 3.5, 5 and 7 TeV 
operation is given in Table 6.  
The possibility of a burn-through of a defective splice 
at 3.5 TeV is extremely small, even when operating 
during several years. 
Operation at 5 TeV implies a non-negligable risk that a 
splice will burn through if it quenches.  
For safe running at 7 TeV, a shunt has to be added on 
all 13 kA splices, also on those with small Raddit. Splices 
with high Raddit or splices with large visual defects should 
be resoldered and shunted. Experimental confirmation by 




Table 6: Summary of maximum allowable Raddit for 











3.5 50 76 10 80 
5 75 43 15 41 
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STATUS OF SPLICES IN 13 KA CIRCUITS 
P. Fessia, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
In this contribution we will review what it has been 
achieved in terms of quality for the 13KA splices during 
the reassembly of the sector 3-4 respect to the previous 
production. Issues and requirements that should guide the 
choices for future consolidation of these interconnects 
(including the insulation) will be addressed, providing a 
first view of the ongoing efforts to translate these 
technical requirements into a viable technical design. 
POSSIBLE ACTIVITY SEQUENCE 
This document will try to review the main challenges to 
be faced and solved to prepare the consolidation of the 13 
KA splices of the LHC. These challenges refer to the 
development of new design and procedures, but also to 
the re-development of previous employed techniques in 
order to achieve a higher quality standard and higher 
output for unit of worked time. 
1) Interconnection opening requires the establishment 
of an efficient assembly chain to deal with the W 
bellows opening, the thermal screens removal, the 
re-conditioning and modification of the 
interconnection screens and the interconnection 
closures. Dedicated workshop shall be operational 
on surface in order to carry out  the reconditioning 
operation 
2) M lines cutting. The optimization of the cutting 
tool is required in order to increase the number of 
M lines cut open each day. In addition a fast 
feedback loop should be put in place between the 
cutting team and the TIG welding team in order to 
provide indication on the welding approach to be 
used. (manual, orbital ...)  
3) Protection. New protection for the bus bar during 
deburring, for the M line flanges during all the 
interconnect activities (reducing pollution from 
low melting metals and therefore consequent 
cracking of the welds) and beam lines should be 
designed, produced and implemented 
4) Interconnection consolidation and repair. For this 
chapter please see dedicate section in the article 
5) Insulation for this chapter please see dedicated 
section in this article 
6) Non Destructive Testing procedures.  A set of 
complementary NdT methods shall be developed 
and applied in order to objectively characterise the 
quality of the consolidated interconnects. The 
quality control procedure should be aimed to 
reduce at minimum the necessity of expert 
judgements that are in any case subjective and time 
consuming to obtain.  
THE SPLICES 
Present LHC splices should be completely re-done 
when at least one of these three criteria in true 
a) The resistance of the superconductor to 
superconductor joint is larger than 0.8-1 ηΩ. In this 
case the criterion is not derived from cryogenic 
issues or power dissipation issues, but from 
mechanical stability consideration. After having 
assembled several interconnect with a variable 
length of insulation between the upper and lower 
cable, the corresponding resistance at 1.8 K it has 
been measured. FEM computations have been 
performed simulating splices with the same 
different effective lengths of current redistribution 
between the upper and lower cable. Due to the 
change of the current paths, and the consequent 
change in induced magnetic field, the map of 
Lorentz forces   is strongly affected. This is shown 
in Fig.1. It is important to remark that for high 
resistance (matching short effective splice length) 
the induced forces try to open the interconnection. 
These forces become positive at about an effective 
overlap of 10-15 mm providing resistances in the 
order of 0.8-1 ηΩ. 
 
b)  The copper to copper in excess resistance is higher 
than 10-15 μΩ over a length of 8 cm. This 
witnesses a very poor copper to copper contact 
with gaps and also possible mechanical 
instabilities. 
c) The misalignment between the different 
interconnect elements, impair the quality the 
following consolidation activities.   
The interconnects will be re-done using the improved 
procedures applied during the assembly of the sector 3-4. 



















Sc to Sc Rc [nΩ]
Force separating cables
 
Fig. 1 Forces separation superconducting cable vs. Interconnect resistance 
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months to put in evidence possible further improvements 
in quality and execution time.  
 
Fig. 2 compares the R8 [1] measurements of the 3-4 
interconnect before disassembly (LHC interconnect series 
production) and the results measured on the new 
interconnect after 3-4 repair. It is evident that 
1) New production present lower median value (in 
average 1 μΩ less) 
2) The large spread strongly affecting the product 
quality on the lyra side is not present in the new 
production 
The last point has been traced to misplacement of the 
inductor during the assembly, misplacement that by the 
way has also strongly affected the heat distribution inside 
the bus bar contiguous to the splice with under heating of 
the connection on the lyra side. Careful analysis of the γ-
ray pictures of the bus bar, in the magnets dismantled 
from sector 3-4, demonstrates a larger lack of filling 
material on the magnet connection side witnessing an 
important over-heating and matching the previous 
observations. 
CONSOLIDATION OF EXISTING 
SPLICES 
The consolidation of existing splices will probably take 
place by adding a shunt in parallel to the connection [2]. 
The aim is to apply a copper section (2 X 15 mm) 
connected in parallel to the copper to copper junction 
complying with the following requirements: 
1) Do not melt or interfere with the existing 
junction 
2) Apply it without cutting the spools on the top of 
the quadrupole bus bar 
3) Accommodate the shape defect of an existing 
interconnection 
4) Being redundant by design 
5) To be easily inspected and declared acceptable 
by QC 
6) Be of rapid installation and minimize the risk of 
error by design 
7) Use “small” tooling allowing co-activity 
8) Use of tooling easy to multiply 
9) Possibly industrially based tooling 
 





The shunt will be applied with soldering. For the 
moment the chosen alloy is Sn-Pb eutectic in order to 
have a melting point lower then the one of the Sn-Ag used 
in the interconnect. In order to optimise the shunt 
application, in term of quality results and execution time, 
different technologies are being tested, i.e. equipments 
derived from machine implied spot welding methodology 
to system based on resistive heating and induction.  
 
 




Fig. 4 Shunt implementation design featuring a rigid shunt with 
redundant connection points 
 




















Fig. 2 R8 resistance of the copper to copper junction. Comparison 
between LHC series production in 3-4  and the statistics after repair 
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  NEW INSULATION 
Due to the presence of the shunt the electrical 
insulation system shall be changed. The new electrical 
insulation should fulfil the following requirements: 
1) Provide electrical insulation. Bus bars are 
protected with polyimide 15 mm wide, 50% 
overlapped and they are separated by 12 mm of 
He. Total distance for electrical path 27 mm. 
This is equivalent to 4 KV at 1 bar. 
2) Accommodate the new shunt 
3) Accommodate the differences in bus bar 
geometry due to shape defects 
4) Provide enhanced cooling 
5) Block lateral movement during the ramp up in 
current 
It is important to underline the necessity of a lateral 
mechanical restrain. In function of the support mode (that 
depends on the quality of the bus bar assembly inside the 
cold masses) the repulsive electromagnetic forces can 
induce tensile stresses in the range from 9 MPa till 50 
MPa. These stress values are induced by the bus bar 
bending in the most external fibre and are cycled with the 
machine cycle. If unconstrained, these loads constitute 
therefore a fatigue loading term that should be taken into 
consideration during the design phase. Fig. 6 illustrates a 
possible design of insulation conceived also to block 
lateral deformations.  
 
The present solution foresees to have thermoplastic 
components formed by injection moulding. 
  CONCLUSIONS 
A 1st analysis of the activity sequence necessary to 
consolidate the 13 KA splices of the LHC has been 
proposed. It is evident that many steps from cutting to 
welding need in depth analysis and rethinking in order to 
be able to provide the required output without 
compromising quality. Concerning the main activities 
related to the electrical junction stabilisation, it has been 
demonstrated that the mastering of the interconnection 
operation is largely improved respect to the series 
production. This improvement is linked to procedure 
optimization and improvement in technical sequences. It 
is important to remark that these improvements have been 
possible thanks to the direct involvement of CERN 
technical staff on the ground in performing the work and 
or in directly supervising it. This shows also the 
importance to stick to a model with strong CERN 
involvement for the final machine consolidation. 
The proposed designs for the shunt need to be 
optimised and compared among them taking in to account 
the difficulties in installation induced by the surrounding 
tunnel environment. The objective is to integrate this 
shunt as pure electrical safely device avoiding to require 
that it also stands mechanical forces. This will be done in 
order to avoid possible deterioration of the performance 
during the machine exploitation. Mechanical elements 
will be added in order to keep the different 
interconnection components together also in case of 
incident delaying the possible creation of an electrical 
arch.  
The new insulation will be design to provide enhanced 
cooling with direct helium contact and to limit the bus bar 
deformation during the powering cycles. 
The solutions proposed in this article should be 
intended as 1st draft. The team in charge of this activity 
has started to work together only from end of November 
and future analysis could bring to substantially different 
choices. 
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Fig. 5 R8 Shunt implementation design featuring braid type shunt with 
mechanical restrains 
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STATUS OF SPLICES IN 6 KA CIRCUITS 
J.Ph. Tock, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland,  
 
Abstract 
This paper gives a progress report on the work done and 
on-going in the frame of the task force on the LHC splices 
consolidation.  
First, an inventory of the superconducting 6 kA splices 
all around the LHC machine is given. Then one circuit is 
presented in detail (Q7L2).  
The method and results of superconducting splices 
resistance measurement are given.  
The so-called interconnection “praying hand” splices 
are detailed: electrical and mechanical specifications, 
procedure used and tests performed on samples. 
Preliminary information is given on a possible 
reinforcement of these splices.  
INTRODUCTION 
There are 94 6 kA superconducting circuits in the whole 
LHC. This represents about 6 % of the total quantity of 
superconducting circuits in the LHC. They are used to 
power individually quadrupoles and dipoles. There could 
be different classifications, according to: 
- The location of the magnet to be powered: inside 
the continuous cryostat or stand-alone or semi-
stand-alone magnets or in some triplets 
- The sector the circuits are located in (From 5 to 17 
circuits per sector) 
- The powering unit (All four main types of DFBs 
are concerned: DFBA, DFBM, DFBL, DFBX) 
The currents corresponding to four energy levels in the 
94 relevant magnets are summarised in Table 1 taking the 
maximum values per “family”.  These values are coming 
from references [1,2].  
 
Table 1: Maximum currents [kA] in “6 kA” circuits 
Family 3.5 TeV 5 TeV 7 TeV 7.6 TeV 
Q7, Q8, Q9, Q10 3.1 4.0 5.4 5.8 
Q4, Q5, Q6 2.1 3.5 4.3 4.7 
D1, D2, D3, D4 3.2 4.6 6.0 6.5 
CIRCUITS ANALYSIS 
The mandate of the “LHC Splices Task Force” [3] 
includes the in-depth analysis of all the circuits, focusing 
on the splices. This work is currently in progress and is 
considerable due to the many different types of circuits. 
One circuit (Q7L2) has been analysed in detail [4]. In this 
small circuit (≈ 20 meters), 2 types of superconducting 
cables (Rutherford and circular) and 5 different 
configurations of splices have been identified, as shown 
in Fig. 1.  From this first circuit, it can be seen that the 
variety of splices and the quantity of different types is 
considerable. Another “(re)discovery” was that “praying 
hand splices were also present inside some cold masses.   
 
Figure 1: Q7L2 electrical circuit scheme  
MEASUREMENT OF SPLICES 
RESISTANCE 
After the 19th of September 2008 incident in sector 34, 
the recommendation was to map the resistance of all the 
splices before powering them. As far as 6 kA splices are 
concerned, no method was available at the beginning of 
the commissioning. In parallel with the development and 
validation of the method, MP3 recommended to 
commission these circuits to reduced currents, 
corresponding to 3.5 TeV level. In the meantime, a 
method and tooling to measure the busbar segments 
resistance have been validated. As a type test, the IPQs 
(Q7L2 to Q10L2) in the dispersion suppressor left of 2 
were measured with a current up to more than 2.5 kA. 
This has proved that this method is applicable. The results 
for these four quadrupoles, involving 12 segments with 
each at least 5 splices each, are that the average resistance 
per splice is 1.1 nΩ and a maximum excess resistance of 
1 nΩ. This is perfectly in-line with the specification of 
1.5 nΩ and with the expectation of 1 nΩ.  
 
QUENCH PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR 
IPQS/IPDS 
The characteristics of the present quench protection 
system (QPS) for IPQs/IPDs are summarised in table 2 
and compared with the new QPS for the main dipoles.  
Looking to the figure of merit (Defined as the product 
of the detection time by the detection threshold), it can be 
seen that the present QPS for IPQs/IPDs is already 
“better” than the new QPS installed for the main dipole. 
An upgrade is nevertheless possible and under study. It 
would allow protecting separately the busbars and the 
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splices, reducing the threshold and a
diagnostics and monitoring splices measurem





Detection time 10 msec 10
Detection threshold 100 mV 0.3
Figure of merit 1 mV sec 3 m
Discharge time < 1 sec 50 / 1
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- Soldering (Fig. 7) 
- Insulation (Fig. 8) 
- Closure of stainless steel sleeves 
 
 
Fig. 6: Preparation of cable extremities 
 
 
Fig. 7: Soldered IC praying hand splices 
 
Fig. 8: Insulated splices, ready for IC sleeve closure 
Fatigue testing at room temperature 
Fatigue testing was performed at room temperature but 
in conditions not representative and much more severe 
than the actual conditions [6]. The sample failed before 
around the 12 000 cycles specified for the LHC 
lifetime[7]. 
Fatigue testing at cryogenics temperature 
Tests on a representative sample in conditions very 
close to the working ones were carried out in FRESCA 
(Fig. 9). Two tests were conducted with a constant 
monitoring of the superconducting resistance. No 
degradation was noticed. The first test was done at 6 kA 
and stopped after 1328 cycles. The second one was done 
at 9 kA and stopped after 1416 cycles. No damage was 
revealed by visual inspection at the end of the test. 
Increasing the current by a factor 1.5 increases the loads 
by 2.25 and should have reduced the lifetime by a factor 
10. The fact that this splice is operating in an oxygen free 
atmosphere should also increase its lifetime by a factor 
larger than 10. Micrographic examination was done but 
was not conclusive; cracks were present but could have 
been there since the beginning. These tests are also 
reported in ref [5].  
 
Fig. 9: Sample ready for test in FRESCA 
Documentation 
A lot of photographs taken during production of these 
splices are archived. They are not covering the point L8 
but most of the other ones are documented. All images 
have been looked at and no anomaly has been detected. 
Nevertheless, the documentation is not complete at 
100 %.  
MCI for an interconnection praying hand splice 
The interconnection hand praying hand splices are used 
to power Individually Powered Quadrupoles (IPQs). The 
current decay in these circuits is very fast (Current is 
halved in less than 0.1 sec). The detection time is shorter 
than 10 msec. If an arc is created, assuming a tension of 
20 V [8], the maximum dissipated energy is less than 
12 kJ. It is also considered [8] that the minimum energy 
that could in the worst case scenario create a hole with 
size that would lead to accidental helium release is 100 
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kJ. So, in the unlikely event of a hole burnt during such 
an MCI, the helium discharge flow will be much lower 
than 1 kg/s.  
Tevatron experience  
In the frame of the LHC splice task force [9], a similar 
splice geometry was shown but less supported than the IC 
praying hand splices. This has led to a failure and burning 
of the joint. (Fig. 10) 
 
Fig 10: Damages after praying hand splice failure in 
Tevatron 
Future work for hand praying splices 
It is proposed to (re)validate the design with an extra set 
of samples tested in representative configuration in 
FRESCA. Some extra finite element studies could also be 
performed.  
A new design with possibly only in-line splices will be 
tried. It will probably involve more splices. The 
possibility to add extra copper around the splice will also 
be studied. This will then have to be thoroughly tested. 
This is a considerable amount of work.  
As the documentation is not complete, it is proposed to 
open the interconnection boxes whenever accessible for 
another reason. The priority for inspection and possibly 
reinforcement of the splices is the 12 splices located in 
the dispersion suppressor left of point 8 because 
documentation is lacking for this zone and it was the first 
one to be assembled.  
If feasible from safety and access points of view, 
imaging with the X-ray tomography with and without 
current of some splices could be interesting to assess the 
real motion created by Lorentz forces.  
FURTHER WORKS 
The work on the LHC 6 kA splices is not completed. 
The following steps still need to be performed: 
- Complete the inventory and schemes of all the 
6 kA circuits or families of circuits,  
- Map all the splices at superconducting temperature, 
prior to power them at a current equivalent to an 
energy higher than 3.5 TeV per beam,  
- Upgrade the QPS of the IPQ/IPD during the next 
shutdown 
- Realise the actions proposed above for 
the interconnection hand praying splices and then 
review the situation in the light of the news 
obtained, especially from inspection of actual 
splices in the LHC tunnel in the dispersion 
suppressor zone L8.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author would like to thank many CERN colleagues 
for interesting discussions and in particular, A Jacquemod 
for his on-going work on the inventory of the 6 kA 
splices, A Poncet for all the information and studies done 
on the IC praying hand splices, R Mompo for the 
development of the method to measure the splices 
resistance at superconducting temperature and the 
FRESCA team for the tests carried out on splices 
samples.  
REFERENCES 




[2] Powering specificities for the 8 sectors : EDMS 1-2 
1009658, 2-3 883231, 3-4 883247, 4-5 88327305, 5-
6 883295, 6-7 883317, 7-8 883182, 8-1 883200 
[3] Scenarios for consolidations intervention, F 
Bertinelli, these proceedings 
[4] Task Force LHC Splices consolidation, Meeting 03,  
https://espace.cern.ch/lhcsplices/Meeting%203/defaul
t.aspx 
[5] Revisited Mechanical Qualification of the Soldering 
solution for the line N 6 KA cable in the “hair-pin” 
(or “praying hands”) configuration, EDMS 990048, 
A Poncet 
[6] Summary of the cycling tests performed on a 6 kA 
LHC-type electrical connection, EDMS 993835, A 
Ballarino, A Jacob  
[7] General parameters for equipment installed in the 
LHC, LHC-PM-ES-0002, EDMS 100513 
[8] Access and powering conditions for the 
superconducting circuits in LHC, LHC-MPP-ES-
0002, EDMS 1001985 
[9] Task Force LHC Splices Consolidation 8th meeting, P 
Limon, The Tevatron Experience 
https://espace.cern.ch/lhcsplices/Meeting%208/default.aspx  
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
79
SCENARIOS FOR CONSOLIDATIONS INTERVENTION
F. Bertinelli, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
A Task Force has been set up to review the status of all 
superconducting splices in the LHC machine and prepare 
the necessary consolidation actions for 7 TeV operation: 
the mandate, organisation and working time frame are 
reported.
The first consolidation actions could start during the 
shutdown 2010-2011. Preliminary considerations are 
presented considering workload, resources and durations.
LHC SPLICES TASK FORCE
The LHC Machine Committee received and endorsed a 
proposal for the creation of a dedicated Task Force [1]. 
The mandate is to review the status of all superconducting 
splices in the LHC machine and prepare the necessary 
consolidation actions for 7 TeV operation.
It is considered important to analyse splices over 
complete circuits (from DFB current lead to current lead), 
i.e. from the point of view of powering as opposed to the 
traditional point of view of individual equipment holders.
The electrical and structural specifications are to be 
defined for both 5 TeV and 7 TeV operation.
The timeframe is to develop and validate design 
improvements, implementation procedures and quality 
control in time for the shutdown starting December 2010. 
In order to leave sufficient time for the shutdown to be 
adequately organised (procurement of components and 
tooling, organisation of procedures and teams, training 
etc.), the Task Force should therefore aim to complete its 
work by June-July 2010.
Also important is to evaluate the interaction with other 
systems that could either affect or benefit from the same 
consolidation action.
The members of the Task Force represent different 
departments and groups, bringing different skills and 
experience.
The Task Force reports to the TE Technical Meetings 
and to the LMC for approval.
Since November 2009 the Task Force has met weekly. 
The top work priorities reflect the issues of the LHC 
machine, all reported separately: analysis [2] and design 
consolidation [3] of the main interconnection splices, 
6 kA praying hands splices [4], and “all the other” cases 
[5], in particular 600A splices and triplets.
Minutes and presentations are openly available on the 
site: www.cern.ch/LHCsplices.
To note that several members are currently still heavily 
involved with commissioning work and can contribute 
only a small portion of their time to the Task Force work.
Also to note that if an external review of the 
consolidated design will be required by Management, this 
will exceed the above timeframe unless it is launched in 
parallel within the coming months.
SHUTDOWN STRATEGY
While the consolidated design for the main 13 kA 
interconnection (IC) splices is still in early development, 
it is possible to make some first considerations.
An important issue is whether all these splices will need 
consolidation. One approach considers experience from 
the 2008-2009, namely the local “R16” warm resistance 
measurements. Table 1 summarises the quantities, type 
and location of the 236 measurements done, i.e. a sample 
of ~2% of the overall IC splices. The chosen locations for 
R16 measurements were driven by previous “segment” 





























S12 0 0 0 0 13 11 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
S34 0 12 0 12 2 14 0 3 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 2
S45 0 2 0 2 8 12 0 0 0 1 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 5
S56 0 6 0 2 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 10
S67 16 18 14 17 24 19 2 5 4 2 14 3 3 4 4 2 6 3








M3M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
repaired for R16
Table 1: summary of R16 measurements data
However for each “biased” splice measured, there is its 
neighbouring parallel splice that can be considered 
unbiased. On the basis of this unbiased population -
unfortunately a small sample, e.g. ~1% for the dipole M3 
splices, see Fig. 1 – it is estimated that ~15% of the 
10 000 splices in the machine will present an excess R16 
resistance of at least 10 ???? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ? TeV 
operation, and will therefore require consolidation.
Figure 1: R16 data for dipole M3 splices
Unfortunately the currently available diagnostics for 
identifying these splices - the segment measurements at 
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warm - can at best localise segments that contain typically 
2 or 3 splices for dipoles, 8 for quadrupoles, but not 
localise specific individual splices. The only existing 
solution is then to cut open the sleeves for all the splices 
concerned to allow a local resistance measurement.
In addition it was noted that in the 2008-09 experience 
a consistent number of splices presented acceptably low 
R16 resistance values, but were repaired for visual 
considerations (gaps, misalignments, oxidation). Also that 
segment measurements for quadrupole lines are limited in 
their precision due to the higher number of IC splices and 
the larger dispersion of busbar resistances.
The conclusion is that it will be required to open all 
interconnects, including cutting all M sleeves, in order to 
access the splices for invasive, local resistance 
measurements. It is foreseen that ~15-20% of the splices 
will require redoing, i.e. desoldering and resoldering 
according to the improved procedures of 2008-09. In 
addition it is foreseen to systematically add a parallel 
shunt and clamp to increase the long-term safety margin 
[2, 3]. A critical unknown at this stage is how to perform 
this work without cutting or damaging the adjacent spool 
splices.
The strategy for a consolidation shutdown is therefore 
based on this scenario.
A second approach based on the analysis of warm 
segment data from 5 sectors yields the same conclusion.
ADDITIONAL MAGNETS IC WORK
The known workload for future shutdowns, both for 
magnets, splices and interacting systems, is already 
considerable. Group and equipment owners will need to 
decide on the priorities for intervention. In some cases the 
intervention will be mandatory, in others it may be done 
preventively in parallel to the splice consolidation 
campaign. The following is a preliminary list of known 
cases:
? Pressure relief nozzles DN200: still to be fitted in 
sectors 7-8, 8-1, 2-3 and partly 4-5 (60/168 DN200 
already done in 2008-09). Without coactivity 
difficulties, a team can typically perform this work in 5-
6 weeks. Teams are typically dedicated, with the 
exception of opening and closing of W bellows: this 
work could be done in parallel to splice consolidation.
? “single event splices” for 5 TeV operation: from warm 
segment measurements the number of splices in the 
machine that present an excess R16 resistance of at 
least 40 ???? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ? TeV operation, is 
estimated to ~20-100 splices. If these could be localised 
at cold (thermal amplifier method [6]) one could 
envisage their repair using the 2008-09 procedures and 
local warm-up [7]. Similarly a few cases will arise from 
cold pyramid measurements showing segments with 
2 n?? excess resistances that could require a local 
intervention (e.g. MB circuit A31L4 to C31L4).
? Connection cryostats: to be opened for inspection of the 
busbars to check against transversal deformation, 
sectors 7-8. 8-1, 2-3 and 4-5. Repairs were stopped 
assuming operation at 5 TeV for 1 year:  these may 
need be reconsidered (e.g. 3.5 TeV but for longer).
? Repair of vacuum leaks: may be required, e.g. sector 3-
4 in sub-sector Q27L4 to Q31L4.
? N-line connections: may be required to be opened for 
inspection in some cases in sector 7-8.
? 6 kA praying hands splices: may be required to be 
opened for inspection, e.g. sector 7-8.
? Spool connections to investigate and possibly repair.
? Replacement of magnets: potentially ~4 cases from 
different reasons (damaged quench heaters, IFS box, 
nested bellows, SC cable, ...)
? Y-lines: defective soldering as identified by cryogenic 
operations, e.g. in 7-8, 8-1.
? Stand Alone Magnets Helium Guards: complete the 
2008-09  interventions in sectors 7-8 and 2-3.
? DFBA flexible: complete the 2008-09 interventions.
? Damaged radiation and thermal screens: it is known 
from 2008-09 that several will need to be repaired after 
dismounting.
? PIMs: RF ball testing will be performed after warm-up,
potentially with some replacement work, either 
preventive or for repair. Use of the tomograph may be 
required. The option of a full intervention campaign is 
still pending.
? Non-conformities: today 35 cases known, with 
additional cases “closed with warnings” and those 
resulting from Hardware Commissioning to also be 
cosnidered.
The above list is not exhaustive. In conclusion, any 
shutdown scenario includes a considerable workload and 
resources and coactivities must be organised accordingly.
Some of this work may be performed in case of shorter 
shutdowns. 
SCENARIOS FOR SHUTDOWNS
The workload compares to that of the series installation 
work in the years 2005-07: in some ways easier (magnets,
with possibly a few exceptions, are already in place, some 
activities will not be required e.g. jumpers, N-line), but in 
other ways harder (a repair is never as simple or as good 
as new, e.g. the potential for root porosities in repaired 
welds with shorter lips).
For the series work, resources were ~100 workers from 
the Main Contractor IEG and ~100 CERN workers 
(including FSU and collaborations) for coordination, QC 
(including ELQA and VAC), troubleshooting, special 
activities.
For the 2008-09 shutdown resources were ~100 CERN 
workers.
Work progress in series installation can be seen from 
historical data, e.g. from sector 1-2, the last sector to be 
installed, see Fig. 2 and 3.
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Figure 2: series installation, sector 1-2
Figure 3: series busbar soldering installation
This experience highlights a few relevant issues:
? Resources were organised to perform critical activities, 
e.g. busbar soldering, at a throughput of 40 IC / week: 
the obtained throughput during long periods was 
actually on average 30 IC / week.
? Once the bulk ~90%, of the work was done, the 
remainder (consisting of difficult cases, repairs, non-
conformities, “natural holes” left for testing) also took a 
considerable time, difficult to plan and often occupying 
the most qualified resources.
A first estimate of the duration of splice consolidation 
for one sector is based on the sequence of required 
activities and on a throughput of 30 IC / week for critical 
activities. “Duration” is intended as time from first W 
bellows opening to last W bellows closing, including final 
testing of vacuum sub-sectors and a provision for final 
repairs. In addition one has to consider cryogenic warm-
up, pressure test and cool-down times, final ELQA testing 
and Hardware Commissioning. Other activities would 
have to be performed in parallel. The first estimate is
therefore of 19 weeks for the first sector, with the second 
sector following 9 weeks later, etc.
The resources required are estimated at ~100 CERN 
workers (including FSU and collaborations), of which 
~45 are present on the CERN site with skills and relevant 
experience, the remainder ~55 would need to be 
integrated: the 2008-09 experience shows this ratio to still 
be manageable with reasonably low risk. As activities 
progress, this large team would be present in 2, possibly 
3, adjacent sectors, already a difficult task for supervision, 
QC and coordination.
Further increasing the number of inexperienced 
workers and the number of activities performed in parallel 
increases the risks and difficulties associated in particular 
with supervision, QC and coordination. Based on the 
2008-09 experience a team of ~100 workers represents a 
good compromise between resources and risk.
Also to be noted is the impact of the shutdown on the 
ongoing surface activities of the “core” team.
A second estimate of the duration of splice 
consolidation is based on a throughput of 50 IC / week for 
critical activities, see Fig. 4 for the first two sectors. The 
duration for the first sector is 14 weeks, with the second 
sector following 5 weeks later, etc.
This increase in throughput is at this stage considered a 
realistic, yet ambitious, target for the optimisation of 
tooling and procedures.
Figure 4: splices consolidation scenario, first 2 sectors, 50 
IC / week
Using this scenario, durations of shutdowns depending 
on the number of sectors to be consolidated can be 
estimated: all the additional work is assumed to be 
performed in parallel to the splice consolidation.
Scenario 1: all sectors. The first sector would be 
finished after 14 weeks, the last 8th sector would be 
finished after 49 weeks: this implies over a year stop.
Alternative scenarios imply spreading the workload 
over different shutdowns. They may become attractive if 
diagnostics allow the identification of those “single 
event” splices that could then be repaired to allow 5 TeV 
operation after the first shutdown.
Scenario 2: 4 sectors. The last 4th sector would be 
finished after 29 weeks. There would then be a second 
shutdown presumably a year later. 
Scenario 3: 2 sectors. The last 2nd sector would then be 
finished after 19 weeks, followed presumably by 2 more 
shutdowns of 3 sectors each. One advantage of this 
scenario would be to allow the early testing at full 
powering of the adopted solution and the optimisation of 
working procedures for future shutdowns.
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Other combinations clearly can be discussed. They 
should be compared accounting in particular for:
? the needs of the physics program,
? radioprotection / ALARA considerations: earlier 
shutdowns are preferred,
? volume of additional work needed,
? the number of resources (and parallelism) introduced. 
The learning curve associated with introducing and 
training a large number of resources only pays off for 
long durations.
? The possibility of unexpected events creating the 
conditions and necessity for an intervention in a sector.
CONCLUSIONS
A Task Force has been set up to review all 
superconductor splices and prepare the necessary 
consolidation actions for 7 TeV operation. Initially these 
actions were expected to start with the 2010-11 shutdown.
The first priority is the analysis and design of the 
consolidated 13 kA main interconnection splices. It will 
be required to access all splices for local, invasive 
resistance measurements: an estimated 15-20% will be 
redone, while all will be fitted with an additional shunt 
and clamp.
In addition to this splice consolidation work, a 
considerable volume of work is already known for further 
magnet and related systems activities. Group and 
equipment owners will need to decide on the priorities for 
intervention, whether mandatory or of preventive nature.
Resources are planned at ~100 CERN workers 
(including FSU and collaborations), of which ~45 are 
present on the CERN site with skills and relevant 
experience, the remainder ~55 would need to be 
integrated. This ratio is considered acceptable to allow 
adequate supervision, Quality Control and coordination. 
The risk to quality of excessive throughput and 
parallelism must be avoided.
Estimates of durations have been made based on the 
experience of series work and 2008-09 shutdown. A 
consolidation work covering all sectors would take 1 year 
for the interconnection work alone. 
Alternative scenarios can be envisaged where the 
consolidation work is spread over more years: these could 
become attractive if diagnostics were developed to 
localise those few splices requiring intervention to 
increase energy to 5 TeV operation which could then be 
repaired with local warm-ups.
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DIPOLE RETRAINING FOR 7 TEV 
C. Lorin, E. Todesco, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
We outline the present understanding of the retraining of 
the main dipoles in the LHC sector 5-6 during 2008 
hardware commissioning. Even though part of the 
observed retraining can be explained through the test of 
individual magnets taken during the production, there is 
an additional unexplained detraining. The energy of 6.5 
TeV seems clearly at hand with a very limited retraining. 
We present the best estimates of the training needed to 
reach the range 6.5-7 TeV, using different methods. We 
then analyse correlations between performance and 
production procedures and components: the present stage 
of analysis does not show any trace of correlations, but 
the analysis is not yet completed. There is also no 
indication of a correlation with the storage time.  
INTRODUCTION 
During the 2008 hardware commissioning campaign, 
all the LHC dipole sectors were brought to a current 
equivalent to an energy of 5 TeV [1,2]. Six of them were 
brought to 5.5 TeV after a minimal training of one quench 
in 2 magnets (out of 924). Two sectors reached 6 TeV 
with 3 quenches. Sector 5-6 was intentionally pushed 
further to see the limiting factors (see Fig. 1). The sector 
rapidly reached 6.2 TeV (corresponding to 10.5 kA) in a 
few quenches. Then, a slow training took place, with 6.5 
TeV reached after ∼20 quenches, and 6.6 TeV after nearly 
30 quenches. The training was then stopped. Quenches all 
happened in different magnets, with a possible exception 
of one case. The apparently odd feature is that nearly all 
quenches happened in the magnets assembled by Firm3, 
two only from Firm2 and none from Firm1. Even though 
this sector contained 55% magnets from Firm3, with 
respect to the 1/3 ratio present in the whole machine, this 
larger ratio is not enough to explain the overwhelming 
majority of Firm3 quenches.  
 
 
Figure 1: Training of sector 5-6 during 2008 hardware 
commissioning [1,2]. 
 
The critical missing information is how the other 
sectors would have trained in the 10-12 kA range. Other 
relevant issues related to the training retention are the 
following ones: (i) Is this a problem of Firm3 magnets? 
(ii) If yes, is this the problem of all Firm3 magnets or only 
of a batch? (iii) What is going to happen after warm-up 
and cool-down? Will it be necessary to train again in the 
range 10-12 kA? (iv) Are these quenches in the straight 
part of the magnet or in the head, as most of the quenches 
in the LHC dipoles?  
The LHC incident of September 19th 2008 and the 
discovery of the weaknesses in the accelerator prevented 
from pushing the other sectors to higher current levels. 
According to the present plan the LHC will not be pushed 
to energies beyond 3.5 TeV before 2013. 
FORECAST TO REACH 7 TEV 
MonteCarlo method based on correlations 
between before and after thermal cycle 
After the 5-6 results, the training data of individual 
dipoles have been critically reviewed. In Ref. [2,3], a 
MonteCarlo method has been proposed to estimate the 
needed training on the ground of the data of individual 
tests. During individual tests, all dipoles were trained up 
to a level of current ranging from 12 to 13 kA, i.e., well 
beyond nominal, and about 10% of them went through a 
thermal cycle and successive training to estimate the 
training retention. Since the correlation in the behaviour 
before and after a thermal cycle is not deterministic, one 
has an intrinsic variability and therefore one needs a 
MonteCarlo. The method correctly estimates the level of 
the first quench in the range of 10 kA, and shows that to 
reach 11 kA one has to expect an overwhelming majority 
of Firm3 quenches (see Fig. 2). On the other hand, the 
sector should have reached 11.2 kA with ∼10 quenches of 
Firm3 magnets, and not ∼25. Moreover, the slope of 
training found during hardware commissioning is much 
lower than what given by the MonteCarlo method. 
  
 
Figure 2: Training of sector 5-6 during 2008 hardware 
commissioning versus MonteCarlo forecast [2,3]. 
 
Rescaling the data of Fig. 2 to the 1/3 ratio between 
dipole assemblers present in the whole machine, one can 
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TeV, i.e. 50 quenches per octant (see Table 1). This 
estimate looks optimistic according to the 5-6 experience. 
 




Previous estimates to reach 7 TeV were giving about 25 
quenches per octant to reach nominal [4]. This estimate 
was based on the following facts: (i) the whole set of 
1232 dipoles takes 1.0 quenches per magnet to reach 
nominal in virgin conditions, i.e. 154 quenches per sector; 
(ii) the subset of 136 dipoles tested after thermal cycle 
show a reduction of the number of quenches to reach 
nominal of about 80% between virgin conditions and after 
thermal cycle (1.75 to 0.35, see Figure 3). Reducing the 1 
quench per magnet of 80%, one gets a global estimate for 
the machine of 0.2 quenches per magnet, i.e. 30 quenches 
per sector. Since the dipoles to be tested after thermal 
cycle were selected between the magnets showing poor 
performance in virgin conditions, a statistical bias was to 
be taken into account, leading to an estimate of 25 
quenches per octant. 
The same data can also be rescaled with a different, but 
equally sound, approach. Assuming no correlation in the 
behaviour before and after thermal cycle, one can apply 
the 0.35 quenches per octant (see Figure 3) needed to 
reach nominal after thermal cycle and measured on the 
sample  as a property of the whole set of LHC dipoles. In 
this case the probability of quenching to reach 7 TeV is 
∼1/3, i.e. one needs 50 quenches per octant and the value 
of the MonteCarlo is recovered. This shows how these 
scalings can be non trivial, containing hidden hypotheses 
that can lead to pretty different results. 
 
 
Figure 3: Diagram summarizing the dipole performance 
in individual tests [1,2]. 
 
Extrapolation of hardware commissioning data 
In Ref. [1] it has been first observed that the training 
curve becomes linear in a semi-logarithmic plot; the 
extrapolation provides about 200 quenches to reach 
nominal for sector 5-6, and rescaling for the whole 
machine one should need 110 quenches per sector, 
neglecting the contribution of the other Firms. The 
extrapolation is somewhat unphysical, since the dipole 
performance cannot grow indefinitely (even in a log 
scale!) as it is limited by the conductor performance. 
Indeed, in the range 10-11 kA the scaling works pretty 
well. A more refined fit with an arctangent in semi-
logarithmic scale keeps the physics and provides similar 
results [3].  
 
 
Figure 4: Logarithmic extrapolation proposed in [6]. 
 
A summary of the results given by the different 
methods is given in Table 2. 
 




The Firm3 anomaly 
Several investigations have been started to better 
understand the anomalous behaviour of Firm3. In fact, in 
Ref. [2,3] we reported on the trace of a lower 
performance of Firm3 magnets with respect to two 
different aspects: 
• Firm3 dipoles show a slower training for virgin 
magnets in the range 7-10 kA (see Fig. 5). 
• Firm3 dipoles after thermal cycle show a larger loss 
of training retention. In particular, a few dipoles 
showed a net loss of performance between the first 
virgin test and the test after thermal cycle, contrary to 
the other Firms (see Fig. 6). 
 
Percentage N. quenches Percentage N. quenches
Firm1 19% 5 33% 9
Firm2 26% 15 33% 19
Firm3 56% 35 33% 21
All 100% 55 100% 49
Sector 5-6 A generic sector
Magnets tested 
virgin
Magnets tested after 
thermal cycle
∼80% reduction of number 
of quenches to go to nominal
1232: 1 quench per 
magnet to reach nominal
136: 1.75 quenches per
magnet to reach nominal
136: 0.35 quenches 






















Quenches per octant 
to reach 7 TeV Comments
Scaling-1 30 Based on test data
Scaling-2 50 Based on test data
MonteCarlo 50 Based on test data
Extrapolation 110±25 Based on HC data
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Figure 6: Gain in current between first quench in virgin 
conditions and first quench after thermal cycle. 
 
An additional feature has been found more recently 
through the analysis of the quench location [5]. The first 
virgin quench takes place in the heads for 97-100% of the 
cases, in all Firms. On the other hand, for the second 
quench the location is in the heads for about 90% in 
Firm1 and Firm2, but 98% in Firm3 (see Table 3). This 
indicates a different behaviour, but one can argue if this 
means that the Firm3 straight part is better than Firm1-2 
or that the Firm3 heads are worse than Firm1-2. 
 




One of the first hypotheses done to explain the 
performance loss was the storage time before installation. 
In Fig. 7 we plot the storage time for the dipole as a cold 
mass (i.e. between arrival at CERN and cryostating) for 
the whole set of 5-6 Firm3 dipoles and for the subset 
which quenched [5]. The two distributions look similar. 
The same analysis is carried out in Fig. 8 for the storage 
time of the cryostated magnets, i.e. the time between test 
and installation. In this case the time can reach two years. 
Also in this case there is no trace of larger quench 




Figure 7: Storage time between arrival at CERN and 




Figure 8: Storage time between arrival at test and 
installation for Firm3 magnets in 5-6, all magnets versus 
quenched magnets. 
Coil properties 
The analysis of the measurements carried out during the 
production [6] shows that Firm3 coil outer layer modulus 
were in between Firm1 and Firm2 (see Fig. 9). The inner 
layer data show a similar feature. This excludes the 
hypothesis that the performance loss is due to a stress 
release during storage due to a softer coil.  
 
 
Figure 9: Elastic modulus of the outer layer of dipole 
coils of magnets in sector 5-6, and magnets which 
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Average Stdev % in heads Average Stdev % in heads
Firm1 8.32 0.40 97% 8.70 0.27 89%
Firm2 7.87 0.53 100% 8.53 0.38 88%
Firm3 7.35 0.79 96% 8.57 0.46 98%
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Collars 
The dipole stainless steel collars were produced by two 
manufacturers (CP1 and CP2). Most of CP1 collars went 
to Firm3, whereas CP2 collars were mainly used by 
Firm1-2 (see Table 4). A priori, an anomaly in Firm3 
could also be attributed in the CP1 collar producer. Firm1 
had 20 magnets done with CP1 collars, and Firm3 had 9 
magnets done with CP2 collars. Whereas for Firm1 the 
performance of the two batches is similar (see Fig. 7), 
Fim3 magnets assembled with CP2 collars show a better 
performance with respect to magnets assembled with CP1 
collars (see Fig. 8). Indeed the sample is very small and it 
is hard to draw conclusions.   
 




Figure 7: Performance in virgin condition of Firm1 
magnets, split according to collar manufacturer 
 
 
Figure 8: Performance in virgin condition of Firm3 
magnets, split according to collar manufacturer 
TESTS ON 3-4 MAGNETS DONE AFTER 
THE INCIDENT 
After the 3-4 incident, several tens of dipoles have been 
brought to surface and replaced with spare magnets. All 
the spare magnets were from Firm2, and had not been 
previously tested. Therefore, 26 Firm2 spare dipoles 
have been tested in virgin conditions: they reached 
nominal with 25 quenches, i.e. ~1 quench per magnet. 
This behaviour is in agreement with the Firm2 data 
gathered during production in virgin conditions (see 
Fig. 5), i.e. they showed no performance degradation. 
Among the dipoles removed from sector 3-4, 16 were 
not damaged and they were tested, and reinstalled: 4 
from Firm1, 10 from Firm2 and 2 only from Firm3. The 
magnets needed between 0.25 and 0.6 quench per 
magnet to reach nominal (see Table 5). This is in 
agreement with what expected from the MonteCarlo 
method, within the thin statistics. The two Firm3 
magnets took one quench to reach nominal, i.e. no 
significant degradation of the performance has been 
observed (see Table 5). 
 




The energy of 6.5 TeV should be reached with a few 
quenches in the whole machine. In order to reach 7 TeV 
one can guess a number between 50 and 100 quenches per 
octant. This is only an educated guess, since no sectors 
have been reached this level of energy. We also discussed 
previous estimates giving about 25 quenches per octant, 
showing their justification. 
This longer training is due to magnets assembled by 
Firm3. Even though traces of an anomalous behaviour 
were present in the individual test data, today we cannot 
manage to reproduce the behaviour during hardware 
commissioning on the ground of these data. 
Coil modulus and storage time do not appear to play 
any role. What is attributed to the dipole assembler could 
as well be attributed to the collar manufacturer: Firm3 
dipoles were all assembled with CP1 collar manufacturer, 
and vice-versa. 
The recent tests on individual magnets removed from 3-
4 sector show no degradation of performance w.r.t. 
expectations.  
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Number % Number %
Firm1 21 5.2% 386 94.8%
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magnet to 7 
TeV
Firm1 4 1 0.25 0.20
Firm2 10 7 0.70 0.39
Firm3 2 1 0.50 0.39
3-4 magnets
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CAN WE OPTIMISE THE CLEANUP PROCESS FURTHER? 




Following the sector 3-4 incident, about 5 km of beam 
vacuum system have been spoiled with soot, metallic and 
super insulation debris. During four months, several 
teams have intensively worked to recover the beam 
vacuum system. The presentation will address the 
successive sequences of this activity in terms of 
preparation, execution and control. Steps where time was 
lost and the possible optimisations will be presented. The 
obtained quality performance of the cleaning activity and 
possible qualification means will be showed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The 19th September 2008, the 2 plug-in-modules (PIM) 
located between magnets C24R3 and Q24R3 were 
destroyed. The consequence of this incident was a helium 
inrush inside the 2 beam vacuum tubes V1 and V2. Under 
this helium pressure, soot and debris of super insulation 
were spread along the 2 x 2.8 km vacuum sectors. 
In the first paragraph, the means developed to evaluate 
the extend of the damage are described. The beam tube 
cleaning and methodology is discussed in a 2nd paragraph. 




After the incident, access in the tunnel was made 
available when all the risk associated to any over-incident 
was eliminated. When the first PIMs were cut by 
beginning of October 2008, plugs equipped with safety 
valves were installed at the beam tube extremities to 
minimise the air and dust pollution of region still at 
200 K.   
The inspection campaign started immediately after with 
the areas around Q21R3 and B30R3. However, the 
progressing rate of the endoscopic inspection of the beam 
tube was rapidly reduced by buckled PIM which blocked 
the aperture. Therefore, these PIMs must be cut by TE-
MSC at the request of TE-VSC. Little by little, most of 
the W bellows were systematically opened and buckled 
PIMs systematically cut. By mid December 2008, all 
required W bellows were opened and PIMs cut. A total of 
122 W bellows and 204 PIMs were cut. 
The beam tube inspections reveal the presence of 
metallic debris, super insulation debris and soot. When 
possible, a length up to 150 m could be inspected in one 
go. Due to the presence of sawteeth inside the beam 
screen, the endoscopic inspection should be done in the 
reverse way than the proton beam path. Indeed, the 
reflected light onto the sawteeth was partially blinding the 
endoscope’s camera.  
Figure 1 shows extracts of reports issued by the team in 
charge of the inspections. In the endoscopic report, all 
components such as beam screens, PIMs and beam 
position monitors were photographed. Their aspect and 
the level of their cleanliness were also evaluated. In the 
interconnection report, the length and the aspect 
(deformation, presence of shocks …) of the nested 
bellows and the PIMs was reported. A picture of the 




Figure 1: Left, example of endoscopic report. Right, 
example of interconnection report 
By the end of December 2008, 4.8 km of beam tube 
and 122 interconnections were inspected and documented. 
A total of 59 % of beam tube were polluted by super 
insulation debris (MLI) and 19 % by soot [1].  
Figure 2 shows the debris distribution along sector 3-4. 
Most of the super insulation debris were observed at the 
extremity of the sector. However, these debris were 
spread from Q30R3 till Q7L4. 
 
 
Figure 2: Debris distribution along sector 3-4. 
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BEAM TUBE CLEANING 
Tooling development 
In parallel to the inspection work, tools were developed 
to clean the beam tubes in sector 3-4. A foam plug was 
successfully tested and applied to recover the V2 line of 
B19R3, C19R3, Q19R3, A20R3, B20R3 and C20R3 
which were polluted by soot. Preliminary test of a 
vacuum cleaner were based on sucking technology with a 
mole perforated with holes. These tests were partially 
unfruitful. However, following successful harvest 
campaign performed by end November in the tunnel from 
Q13R4 till Q8R4. It was decided to use the RF ball 
automatic pumping/venting technology to develop the 
cleaning tool. A nozzle designed to blow nitrogen and 
attached to the endoscope’s head was built and tested in 
the laboratory by January 2009. During the validation 
phase, 17 PIMs cut and recovered from the sector 3-4 
were subjected to 2 successive passages for a total 
accumulated time of 8 minutes per PIM. The removal 
efficiency was found to be better than 90 % [1,2]. After 
evaluation in the tunnel of the parameters such as the 
number of passages, the time per PIM, the time per beam 
screen and the nozzle opening, a detailed cleaning 
procedure was issued [3]. The maximum sector length to 
be cleaned was one half-cell. A summary of the procedure 
is given below: 
• 1st Step, automatic pumping/venting of the sector 
during at least one hour. At the end of this time, 
additional automatic pumping/venting of the so-
called pumping hoses (vacuum ports at each 
quadrupole) during at least 15 minutes. 
• 2nd step, 10 passages along the vacuum sector with 
the nozzle-endoscope tool and the automatic 
pumping/venting. During passage 1, 2 and 3, the 
nozzle-endoscope tool should be applied during 10 
minutes at each PIM then 5 minutes are required. In 
the beam tube, the speed of the nozzle-endoscope 
tool is 3 to 4 m/minute. In case of an event visible 
by the endoscope camera, the operator shall insist 
with the tool to remove the event. The beam line is 
subjected to automatic pumping/venting during 
passages 1,2,3,4,9 and 10. Additional automatic 
pumping/venting of the pumping hose is installed in 
parallel during passages 5,6,7,8. After each passage, 
the debris are collected in a plastic bag for future 
documentation.  
• 3rd step, endoscopic control. Once a sector has been 
cleaned, quality control is ensured by a systematic 
endoscopic inspection in both directions. Each beam 
position monitor, each PIM, each entrance, mid and 
end part of the beam screen and finally, each 
unexpected event are recorded by video. A report is 
issued at the end of the control. 
• 4th step, validation of the cleaning of the sector and 
release of the sector for PIM welding.  
This procedure was established by end February. It asks 
for a challenging mean cleaning rate of 50 m of beam 
tube per team and per day with a total of 3h15 min spent 
for the PIM cleaning. Obviously, the 2nd step was the 
longest of the procedure. Each PIM were cleaned during 
1h5 min. Note that reducing the amount of passages from 
10 to 5, i.e. 40 min per PIM, would gain 40 % of time at 
the price of a slightly lower quality.  
In parallel to the establishment of the procedure, after 
discussions with AB-AP and following Chamonix 2009, 
it was agreed with the management that a maximum of 
one fibre per half-cell and two debris (from super 




During the cleanup work in the tunnel, a day by day 
reporting and analysis of the cleanliness was settled. A 
total of 3 teams employed to clean the beam tube and 1 
team for final endoscope analysis were deployed. Figure 3 
shows the dashboard of the cleanup process. After the 
procedure set up phase till the 23rd of February 2009, the 
work progressed at the requested speed. By the 11th of 
May, i.e. 4 months after the beginning of the cleaning, all 
the PIM were delivered to TE-MSC for welding.  
 
Figure 3: Dashboard of the cleanup process 
Of course, the work did not progress without 
difficulties. Several times, the endoscopes were damaged 
or the nozzle was stuck inside a PIM as shown in Figure 
4. In this last case, TE-MSC was requested to open the W 
below and cut the PIM. There were also issues with 
coactivity which not only delayed the task but also, some 
time, decrease the performance of the work. Indeed, dusts 
were produced in the tunnel by the teams in charge of 
drilling a hole for the cryostat relief valve beside the team 
in charge of cleaning the beam tube. Obviously, this could 
not work!  
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 Figure 4: Nozzle blocked by metallic debris 
Finally, the validation of the beam cleanliness by 
simple endoscopic inspection was not always trivial. As 
shown in Figure 5 where fibre or MLI are hardly 
identifiable. A total of 101 non-conformities left as “use 
as is” were recorded. 58 were assigned to super insulation 
debris, 38 to fibre and 5 to oxidation stains. All these non-
conformities were documented and archived.  
 
Figure 5: Examples of non-conformities left as “use as is” 
identified during the validation step 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The incident of sector 3-4 spoiled all the beam tubes in 
the arc. It required the setting up of a team and the 
development of new tools and methodology to recover the 
beam tube. About 3 month were required to develop the 
tooling and perform the first inspections. 4.5 more months 
were also used to define the methodology, clean the beam 
tube and perform the final endoscopic control.  
In the advent of a similar event, it is estimated that at 
least 2 months would be required to performed 
inspections which are slowed down by W bellows 
opening and PIM cutting. Another 3 month would be 
required to perform the beam tube cleaning and the final 
endoscopic control. The total intervention time will be 
then reduced from 7.5 to 5 months. At the price of a lower 
cleaning quality, 1 more month could be gained.  
Today, 6 sets of tooling are on the shelves, ready to 
interne. I hope they will stay there forever! 
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WHAT IS THE MCI IN TERMS OF HELIUM DISCHARGE IN CASE OF A
BEAM DRIVEN FAILURE OF A MAGNET ENCLOSURE?
R. van Weelderen, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
The superconducting magnets in LHC function either in
a pressurized bath of superfluid helium at about 1.3 bar and
1.9 K or in a pool boiling bath of normal helium at about
4.5 K (1.3 bar saturation pressure). The question of the
Maximum Credible Incident (MCI) in terms of helium dis-
charge due to a ”beam driven” failure of the magnet en-
closure does not have a unique answer. Nevertheless or-
der of magnitude discharge rates for various failure condi-
tions are possible to establish. We will describe the effect
of the main determining factors: thermodymic state of the
helium, hole size, magnet geometry. The results derived




The superconducting magnets in LHC function either in
a pressurized bath of superfluid helium at about 1.3 bar and
1.9 K or in a pool boiling bath of normal helium at about
4.5 K (1.3 bar saturation pressure). The volume of helium
and the number of magnets contained in it vary consider-
ably: from 5600 ` at 1.9 K for a typical ARC hydraulic cell
(4 optical half-cells giving a total length of 214 m, contain-
ing 4 quadrupoles, 12 main dipoles and several corrector
magnets) to 400 ` at 4.5 K for a stand-alone quadrupole
of about 10 m length. We assume an incident can happen
anywhere in any of these hydraulic units.
Incident Scenario
We assume that accidentally a hole in the helium enclo-
sure of the magnets is made by the LHC beam. The hole is
made almost instantaneously and the beam is dumped im-
mediately. There are two distinct possible locations for the
hole: between beam pipe and magnet cold mass or between
insulation vacuum and magnet cold-mass (in case the beam
gets astray in the magnet end-caps and/or magnet intercon-
nects). The size of the hole depends on the detailed process
by which the beam is lost in the magnets. For the purpose
of this article we consider the size of the hole to be arbi-
trary.
Energy
The energy dumped by the beam is assumed to be ex-
pended mainly for making the hole, and the energy fraction
transferred to the helium considered negligible.
The magnets may quench, either provoked by the beam
or by the quench protection system. The effect of the
quench energy release to the helium will be to affect the
thermodynamic state of the helium being released.
Mass Discharge Estimator
The discharge flow is limited by a process commonly
called ”choked flow” due to the high ratio of upstream
pressure Pu at the magnet cold mass to downstream pres-
sure Pd, either at the beam pipe vacuum or the insu-
lation vacuum. This phenomenon appears typically for
Pd . (0.5 − 0.8)Pu, a condition easily satisfied since it
would take a very long time to pressurize either the full
sector length of beam pipe vacuum space or the 214 m long
ARC hydraulic cell insulation vacuum space. Even in cases
where the space into which one discharges is limited in vol-
ume this condition will still hold as long as the safety re-
lief devices can handle the flow. Examples are the (semi-)
stand alone magnets or the inner triplets. There the beam
pipe vacuum might rise to 1.5 bar absolute, their safety re-
lease pressure, due to closing of the vacuum sectorization
valves. Their insulation vacuum is as well limited in vol-
ume and would rise to 1.5 bar absolute, their safety release
pressure.
Choked flow is manifested by no additional increase in
flow rate with increasing pressure differential under fixed
upstream conditions. The flow becomes limited when the
exit plane velocity is at sonic condition [1]. This is the case
for homogeneous fluids (no phase change) at adiabatic con-
ditions. In addition cavitation will occur if the downstream
pressure is below the vapor pressure at the prevailing liq-
uid temperature. For the purpose of this article we use as
discharge flow estimator the flow at sonic conditions and
assume a geometry factor of 1 for the hole:
m∗ = ρc (kg/s · cm2) , (1)
with m∗ the specific discharge flow, ρ the helium density
at the hole and c the local sound velocity at the hole.
Magnet Specific Flow Restrictions
Hole at End-Caps and/or Magnet Interconnects If a
hole is made at the magnet end-caps or interconnects the
flow limitation will be given by the thermodynamic condi-
tions of helium at the hole and by its size. The discharge
flow rate will ultimately be restricted by the rate at which
helium is able to reach the hole location from elsewhere in
the hydraulic section. This ultimate limitation comes from
the flow impedance in the longitudinal direction along the
magnet(-chain) and would become visible only for an ex-
cessively big hole as happened during the incident in sector
3-4 in 2008.




































































Figure 1: Specific helium discharge flow at random back-pressure and temperature.
Hole between Beam Pipe and Magnet For reasons
of electrical insulation the magnet coil blocks are covered
by several layers of thick Kapton foil, inpenetrable to he-
lium. If a hole is made between beam pipe and magnet
cold mass, the helium from the main volume of the cold
mass can only access the beam pipe region by circumvent-
ing the coil blocks. There are only two possibilities. One,
longitudinal, via the end-caps regions through the beam-
pipe - coil spacing annulus. This route has a very high flow
impedance and is not capable of sustaining any substantial
discharge flow rate [2]. The other, radial, through the yoke
and collar spacing and then via the so-called ”nose” area to
the beam pipe. This will be the main discharge route.
The collars are spaced 0.2 mm per 6.2 mm length. The
collar nose is an about 10 mm long fraction of the inner
magnet coils circumference. If one considers the collar
nose to be opened up completely over its 10 mm circum-
ference fraction, this then makes for a total ”slit” area of
3.23 cm2/m (∼161 slits per meter length). The available




Figure 1 shows the range of possible specific discharge
flow values, the ”landscape”, as function of the thermody-
namic state of the helium defined by its pressure P and
temperature T . We see that the values cover a full or-
der of magnitude. From 3.5 kg/s · cm2 at P = 1.3 bar,
T = 1.9K, the nominal operating conditions for the ARC
magnets, to as high as 5.9 kg/s · cm2 at P = 20 bar,
T = 2.9K and as low as 0.5 kg/s · cm2 at P = 10 bar,
T = 30K. In general the specific discharge rate rises with
rising pressure and goes down with increasing temperature.
The actual encountered specific discharge values will be
determined by the state of the helium at the hole location
and thus by the physical process taking place in the cold
masses. Figures 2 and 3 show the specific discharge for iso-
choric (closed volume) heating and adiabatic compression
of helium in ARC or Inner Triplet magnets. They do not
vary much over the whole heating or compression range.
Table 1 gives the typical values for 4.5 K pool boiling
vapour and liquid phase and for the isochoric heating and
adiabatic compression. It shows that except for the vapour
phase, which is not a realistic phase, the order of magnitude
is the same ∼ 3 kg/s · cm2 or ∼ 0.06 kg/s · slit.
Figure 2: Main dipole discharge mass flow per 0.2 mm
wide 10 mm large collar slit under semi isochoric condi-
tions. Average discharge flow 0.078 kg/s per slit
In order to quantify better what might be the develop-
ment of the thermodynamic state of the helium in actual
cases we’ll make use of measured quenches in the LHC
ARC.
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Table 1: Specific discharge values
Helium state Specific Per slit Per meter
collar nose
(kg/s · cm2) (kg/s · slit) (kg/s ·m)
Pool boiling, 0.22 0.004 0.71
vapour phase
Pool boiling, 2.0 0.039 6.3
liquid phase
Isochoric 3.9 0.078 12.6
Adiabatic 4.3 0.085 13.7
Reality ? ? ?
Figure 3: Main dipole discharge mass flow per 0.2 mm
wide 10 mm large collar slit under semi adiabatic condi-
tions. Average discharge flow 0.085 kg/s · slit.
REALISTIC P-T DEVELOPMENT
Figures 4 and 5 show the measured pressure and temper-
ature development as function of time for a single magnet
quench in the LHC ARC at various currents.
Figure 4: Pressure as function of time after quenches at
various currents.
If we map these data to a pressure versus temperature
phase diagram we can determine where we are situated in
the ”landscape” of possible specific discharge flow rates.
Figures 6 and 7 show the phase diagrams for quenches at
6 kA and 10 kA respectively. For reference the theoretical
adiabatic compression line is added in figure 6 and the the-
Figure 5: Temperature as function of time after quenches
at various currents.
oretical isochoric heating line in both. We see that apart
from the first 10 - 15 s most of the time the temperature
rises faster than even the isochoric heating case.
The specific discharge values when following the P-T
development are indicated in table 2. It shows that as long
as the energy dumped into the helium is low the specific
discharge rates stay in the region of ∼ 3.5 kg/s · cm2 or
∼ 0.070 kg/s · slit. Only at later times and only for the
10 kA quench do we see that the temperature rise compared
to the pressure rise is such that we start to move into the
region of lower specific discharge rates.
Figure 6: Phase diagram after a 6 kA quench.
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Table 2: Specific discharge values along the P-T development line for single magnet quenches in LHC
6 kA quench m∗ m∗ per slit 10 kA quench m∗ m∗ per slit
P, T P, T
(bar, K) (kg/s · cm2) (kg/s · slit) (bar, K) (kg/s · cm2) (kg/s · slit)
(1.3, 1.9) 3.6 0.071 (1.3, 1.9) 3.5 0.071
(4.0, 3.0) 3.8 0.076 (4.0, 4.0) 3.3 0.066
(6.0, 4.0) 3.7 0.074 (6.0, 4.5) 3.4 0.068
(8.0, 5.0) 3.5 0.070 (8.0, 5.5) 3.2 0.063
(10.0, 5.5) 3.6 0.071 (10.0, 6.0) 3.2 0.065
- - - (14.0, 7.0) 3.4 0.068
- - - (18.0, 10.5) 2.4 0.048
- - - (22.0, 16.0) 1.9 0.037
Figure 7: Phase diagram after a 10 kA quench.
CONCLUSIONS
The MCI in terms of helium discharge due to a ”beam
driven” failure of the magnet enclosure depends in details
on the size of the hole produced and at its location. For
scaling, if the hole is in the magnet end or interconnects
the m∗ has to be used. Otherwise if the hole is in the beam-
pipe to magnet coil area the m∗ per slit value has to be
used.
The order of magnitude discharge rates for low en-
ergy quenches, as deduced from the data of LHC for sin-
gle quenches, will be in the range of ∼ 3.5 kg/s · cm2 or
∼ 0.070 kg/s · slit. Only when the system can evolve to
higher temperatures will we see a significant, up to an or-
der of magnitude, decrease in discharge rates.
Inducing multiple quenches whenever a beam loss in-
cident is detected would be a way to effect this order of
magnitude decrease. It so happens that the new quench
protection system, which triggers more neighbouring mag-
net quenches to avoid the so-called ”symmetric quenches”
goes already in the right direction. Any major incident is
likely to produce as well many simultaneous quenches, as
seen the sector 3-4 incident in 2008, with potential to go
down to values of 0.5 kg/s · cm2 (∼ 0.010 kg/s · slit).
Discharge rates are highest, up to and order of magni-
tude, for low energy incidents.
The results derived can serve as a basis for further study
of specifically defined cases based on feasible beam loss
scenarios.
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MEANS TO LIMIT THE COLLATERAL DAMAGES IN THE BEAM 
VACUUM CHAMBERS 
J.M. JIMENEZ, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
Technology Department, Vacuum, Surfaces & Coatings Group 
 
Abstract 
The incident in the sector 3-4 has pointed out the need 
to limit whenever possible the propagation of the 
contamination by soot, multi-layer insulation (MLI) and 
other debris to an entire bending section (arc). Indeed, the 
subsequent endoscopic inspection and cleaning imply 
about 6 months of shutdown and requires opening the 
interconnections every 200 m.   
Following a brief review of the 3-4 incident, the impact 
of a similar event at other locations in the LHC ring will 
be discussed together with the expected impact onto the 
upstream and downstream vacuum sectors. Expected 
pressure profiles will be presented. Some proposal to limit 
the induced overpressure and the propagation of dusts 
will be discussed.  
Their feasibility and drawbacks as well as the 
prerequisite and time required for their implementation 
will be discussed and compared to solutions implemented 
in other accelerators. The applicability to the recently 
defined maximum credible incident (MCI) will be 
commented. 
INTRODUCTION TO LHC BEAM 
VACUUM SECTORISATION 
The LHC beam vacuum sectorisation has been defined 
to limit, whenever possible, the impact of air or helium 
leaks due to failing welds and seals, corrosion problems 
in feedthroughs and beam screen capillaries. The beam 
vacuum was sectorised as follow (Fig.1): 8 bending 
sections (arcs) and 8 long straight sections (LSS) in which 
cold and RT vacuum systems can always be decoupled 
using sector valves. This sectorisation aimed also to 
create vacuum sectors in long and fragile RT zones for 
example for the equipment which need an ex-situ 
conditioning (RF cavities and kickers) and at the 
experimental areas. 
By construction, the arc insulation vacuum was 
sectorised every 204 meters by vacuum barriers and two 
spring relief valves (DN90) aimed to avoid their 
pressurisation. Following the incident in sector 3-4, 
additional exhausts were added, DN200 safety relief 
valves and/or declamped DN63 and DN100 flanges. By-
passes were installed across all vacuum barriers (5/8 arcs 
completed). 
The pressurisation of the arc beam vacuum was 
prevented using rupture disks (30 mm aperture) available 
at each arc extremity (~3 km); the arc beam vacuum is not 
sectorised. 
The standalone magnets (SAMs) and inner triplets (ITs) 
have similar configurations both for the insulation and 
beam vacuums. 
The Experimental areas were not protected at the 
exception of LHCb (rupture disk at the Velo detector) 
from an internal pressurisation. In spring 2009, all four 
(4) Experimental areas were equipped with rupture disks 
(30 mm aperture) installed on the pumping ports close to 
the Q1 quadrupoles. Since the central beam vacuum 
sector could not be equipped with rupture disks, the two 
central sector valves are locked in an open state during 
the hardware commissioning and operation with beams. If 
required, these valves can be remotely closed during 
accesses. 
BEAM VACUUM FAILURE MODES 
The beam vacuum can be affected directly or indirectly 
(collateral effect) and the amplitude of the incident will 
depend on the type of failure and on its localisation: warm 
or cold sectors, interconnection or cold mass. 
The direct failure modes are: air and helium leaks, 
electrical arcing in the cold mass (liras or coils) and 
accidental beam losses. The first type is assimilated to a 
“natural” incident as the two others are “provoked”. 
 “Natural” (not triggered by another incident) air or 
helium leaks were taken into account at the design stage 
and were included in the risk analysis [LHC Project Note 
177]. These leaks often result from corrosion (bellows, 
feedthroughs, beam screen capillaries) and/or fatigue 
(bellows and beam screen capillaries). The development 
of these leaks is expected to be slow and the venting 
should be limited to the beam vacuum sector (entire arc if 
happening in the arc) by triggering the closure of the 
vacuum sector valves. 
“Provoked” helium leaks resulting from accidental 
beam losses and/or electrical arcs (liras and coils) will 
lead, if the cold bore is perforated, to a fast venting and 
later internal pressurisation of the beam pipes as the cold 
helium warms-up. This type of failure mode is the most 
severe since it will damage the magnet, induce a huge 
contamination (soot, Kapton and metallic debris) and 
buckle the beam pipe bellows (PIMs and nested) in case 
of excessive internal pressurisation (3.5 bars for PIMs, 5 
bars for nested). 
The indirect failure modes are collateral effects of 
incidents occurring in the cryomagnets insulation 
vacuum. The beam vacuum can only be affected in case 
of a simultaneous failure of the bellows (nested and PIM) 
between the insulation vacuum and the beam vacuum.  
Only two events have been identified as potentially 
dangerous for the integrity of the beam vacuum bellows: a 
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mechanical displacement of the magnet cryostat or cold 
mass and an electrical arcing inside the interconnections 
(busbars). The expected consequences are a brutal venting 
and the injection of MLI debris into the beam vacuum. If 
associated to an electrical arc in the busbars, the incident 
becomes more serious as observed in sector 3-4, the beam 
vacuum will, in addition, get contaminated by soot and an 
internal pressurisation shall be expected (Fig.2).  
The installation of additional spring relief valves 
prevents, for the fully consolidated sectors, that the 
pressurisation exceeds 1.5 bars, 3.5 bars for the partly 
consolidated sectors. Associated with the reinforcement of 
the supports of the quadrupole magnets with vacuum 
barriers, the displacement of the magnets is excluded. 
Only in presence of the maximum credible incident 
(MCI) which corresponds to the damage of all three (3) 
cryolines passing through an interconnection (Fig.3), the 
internal pressurisation could lead to buckling of the 
bellows in the beam vacuum. In all other cases, the spring 
relief valves installed on the magnet cryostats will prevent 
the buckling of the beam vacuum bellows. 
EXPECTED CONSEQUENCE 
Accidental venting of beam vacuum 
As expected, the more brutal is the venting and the 
more damages and collateral effects are expected. For the 
beam vacuum, the effects of an air or helium leaks are 
drastically different. 
An air leak is expected to develop slowly and since it 
can only take place at extremities, it should be detected by 
the vacuum instrumentation. In terms of collateral effects, 
it implies the warm-up of the cold sector (arcs, SAMs and 
ITs) if the leak is big enough (>10-4 mbar.l/s) and safety 
precautions due to the condensation of oxygen on the cold 
surfaces. In the LSS RT sectors, it will require a bake out 
and activation of NEG coatings i.e. requires several 
months in the Experimental areas. 
Two types of helium leaks are expected, with and 
without pressurisation and contamination by dusts.  
A helium leak without pressurisation has as origin, a 
leak on the beam screen capillaries. In this case, no dust 
contamination is expected but it will require the warm-up 
of the cold sectors (arcs, SAMs and ITs) and the removal 
of at least one magnet. In case the upstream or 
downstream RT vacuum sectors are partly vented, a pump 
down should be sufficient to recover the initial 
performances since dry helium does not saturate the NEG 
coatings. 
A helium leak with pressurisation results from a brutal 
rupture of the cryolines or of the magnet cold bore. The 
resulting external or internal pressurisation is 
accompanied by dust and/or soot contamination. As in the 
previous case, a warm-up is required followed by a 
cleaning of the beam lines [see talk V. Baglin]. 
Mechanical damages to Beam vacuum 
The following damages will be considered as 
mechanical damages: buckling and rupture of the bellows 
due to both internal and external pressurisation (insulation 
and beam vacuum respectively), rupture of the bellows 
induced by a mechanical displacement of a magnet 
cryostat or cold mass, hole induced by accidental beam 
losses. 
In the arcs, SAM and ITs, it will require a total warm-
up and a removal of all damaged magnets and 
replacement of other damaged components. In case of an 
internal pressurisation, the damages could expand far 
away from the incident areas (Fig.2). The buckling of the 
nested bellows is critical since welded to the beam screen 
and its replacement implies the removal of the magnet 
from the tunnel. The internal buckling pressure for the 
PIMs and nested bellows is respectively 3.5 and 5 bars. 
In the Experimental areas, many components are 
critical: bellows, chambers and supports. The later could 
fail resulting from the build-up of longitudinal forces not 
considered during the design of the supports. Some 
components are extremely fragile like thin-wall beam 
pipes, aluminium bellows, VELO detector and LHCb 
aluminium window. 
In the LSS warm sectors, the damages will be fixed by 
replacing all damaged components. This operation 
requires a bake out but will still stay in the background of 
magnets exchange in the arcs, SAM and ITs or for any 
intervention in the Experimental areas. 
Contamination 
The contamination is expected to expand very quickly 
(several hundred of meters per second) to the upstream 
and downstream beam vacuum pipes. Similarly to other 
damages, the consequences are more critical in the arcs 
(warm-up and cleaning) and in the Experimental areas 
(cleaning, bake out). The type of contamination will 
depend on the origin of the failure. 
If the failure originates from the insulation vacuum, the 
contamination has to be injected through the damaged 
interconnection e.g. PIMs and/or nested bellows. MLI 
debris will be injected into the beam vacuum. The bellows 
can also fail due to an electrical arc in the busbars. Then, 
a contamination by soot, MLI and metallic debris is 
expected. Heavy soot contamination of cold bores and 
beam screens implies the exchange of the magnet. Light 
contamination can be cleaned in situ. However, the 
removal of all dust is not granted. 
If the failure occurs in the cold mass (beam losses, lira 
or coil shorts), the cold bore has to be perforated to inject 
contamination in the beam vacuum. Kapton and metallic 
debris as well as soot are expected to propagate upstream 
and downstream. Faster is the venting, bigger will be the 
quantity of cold helium injected, higher will be the 
pressurisation and more contaminant will be injected into 
the beam vacuum. 
MITIGATION SOLUTIONS 
To limit the effect of the previous failure scenarios, new 
mitigation solutions are presented together with their 
expected efficiency and feasibility. 
  








Table 1: Expected protections from all mitigation measures implemented or proposed for the LHC beam vacuum. 
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Fig.2: Calculated pressure profiles in case of an internal cold bore pressurisation. Two cases are represented, for 17 bars 
and 5.5 bars pressurisation and assuming only rupture disks at extremities, 1 over 3 quadupole (SSS) and at each 
quadrupole (SSS). 
Protective half-shells on bellows 
During the incident in sector 3-4, it appeared that the 
fragility of the bellows acted as a worsen factor. The 
proposed protection, to be applied on all bellows of an 
interconnection (PIMs and nested beam vacuum bellows 
and cryolines bellows), consists in two half-shells made 
out of insulation material, Vetronite or equivalent to 
reduce the arcing risk. This solution cumulates many 
advantages: easy to retrofit in all cryomagnet 
interconnections, provides a higher resistance to plasma 
discharge (high temperature resistance) and to projection 
of melted metal.  
In addition, the screening effect will limit the injection 
of MLI in the beam vacuum as the “guiding” effect (no 
lateral deformation of the bellows) shall improve the 
resistance to internal and external buckling.  
Opening the interconnections requires a total warm-up. 
Therefore, these half-shells can be easily retrofitted 
during the consolidation of the splices. 
Fast-closing valves 
To be successful, the fast-vales shall close within 20-30 
ms while being highly reliable to reduce beam downtime 
due to inopportune closures. 
 Usually, the fast-closing valves are also vacuum leak 
tight. For the LHC, the priority is to limit the propagation 
of the contamination, in particular to protect the injection 
kickers, RF cavities and Experimental areas. The 
accidental venting of the beam vacuum by dry helium gas 
from the cryolines does not permanently degrade the 
beam vacuum quality even for the NEG coated beam 
pipes as seen in sector 3-4. Therefore, the leak tightness is 
no longer mandatory and a more adapted and audacious 
design can be envisaged.  
Low-Z material (Carbon-Carbon or equivalent) will be 
used for the fast-valve sealing plates to limit the collateral 
damages in case the beam accidentally intercepts the 
sealing plate. Indeed, the material will be transparent to 
beams. The use of low-Z material has another advantage; 
its low weight will favour a faster actuation which can be 
spring or pyrotechnic based. 
As always with fast-valves, the triggering is the key 
issue: in presence of beams, beam loss monitors can be 
associated to pressure signals. In the absence of 
circulating beams, nQPS signals could be used (not 
studied yet). 
The development and validation of this non- leak tight 
fast-valve is expected to take about 1 year. In parallel, the 
triggering signals for the closure of the fast-valves will be 
studied as well as studying their possible implementations 
in the arcs of the LHC. 
Rupture disks 
The present protection scheme is based on one rupture 
disk at each extremity of the cryomagnet assemblies (arcs, 
SAMs, and ITs) and Experimental areas. Adding more 
rupture disks in the arcs was considered after the 3-4 
incident but finally postponed. The present design could 
induce major damages in case of accidental 
depressurisation resulting from a failure of the sealing 
metallic membrane.  
An upgraded solution is being studied to mitigate the 
effect of the membrane rupture. The rupture disks, which 
industrial design will not be modified (years of 
experience gained in Industry) will be equipped with a 
head including a spring-based cap. A pin, actuated by the 
pressure difference, will indicate when the membrane has 
failed. This head can be retrofitted to the rupture disks 
already installed. 
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The basic principle is the following. In cas
pressurisation, the membrane will break and
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of all arcs and the opening of the W bello
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only be limited by installing more ru
However, in case of an MCI, about one perio
cells, 8 magnets or 108 metres of machin
damaged. This option is being studied a
considered once their reliability and c
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membrane failure will be technically validate
The installation of a large number of rup
the arcs of the LHC requires the warm
cryomagnets but no mechanical modifi
alternative solution using a Neon venting a
e of internal 
 the spring-
verpressure. 
sed cap will 
c air. In case 
g-based cap 
e tightness, 
of the beam 
ting visually 
d. 
e bellows in 
 the number 
e collateral 
ted bellows, 




s in the arcs 
magnets. An 
of the beam 
on and then 
 and rupture 
rpressure to 
e will imply 








d a careful 
quisites and 
to account.  
llows in the 
 warming-up 
ws (cryostat 
upled to the 
f the beam 
 bellows can 
pture disks. 
d (two half-
e) could be 
nd will be 
ompensatory 
n case of a 
d. 
ture disks in 
-up of the 
cation. The 
t cold is an 
option only for the Experimental areas 
units in the arcs.  
As the rupture disks are not expected
propagation of the contamination, the 
valves is being considered. A new desi
leak tight and with a sealing plate 
material will be studied. The best opt
their closure will also be studied. 
These additional protections shall b
complement of the other already d
nQPS, pressure and quench relief val
Then, it is expected that the collater
beam vacuum will be limited, even in c
k/s of cold helium). But, it is still delic
primary machine protection systems.  
The impact of the contamination is 
it will strongly depend if the primary i
inside or outside the cryomagnet cold m
 
Fig.3: Illustration of the maximum 
(MCI) as compared to the sector 3-4 inc
CONCLUSIONS
Together with the consolidation of 
actions can be taken to reduce the con
prevent the internal pressurisation of 
responsible for the buckling of the beam
While waiting for this consolidat
already taken have increased the safety
pressure relief valves, and reinforceme
of the quadrupole with vacuum barrie
internal helium leak is still critical (Tab
ACKNOWLEDGEME
The author would like to thanks V
P. Cruikshank, C. Garion, J. Strait, L. 
and R. Van Weelderen for their help. 
and to install a few 
 to help against the 
use of fast-closing 
gn, not necessarily 
which uses low-Z 
ions for triggering 
e implemented in 
ecided measures: 
ves, rupture disks. 
al damages to the 
ase of an MCI (40 
ate to see them as 
difficult to predict, 






the splices, many 
tamination and to 
the beam vacuum, 
 pipe bellows. 
ion, all measures 
 margin i.e. nQPS, 
nt of the supports 
rs. The case of an 
le 1). 
NTS 
. Baglin, P. Coly,  
Tavian, R. Veness 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
100
WHAT REPAIR ACTIVITIES CAN BE DONE TODAY ON A LOCALLY 
WARMED-UP SUB-SECTOR 
P. Cruikshank, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
Technology Department, Vacuum, Surfaces & Coatings Group
Abstract 
Interventions to repair components inside LHC 
cryostats can only be performed with the system at room 
temperature. The architecture of the cryogenic and 
vacuum system permits local warm-up of the 2.8 km arc 
cryostat. The method, prerequisites, means, constraints, 
risks and time to locally warm-up a sub-sector are 
compared to a complete arc warm-up, including the steps 
to get back to 1.9 K powering. Configuration variants in 
each arc sector and sub-sector are considered and their 
impact on the local warm-up procedure. Typical repairs 
such as diode exchange, helium leak repair and splice 
consolidation will be presented, including the recent 
experience of local warm-up in sectors 8-1 and 2-3 to 
repair DFBA flexible hoses. The necessity and impact of 
beam vacuum venting during local warm-up will be 
explained and reviewed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Each 2.8 km continuous cryostat houses 4500 tonnes of 
cold mass and many thousands of components at 
cryogenic temperature. From an early stage in the 
conceptual design of the LHC project, the down-time and 
cost benefits of locally warming only part of the arc to 
execute repairs were identified. Reduction of the number 
of thermal cycles also minimises risks to component and 
circuit integrity. Cryogenic and vacuum sectorisation of 
the LHC arcs was implemented during the design phase 
of the LHC following inputs from the Sectorisation 
Working Group [1]. 
LOCAL WARM-UP SCENARIOS 
Baseline 
Sectorisation of the arcs applies only to the insulation 
vacuum and cryogenics systems, in particular the magnet 
cold masses. The two beam vacuum apertures are 
continuous along the 2.8 km arc and are equipped with 
room temperature vacuum valves at their extremities. 
During a typical forced warm-up, warm helium is fed 
via the helium distribution line (QRL) to the magnet cold 
masses. The configuration of cryogenic valves and so-
called bus-bar plugs at short straight sections (SSS) 
permits local warming of some cold masses whilst other 
remain cold. Longitudinal vacuum barriers in the SSS are 
positioned to coincide with the bus-bar plug positions and 
transverse vacuum barriers are positioned in each jumper. 
The cryogenic and vacuum sectorisation of the arc 
cryostat can be seen in figure 1. The standard vacuum and 
cryogenic subsector is 214 m long, equivalent to 2 
machine cells. A number of variants exist: the dispersion 
suppressor subsectors at the arc extremities are 170 m 
long, the mid-arc cryogenic subsector is 321 m long (3 
cells) but its insulation vacuum volume is subdivided into 














Figure 1: Cryogenic and vacuum sectorisation of the arc 
 
Baseline local warm-up is restricted to interventions   in 
the insulation vacuum or on the cold mass helium 
volume. Typical interventions on magnet interconnections 
include repairs on the cold mass volume such as diode, 
busbar, splice, helium leak or instrumentation 
feedthrough, and repairs in the insulation vacuum such as 
air leak, temperature sensor, BPM cable, feedthrough 
flange, alignment check or MLI inspection. Interventions 
on helium circuits or vacuum volumes which extend 
outside of the locally warmed subsectors (beam vacuum, 
thermal shield, beam screen, heat exchanger) are excluded 
as the cold and warm zones cannot be isolated from each 
other. 
Figure 2: Baseline warm-up scenario 
 
 The warm-up scenario is shown in figure 2. The 
intervention zone is in the central subsector, n. To ensure 
that there is no water condensation at the intervention 
subsector extremities following venting and exposure to 
tunnel air, thermal buffer subsectors, n-1 and n+1, to the 
left and right are also warmed to room temperature but 
remain under vacuum.  
Baseline revisited 
Following a full thermal cycling of the arc 7-8, the RF 
fingers of several plug-in modules (PIM) of the beam 
vacuum system collapsed into the beam aperture. The 
PIM Working Group concluded that the RF finger 
problems could not be excluded in any of the LHC arcs 
LHC ARC: CRYOGENIC AND INSULATION VACUUM BASELINE DESIGN
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Insulation Vacuum sectorization:
Magnet vacuum barriers          Jumper vacuum barriers          Cryogenic line vacuum barriers
Cold-mass sectorization:
Bus-bar plugs              Safety relief valves              Cooldown and fill valves
QRL vacuum jacket
Magnet vacuum vessel
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Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
101
[2]. When applying the baseline warm-up scenario, PIMs 
could collapse in any of the 16 interconnections of the 
intervention subsector or any of the 32 interconnections 
of the buffer subsectors. The new challenge is 3 fold: how 
to identify collapsed PIMs, how to repair PIMs in a 2.8 
km beam vacuum system which is only locally warmed 
and how to access PIMs in the evacuated buffer zones.  
In the revisited local warm-up scenario, the zone 
warmed to room temperature is limited to the intervention 
subsector. A simplified cryogenic scheme of the subsector 
is shown in figure 3. The 2 cell subsector contains 16 cold 
masses (3 cells and 24 cold masses for the mid-arc 
subsector), and the SSS cold masses at the subsector 
extremities are integral with the vacuum barriers. The 
SSS cold mass to the left is part of the chain of the 16 
cold masses that is warmed to room temperature. The SSS 
cold mass on the right cannot be warmed via the QRL 
without also warming at least one cell of magnets in the 













Figure 3: Simplified cryogenic scheme of subsector 
 
As the buffer subsectors to the left and right of the 
intervention subsector remain cold, part of the vacuum 
barrier, thermal shield and SSS cold mass to the right will 
be at cryogenic temperatures. Subsequent venting to 
tunnel air will result in condensates such as water, 
oxygen, nitrogen. Ensuring that all surfaces are > 90 K 
will eliminate 02 and N2 condensation at atmospheric 
pressure. Venting with dry air and subsequent 
containment of the dry air at the intervention subsector 
extremities will ensure low levels of water contamination. 
Figure 4: Full scale test on SSS523 in SM18 
 
 
Proposals were made via the PIM Working Group to 
force warm this single SSS using the beam tubes as 
longitudinal heat exchangers, with nitrogen gas being fed 
in and out via the SSS pumping pipes [3]. The warm-up 
proposal was validated in 2 full-scale tests on SSS523 in 
SM18 – see figure 4. Warm-up from 80 to 290 K took ~ 6 
days, with a maximum heat transfer of 2.5 kW [4]. Stress 
measurements at the cold mass/cold bore interface 
indicate that no plastic deformations are induced. 
However this unconventional usage of the beam vacuum 
system carries many risks for its integrity; including 
potential contamination from dust, water and other 
condensable gases or oil from recirculation pump. 
PIM behaviour of this SSS during warm-up to room 
temperature was analysed [5]. The non-accessible PIM, 
type QQBI, would undergo 16.9 mm of compression, 
which could result in residual deformation to non-
conforming RF fingers. Checking the condition of this 
PIM during a local warm-up is strongly recommended. 
Keeping the SSS cold mass at cryogenic temperature will 
reduce the compression and hence the risk of PIM failure. 
Inspection of PIMs 
A full sector warm-up or a local subsector warm-up 
may cause PIMs to fail. A single RF finger in the beam 
aperture would have a large impact. Following studies by 
the PIM working group, the maximum warm-up 
temperature which avoids any PIM failure is 130K [5]. 
 Invasive inspection methods, typically by endoscope, 
require venting and opening of both 2.8 km beam tubes. 
Contamination of the vacuum system, in particular with 
condensable gases in the cold zones must be avoided. 
Laboratory measurements [6] show that the beam vacuum 
system can be protected from gases which may enter at 
the temporary opening, and back-stream to towards the 
cold surfaces. A 0.5 m/s outflow of nitrogen gas from a 50 
mm cold bore is sufficient to avoid helium back-
streaming > 0.5 m. Extrapolation of this result implies 
that other circuits that extend outside the locally warmed 
zone may be protected in the same way, opening the 
possibility to perform repairs on the beam screen, heat 
exchanger and thermal shield lines, and therefore, 
potentially, the replacement of a cryomagnet [7].       . 
Non-invasive methods using x-ray imaging have been 
extensively used on LEP and LHC RF shielded bellows to 
check finger geometries. With an LHC cryomagnet 
interconnection fully open, standard x-ray methods can be 
used to check PIM integrity. However, checking of a 
subsector would require the opening of 16 interconnects. 
Other interconnects in the inaccessible subsector, in 
particular the QQBI interconnect on the SSS to the right 
of the intervention subsector cannot be checked in this 
way. A tomograph has been studied, developed and 
recently procured[8] in order to check PIM integrity with 
cryomagnet interconnections closed. The inspection 
technique can be made with the beam or insulation 
vacuum system evacuated and at cryogenic temperatures. 
Elimination of arc beam vacuum venting avoids complex 
















Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
102
Figure 5: Tomography image of a damaged RF finger 
Revised baseline 
• Warm the intervention subsector to room 
temperature 
• Suppress the warming of buffer subsectors to room 
temperature; warm the 107 m machine cell to the 
right of the intervention subsector to ~ 90 K. 
• Vent insulation vacuum with dry air from the 
compressed air distribution line. 
• Open the interconnection at the repair location. 
• Contain dry air at the sub-sector extremities to avoid 
water condensation on cold surfaces. The 
longitudinal position of these anti-condensation 
pockets is determined by the repair location. 
• Monitor cryostat wall temperature near subsector 
extremities and apply heaters if required to maintain 
external surfaces above air dew point. 
PIM integrity checks: 
• The 16 interconnects in the intervention subsector 
and the QQQBI interconnect at the right hand SSS 
must be checked 
• By tomography – interconnects are checked as soon 
as the forced warming is complete. 
• By endoscopy – beam vacuum is vented with a non-
condensable gas, via the SSS pumping pipes, in the 
room temperature zone. With a small overpressure in 
the beam vacuum, 2 PIMs at an opened interconnect 
are cut and removed. Gas outflow is maintained to 
avoid H2O back-streaming. 
PIM repairs: 
• All PIM repairs require venting and PIM cutting as 
mentioned above. Precise control of gas 
overpressure in the beam vacuum is required during 
PIM re-welding. 
LOCAL WARM-UP EXPERIENCE 
Two local warm-ups were made in 2007 in the sector 4-
5 to repair leaking DFBA flexible hoses. Both warm-ups 
were made in accordance with the baseline. As each 
intervention subsector was at the extremity of the arc, 
warm-up of only one buffer subsector was required. The 
PIM problem had not been evoked at that time. Following 
the DFBA repairs, the subsectors were cooled down 
without checking of the PIMs. 
In 2009, 3 further local warm-ups were performed. 
During the cool-down of sector 6-7 an electrical short 
circuit occurred. With a minimum temperature of 250 K 
in the arc, PIM damage due to thermal cycling could be 
excluded. A single 214 m subsector was re-warmed to 
room temperature to perform the repairs. No precautions 
were taken to avoid condensation on the cold surfaces at 
the subsector extremities. 
Over a period of days, the sectors 2-3 and 8-1 both 
suffered helium to insulation vacuum leaks at a DFBA 
flexible hose. The revised baseline was adopted for the 
local warm-up. The warm-up procedure was significantly 
simplified as the intervention subsector was at the right 
extremity of the arc ie no cold SSS to the right. PIM 
inspection was performed by endoscopy as the 
tomography was not available. With minimum cold bore 
temperatures ~ 50 K, the beam vacuum was vented to 
ultra-pure neon via a NEG filter. PIMs were cut in both 
beam lines at the same QQBI interconnect. A minimum 
overpressure of 2 mbar was maintained to avoid back 
streaming. The PIM cutting position was chosen with the 
following constraints: allow visual inspection of the 170 
m intervention subsector with a 100 m endoscope; chose 
an interconnect with high risk of PIM failure; enable 
installation of anti-condensation pocket; allow upstream 
feed of neon at a room temperature SSS; minimise the 
number of interconnects to be opened. No PIM failures 
were observed. The intervention on the beam vacuum, 
including its re-pumping, was longer than the DFBA 
flexible repair. PIM inspection with the tomograph could 
reduce the total intervention time. Based upon the 
experience gained, detailed intervention procedures have 
been prepared. 
FULL VERSUS LOCAL WARM-UP  
All interventions involving local or full sector warm-up 
are primarily aimed at performing a repair and getting the 
LHC back into operation. Considering that only 8% of the 
arc is warmed up in the revised baseline, the time gain for 
cryogenic activities in comparison to a full sector warm-
up and cool down is only 5 days due to mass flow 
limitations into the intervention subsector. However, as 
only a small part of the arc is thermally cycled, there are 
much reduced test programmes for electrical quality 
assurance (ELQA) and powering. Table 1 show the 
critical path activities for a typical intervention to repair a 
helium leak on a cold mass circuit. The time gain of local 
warm-up compared to full sector warm-up is > 2 weeks, 
52.5 days compared with 69 days, assuming no secondary 
problems in the thermally cycled zone eg PIM or 
electrical fault. 
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Table 1: Critical path activities to repair a helium leak 
 
SUMMARY  
Local warm-up of the arc has always been part of the 
LHC baseline to permit local repairs. However the 
baseline has been revised to deal with risk of PIM failure. 
The revised baseline further reduces the zone which is 
thermally cycled to room temperature and hence reduces 
the probability of electrical degradations. 
Warming of the SSS an the intervention sub-sector 
extremity using the cold bores as heat exchangers has 
been validated in full-scale tests in SM18. 
Retro-diffusion tests have been performed to confirm 
that beam vacuum contamination by gas back streaming 
can be eliminated. The results imply that repairs could be 
performed on other non-sectorised LHC circuits.  
A dedicated tomograph has been developed to check 
PIM integrity in the thermally cycled zone without 
venting of beam vacuum or opening of magnet 
interconnections. 
Several local warm-ups have been performed on LHC 
arcs. Valuable experience has been gained on warm-up 
procedures with respect to cryogenics, beam vacuum 
venting with neon, PIM inspection by endoscopy, PIM 
replacement, and application of anti-condensation 
barriers. 
The potential time gain comparing local warm-up with 
full sector warm-up is > 2 weeks.  
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CANWE CHANGE A MAGNETWITHOUTWARMING-UP A FULL ARC?
S. Claudet
Abstract
What can be done today? Time required, risk to cryogenic
lines and beam vacuum (back-streaming of gas) Can the
cryogenic distribution be adapted to allow it? Safety, in
particular during welding processes of lines What has to be
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper and associated presentation is th
years of operation of LHC cryogenic system. 
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The nominal scheme for the cryogenic
system is one helium refrigeration plant (1
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(See Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1: Nominal scheme. 
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Figure 4: Temporary tool used to protect head
pressure and air in leak 
SCENARIOS PROPOSED FOR F
INTERVENTION 
One sector cooled by normal cryoplan
sector under intervention. 
The problem of pollution and icing of t
header B should be solved by adding a ne
header B. This solution fixes the pollution 
Figur
 





er B from 
UTURE 
t, One 
he valve on 
w valve on 
problem and 
upgrades the interconnection of Head
configuration than all the other head
Figure 5 shows the new added valve on
 
Figure 5: New added valve on header B
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Figure 6: QUI internal piping 
Figure 7 shows a first study done in 2006 
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Figure 10: Valve-box added on junction region S81 
 As partial summary the solution to add a new valve 
box gives the following advantages: 
• Same than previous solution plus redundancy of 
cryoplant guaranteed. 
Disadvantages of the added valve solution are: 
• Integration design to be checked and validated. See 
figure 11 showing stress simulation for junction 
region, sector S81. 
• Installation possible only if the two sectors are at 
room temperature. 
• Time schedule duration and cost. 
 
Figure 11: Stress simulation, junction region S81 
 
Other points not detailed in this document. 
To fulfil the main topic of this document “Decoupling 
of adjacent cryogenic sectors” some other subjects must 
be studied. 
• Some Helium Ring Line (HRL) sectorisation valves 
must be remotely driven. 
• In the QUI area, by pass of the Warm Helium Line 
(WRL) must be installed. 
• The QUI purge panel must be separate in two half 
parts to prevent possible gas communication from 
one sector to the other one. 
CONCLUSION 
Heavy intervention, such as exchanging magnet or a 
QRL service module, while keeping the adjacent sector in 
nominal cryogenic operation will be possible only by 
upgrading the gas buffer system on header B. This new 
valve will also restore leak-tight insulation and gas buffer 
system between sector and Cold Compressor unit  during 
intervention. 
If the cryoplant redundancy is mandatory during this 
heavy intervention, a valve box must be added on the 
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SAFETY TASK FORCE FOLLOW-UP IN PERSPECTIVE TO THE 2ND LHC 
PHYSICS RUN IN 2011 
R. Trant, CERN, Switzerland.
Abstract 
Following the incident in sector 3-4 of 19th September 
2008, the related safety of personnel in the LHC 
underground areas was investigated and preventive and 
corrective measures recommended. All efforts have been 
deployed to fulfil the short term recommendations of the 
task force. Still, many of the solutions implemented are of 
temporary nature and valid only for the 1st LHC physics 
run in 2009/10/11. The presentation address the safety 
measures that still need to be implemented for the 2nd 
LHC physics run. 
INTRODUCTION 
A “Task Force on Safety of Personnel in the LHC 
underground areas following the accident in sector 3-4 of 
19th September 2008” (Safety Task Force) was set up by 
the CERN Director General in January 2009. The safety 
task force, chaired by the Head of the Safety Commission, 
was composed of representatives from the Beams 
Department, the Engineering Department, the Physics 
Department, the Technology Department, the Safety 
Commission and the Staff Association. The mandate to 
investigate the impact of the incident, a large helium leak 
into the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) tunnel, on the 
safety of personnel working in the LHC underground 
areas included the elaboration of preventive and/or 
corrective measures. The recommendations of the Safety 
Task Force [1], reviewed by an External Advisory 
Committee [2], were fully endorsed by the CERN 
Director General in June 2009. 
CONCLUSION OF THE SAFETY TASK 
FORCE 
Having established the sequence of facts related to the 
safety of personnel based on level 3 alarm records and the 
CERN Fire Brigade emergency intervention records, and 
having analysed the LHC underground environmental 
conditions and explained their development with relation 
to the original risk analyses performed, the safety task 
force concluded the following. 
1. All efforts have to be made to limit an incidental 
helium release and the resulting overpressure.  
2. Any incidental helium release shall be confined 
to the ventilation sector where it occurs. 
3. This confinement must be carried out in 
combination with a controlled release of 
overpressure to the surface. 
4. No access shall be allowed to any ventilation 
sector of the LHC in which a large helium release 
has a non-negligible probability to occur. A 
ventilation sector is defined as the area directly 
affected by the overpressure resulting from the 
helium release. A large helium release is defined as 
being at least of the same order of magnitude as the 
release of 19th September 2008 accident. 
While considering all LHC underground, the safety task 
force has restricted itself to the scenario of a major 
cryogenic incident with release of helium caused by any 
sources. The maximum credible incident (MCI) would 
release an initial mass flow rate of ∼40 kg/s (or ∼166 m3/s 
of helium gas at ∼200 K), which is about double the mass 
flow rate experienced in September 2008, resulting in a 
release of ∼1500 kg within the first minutes. The total 
Helium inventory loss would be about 5000 kg (∼6000 kg 
in September 2008). 
SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE SAFETY TASK FORCE 
All safety measures required for the 1st LHC physics 
run were implemented, in particular: 
• The sealing of the LHC tunnel towards the 
experimental areas to protect them from Oxygen 
Deficiency Hazard (ODH) and from possible 
overpressure;  
• Intermediate solution for the controlled He-release 
to the surface [3].  
The safety task force provided a conservative estimate 
of the static overpressure values in the LHC tunnel 
following an MCI. The estimate was given for the 
configuration of the intermediate solution implemented 
(see figure 1) using the existing ventilation door(s) as 
pressure relief device(s) allowing the air/He to be released 
via the UL and US service areas, the PM shafts and 
finally the SD buildings.  
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Figure 2: Intermediate solution for the controlled release of overpressure to the surface (here sectors 1-2 and 2-3) 
 
LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE SAFETY TASK FORCE 
The pending recommendations are presently looked at 
by a dedicated working group “Safety Task Force follow-
up: 2nd phase”. While six recommendations are being 
addressed or scheduled for the next shut down 
(recommendations # 1, 2, 5, 12, 13 and 14 of the safety 
task force report [1]), the following 2 issues are at present 
open, but will soon be addressed by the above mentioned 
working group. 
• The sealing of the LHC tunnel towards other 
underground areas of the machine (e.g. tunnel 
towards service areas) to protect them from Oxygen 
Deficiency Hazard (ODH) and from possible 
overpressure. 
• For the guided release of static overpressure from 
the LHC tunnel to the surface, the Safety Task Force 
recommends the implementation of a study group to 
propose possible options. 
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PROTECTION OF UNDERGROUND AREAS AND HE RELEASE TO 
SURFACE 
 
S. Weisz, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the status of the separation of 
underground areas from the LHC tunnel and the present 
pressure release paths in case of a large He leak. It also 
describes the shortfalls of the present situation and 
presents the strategy for the upgrade/consolidation of the 
overpressure and He release in case of a Maximum 
Conceivable Incident (MCI). 
INTRODUCTION 
A set of recommendations was issued by the Task Force 
on Safety of Personnel in LHC underground areas 
following the accident of 19th September [1]. All safety 
measures required to run the LHC in 2009/10 have been 
implemented. The main effort concerned the sealing of 
the experimental areas to insure a safe access to the 
detectors while the LHC magnets are powered. In 
addition, the release to the surface of the overpressure and 
helium flow in case of a MCI involved the installation or 
modification of ventilation doors around the LHC ring. 
Preference was given to the limitation of overpressure 
rather than to structural reinforcement, and the present 
release paths use the machine access shafts whose hearth 
cavities allow for the evacuation of massive gas flows. 
 The sealing of the LHC tunnel towards other 
underground areas must be pursued together with the 
study of alternate guided release of the overpressure and 
helium flow to the surface: the sealing of the LHC 
underground service areas is required for radio-protection, 
ODH and fire hazard mitigation [2] and to insure a full 
control of the underground ventilation [3]; A risk of an 
helium release in the access shafts appears when any test 
current in a sector exceeds the powering phase II 
thresholds defined in [4], and this also precludes access to 
the adjacent sectors during such tests [5]. 
PROTECTION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
UNDERGROUND PREMISES 
The LHC machine areas and the underground 
experimental premises present interfaces on the beam 
line, at the survey galleries and on passages to detector or 
experimental service caverns. All these interfaces have 
been made air tight, pressure and fire resistant: detailed 
description of the corresponding work can be found in the 
minutes of the control visits made to access the readiness 
for powering phase II while access is permitted to the 
experimental areas [6,7,8,9]. A short review of the 
protections in the various configuration encountered is 
given below.  
Separation on the beam line 
The natural interface for the high luminosity 
experiments is at the TAS level: ATLAS has developed a 
kind of bell fixed to the beam pipe and to the outer casing 
of the TAS (see Fig 1) that seals the air gap left for the 
fine alignment of the TAS. Such a bell is designed for an 
overpressure of 110mb, providing a substantial margin 
since 32mb are expected in case of a MCI [10]. The 
system can stand a 200K lower temperature and allows 
for a ±15mm lateral adjustment of the TAS.  CMS has 
installed a Z-stopper to prevent longitudinal movements 
of the TAS and a clapper that seals the air gap around the 
TAS in case of rapid rising overpressure from the LHC 
tunnel side. 
 Figure 1: Sealing at TAS level around ATLAS 
For the lower luminosity experiments, the interfaces 
with the machine are materialised by thick shielding walls 
left of ALICE and on both sides of LHCb, that have been 
completed by a sealing around the beam pipe. A pressure 
resistant partition was installed right of ALICE to 
complete the separation along the beam line: the structure 
and anchoring of this partition (see Fig 2) is designed to 
stand an overpressure of 76mb while less than 40mb are 
expected in case of an MCI [10]. This structure is dressed 
with steel plates that are sealed to the tunnel vault and 
floor on the outer edge, and to the beam pipe at the inner 
edge.   
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Figure 2: Partition frame right of ALICE 
 
Separation of the survey galleries 
Points 1 and 5 have survey galleries to align accurately 
the low-β triplets on both sides of the experiments. Doors 
are situated on both ends of these galleries, with access 
from the experimental caverns and emergency exits to the 
tunnel. Ducts allows for the passage of invar rods that 
deport the position of the quadrupoles in the tunnel to the 
alignment wires located in the galleries. 
Metallic pressure resistant boxes have been installed on 
the LHC tunnel vault around point 1 (see Fig 3) to seal 
the survey ducts and leave the passage of the invar rods. 
Consistently, the emergency exit doors have been 
replaced by pressure and fire resistant doors so that the 
survey galleries on both sides of ATLAS are protected 
from overpressure and helium leak from the LHC tunnel. 
 
Figure 3: Sealing of survey ducts left/right of ATLAS 
The case of CMS was handled in a rush and it is the 
access doors from the experimental cavern to the survey 
galleries that have been replaced by pressure and fire 
resistant doors. This situation does insure the protection 
of people inside the CMS cavern, but it makes the access 
to the survey galleries very cumbersome: the access 
system allows going into the survey galleries when the 
experiment is in access mode, but the situation would not 
be safe in these galleries when powering tests are in 
progress. This actually forces to lock the access doors to 
the survey galleries. Safe access to a survey gallery 
requires to physically block the power converter of the 
corresponding sector and the procedure to deliver the key 
of the access door is thus rather tedious.  
Passages to the experimental caverns 
Passages between the areas at the bottom of the LHC 
access shaft and the experimental caverns are available at 
Points 1, 2 and 8. These are essentially used as emergency 
exits when the LHC is not in shutdown mode. The 
corresponding doors have been replaced by air tight, 
pressure and fire resistant doors. The case of ALICE is 
particular since a material access point (MAD) of the 
interlock access system is the emergency passage between 
the experimental cavern and the LHC machine area: in 
this case, a pressure and fire resistant door was added in 
front of the MAD (see Fig 4) to protect the ALICE 
cavern. 
 
Figure 4: Additional pressure resistant door for ALICE 
 There are also numerous passages of services, cables 
and pipes between the LHC machine areas and the 
experiments. These have all been sealed with reinforced 
foam to insure the protection of the experimental cavern 
in case of an MCI. The passage of the QRL between the 
LHCb cavern and the straight section left of point 8 (see 
Fig 5) is one among the most impressive of these sealing.  
 
Figure 5: Sealing of the QRL left of LHCb 
Passages to the experimental service caverns 
The layout of point 5 presents many passages between 
the LHC machine area and the CMS service caverns. 
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Study of alternate paths for the release of over-
pressure and helium flow 
Alternative options for the guided release of 
overpressure from the LHC tunnel to the surface will be 
studied. As pointed out by the Safety Task Force [1], one 
such option is to use the existing ventilation ducts 
equipped with overpressure relief devices and reinforced 
to withstand the high mass-flow rates. This would be 
appealing provided the ducts installed in the shafts can 
stand the overpressure: indeed, the replacement of these 
ducts would represent a major intervention, with the 
removal of a large quantity of cables running down the 
shafts to access the existing ducts.  
This is why all existing paths linking the LHC tunnel to 
the surface will be considered. The list includes: 
− UJ18 ? PM18 for Sector 1-2  
− TI2 ? PMI2 for Sector 1-2 
− UJ32 ? TZ32  ? PM32 for Sectors 2-3 and 3-4  
− RUX45 ? UX45 ? PX46 for Sectors 3-4 and 4-5 
− UP56 ? UJ56 ? PM56 for Sectors 4-5 and 5-6  
− RUX65 ? UX65 ? PX64 for Sectors 5-6 and 6-7 
− RA83 ? UGC1 ? PX84 for Sector 7-8 
− TI8  ? PGC8 for Sector 8-1 
And on a longer term scale (>3years), since it involves 
heavy civil engineering: 
− Shafts close to RR13, RR17, RR53 & RR57 
− PGC2 (to be emptied from rubble) for Sector 2-3  
 
It is however important to note that the implementation 
of alternate paths for the release of overpressure and 
helium flow is essentially to add flexibility into the access 
matrix. The present paths fulfil all safety requirements 
and could be maintained for many years. The 
implementation of new alternative guided releases of 
overpressure from the LHC tunnel to the surface is thus of 
lower priority than the separation of underground 
ventilation sectors.  
SUMMARY 
All safety measures required to run the LHC in 2009/10 
have been implemented. The main effort concerned the 
sealing of the experimental areas to insure a safe access to 
the detectors while the LHC magnets are powered. In 
addition, the release to the surface of the overpressure and 
helium flow in case of a MCI involved the installation or 
modification of ventilation doors around the LHC ring. 
The release paths use the machine access shafts whose 
hearth cavities allow for the evacuation of massive gas 
flows. 
The present situation has two main drawbacks:  
• The air from the tunnel can mix freely with the air of 
the service galleries at the even points: this limits the 
control of the underground ventilation flows and does 
not insure best practice for radio-protection, ODH 
and fire hazard mitigation; 
• The LHC access shafts are on the release path of 
overpressure and helium flow to the surface in case 
of a MCI: this puts strong constraints on the access to 
underground machine areas when a sector is in 
powering phase II.  
 The sealing of the LHC tunnel towards other 
underground areas must be pursued with first priority 
during the next long shut down. The study of alternate 
release paths from the LHC tunnel to the surface will 
continue, to ease underground access during powering 
tests. However, a full flexibility of the access matrix is a 
long term objective that may require digging new 
dedicated shafts.  
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Safety of personnel in LHC underground areas 
following the accident of 19th September 2008, 
CERN-ATS-2009-002 
[2] How radiation will change your life, D. Forkel-Wirth, 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 
[3] Modification of the LHC underground ventilation 
system, M. Nonis, Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 
[4] Access and powering conditions for the 
superconducting circuits in the LHC, EDMS 
N°1001985 
[5]  Access Restrictions in the LHC and SPS during the 
Powering Phase 2, M. Gruwe, EDMS N°1010617  
[6] Readiness for powering phase 2: ATLAS, EDMS 
N°1027686 
[7] Readiness for powering phase 2: ALICE, EDMS 
N°1027705 
[8] Readiness for powering phase 2: CMS, EDMS 
N°1027714 
[9] Readiness for powering phase 2: LHCb, EDMS 
N°1027632 
[10] Technical Report on maximum pressure in the LHC 
tunnel and volume flow toward the different release 







Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
116
SAFETY ORGANIZATION AND SAFETY STATUS  
OF THE LHC EXPERIMENTS 






The LHC experiments have reached very high levels in 
matters of safety to face all possible risks associated to 
the LHC Run Period. 
Following appropriate risks assessments, the required 
level 3 alarm safety systems have been installed and are 
operational. The radioprotection strategy has been set up, 
the adequate general and specific safety trainings have 
been developed. 
The Experiments safety organization and structures 
have been reinforced with: SLIMOS in the control rooms, 
radioprotection experts and assistants, patrollers, safety 
officers. 
The Experiments SLIMOS desks in the control rooms 
are playing a key role in this safety organization:  
controlling all safety and infrastructure data and operating 
a strict control and coordination of all experimental areas 
access, activities and emergency situations. 
Finally, all safety measures have been implemented to 
protect the caverns in case of re-occurrence of Helium 
accidental release in the Tunnel areas. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The LHC experiments have in the past years 
implemented very high safety standards in the 
experimental areas to be ready for the LHC operation. 
The Experiments are ready to safely operate in Run 
period and during the LHC Machine Shutdowns:  
After appropriate risks assessments, the required Alarm 
level 3 safety systems have been designed and installed: 
fire, oxygen deficiency and gases detection, specific 
Sniffer system, etc.. These systems have been 
commissioned and are currently under maintenance 
control.  
In order to cope with the complexity of the experiments 
and the experimental areas, the Experimental safety 
structures have been reinforced. In this organization, a 
key role has emerged: the SLIMOS, Shift Leader in 
Matter of Safety to whom the GLIMOS delegates his 
functions in the experiments control rooms. In addition, a 
strict control, analysis and planning of all activities is 
performed by the experiments.  
In addition, a close collaboration has been set up with 
the CERN Fire Brigade.  
The Experiments radioprotection strategy has been set 
up in collaboration with the CERN radioprotection group. 
The required associated radioprotection equipments have 
been installed and the safety procedures are operational.  
Finally, following the accidental Helium release of 
19.11.2008, the experimental caverns have been pressure 
protected and sealed. These protections are mostly also 
fire resistant.  
As side benefits, the caverns and tunnels overpressures 
have been highly improved. And most of the experiments 
reach today the 20 Pa overpressure required for 
radioprotection and fire safety. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL AND SERVICE 
CAVERNS PROTECTION AGAINST AN 
ACCIDENTAL HELIUM RELEASE 
During the long shutdown 2008-2009, an extensive 
protection campaign has been run in the 4 experimental 
underground areas to protect the service and experimental 
caverns in case of the reoccurrence of an accidental 
Helium release in the tunnel areas following the Safety 
task force recommendations.  
 
It was especially requested to seal the LHC tunnel 
towards other underground areas to protect them from 
oxygen deficiency and from overpressure.  
The maximum possible overpressures were assessed by 
the Safety Commission for each relevant interface 
between the tunnel and the experimental or service areas 
associated to minimum gas temperature of 200 K.  
 
All structures interfacing between the tunnel and the 
service or experimental caverns have been analyzed 
versus these constraints and redesigned when required. A 
very tight sealing have been performed in order to 
guaranty air tightness between the tunnel and the other 
underground areas volume. When required and if 
possible, the modified structures have been rebuilt to 
ensure also fire protection.  
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 ALICE pressure resistant partition/door between 




ATLAS Survey hole between tunnel and UX15 
cavern survey galleries 
 
 
The TAS regions at the interface between the 
experimental caverns and the tunnel areas in CMS and 
ATLAS have been redesigned taking into account the 
ALARA, As Low As Reasonably Achievable, 
radioprotection strategy in addition to the other 
constraints. ATLAS and CMS have developed two 
different design solutions adapted to their specific 











ATLAS TAS protection design. 
 
 
In addition, the ventilation doors have been 
instrumented and connected to the LACS system, LHC 
Access Control system, in order to monitor their 
positions. In future and if required, the ventilation doors 
could be connected to the LASS, LHC Access Safety 
system, and inserted in the chain of interlocks. As a 
consequence of this protection campaign and thanks to 
the collaboration with EN-CV group, the overpressures 
between the experimental caverns and the tunnel have 
been highly improved. This is a side benefit for 
radioprotection and fire protection.  
 
ATLAS and CMS reach in Run mode the required 
overpressures: 
• Between service caverns and experimental 
caverns (> 20 Pa) 
• Between experimental caverns and tunnel areas 
(> 30 Pa) 
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Due to the ventilation system configuration, LHCb 
overpressures still need to be improved. This is addressed 
in Mauro Nonis proceedings. 
 
ALARM LEVEL 3 SYSTEMS STATUS  
The safety systems have been audited in the four 
experimental areas in 2008. An audit update campaign 
has been performed in 2009.  
The level 3 safety systems are operational and under 
maintenance control. It has to be noticed a special care 
will be taken in the coming years to coordinate the system 
maintenances that none of them exceed their annual limit 
in the specific context of two years run.  
The coverage of the alarm level 3 safety systems has 
been reinforced during the long 2009 shutdown. As an 
example, additional oxygen deficiency detectors have 
been installed in CMS survey galleries for an early 
detection in case of a reoccurrence of He release in the 
tunnel areas.  
 
Following the 19.11.08 accidental Helium release, the 
evacuation matrixes are currently under revision process. 
The main issue is the evacuation of the experimental 
caverns when there is a confirmed oxygen deficiency 
alarm in the tunnel areas. Depending on their specific 
topology, the four experiments have different strategies: 
automatic evacuation of the experimental caverns or 
evacuation triggered by the SLIMOS. 
In all cases, the issue of the missing second evacuation 
path, and the risk to evacuate via dangerous areas are 
raised.  
A global analysis of the whole LHC areas evacuation is 
on going in collaboration with the Machine safety 
responsible.  
 
EXPERIMENTS SAFETY STRUCTURE 
AND ORGANIZATION  
In order to cope with the complexity and the specificity 
of the detectors and of the experimental areas, a 
reinforced safety organization have been set up by the 
GLIMOS in the past years. This is one of the main 
parameter to guaranty very high safety standards in 
experimental areas and a safe operation of our detectors.  
 
The Experiments safety structures are leaded by the 
GLIMOS who is responsible and represents the 
experiments safety organization in front of the various 
CERN departments, safety partners and committees and 
in front of the experiments collaboration institutes.  
Several groups of specialized safety experts belongs to 
the Safety Structure and report to the GLIMOS.  
In first place, the GLIMOS is assisted by a team of 
engineers and physicists for all matters directly related to 
safety and database projects: alarm level 3 safety systems, 
detector safety systems, safety related databases 
development and maintenance, etc...  
Safety Officers, engineers or physicists, have been 
nominated in the various safety fields: cryogenics, 
electricity, flammable gases, territorial, lasers, radiation. 
They act as safety officers specifically for the 
experimental areas.  
A radioprotection organization of engineers, physicists 
and technicians has been set up around the GLIMOS and 
the radiation safety officer, RSO. This structure is 
responsible to organize, implement and perform the 
radioprotection tasks for the experiments.. 
Radioprotection Experts, so called RPE, who are 
engineers or physicists and Radioprotection Assistant, so 
called RPA, who are technicians have been certified by 
external national radioprotection authorities and are 
regularly trained by the CERN RP group and the 
experiment RSO. It shall be reminded that the 
radioprotection at CERN is under the authority of the 
CERN radioprotection group.  
 
All the activities and accesses happening in the 
experimental areas are controlled by the Work Package 
Analysis organization, during the LHC Run and 
Shutdown periods. The responsible of any type of activity 
(infrastructure or detectors) shall declare the activity via 
work declaration forms. He provides the appropriate 
safety and working information to the work package 
analysis team.  
A description of the work, the criticality of access, a 
proposed activity schedule with the required warning 
time, the required tooling is provided with the estimated 
time of intervention and the detailed region of access. All 
safety aspects and risks linked to the activity are provided 
via the so called PPSPS documents and analyzed during 
the Work Package Analysis (WPA) meeting by the 
GLIMOS or Experimental Area manager, all required 
safety experts and Technical Coordination responsible in 
presence of the activity responsible. The radioprotection 
aspects and especially the optimization of the individual 
and collective dose rates are analyzed by the ALARA 
engineers in collaboration with the CERN RP group; this 
is an input for the WPA meeting. The list of intervening 
persons associated the required safety trainings, medical 
certificates, and in near future associated dose budgets are 
also analyzed during the meeting.  
Finally, the activity is approved by the Technical 
coordination. In Run period, the criticality of the work is 
assessed by the Run Coordinator who proposes a schedule 
to the agreement of the LHC Program Coordinator.  
Depending on the experiment, this organization is 
leaded by the GLIMOS or by the EAM, Experimental 
Area Management.  
 
A key role for the safety of the Experiments is the 
SLIMOS: Shift Leader in matter of Safety. The 
Experiments safety, infrastructure and access data 
converge to a central location: the SLIMOS desk.  
All these data are analyzed and treated by the SLIMOS 
to which the GLIMOS delegates part of his safety duties 
together with the necessary authority. The SLIMOS are 
engineers or physicists especially trained for their safety 
duties. They follow regular information and instructions 
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campaign on safety systems, safety procedures, access 
systems, … In ATLAS experiments, weekly SLIMOS 
meeting are organized in order to collect the feedback 
from the shifters and to provide regular safety trainings.  
Generally, the SLIMOS coordinates actions resolution 
after a level 2 or level 3 alarms occurring in the 
experimental areas. He interacts the Fire Brigade, the 
CERN Control Center, CCC, and the infrastructure and 
detectors experts.  
 
During the LHC Run period, the SLIMOS coordinates 
the cavern opening and closing process, mainly he 
perform the following tasks:  
• Check of the caverns safety conditions: presence 
of alarms, infrastructure status, ventilation 
system modes (Run mode or Access mode), 
cavern overpressures (for ATLAS and CMS 
detectors), … 
• Coordination of the radioprotection experts and 
safety team interventions: radiation veto 
removal, material activation control, control of 
the cavern status before closing, … 
• Run the access systems opening and closure 
procedures in collaboration with the CERN 
Control Center. 
• Strict control of the persons and material going 
in and out during the intervention 
• Control the personnel required safety training, 
medical certificate (for ATLAS magnetic field) 
• Provide the required specific safety equipment 
(CO2 and ODH personnel detectors for ATLAS 
experimental cavern for example). 
• When required coordinate patrol interventions. 
 
The SLIMOS documentation is available in the 
experiments SLIMOS handbooks web pages. This is a 
web link to all SLIMOS and infrastructure data and 
procedures. This documentation is composed of users 
manuals, systems description, and specific procedures for 
SLIMOS, patrollers, experimental area users, 
radioprotection experts and assistants.  
 
It is specifically related to the following items:  
• Alarm systems (CSAM, DSS, Lasers, etc.) 
• Safety systems and alarm/action matrixes 
• Access control (access procedures, access 
control and safety systems, web cams, etc.) 
• Infrastructure parameters (electrical power, 
cryogenics, magnets, cooling and ventilation, 
gases, etc.) 
• Fire Brigade documentation and specific 
intervention procedures 
• Radioprotection (radiation monitoring system, 
specific procedures, etc…) 
• Safety equipment status and monitoring 




The infrastructure and safety parameters are consultable 
in real time at SLIMOS desk and through the experiments 
restricted access web pages. The web pages use the DIP 











ATLAS Magnet Status web page. 
 
It has to be noticed that the organization of safety for 
the experiments forward detectors shall be clarified. 
 
As far as the safety organization is concerned, CMS has 
opted for a structure that includes a second outfit with 
responsibilities complementary of those of the GLIMOS: 
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The Experimental Area Management (EAM) team. This 
outfit holds the overall responsibility when it comes to the 
work package analysis activities. The meetings are called 
and chaired by the EAM team. Subsequently, the EAM 
team ensures that the recommendations made during the 
meeting (detailed planning & coordination, work method, 
safety aspects) are implemented on site. The EAM team 
also has clearly defined responsibilities regarding access 
management to the experimental area. Access requests 
from users are primarily treated by the GLIMOS, while 
the Experimental Area Manager treats the ones from 
contractors and CERN staff. As a general rule, the CMS 
GLIMOS has as a prime responsibility the safety of the 
CMS detector and collaborators whereas the EAM 
focuses on the safety of the experimental area (i.e. 
infrastructure, interface with LHC machine…) and the 
CERN personnel and contractors. When it comes to 
managing general safety projects, the EAM team also 
plays a clearly defined role in the preparation and 
execution of the activities alongside the CMS 
GLIMOS. The CMS EAM team belongs to the EN 
department, has no hierarchical link with CMS GLIMOS 
but works in very close collaboration with him and his 
team.  
 
THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE 
CERN FIRE BRIGADE AND THE 
EXPERIMENTS 
Due to the complexity of the experiments, the Fire 
Brigade requires specific information and assistance for 
their interventions inside the experimental areas, 
especially inside the ATLAS experiment. A collaboration 
program has been developed in the past years between the 
LHC experiments and the Fire Brigade. This program is 
composed of specific collaborative procedures, training 










The general emergency procedures are currently under 
finalization process. These procedures define the main 
intervention steps in case of an emergency inside the 
experimental areas. They precise the roles and 
responsibilities of both parties: the SLIMOS/GLIMOS 
and the Fire Brigade intervention teams. They also remind 
the collaborative interactions between the Fire Brigade 
and the Experiment safety responsible.  
 
An experimental site familiarization is organized by 
CMS and LHCb. ALICE and ATLAS experiments have 
developed a formal experiment training which is 
delivered regularly to the Fire Brigade team and in any 
case to each new comer. These trainings explain the 
SLIMOS and GLIMOS role, remind the basic 
intervention procedures, detail the experiments topology 
and specific risks. In ATLAS case, when the experimental 
cavern access is possible, the training includes a 
familiarization of the ATLAS detector internal areas, so 
called Toroid area.  
 
Indeed, the ATLAS Toroid area is an example of 
complexity: it is composed of few hundred meters of 
platforms punctuated by ladders, small diameter holes, 
traps, etc. Some platforms require use of harnesses. The 
main ATLAS risks are concentrated in this area: high 
magnetic field, Beryllium pipe, liquid argon, 







ATLAS Toroid Area topology and main risks web pages. 
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A naming convention has been developed in agreement 
with the Fire Brigade to identify the internal platforms. 
Plates indicating the location name has been installed on 
all ATLAS detector platforms to assist the FB intervening 
teams and more generally the ATLAS users.  
 
It has to be noticed that the ATLAS internal topology 
and the safety risks changes depending on the detector 
access scenarios. The main access configurations are 
closed configuration: the detector is fully closed, ready 
for beam and standard access configuration: the detector 
is opened, the heart of the detector is reachable, additional 
scaffoldings are installed.  
 
The ATLAS detector opening configuration, main risks 
list and location, the topology details and naming 
convention are available for the Fire Brigade intervention 
team at SLIMOS desk. They are also visible through the 




Finding People inside ATLAS areas 
 
During the emergency, the SLIMOS will indicate to the 
Fire Brigade, the preferable way to access the region of 
intervention, the access difficulties (holes, harness, 
ladders.) and what are the risks in the areas.  
 
The progression of the intervening team inside the 
ATLAS detector is followed by the SLIMOS and the Fire 
Brigade head of intervention via a very useful safety 
assisting device: the FPIAA, Finding People Inside 
ATLAS Areas tracking system.  
 
This system based on passive infrared sensors detects 
movement of people inside the areas. It is very useful to 
detect presence of people and to guide the Fire Brigade 






STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The Experiments strategy in matter of radioprotection 
has been determined and agreed with the CERN 
Radioprotection group in the past years.  
 
The procedures have been defined for the various 
radioprotection tasks: experimental caverns material 
control procedures, material traceability, radiation veto 
removal in nominal conditions or in case of 
emergency…These procedures depend on the 
radioprotection risks and are regularly revised depending 
on the luminosity increase.  
 
In order to assist the Experiments in their daily 
radioprotection tasks, experiments radioprotection 
experts, RPE, and assistants, RPA, have been certified by 
external national radioprotection authorities and follow a 
regular training done by the CERN Radioprotection 
group. The RPE and RPA perform radioprotection tasks 
in low risks areas (< 15μSv/h). The experiment radiation 
safety officer, RSO, directly supervises their activities.  
 
ATLAS experiment is the only experiment that 
remained classified as radiation controlled area after the 
first LHC beam in September 2008. It is here taken as an 
example of more than one year of an operational 
radioprotection strategy.  
 
The RPE and RPA have been acting on shifts since 
September 2008 in two different modes depending on the 
LHC mode. In LHC Run period, the shifts are active 
24H/7D, during the Shutdown period the shifts are 
performed only during normal working hours. The RPE 
and RPA have assisted the CERN RP group and the RSO 
at the beginning of 2008/2009 Shutdown to perform the 
experimental radioprotection survey measurements.  
During the whole shutdown period, they have 
performed the material control measurements and 
traceability records of all material exiting UX15 
experimental cavern on the various sub-detectors 
requests. This is done using the Material Control and 
Traceability console that is fully operational. This console 
has been developed by ATLAS, and is taken as common 
approach by the four experiments ATLAS, CMS LHCb 
and soon ALICE. 
All material exiting the ATLAS experimental cavern 
are measured labeled and traced in the material database 
via a GLANCE interface.  
 









ATLAS RP measurement and traceability console. 
 
The ATLAS radioprotection philosophy has defined 
that all material taken out of a zone that has been 
estimated as potentially radioactive shall exit the 
experimental cavern through the shafts and be delivered 
directly in the surface Buffer zone.  
In order to prevent an accidental or volunteer transfer 
of radioactive material through the experimental cavern 
exit doors (PAD, personnel access device or MAD, 
material access device), radiation gate monitors have been 
installed at the cavern exits and at surface buffer zone exit 
to detect any radioactive material going through. The gate 




Radiation gate monitors at UX15 cavern exit 
 
In case of detection, at gate monitor location, a video 
surveillance will start to record; siren and flashes will be 
activated to alert the person exiting.  
 
In the ATLAS control room, an alarm will alert the 
SLIMOS who will immediately initiate an emergency 
procedure with the assistance of the RPE on shift, the 





ATLAS Radiation gate monitors alarm screen. 
 
Campaigns of control of radiations calculations and of 
the radioactive areas will be systematically run during 
each major long shutdown. The activation calculations 
have highlighted the zones where the material can 
potentially result to be radioactive during the ATLAS 
openings. About 95 samples have been placed inside the 
detector and experimental area to be analyzed at each 
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major shutdown by the radioprotection group in order to 
confirm the calculations and the radioactive zones 
boundaries.  
 
The ATLAS ALARA, As Low As reasonably 
Achievable, organization and strategy are currently been 
set up. ATLAS took the opportunity of the 2008/2009 
long shutdown to record the ATLAS detector closure 
scenario in order to prepare for the ALARA studies. In 
agreement and collaboration with the intervening teams, 
all the relevant steps of the various activities were filmed:  
• Detector movements operations 
• Survey activities 
• Beam pipes activities 
• Scaffolding and crane activities, etc. 
The relevant ALARA data: activity location, time 
spent, person expertise, etc.  have been recorded and are 
vital for the future ALARA process. These data are 
currently under treatment with especially the calculation 
of doses per activity and per type of personnel, the 
process optimizations, etc… 
 
As a conclusion, in the 2008/2009 shutdown period, the 
ATLAS collaboration has gained experience and has 




In the past years the LHC Experiments have developed 
very high safety levels for the protection of their 
personnel and equipment thanks mainly to a strong 
organization, several safety projects campaigns, and a key 
role that is emerging the SLIMOS.  
The radioprotection strategy has been implemented, is 
being experimented and will be developed in the coming 
years especially for the ALARA aspects. 
 There is nevertheless some remaining pending safety 
issues to be solved in the coming years; they are 
addressed in C. Schaeffer proceedings. 
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Safety in the Experiments - Still Something To Do
Ch. Scha¨fer, GLIMOS CMS, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
With the re-start of LHC after the incident of 19-Sept-
2008, safe operation of the experiments with LHC beam
was possible after signiﬁcant consolidation works and im-
provement during 2009. This is an excellent achievement
from both the machine and experiment’s sides. This pa-
per ”Safety in the Experiments - still something to do” on
behalf of the LHC experiments reﬂects this consolidation
and outlines the remainders. It is complementary to the
talk given by O. Beltramello, GLIMOS of ATLAS, same
proceedings.
INTRODUCTION
The incident of 19-Sept-2008 on the LHC machine, only
ten days after start-up came as a big shock to the commu-
nity. In the aftermath of this incident, enormous consoli-
dation efforts on the machine and experiment’s sides were
carried out. The presentation ”Safety in the Experiments
- still something to do” on behalf of the LHC experiments
reﬂects this consolidation and outlines the remainders. All
four large LHC experiments already operated for several
years before LHC start-up and without the LHC beam, e.g.
by taking cosmic ray data or during calibrations and tests
of the experimental magnets. With the re-start of LHC, safe
operation of the experiments with LHC beam was possible
due to signiﬁcant consolidation works and improvement
during 2009. This is an excellent achievement. Neverthe-
less, further safety consolidation is required and to a part
already underway to allow sustainable operation of all ex-
periments and the experimental areas for the next 15 years,
at least. The topics considered most urgent by the experi-
ments for safe operation currently and in the future can be
summarized as follows:
• The underground ventilation system;
• The underground evacuation system;
• The completeness and soundness of the emergency
procedures underground and on surface;
• The implementation and modiﬁcation of the existing
automatic alarm action matrix explicitly the commis-
sioning of actions following alarms of level 3;
• Veriﬁcation of the procedures and instrumentation
used for radiation protection;
• Deﬁnition and procedural approach to general safety
systems.
Figure 1: Example for a blast resistant, air tight and ﬁre
proof sealing done in 2009 in the CMS experiment.
THE UNDERGROUND VENTILATION
SYSTEM
The underground ventilation system is of utmost impor-
tance with respect of safety of personnel working in un-
derground facilities. Above all, breathable air is what we
need at least. In this context, a comprehensive safety as-
sessment for the existing ventilation system and the under-
ground requirements are needed to ensure that ventilation
can be guaranteed during all possible situations. Although
this requirement appears to be obvious, all LHC experi-
ments agreed on the need to underline the safety function
of the underground ventilation system by submitting a re-
quest as follows:
• An overpressure regime between the service caverns
and the experimental caverns as well as between the
latter and the LHC machine tunnel needs to be kept.
In locations where this is not yet the case, this pres-
sure hierarchy1 described above has to be established
and its stability ensured. It has to be emphasized that
1The pressure hierarchy or overpressure regime denote a differential
overpressure of the service caverns with respect to the experimental cav-
erns of at least 20 Pa, and equally a differential overpressure of the ex-
perimental caverns with respect to the LHC machine tunnel of at least 20
Pa
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the purpose of the overpressure regime in the LHC
underground areas is for safety of personnel, conse-
quently, it may not be violated in any situation with
people underground. This includes maintaining the
overpressure regime during the LHC shut-down peri-
ods as much as possible.
• A sufﬁcient air ﬂow has to be provided for all under-
ground safe areas, i.e. the areas in front of the access
lifts. This air ﬂow rate has to be such that the ingress
of smoke in case of ﬁre is excluded. In addition, the
required overpressure in all safe areas has to be 20
Pa at least. Further, it has to be guaranteed that said
overpressure within the safe area can be maintained
in the case of an incident while evacuating personnel
accesses the safe area by opening the large ﬁre doors.
This requirement is currently not met.
• The underground ventilation system is part of the ex-
isting automatic alarm action matrix. The function-
ality of the underground ventilation system has to be
ensured in application of the existing automatic alarm
action matrix, and in possible emergency scenarios
”mode degrade´e”, e.g. for the case of a general power
cut, or similar scenarios. Further, it has to be ensured
that the safety action creates no conﬂict with other
emergency procedures, e.g. in the case of an ODH
alarm when the air extraction works under full power
such that the pressure difference is increased, it has to
be ensured that the escape doors can still be opened
by one person only.
• All critical safety functions of the underground ven-
tilation system have to be operated via a reliable and
redundant control system in agreement with the safety
standards. This includes an adequate instrumentation.
EVACUATION
The safe areas in front of the access lifts are the backbone
of all LHC evacuation scenarios. These areas are intended
to work as temporary waiting areas for the personnel in un-
derground in the case of an incident. Hence, their resis-
tance to ﬁre was agreed to be of duration of 120 minutes at
least. In order to meet these requirements, a revision of the
safe areas is mandatory, comprising the above-mentioned
aspects of underground ventilation as well as their struc-
tural integrity. The structural integrity includes, amongst
others, the appropriate seals of cable passages and correct
joints between ﬁre doors and surrounding walls, as well
as the installation of ﬁre dampers complying with interna-
tional standards. Further, two independent and individu-
ally secured evacuation paths have to be made permanently
available for the personnel in the case of emergency. To this
effect, all areas have to be re-visited in which measures fol-
lowing the recommendations of the Safety Task Force were
recently installed. In the case of an emergency, it is possi-
ble that one of the two evacuation paths is inhabited by the
nature of the emergency, e.g. due to ﬁre or helium release
such that it is mandatory to make a correct choice of the
safe exit path. To that end, an automatic signalization of
the evacuation paths is needed, including a clear indication
of the paths prohibited for exit. A public address system
in the underground caverns as safety supporting system is
required, mainly due to the size and complexity of the ex-
perimental underground areas. This public address system
will be used to provide the personnel with speciﬁc informa-
tion in the case of emergency or abnormal events such that
e.g. panics can be avoided in the case of evacuation alarms
or instructions can be given that could otherwise provided
only to personnel equipped with portable phones.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Emergency procedures are one of the main ingredients
for a successful handling of dangerous situations. In order
that these emergency procedures are correctly launched it is
obvious that the CERN Fire Brigade has to be always and
immediately and duly informed about the safety situation
of the CERN premises. At several occasions it could be ob-
served that the chain of actions starting with the automatic
recognition of a potentially dangerous situation until the
correct reaction of the CERN ﬁre brigade was not optimal.
Therefore, the LHC experiments request that this chain of
actions is assessed and properly implemeted. An important
point for this chain of actions is the validation of emergency
procedures. The LHC experiments are currently either ﬁ-
nalizing and validating their individual emergency proce-
dures or have already approved. As for all procedures, a
regular application or training is mandatory to achieve suc-
cess, especially for emergency procedures, since stress can
be an important obstacle in this case. Hence, the LHC ex-
periments request that regular training and emergency exer-
cises are done. These exercises must be done with the par-
ticipation of all departments involved as well as the CERN
ﬁre brigade and very important the local ﬁre brigade of the
host states.
ALARM ACTION MATRIX
The majority of the automatic alarm action matrices was
deﬁned and implemented already before the incident of
19th September 2008. Consequently, they cannot reﬂect
the new risk analyses and the evaluation of the new situa-
tion in the underground areas that were carried out after the
incident. In some rare cases, the implemented measures
create a conﬂict with the exiting safety concept in place.
Examples are that the recently implemented very tight seal-
ing of the CMS experimental cavern leads to the situation
that in case of an ODH alarm with air extraction the door
to the safe area can no longer be easily opened due to the
increased under pressure provided by the air extraction sys-
tem. Consequently, the exit of a person in the cavern could
be blocked by this door such that one may not be able to en-
ter the safe area. Another example is the evacuation signal
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by activating the sirens. It is currently not clariﬁed whether
the experimental caverns also have to be evacuated in the
case of an emergency in the LHC machine. Equally, it has
to be excluded that people enter the LHC machine during
LHC emergency. To answer these questions, it is neces-
sary to perform a systematic review of all automatic alarm
action matrices in view of the new safety situation.
Currently the experiments are equipped with two ma-
jor systems performing automatic safety actions: CERN
Safety Alarm Monitoring (CSAM) and the Detector Safety
System (DSS); the ﬁrst being in charge of personnel safety
and the latter used for equipment protection. These safety
systems must be as simple as possible in order to achieve a
maximum reliability. The complexity of some experiments
makes it necessary though that relatively complex alarm
action matrices have to be created to guarantee personal
protection. In the case of the ATLAS experiment, this com-
plexity is not covered with the existing systems and there
could be a need to develop a third system.
RADIATION PROTECTION
With increased luminosity delivered to the LHC experi-
ments by the LHC machine, it is very important to take all
aspects of radiation protection into account. One of these
aspects is the so-called lifting of the RP veto, i.e. the mea-
suring of the radiation level in the experimental caverns be-
fore access can be granted. For safe operation of the detec-
tors, access to these caverns is needed on a regular basis
and for short accesses the experimental magnets might not
be switched off. It has been observed that some areas of
the cavern have a magnetic stray ﬁeld that is inﬂuencing
the proper functioning of the hand held RP instruments.
Therefore it cannot be proven that for all work places in the
cavern the radiation ﬁeld is compatible with a supervised
area in terms of radiation protection. Nevertheless, simula-
tion data shows that with the current luminosity, these ar-
eas should not give rise to safety concerns. With increased
luminosity though some of the LHC experiments need ad-
equate hand held RP instruments to guarantee the safety of
the workplace. As an immediate action, the experiments
are currently revising the need for additional ﬁxed RAM-
SES monitors in order to cope with the shortcomings of the
hand held instruments.
In order to avoid that activated material leaves unautho-
rized the experimental sites, the already existing RAMSES
gate monitors on the surface, detecting an increased level
of ionizing radiation, shall be connected to the CERN ac-
cess control system. In case that RAMSES triggers, the
gate barriers shall not open automatically. An individual
intervention of a group member of DGS-RP or a radiation
protection expert of the experiment must be required.
Another very important aspect of radiation protection
is the work planning, allowing including the ”ALARA2”
principle right from the beginning as well as the required
2As Low As Reasonable Achievable
traceability of radioactive material when it leaves the ex-
perimental caverns. The LHC experiments are currently
working on an integrated approach in order to cover all the
different aspects in a common application and database.
Important for radiation protection is that it must be guar-
anteed that only those people enter a radiation area that
have not yet taken a too high dose. Since the time gap of
two mandatory read outs of the personal dosimeter could
be almost 2 month, the experiments request that a more
adapted surveillance of the personal doses should be done
when needed. In addition it is necessary to determine
the individual and collective dose for every work package
within the global application, to that end the LHC exper-
iments must have access to the RP database. A review
is needed of how to connect the reading of the individual
dosimeter can be connected to the access control system,
ensuring that only people access the caverns that have read-
out their dosimeters right before access and right after leav-
ing.
SAFETY SYSTEMS
Today, CERN has a comprehensive set of rules for alarm
level 3 systems, i.e. systems that detect emergency sit-
uations and transmit this information to the CERN ﬁre
brigade. These rules deﬁne the scope of alarm level 3 sys-
tems as well as their commissioning and their maintenance.
Unfortunately there is currently no set of CERN rules about
safety systems, i.e. systems that are important for the safety
of personnel. The LHC experiments request that the Safety
Commission deﬁnes, as already done for level 3 alarm sys-
tems, what a safety system is. An example about the impli-
cation of missing rules is the foam system in some of the
experimental caverns. This system is clearly not a alarm
level 3 system, since it will not generate an alarm to the
ﬁre brigade, in contrary it is the ﬁre brigade that will op-
erate this system in an emergency. On the other hand, this
is obviously a safety system. Nevertheless the water reser-
voir of the surface that serves the foam system for proper
operation does not underlie any safety rule especially not
for the periodic maintenance. It must be guaranteed that all
safety systems operate correctly and if not available, com-
pensatory measures are in place. There is also a strong need
to improve the operation and maintenance procedures and
especially their application for both level 3 alarm systems
and also for safety systems, as soon as they are deﬁned as
such.
CONCLUSION
For the LHC experiments and their experimental areas, a
comprehensive set of safety equipment is installed. In order
to maintain their very good safety records it is important to
focus now on areas that have not gotten the necessary at-
tention so far. The ﬁrst priorities identiﬁed by the LHC
experiments are the safety aspects of the underground ven-
tilation system, especially the pressure regimes and equally
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the evacuation means and procedures in the underground.
Since safety is an iterative process, all aspects of safety
must be revisited regularly.
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AN APPROACH TO A WORK AND SAFETY ORGANISATION IN THE 
LHC DURING LONG SHUT DOWNS 
J. Pedersen CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
      Abstract
     Following the restructuration of early 2009, the EN 
department took over the territorial safety      
responsibility for the machines. However, the beam      
related safety is still handled by BE and the      
supervision of the LHC safety will switch from the       
beams department to the EN department during shut       
downs. 
 
      This presentation gives an overview of the safety      
organisation that will be in place during an LHC shut       
down. It will also review a number of questions that       
still need to be addressed and must be settled for the       
next long shut down. 
 
      A primordial element of safety is the ability to Control 
and trace all interventions. For this the AET (Avis 
d’Execution de Travaux) is under development and its 
main aspects will be presented. The AET is an improved 
tracing procedure replacing the ADI from the hardware 




Following the restructuration in the beginning of  
2009 the EN department took over the territorial 
safety responsibility for most of the beam facilities, 
including the machines LHC, SPS and PS. The 
creation of the MEF group within the EN department 
brought all the TSOs for the machines and 
experimental areas to the EN department, and thus 
the occupational health and safety in these areas fell 
to the EN safety organisation.  
 
The competence and experience in beam related 
occupational health and safety, e.g. radiation safety, 
EIS and AIS interlocks and access control, did 
however remain with the BE department. There were 
several reasons for this arrangement: 
• The need for continuity in the treatment of 
these systems 
• The need for proximity between the safety 
organisation looking after the above 
mentioned aspects, and the BE operations 
group 
• The concentration in the beams department 
of the competence in these fields. 
 
The natural consequence was that EN exercised its 
role as territorial safety responsible only when above 
mentioned aspects were absent, namely during shut 
down. This led to the idea of a machine-mode 
dependant safety organization.   
This paper proposes an approach to a work and 
safety organization for the LHC during the long shut 
downs. Most of the units foreseen to contribute to the 
long shut down effort already have a well established 
functioning. However, a review of the methods and 
procedures is needed, due to the fact that the shut 
down will apply a new tool, the AET, a transfer of 
responsibilities and – most important – the LHC will 
have seen beam on a large scale. This will require the 
full scope of radiological measures to be respected: 
DIMR, ALARA, dose mapping, waste handling etc. 
All of these have an impact on the occupational 
health and safety. 
 
MACHINE MODE DEPENDENCY 
 
The risks to which workers are exposed in the LHC 
depend on the mode of the machine. For the 
assessment of the general safety situation the 
following modes are considered sufficient:                                   
• Machine in shut down 
• Machine operational without beam 
(Technical stop, cold check-out, powering 
tests and hardware commissioning) 
• Machine operational with beam. 
In order to simplify further, it is possible to consider 
only two modes: ‘Operational’ or ‘Shut down’. As 
will be shown in the following there are two set of 
criteria that condition the global safety approach 
 
Machine in operation 
 
The safety, with the machine in operation, is, in 
general, based on: 
• the absence of people in the machine, 
• the need to control the access, 
• the risks are generated by exposure of the 
workers to radiation and to the electrical and 
cryogenic systems. 
This situation is primarily controlled through 
technical measures that will keep people out of harms 
way. These measures are made up of the access 
control system with its interlocks, the various alarm 
systems etc. 
A system of patrols, as part of the preparation to 
enter into operation, is one of the measures needed to 
ensure absence of people in areas of risk. 
 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
129
The handling of this situation requires a good 
knowledge of the risks of the machine, of its 
operation and of the access control and alarm 
systems. This knowledge is an integral part of the 
competence of the BE safety organisation 
 
Machine in shut down 
 
For safety, when the machine is in shut down, it is 
required to handle: 
• the presence of many people in the machine, 
• the need to trace the people intervening, 
• the risks generated by exposure to various 
systems undergoing maintenance or tests, 
and with the services operational, 
• limiting exposure to radioactivity. 
As this situation is characterised by the fact that 
people need access to the systems on which they 
have to  intervene for maintenance or tests etc, it is 
not possible to rely only on technical measures. A 
large part of the occupational safety, i.e. risk 
mitigation or risk control is based on organisational 
measures: rules, procedures, etc. These measures are 
less efficient and must thus be strictly enforced in 
order to retain their credibility. 
 
The handling of safety during shut down requires a 
comprehensive planning and co-ordination, intimate 
knowledge of the lay out of the machine and of ‘best 
practice’. The knowledge of the lay out of the 
machine is necessary in order to be able to maintain 
the overview of the activities ongoing. ‘Best practice’ 
is required from all units intervening; only teams that 
know their trade or technology, and also the safety 
aspects being an integral part of the work, can 
provide the technical and safety performance 
required for a successful shut down. 
 
Proposal for a machine mode dependant 
safety organisation 
 
Based on the requirements facing the safety 
organisation in the two situations, or machine modes, 
it is proposed that  
• the EN safety organisation supervises the 
safety during shut down, 
• the BE safety organisation supervises the 
safety during operation, with or without 
beam. 
 
This proposal requires a clear definition of the 
interfaces and responsibilities during transfer from 
operation to shut down and back. It also requires a 
clear definition of when the machine can be 
considered in shut down mode. The answers to these 
detailed questions will be found during the coming 
months, well before the next long shut down. 
 
LHC SHUT DOWN SAFETY 
ORGANISATION 
 
Even though all details of the transfers between 
modes have not yet been determined, it is possible to 
describe the principles that circumscribe the safety 




The safety on the work site (in this case in the LHC 
tunnel) during the shut down depends on a number of 
stakeholders. The most important, due to their 
numbers, their presence in all parts of the machine 
and the diversity of their activities, are the 
intervening groups and their contractors. They 
contribute to the occupational safety through 
application of ‘best practice’. Through good work, 
respective of norms and standards, they cover a large 
part of the safety relevant actions. They do this as 
part of the trade they exercise, and limited to their 
activities. 
 
The other group of stakeholders are the units or 
individuals that have the task to set up an 
organisational framework within which the groups 
and their contractors can operate safe and efficiently. 
This group is constituted by: 
• The shut down planning and co-ordination 
• The safety coordinators [1] 
• The safety officers 
• The ‘service provider’ or safety inspection 
service 
• The Safety Commission 
• The Fire Brigade 
• The CERN management 
 
       These units provide help and service and make     
       available planning and co-ordination, safety experts,  
       emergency interventions and the necessary pressure,   




The basic referential are the CERN safety rules.  
The Safety Commission is in the process of updating 
rules and instructions for Health & Safety in the 
Workplace and for Work Organisation.  
Most groups have the procedures needed to control 
the safety of their activities. It is in the interest of the 
groups that this kind of documentation is available 
and up to date. 
 
These reference documents should form a coherent 
set, and must be available and understandable. 
The correct application of the rules will require the 
understanding of them. Rules that are understood and 
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accepted as reasonable will have a much higher 
success than will rules that are imposed without 
explanation.   This implies that some training or 
information must take place 
It is part of the responsibility of the CERN groups, 
and of the contractors, that their personnel - and their 
contractor’s personnel - follow the proper training.  
The personnel on site must respect the safety rules to 
assure their own safety and that of their co-workers. 
 
CERN users – personnel from experiments and 
collaborations - that will be involved in the shut 
down activities in the LHC tunnel must respect the 
tunnel safety rules. They must receive the proper 




It is intended to hold safety information meetings 
with contractors before the start of the shut down, as 
a complement to the specific safety training.  The aim 
is to convince the local managers, the representatives 
of the personnel and the safety experts of the 
companies of the interest in a safety alliance, where 
all parties contribute to occupational safety, also by 
realising the need for it - and planning for it - from 
the beginning. 
 
Tracing of intervening teams 
 
It is of great importance for the occupational safety 
during the shut down that the planning unit and the 
safety coordination knows what is happening in the 
machine. This is to: 
• Be able to validate the analysis of working 
methods 
• Have knowledge of the ‘imported risks’ of 
all activities 
• Avoid risks due to co-activities 
• Avoid risks due to rushed and ill-prepared 
interventions and the ensuing surprises  
Thus - in the interest of the safety of the workers - 
All interventions must be declared to the work 
planning and coordination.  
It must be assured that access to the machine is 
granted only to those with activities approved by the 
shut down planning and co-ordination. 
 
It must be possible for the central planning authority 
to know the situation at all times:  
• who is in - or will go in - the machine,  
• where they are 
• when they are there,  
• what they do, 
• how they do it (Safety coordination), 
• for whom are they doing it? 
 
To trace the activities as described, a user friendly, 
rapid and flexible declaration of work or intervention 
is needed. A tool that is flexible with respect to the 
details of the intervention, which is not easily tricked 
out ‘to gain time’ and which can condition the access. 
[2] 
 
Such a tool, currently under development, will be the 
Avis d’Execution de Travaux (AET) This tool is 
expected to be operational during 2010. It will 
replace the Avis d’Ouverture de Chantier (AOC, IS 





A number of questions still need to be addressed:  
• Are the rules governing safety during shut 
down complete and coherent?  
• Are the safety rules and procedures properly 
understood by all parties? 
• How do we define the start and end of 
operation and shut down for the transfer? 
• How do we handle the transitions between 
operation, test and shut down? 
• How do we handle the safety aspects of one 
sector of the machine in one mode and other 
sectors in another mode? 
 
The discussion of these issues should be started 
soonest and the answers be ready well before the next 




A proposal for a safety organisation for the LHC long 
shut down exists. It needs to be developed in detail, 
but the participants in this development have been 
identified. All the participants are currently mastering 
their individual contribution; what is outstanding is 
the creation of a forum that can assure that all 
stakeholders can exchange information and 
requirements as needed for an efficient and safe shut 
down, taking into account the AET tool, the radiation 
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WHAT CAN THE SAFETY COORDINATION DO FOR YOU?
John Etheridge, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland.
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the progress 
we all made over the last 12 months, looking at the safety 
procedures (AOC ,VIC, ADI) define our strong points and 
see how we can improve them. Identify the weak points 
and highlight the problems.
Build in safety from the conception stage of “ALL” 
project including the LHC, define the rule and regulation, 
ensure they exist, that they are clear and the same for 
“ALL”. 
Show how close team work between all actors and in 
particular the safety coordination and general 
coordination will help with the organization for future 
shut downs. Make available a database for all relevant 
documentation (DIMR, PPSPS, SAFETY FILES, etc).
Pin point the areas that need to be improved, to enables 
the organization to move forward in such a way that the 
CERN remains the center of excellence throughout the 
world in all domains. 
RESPONSIBILITY
Safety responsibilities follow an executive line starting 
at the very top with the Director General, Directors, 
Department Leaders, Group and Section Leaders, down as 
far as each and every individual CERN staff member. 
In November 2006 the Director-General Mr. R. Aymar 
entrusted to the Safety Commission to carry out a full 
revision of SAPOCO 42 and issue a coherent set of safety 
rules. He further stated in a later publication in December 
2007, which coincided with the updated version of the 
new SAPOCO 42, that one of the important objectives of 
his mandate was to improve Safety at CERN. The most 
important change was that “ALL” executive 1 tasks 
aimed at ensuring the Safety of the personnel and the 
equipment shall be the sole responsibility of the 
Departments, who shall also be responsible for the 
effectiveness. With the change of Director-General in 
2009 the political statement has remained the same, the 
SAPOCO 42 document is still being updated, and only 
time will tell if the necessary means are made available to
ensure that the statement becomes reality. 
In some departments there would seem to be a real 
policy in place that wants to create a real safety culture. 
To enable the organization as a whole to improve its 
safety culture the direction must come from the 
management at the highest level. This will also require a 
complete change in attitude of many members of staff in 
their everyday working lives. Anyone can write a safety 
policy, but it takes real commitment on behalf of everyone 
in the Organisation to create and implement a complete 
safety culture. If we are to create a real safety culture at 
CERN, safety must come first and everyone involved 
should be taken into consideration, Safety Procedures 
must not simply be done to keep people happy with the 
hope of avoiding accidents. Safety should never be 
viewed as business risk or cost. If we can develop high 
standards in the work place a safety culture should be risk 
free and a profitable venture. By implementing and 
maintaining the safety culture from the conception stage 
of a project, and keeping it in place for the lifecycle of the 
project, the Organisation can not only reduce the number 
of accidents and incidents but also save valuable time and 
money. This is why safety must be built in from the 
conception stage of any new project. This is not 
systematically the case today at CERN, it must be said 
however that in nearly all new projects safety plays a vital 
role at CERN. Furthermore we can no longer tolerate 
“special situations” kingdoms within kingdoms. All work, 
tests and interventions must be planned, prepared, official 
authorisation given and the documentation relating to the 
operation concerned approved by all those concerned.
KEY PLAYERS
For the first shut down of the LHC a new organisational 
structure has been put in place. It is imperative that 
everyone wishing to carry out any intervention in the 
LHC follows the new strategy. Once a project manager or 
work supervisor is aware that he needs to carry out an 
intervention he must first contact the LHC planning and 
Coordination team who will give a window to carry out 
the work. Any person found working in the LHC without 
obtaining formal authorisation from the planning will be 
removed. Planning is supported and assisted by the 
general coordination team.  The team is made up of the 
six LHC Site Coordinators whose new role is divided into 
three separate but equally important tasks. The first being 
assistant to the general coordination for his sector, the 
second as his title suggests, he coordinates the day to day
running of his site and thirdly he has been appointed 
territorial safety officer (TSO) for his sector. These three 
roles combined give the Site Coordinator the unique 
opportunity to provide anyone working in his sector with 
valuable information concerning what is happening on 
daily basis, he should be the first person to call in case of 
a problem.
STARTING WORK
Once official authorisation from the EN/MEF LHC 
planning and coordination team has been obtained, the 
next step before the work on site can physically start is to 
take into account the information contained in the “Work 
and Safety Coordination Plan” ref [1].
This is a contractual document that must be issued as 
part of any call for tenders related to work to be 
performed in the LHC. The information contained within 
will enable to complete the Particular Health and Safety 
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Plan (PPSPS), Dossier d’Intervention en Milieu 
Radioactif (D.I.M.R). These documents are to be 
completed by each contractor, subcontractor, collaborator, 
CERN group or staff member for the work they wish to 
carry out. The documents must contain the habitual 
general information: names, addresses, qualifications, 
habilitation and formation of the staff who will be 
working on site. It is primordial that it contains a detailed 
description of the work to be carried out, what the risks 
are, not only for their staff but the risks they could export 
to others working in the area, what measures will be put 
in place to remove or reduce the risks and the equipment 
to be used to carry out the work.
HEALTH AND SAFETY COORDINATION
There are currently four qualified Health and Safety 
Coordinators at CERN, each one employed by different 
departments: BE, EN, GS, PH, EN. It was evoked during 
the presentation that it may be prudent in the future to 
employ a fifth health and safety coordinator for the TE 
department. This will provide the Organisation with a 
flexible pool of Health and Safety Coordinators with 
complementary skills to cover the machine shut downs 
and work requiring their expertise within the other 
departments. Their role is to help everyone working on 
the CERN to prevent incidents and accidents, ensure that 
safety is integrated throughout all activities, evaluate the 
risks and including those resulting from co-activity and 
successive activities, ensure that the general principles of 
prevention are implemented and the rules and regulations 
are respected. To enable them to fulfil their role they need 
the help and cooperation of all those concerned.
PROFESSIONALS CHECK LIST
The project manager or work supervisor shall verify the 
safety documents are sent to all those concerned including 
the safety coordinator for comments. Once it has been 
commented upon by all concerned, the Joint Inspection 
(VIC) can be carried out. The work supervisor will 
contact the safety coordinator to arrange the date for the 
joint inspection approximately one week before the 
programmed start date. There are a certain number of key 
players that must be present at the joint inspection. They 
are the contractor, subcontractor, collaborator, CERN 
group or staff member, the supervisor him/herself and the 
Territorial Safety Officer. During the visit the participates 
will see if there are last minute problems, see the actual 
site conditions, establish whether or not a cryogenic 
authorisation is required, or an electrical consignation for 
example, if this is the case TE/CRG shall be contacted 
and the person responsible for each zone informed so that 
the written cryo authorization can be issued. For all 
electrical consignation the contact is EN/MEF. 
As the person in charge, the work supervisor will 
ensure that he has been given the means necessary to 
ensure that the written procedures can be put into 
operation on site. He will also ask himself the question 
whether or not he has been provided (or his work package 
contractor has provided the teams working on site) with 
everything needed to carry out the work safely. It is also 
the moment to ask any questions, if he is not sure or has 
doubts.
STRONG AND WEAK POINTS
The Organisation has shown over the years its 
redoubtable capability to get things done, to manage and 
control difficult situations, to meet deadlines and make 
the very most of the means made available to us. All of 
these things are very positive. However there are a 
number of areas where we could make some 
improvements that would make everyone’s life much 
easier: 
? The creation of centralized database for all safety 
documents, the creation of official cryogenics and 
pressure test documents, the replacement of the 
AOC/ADI with a more user friendly document.
A draft document has been drawn up and in principle 
approved by all departments; the document itself is a 
hybrid of the AOC and the ADI. The new document is 
called the Avis d’Execution de Travaux (AET) which will 
be used during the next shut down this document it will 
help improve our reactivity. These actions in turn would 
enable CERN to implement a CERN wide safety culture 
with the same rules for everyone. 
CONCLUSION
The new CERN safety culture needs to expand 
throughout ALL Departments, we must nurture it, help it 
gather momentum and grow, we must all work together 
for the same common goal, we must deal with the risk at 
source, we must plan preventive measures as part of our 
daily routine and we must adapt the working conditions to 
the workers. It is essential that the necessary impetus 
comes from the very top management; they must lead by 
example and give the means to achieve our goals of 
obtaining a satisfactory safety situation for all and avoid 
accidents and professional illnesses.
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HOW RADIATION WILL CHANGE (Y)OUR LIFE 
D. Forkel-Wirth, F. Corsanego, S. Roesler; C. Theis, L. Ulrici, Heinz Vincke, Helmut Vincke,  
P. Vojtyla, CERN DGS, Geneva, Switzerland 
M. Brugger, F. Cerutti, CERN EN-STI, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
The paper addresses radiological risks during the LHC 
operation and maintenance as expected for the first year 
of the LHC operation. Data on ambient dose equivalent 
rates and induced radioactivity will be presented as 
function of beam parameters and “cooling times”. The 
radiological risks result in radiation protection 
requirements and constraints for operation and 
maintenance. In case of LHC air management both, 
general safety and radiation protection requirements and 
constraints are presented. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2008, the LHC beam operation had been 
stopped due to a technical problem. The damaged 
material had been repaired and in parallel - after thorough 
and detailed studies - measures were taken to protect 
personnel and material against risks from similar 
incidents. In November 2009 the LHC beam operation 
was resumed for a few weeks until 17th December 2009. 
Both, the beam energy and total number of protons used 
during these few weeks in 2009 were orders of magnitude 
lower than the beam parameters foreseen for the nominal 
LHC operation. The radioactivity produced in the LHC 
and the resulting ambient dose equivalent rates had been 
very low when compared to the future LHC operation. 
The ambient dose equivalent rates measured in the 
collimator regions - the areas mostly prone to beam losses 
- did not exceed few μSv/h. After the stop of LHC in 
December 2009 the entire machine tunnel and all 
experimental LHC caverns were classified as “Supervised 
Radiation Area”. 
 
By resuming the LHC commissioning, the beam energy 
and intensity are supposed to increase, the levels of 
prompt radiation and the production of radionuclides in 
accelerator components, tunnel structure, gases, air and 
water will increase accordingly.  
 
The paper summarizes the radiation protection studies 
that have been performed for various LHC operation 
scenarios and gives an ALARA-conform prioritising of 
the LHC consolidation and maintenance work.  
 
RADIATION RISKS 
The radiation protection studies for the first year of the 
LHC operation are based on input beam parameters as 
defined by LHC operation [1], assuming a maximum 
number of protons per beam of few 1013 protons, a 
maximum beam energy of 3.5 TeV and a maximum 
luminosity of 1032 cm-2s-1. In case the beam parameters 
will change, the corresponding radiological risk can be 
forecasted by simple extrapolation. The radiation risks 
during the LHC operation are different than those during 
maintenance periods and will be addressed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Radiation risks during the LHC operation 
The main radiation risk during the LHC operation is the 
exposure of workers and public to prompt ionising 
radiation and to radioactivity released in air and water. 
During the LHC operation only some areas close to the 
beam tunnel are accessible (e.g. service areas of the 
experiments). The workers in the service areas might be 
exposed to high-energetic, mixed radiation fields 
(hadrons, leptons, photons) with energies up to GeV. 
About 90 % of the received personal dose will be due to 
neutrons, about half of the neutron dose will be due to 
neutrons with energies above 20 MeV. The expected 
ambient dose equivalent rates due to prompt ionising 
radiation are low, even under nominal conditions – due to 
thick shielding walls between the experimental caverns 
and service areas. In USA15 the ambient dose equivalent 
rate will reach 2 to 4 μSv/h for the nominal operation, in 
2010 levels are expected not to exceed the natural 
background radiation level by a factor of two  as 
luminosity will reach only about 2% of its nominal value. 
In 2010, persons working in USA15 will receive 
individual doses of less than 100 μSv/year and a 
collective dose of about 2.5 mSv/year. The radiological 
conditions for workers in the service caverns of CMS, 
ALICE and LHCb are more favourable when compared to 
the ATLAS experiment, due to a very thick shielding wall 
in case of CMS and due to much lower luminosities in 
case of ALICE and LHCb.  
During the LHC beam operation, activated air might be 
released into the environment. The amount of 
radioactivity scales with beam energy and beam losses in 
case of the tunnel air or with luminosity in case of the air 
from the experimental caverns or the inner triplet. Mainly 
short-lived radionuclides (11C, 13N, 14O, 15O, 41Ar) are 
produced and result in the risk of mainly external 
exposure of members of the public. In 2010 the individual 
dose to a person of the respective reference group might 
be, under the most unfavourable conditions, in the order 
of 100 nSv/year for LHC Point 1 and about 1 μSv/year 
for LHC Point 7. For the nominal operation the dose to 
the person of the reference group may reach about 5 
μSv/year for LHC Point 1 and 4 μSv/year for LHC Point 
7 – assuming that the requested modifications of the air 
management system at LHC Point 7 have been 
implemented until then. The modifications foresee a 
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confinement of the  air activated around the collimators in 
Point 7 to allow short-lived radionuclides to decay before 
the air will be released into the environment after beam 
stop. 
 
Radiation risks during the LHC maintenance 
and repair 
The main radiation risk during the LHC maintenance is 
the external exposure of workers to gamma radiation. The 
photons are emitted during the decay of radionuclides 
which have been induced in accelerator-, detector 
components and tunnel structure by beam losses 
(accelerator) or beam-beam interactions (experiment 
detectors, inner triplets) during the operation. The gamma 
energies of these photons do not exceed 2.7 MeV (emitted 
by 24Na). The risk of external exposures has to be 
assessed for all types of LHC maintenance and repair 
works, the additional risk of internal exposure of workers 
needs to be assessed in case of destructive activities 
(cutting, welding, etc.), maintenance of some mobile 
equipment (presence of grease or other lubricants), 
change of filters, etc.  
 
The radioactivity of a component is a function of its 
chemical composition, its impurities, the radiation field 
which the component was exposed to, the beam energy, 
and beam losses or luminosity. Typically, the ambient 
dose equivalent rates at a certain cooling time are 
dominated by the decay of nuclides with half-lives of the 
order of the respective cooling time, i.e., short-lived 
radionuclides shortly after the beam stop and by longer-
lived radionuclides after few months of cooling.  
 
During the first year of operation the ambient dose 
equivalent rates will be low. Three examples are given: 
 
1) LHC ARCs: the ambient dose equivalent rates 
have been calculated, assuming 180 days of 
operation, a beam gas interaction rate of 2400 
protons/m/s at 3.5 TeV assuming a H2-equivalent 
beam gas density of 4.5×1014/m3. Under these 
assumptions, the ambient dose equivalent rates 
inside the arc magnets, close to the beam line 
will reach 5 μSv/h after one day of cooling. On 
the surface of the arc magnet not more than 50 
nSv/h are expected.  The ambient dose 
equivalent rate close to the beam line will 
decrease to 1 μSv/h and on the surface to 20 





Figure 1: Monte Carlo results for ambient dose equivalent 
rates in the LHC arcs, assuming 180 days of operation, an 
H2 equivalent beam gas density of 4.5 1014/m3 and a beam 
gas interaction rate of 2400 protons/m/s at 3.5 TeV.   
 
2) Inner Triplet: the ambient dose equivalent rates 
have been calculated assuming one month of 
operation and a luminosity of 1032/cm2/s. The 
expected dose rates on the surface of the cryostat 
will be 10 μSv/h after one week of cooling, few 
μSv/h after one month and 1 μSv/h after 6 











Figure 2: Monte Carlo results for ambient dose equivalent 
rates (in μSv/h) of the Inner Triplet, assuming 1 month of 
operation and a luminosity of 1032/cm2/s. 
 
3) Collimator Region: After one year of operation 
at the nominal beam intensities the ambient dose 
equivalent rate in the aisle close to the 
collimators at Point 7 will reach some mSv/h 
after few days  of cooling. At the end of 2010 the 
ambient dose equivalent rate is expected to reach 
about 100 μSv/h, i.e.  a factor of 20 lower values 
(see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Monte Carlo results for ambient dose equivalent 
rates in the aisle of the collimator region at Point 7, 
assuming one year of beam operation under the nominal 
conditions (180 days of beam, 1016 protons lost). At the 
end of 2010 the ambient dose equivalent rates will be in 
the order of 100 μSv/h, i.e. about a factor of 20 lower. 
 
RP REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LHC 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 
 
Repair and maintenance of accelerator and 
detector components 
All LHC underground areas with exception of USC55 
are presently classified as “Supervised Radiation Areas”. 
With increasing beam intensity and energy, the 
radiological classification will change due to increasing 
ambient dose equivalent rates. Only radiation workers are 
allowed to work in the LHC underground areas or to 
maintain radioactive material from the LHC in auxiliary 
areas. Any destructive work like machining, cutting, 
drilling, etc. on machine components and tunnel 
infrastructure requires a radiological risk assessment in 
collaboration between DGS-RP and the maintenance 
team. Work procedures and choice of tooling need to be 
discussed with and approved by DGS-RP prior to the start 
of the work. These RP requirements might have a strong 
impact on consolidation works like the opening of the 
interconnects or the installation of safety valves, in 
particular as techniques causing contamination risks like 
grinding will not be permitted. 
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Maintenance and repair work in areas like the collimator 
regions, inner triplets, TAN, TAS, beam dump areas, etc. 
will be the first ones to become subject to CERN’s formal 
approach to ALARA [2]. Prior to each job and with the 
aim to optimise the dose to personnel, a detailed job and 
dose planning might be necessary and will be elaborated 
in collaboration between DGS-RP and the respective RSO 
and maintenance team. The approach to minimise the 
individual and collective doses comprises optimised work 
coordination, editing and respecting of maintenance and 
repair procedures, use of optimised tools, design and 
material. In case the predicted, individual dose will 
exceed 1 mSv or the predicted collective dose will exceed 
10 mSv the job needs to be submitted to the ALARA 
committee for approval [3] 
 
All material and components that have been inside the 
LHC tunnel or inside the operational zone of the LHC 
experiments during the beam operation are subject to a 
mandatory radiological control by DGS-RP. Only 
controlled material will be permitted to leave the LHC 
premises. The owner transports portable material into one 
of the buffer zones where he will register it. RP will 
control the material and inform the owner on the 
radiological risk due to the foreseen handling of the 
material. Heavy material and material from radiation 
areas with increased risks (Limited stay area and above) 
will be controlled in situ by DGS-RP. DGS-RP follows 
up closely the maintenance and repair of items with 
considerable radioactivity. All radioactive material has to 
be maintained in appropriate workshops – but presently 
only few, adequate workshops are available at CERN like 
the mechanical workshop in Building 109. As a 
consequence, compensatory measures need to be 
implemented, like limiting the number of maintenance 
and repair jobs to the absolute minimum, applying 
sophisticated and time consuming risk assessments to 
ensure safe working conditions at temporary, suboptimal 
work places and a very tight and close control by DGS-
RP. The lack of properly equipped and grouped 
workshops results in measures which are costly in man-
power, time and budget for all parties involved. The 
refurbishment of Building 867 as a central work area for 
maintenance of radioactive equipment will mark a big 
step towards a state-of-the-art infrastructure for handling 
of radioactive material. 
 
The operation of the LHC will double the total amount 
of radioactive material at CERN. Parts of the material will 
be taken out of the experiments and the accelerator for 
maintenance and repair inside and outside of CERN. The 
material will be transported, repaired and maintained, 
stored and in some case even sent to collaborating 
institutes and companies outside CERN. At the end of its 
lifetime it will be declared as waste. At each of these 
single stages of its lifecycle the radioactive item or parts 
of it risk to be mixed with non-radioactive material, due 
to various reasons like the lack of appropriate 
infrastructure or the need to test radioactive and non-
radioactive material at the same, highly expensive test 
bench, etc. Obviously all radioactive material will be 
marked with the appropriate warning stickers, but the 
implementation of a modern traceability system of 
material leaving the LHC will allow for following up the 
history of a radioactive item. It will increase the overall 
efficiency of the laboratory with respect to the separation 
of radioactive and non-radioactive material, the transport 
inside and outside CERN, the storage and waste 
management of radioactive items. The LHC experiments 
developed and are implementing a modern traceability 
system for all items leaving the experimental caverns. In 
case of the accelerator a functional specification has been 
released [4], however, the technical implementation is 
pending as responsibilities for the overall maintenance of 
the accelerator traceability system still need to be defined.   
 
Water management 
Cooling water of accelerator and detector components 
will be either directly activated by the interaction of 
hadrons with the stable nuclei of hydrogen, oxygen and  
chemical impurities (e.g. 3H, 7Be) or contaminated by 
radionuclides removed from radioactive accelerator or 
detector components  (e.g. 60Co). Ion exchangers installed 
within the demineralised water circuits will filter and 
retain a major part of the radioactivity. The radioactivity 
of the demineralised water will most likely not exceed the 
limit above which it needs to be treated as radioactive 
water but the ion exchangers need to be treated as 
radioactive. 
 
The risk of a direct activation of infiltration water will 
be low – according to estimates. Potential contamination 
(e.g. by 22Na, 24Na) due to leaking from activated concrete 
is difficult to predict.  
 
The Radiation Protection Group will perform regular 
sampling campaigns of demineralised and infiltration 
water to keep control over the risk for workers and the 
public. In addition, retention basins at LHC Point 3 and 
Point 8 will decrease the radioactivity released in water. 
 
Air management 
The air in the accelerator tunnel and the experimental 
caverns will be activated during the beam operation, due 
to the direct interaction between hadronic particles and 
the stable nuclei of e.g. oxygen, nitrogen and argon. The 
activated air has to be confined within the tunnel and 
experimental caverns, no activated air should penetrate 
into adjacent areas like service galleries, service caverns 
and the LHC surface area. The activated air has to be 
conducted and released into the environment via well 
defined pathways and release points. All air releases 
potentially containing radioactivity need to be monitored 
with respect to the total air volume and total radioactivity. 
The contribution to the dose of the public is calculated 
from measured released activities.  
The LHC air management scheme is supposed to 
mitigate three risks: oxygen deficiency hazards due to 
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accidental gas releases, in particular helium releases, fire 
and the dispersion of radioactive air. Oxygen deficiency 
hazards (ODH), fire and air activation require very similar 
protection measures: compartmentalisation of the 
installation, confinement of air and gas, controlled air and 
gas flow as well as well defined release points. After the 
incident in Point 3-4 in September 2008 compensatory 
measures had to be taken to protect workers against an 
accidental release of helium. The ventilation doors 
between the tunnel and the UA service galleries had to be 
removed to enable depressurisation and fast release of 
helium gas from the tunnel. This action resulted in a 
partial loss of compartmentalisation, confinement and 
controlled air flow. Consequently, a second set of 
compensatory measures had to be applied: 
  
• the LHC beam power needs to be limited to about a 
tenth of the value for the  nominal operation to avoid 
possible, undue and uncontrolled releases of 
radioactivity into the environment (radiation 
protection requirement). This constraint will be 
lifted upon the reestablishment of the 
compartmentalisation.  
• any access into the service galleries needs to respect 
a 30 minutes waiting time to allow for the decay of 
potentially present radioactivity in the  air (radiation 
protection requirement) 
• during the power testing in one sector, the adjacent 
sectors need to be closed (ODH mitigation 
requirement) 
With respect to fire protection no measure can be applied 
to compensate for the loss of compartmentalisation.  
 
In order to restore state-of-the-art  safety and radiation 
protection conditions the following requirements have to 
be implemented: 
 
• Overpressure in machine service areas (UA, UL, 
US) when compared to the machine tunnel 
(reinstallation of the ventilation doors, closure of 
cable ducts and holes, etc.)  
• Overpressure in service areas accessible during the 
beam operation when compared to the experimental 
caverns and accelerator tunnel 
• Continuous monitoring of the pressure differences, 
and air flow with its direction 
• Monitoring of activated air in experimental areas – 
spot-wise  at the beginning, if required permanent in 
at a later stage 
• Monitoring of all released radioactivity will require 
additional monitoring stations at LHC Point 4 and 
Point 6 
CONCLUSION 
The first year of the LHC operation foresees a rather 
low beam intensity, beam energy and luminosity. As a 
consequence the associated radiological risks for workers 
and public are limited and the doses to workers and public 
have been extrapolated.  
 
CERN’s infrastructure is not yet completely optimised 
with respect to the transport, maintenance, repair and 
storage of radioactive items. Work areas for radioactive 
material need to be properly refurbished and grouped, an 
efficient traceability system for all radioactive material 
from the LHC accelerator shall be implemented.  
 
The LHC air management scheme shall meet the 
requirements of ODH mitigation, fire and radiation 
protection which are compartmentalisation, confinement 
and controlled air flow. The required actions to be taken 
during the next shut-down are sealing of areas, 
implementation of pressure cascades, the installation of 
ventilation and fire doors and the installation of additional 
air monitoring stations at Point 4 and Point 6. 
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MODIFICATION OF THE LHC VENTILATION SYSTEM 
M. Nonis EN/CV 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the present document is to review the 
current LHC ventilation configuration and evaluate 
the need to modify part of the existing installations 
in order to increase its safety functions. 
The input of this review is coming from the 
result of the Task Force on Safety that has been set 
up in 2008 to analyse the incident on sector 3-4 that 
took place on September 19th, 2008; the outcome of 
this study showed that new functionalities need to 
be studied in order to guarantee a proper 
performance of the ventilation system, for instance 
in case of controlled helium release. 
Recommendation number 14 of the Task Force 
report [1] says that “the Safety Task Force 
considers that the ventilation system is relevant for 
safety of personnel and thus recommends to set up 
a study of the LHC ventilation system with respect 
to monitoring and reliability of the system”. 
The present article refers about those aspects and 
is focused only on underground structures (tunnel 
and Experiments). 
The main topics that will be discussed in the 
following lines are, after recalling some of the 
principles of the possible referential to use for LHC 
underground areas, an overview of the present 
configuration for the 2009-2010 run and the 
evolution on the medium term, the first results on 
the impact of a controlled release of helium in the 
tunnel, the actions that might be taken in order to 
improve the current situation and finally a short 
reference to the consolidation plan that has been 
presented by EN/CV in 2009 for HVAC systems in 
LHC. 
REFERENTIAL 
As already mentioned in previous papers (see 
[2]), it is not possible to define a referential that is 
comprehensive of all the specificities of a complex 
such as the LHC; the most appropriate one seems 
to be the ISO 17873 Nuclear Facilities – Criteria 
for the design and operation for ventilation systems 
nuclear installations other than nuclear reactors [3]. 
The most important guidelines mentioned in the 
standard and that will be taken into consideration in 
the following paragraphs are: 
• Prefer static confinement with respect to the 
dynamic one, 
• Keep duct networks separated, 
• Ensure functionalities in degraded mode, 
• Filter air with appropriate filter class before 
releasing to external environment, 
• Foresee a monitoring system covering main 
parameters to be controlled during the 
running of installations, 
• Avoid booster fans, 
• Foresee an optimum air renewal ratio: 
between 1 and 2 volumes/hour, 
• Test periodically (yearly) the ventilation 
system, 
• Foresee redundant system, 
• Avoid single point of failure, 
• Allow manual operation of dumpers in case 
of fire. 
While some of these points are already integrated 
in the LHC ventilation system, the remaining part 
of them is the object of the present paper. 
PRESENT CONFIGURATION 
The compensatory measures taken in order to 
guarantee the maximum safe conditions during the 
run from 2009 to 2010 with respect to the 
consequences of a new accident in the accelerator, 
have an impact on the sectorisation of areas and 
therefore on the ventilation conditions in the 
underground. 
One conclusion of the Task Force on Safety is 
that the maximum credible incident (MCI) has been 
redefined with respect to previous definition 
(dating in 1999) and therefore new compensatory 
measures have to be taken to counteract the 
consequences of such an event. 
Without going into many details the most 
important parameters in case of MCI to take into 
account are the following [1]: 
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• maximum helium flow during the leak: up to 
40 kg/s (around 166 m3/s), 
• helium loss in first minutes: up to 1’520 kg, 
• total helium loss: up to 4’920 kg. 
Compared to the previous risk analysis, it has to 
be noted that the flow rate to take into account has 
doubled, whereas the helium loss during the fast 
release has become 2.5 times higher. 
It has therefore been decided to create “helium 
escape paths” from the underground to the surface 
in order to avoid major damages in case of a new 
MCI in the next run; this has been achieved by 
dismantling the ventilation doors from the tunnel 
and the UAs thus creating one single volume 
between these areas (previously considered two 
different ventilation zones); helium can then rise 
via the PMs shaft in the SD buildings that have 
been equipped with calibrated pressure panels that 
will open in case of an overpressure of around 10 
mbar.  
Further calculations performed later in 2009 [4] 
indicate that, in the new conditions the 
overpressure shall reach around 55 mbar in the 
tunnel and 11 mbar in US. 
During the start up phase of LHC in Summer 
2009 the air flow rates supplied and extracted from 
the tunnel have been slightly modified in order to 
reach a differential pressure between experimental 
caverns and tunnel as close as possible to 20 Pa. 
Instead of keeping a fixed flow rate of 36’000 m3/h 
both at supply and at extraction, the working 
parameters are presently 30’000 m3/h at the supply 
and 40’000 m3/h at the extraction (tunnel in non 
accessible conditions); later in 2010 it will be 
monitored whether this modification has an impact 
on the removal of the thermal charge from the 
tunnel. 
In addition to that, the fresh air blown in all UAs 
(equal to 22’000 m3/h), goes then in the tunnel and 
therefore the air speed in the sectors vary from 0.2 
to 1.9 m/s (according to the part of the sector). 
Differential pressure between different 
ventilation areas is the following: 
• pressurised shaft: above 20 Pa everywhere, 
as foreseen. 
• ATLAS and CMS: above 20 Pa between 
caverns and between cavern and tunnel. 
• LHCb: underpressure of the cavern with 
respect to the sector 78, very slight 
overpressure between UX and sector 81. 
Overpressure of the UX85 with respect to 
US85. 
• ALICE: the cavern is in underpressure with 
respect to the tunnel on both sides. 
Finally the supervision system confirms that the 
stability of conditions is guaranteed only in close 
configuration; no possible pressure differential can 
be ensured in access mode. 
CONTROLLED HELIUM LEAK 
SCENARIO 
In order to avoid as much as possible major 
damages related to helium increase of pressure 
inside the accelerator equipment, safety valves 
have been installed in most of the sectors; these 
valves shall open and release 1 kg/s of helium in 
the tunnel for a maximum duration of 25 minutes. 
In order to evaluate the impact of such a 
discharge; two computational fluid dynamics 
simulations are presently running and preliminary 
indications on temperature, pressure and helium 
propagation in the tunnel are available. 
Since this scenario is also possible with presence 
of people in the tunnel (TA - accessible mode) 
other than during the run of the accelerator (TNA - 
non accessible mode), both cases are studied and 
first results (45 seconds of leak) show that the 
helium cloud follows the same direction of the air 
in case of TNA mode (45’000 m3/h), while the 
cloud propagates in both direction in case of TA 
mode (18’000 m3/h); the overpressure due to the 
helium is around 20 Pa at the end of the sector. 
MONITORING 
Several actions referring to the monitoring 
system are proposed. 
At present, not all the parameters of the air 
condition in the tunnel are monitored from remote 
stations; temperature probes are located in RRs and 
in front of REs but air speed is only obtained by 
calculation knowing the supplied flow rate. The 
cryogenic group TE/CRG shall install in the next 
shutdown some sensors to monitor the air speed 
and the pressure in case of a MCI; since the range 
of these sensors has to be of another order of 
magnitude from the ones needed for standard 
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conditions, additional probes will be installed to 
monitor the air speed and the differential pressure 
between different ventilation sectors (where 
already not existing): UX and US, UA and RA, UA 
and US. The signals from these sensors shall not 
interfere with the ventilation process but will 
generate an alarm in the control room that will 
allow taking decision on the procedures to adopt 
before going into underground areas. 
In all sectors and caverns the air is extracted via 
dedicated air handling units; the only exception is 
represented by UX45 and UX65 where the air is 
mechanically blown into the PX shaft and then 
goes via the shaft in the SX building. Although this 
does not represent a problem from a 
radioprotection point of view, it has been decided 
that the PX shafts shall be closed and that one 
extraction unit (that was running during LEP 
period) per shaft shall be re-commissioned; this 
will allow a radioprotection monitoring of the 
extracted air and its filtering. 
Most of the ventilation sectors are separated by 
static confinement and big efforts in tightening the 
areas have been done in the last year; some issues 
still need to be solved between UA and RA and 
between ALICE and LHCb caverns and tunnel. 
The drillings made between UAs and RAs for the 
passage of cables do not allow having the required 
air separation between those two areas with strong 
drawbacks in terms of air activation and risk in 
case of helium leak; the beam energy of the LHC is 
limited as long as this configuration will be kept. It 
is therefore foreseen to close all those cable 
passages and reinstall the ventilation doors between 
those areas; it is estimated that a few drillings per 
UA shall need to be ventilated in order to dissipate 
the cable thermal charge; this will be achieved 
blowing air from UA to RA by installing one 
dedicated fan per drilling and, possibly, fire 
dampers. Contrary to ISO recommendation, it 
would not be possible to install a redundant system. 
Since the tunnel is in overpressure with respect 
to the experimental caverns of ALICE and LHCb, 
static confinement has to be improved; in fact it is 
not possible to modify the pressure conditions since 
the fresh air for the tunnel is supplied in the even 
points. In case of LHCb cavern, while this can be 
achieved on RB84, it seems more complicated to 
be obtained in RB86. If this solution cannot be 
implemented and in order to avoid air going from 
the tunnel to the experimental caverns, an 
extraction system should be then installed in RB84 
and/or RB86 and the volume between the TAS and 
the existing “chicanes” made airtight; this will 
allow this areas to be in underpressure. Such an 
extraction system might be made redundant but 
will consist of a booster fan, solution that is not 
counselled by the ISO standard. 
Finally, the last issue related to confinement is 
the separation between the LHC tunnel and TI2 and 
TI8 tunnels to protect those tunnels from damages 
due to a MCI. If separation doors have to be 
foreseen, the need of bringing fresh air into TI2 and 
TI8 shall require the installation from UJ24 to 
UJ22 and from UJ86 to UJ88 of an DN1000 air 
duct, these dimensions are however not compatible 
with the existing available space in those areas; 
other solutions have therefore to be foreseen for 
those two tunnels. 
RELIABILITY 
All AHUs blowing or extracting air from 
underground areas are backed up by a redundant 
unit with the exceptions of the extraction from RF 
area in UX45 and the boosters extracting air from 
the tunnel in UJ76. The installation of an additional 
unit in UX45 should not represent a major problem, 
whereas the available space in UJ76 is reduced. In 
other cases (boosters in tunnel at Point 3, units in 
PX24, PM65 and PZ65 and the supply of the 
tunnel), in case of breakdown the redundant system 
can ensure a lower flow rate but this does not 
represent a operational nor a safety issue. 
FIRE SAFETY POLICY 
The existing fire policy with respect of the 
ventilation system is based on the following 
principles: 
• Ventilation can ensure confinement of 
pressurized areas if doors kept closed, 
therefore contact alarms have to be foreseen 
where not existing. 
• Actions to be taken are decided on site by 
Fire Brigade after assessment of the 
situation. 
• The extraction system is designed for cold 
smoke extraction (without filtering) only. 
• In case of fire detection, all the supply and 
extraction units are stopped and can be 
restarted only by fire brigade personnel. 
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While the units managing air for the 
experimental caverns are on the secure electrical 
network (however no pre heating is possible), this 
is not the case for the units related to the LHC 
tunnel. A first study has been done to understand 
the work required to modify such situation and the 
related cost sums up to 10 MCHF (excluding civil 
engineering costs), since in very few LHC Points 
there’s enough secure power available. 
At the same time it has to be assessed the need of 
including the preheating coils in the secure network 
for all units backed up by diesels, taking into 
consideration that freezing problem can appear 
during cold season.  
CONSOLIDATION 
It has to be reminded that the present ventilation 
system dates mainly from LEP period and 
important part of it is still the original one. 
Therefore some consolidation work has to be 
foreseen in the coming years to allow a proper run 
and operation of the installations without impacting 
into the accelerator program. 
The most important aspect concern safety 
features, absolute filtering, supply air plenum, 
thyristors replacement, instrumentation replacement 
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A more detailed explanation of the consolidation 
program for EN/CV consolidation program can be 
found in the technical note: Mid-term consolidation 
plan for the cooling and ventilation facilities, 2010-
2017 – August 2009 [5]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The existing ventilation system satisfies almost 
the totality of requests that were made during its 
construction; some new issues have then been 
raised at a later stage, mainly related to the 
consequences of a helium leak in the underground 
areas, requesting additional functionalities or the 
reinforcement of existing installations. In addition, 
the compliance with a new referential, such as ISO 
17873, is quite costly and technically difficult to be 
achieved; this standard can therefore only be used 
as a possible reference document but not taken as a 
new set of rules or guidelines to fully comply with. 
Other aspects, such as the fire policy to follow or 
the confinement of TI2 and TI8, need a risk 
assessment of the situation before taking a decision 
about approving new work that might cost several 
millions. 
The remaining open issues, linked to existing 
redundancies, pressure differentials, monitoring 
ventilation conditions are already foreseen or can 
be rapidly launched if a positive decision is taken. 
The cost related to these actions shall be estimated 
in the coming months but it is considered that most 
of the action will sum up to a few millions 
maximum. Work shall fit into future shutdowns, 
according to other interventions foreseen in the 
tunnels and caverns. It has anyhow to be remarked 
that the actions taken do not always represent an 
optimized solution according to ISO 17873 
standard (use of boosters, redundancies, 
accessibility problems, dynamic versus static 
confinement, etc.), since we have to adapt to 
existing premises and installations. 
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As in 2008, the access system has been used in different
configurations all along the 2009 year, following the ma-
chine status: shut-down (plus reparation), powering tests
period and finally beam operation. The performances fol-
lowing the different evolutions introduced during the year
and the issues, solved or still pending, will be reviewed
during the presentation. The list of needed modifications
for a more reliable and efficient use of the system for 2010
run will also be presented and in particular the effort for
the material detection device (MAD). And finally, the cur-
rent implementation of the software interlock between the
access system and the power converters will be presented
reviewed and discussed.
INTRODUCTION
After the commissioning period, the access system is
now in operation. There is no major safety problem as the
LHC Access Safety System has demonstrated a high reli-
ability, but the operation crew has faced, as in 2008, a lot
of disturbances in the daily operation of the system. The
problems do not have the same level of severity or priority
according to the exploitation status of the machine, but are
recurrent.
STATUS AND MAJOR ISSUES
As a detailed presentation of the status and problems,
together with the different actions undertaken by the ac-
cess system team have been presented several times to the
LMC [1], the presentation at the Chamonix Workshop fo-
cused only on the main issues which had a strong impact
on the operation efficiency of the system.
Hardware
A complete maintenance campaign has been done during
the 2008-2009 shut-down. Even if most of the problems
mentioned in the previous workshop have been solved,
some issues are still present and for some even with a
higher occurrence.
Mechanical problems Different kind of mechanical
problems have been identified during the exploitation pe-
riod : people blocked in the Personal Access Device (none
of the doors re-opened in case of failure of the entry/exit
procedure), door not closing properly or not opening prop-
erly. After 2 maintenance campaigns, most of the prob-
lem disappeared, except in some systematic location, like
PM25 or UJ16, where the whole access point may need to
be fully re-installed.
The problems are generally reported to the shift crew by
the users and transmitted to GS/ASE team via the ODM
(Ordre de Maintenance) system. This works fine for the
intervention but the feedback after intervention could be
improved to avoid repetition of ODM.
The impact of these problems was seen mainly during
the HWC period when there is a high number of accesses
after the long shut-down. There is no safety issue, but
clearly an operation efficiency issue for users trying to ac-
cess.
Key distributor During the first year of operation of
the system, several problems with giving back the safety
token were experienced. The problem has been traced back
to a hardware fault (grounding of the key distributor) com-
bined with a software error (poor management of error han-
dling). A new version of the software has been deployed
during the shut-down together with a proper grounding of
the box and the problem has been solved.
However another problem appeared along the year with
faulty token slots : the pins supposed to guarantee that only
the correct token can be put back in a given slot got stuck
and as a consequence any key can be put back in the faulty
slot, with the side effect that the proper token cannot be put
back at all. The only cure to that situation is the exchange
of the key distributor. This problem has been identified by
GS/ASE as a conceptual fault of the distributor box and a
new hardware has been developed together with the con-
tractor. New distributors are already available and all the
faulty ones have been exchanged, but a general exchange
should probably be planned as the fault will very likely ap-
pear everywhere with aging of the system. The impact on
operation efficiency is seen when trying to come back from
access mode to beam mode as at least one safety token is
not seen as present.
During the 2009 exploitation period, we got two times
the separation of the safety key used to open the PAD in
the RESTRICTED mode from the token used to identify
and lock the key in the distributor. Again, there is no safety
issue
Drop of the patrol during standard entry Another
important issue, which was really time consuming during
the hardware commissioning period in powering PHASE 2,
was the simultaneous opening of both PAD doors during a
standard entry procedure, causing a loss of the SAFE status
of the patrols.
The cause has been identified by GS/ASE after about
20 occurrences in different locations and circumstances. A
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new software has then been implemented and deployed in
few weeks, just on time for beam operation.
After the intervention, some cases of patrol drops still
occurred during standard passage through the PAD, but due
to another reason, probably a contact problem on the doors.
The impact is still in the availability for powering tests
or beam operation as the sector, and very often several sec-
tors, have to be re-patrolled before switch back from access
operation, even in RESTRICTED mode.
LHC Access Safety System (LASS) status
Only few modifications have been made on the LASS
system since 2008 operation, and they have all been suc-
cessfully validated by the DSO tests.
The major improvement is the SPS-LHC Safety chain
connection which has been upgraded to avoid the launch-
ing of false evacuation signals in point 8. The state of each
SPS Element Important for Safety (EIS) is monitored in-
dependentely to allow the start of the evacuation siren ac-
cording to the specification, i.e when 2 EIS are UNSAFE
simultaneously.
The modification of the access sectorisation in point 5
for the needs of the Hardware Commissioning has been fi-
nally done with a few problems of logic in the LACS sys-
tem. The diagnostics of the problem was done only after
moving to the RESTRICTED mode with the patrol done,
so quite late after the intervention.
During the 2009 beam operation period, the beam was
dumped only once because of the loss of the patrol in the
ATLAS cavern. The problem has been identified in the link
between the LASS and the ATLAS dedicated system SSA
and is followed up by GS/ASE.
Material Access Device (MAD) problem
The problem of the personnel detection in the Material
Access Device (MAD) is an on-going issue since 2008. A
new software and a new hardware based on high resolution
movement detection has been investigated and deployed all
along the year. During the phase 2 powering tests, only
PM45 MAD access point was equipped.
The impact on the operation of the system, as well as for
the users is probably the most painful one. Before the in-
stallation of the new software, we registered obvious viola-
tion of the rule. After the installation in PM45 with the first
set of parameters, system was still too easy to violate and
was anyway not deployed everywhere. So, for the beam
operations, new compensatory measures had to be put in
place for about one week: human guarding of the MAD by
OP crew during the access period in RESTRICTED mode.
After one week of operation with the measures in place,
the sensitivity of the system was pushed and the system de-
ployed on all MADs, on surface and in the tunnel. The
compensatory measures have been then lifted provided
consolidation of the system will continue.
During the beam operation at the end of 2009,the sys-
tem was stable, but at the beginning of the 2010 short shut-
down, users had to face a lot of trouble to enter the material:
false triggers of the obstruction detection system due to bad
image reference, micro-movements detected (material sta-
bilization, melting snow, flexi...).
The system still needs a lot of development efforts and
follow-up from GS/ASE to optimize the settings, provide a
better monitoring of the system status and guarantee a fail-
safe behaviour as requested when the compensatory mea-
sures were lifted.
LHC Access Control System ( LACS) status
The Access Control System is the main issue for opera-
tion due to a very slow and not optimized application. As in
2008, the access modes were used to control activities dur-
ing the Hardware Commissioning creating a Heavy load
on the system and the operators. We had an average of 200
keys taken per day with peak period of requests spread over
the whole machine.
Several versions of the application have been deployed
and tested during the year, but did not give satisfactory
improvements and even led to the degradation of perfor-
mance. So, we had to roll back to previous version to get
back acceptable level of stability.
New features in 2009 The distribution sequence of the
safety tokens (restricted mode keys) has been modified to
implement a daisy chain algorithm: it is always the next
key which is distributed to a new user, avoiding blocking of
the access point when there is a faulty token or an inversion
of tokens.
Another important improvement for operation is the de-
ployment of the filtering of key requests per access point
to avoid giving key to a wrong location when controlling
activities.
Furthermore,after GS/ASE spent a lot of time debugging
with IT the network and routers related problems , most of
the mis-behaviors of the system has been solved avoiding
mixing the keys when giving them back.
Remaining issues All these new features, requested
by The Operation group gave a good improvement in the
availability of the system for access. However some other
problems are still pending since last year without proposed
solutions for the moment:
• Recorder problems in few access points leading to no
video availability;
• Delays in access request transmission longer than the
time-out of the request;
• Crash of the application;
• Quality of the audio connection, especially when
cryogenic installation are ON;
• ALICE delegation instability;
Another issue appears this year which is the crash of
the gateway between the LACS and the LASS. As a
consequence, the change of mode are not transmitted,
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which might result in the impossibility of using the RE-
STRICTED mode. The problems appeared at least 3 times.
The procedure to recover from the problem has been well
improved but the redundancy of the gateway should be
sorted out as the gateway is critical for the availability of
the system.
Once more, none of these problems represents a safety
issue, but generates a lot of delay in the access procedure
handling, leading to very long queuing time for the user.
On the other hand, some features still need to be imple-
mented, again to ease the use of the system, like improving
the display of total person count in the underground area at
the surface level,avoiding switching of video and intercom
on double PAD access points.
OP main requirements In order to compensate the
slow access procedure, the operation crew needs a more
efficient LACS application to allow multiple key distribu-
tion for a group of users (up to 35 persons at the same time
in an access point) and to allow handling different access
points in parallel when several groups are entering at dif-
ferent places at the same time.
Some modifications in situ are also needed to avoid peo-
ple leaving with the safety token which prevents putting
back the system in beam mode when the machine is empty.
Different solutions could be studied, e.g opening of the key
distributor independently of which PAD is used for double
PAD access points or the use of the token during the exit
procedure to force people to have the token in hand.
A proposal as been made by T. Hakulinen to develop
in short term a multi view application combined with the
unlinking of the interlock switch from the key distribution.
INTERLOCKING WITH THE POWER
CONVERTERS
Following the 19th of September, to reinforce the respect
of the rules for access, the interlocking of the Access sys-
tem with the power converters was raised. To date, the
only communication of the Access system with CMW is
through the signals published via TIM. Therefore as a short
term solution to help the Engineer in Charge to apply the
procedures, a software interlock has been implemented and
deployed in March 2009.
The principle is to prevent powering above the phase 1
current limit [3] when people are in zone and to stop the
Power Converters of the concerned areas when people are
entering a zone.
Implementation
The interlock is based on the Software Interlock System
(SIS) to generate the logic between the access conditions
and the current read in the PCs and send commands to the
power converters via the Power Interlock Controller (PIC).
In case conditions are not met a global remove PC permit
is sent to all the powering sectors concerned, provoking a
slow power abort of the targeted power converters.
Logic used in 2009
There is one powering permit per sector, so eight inde-
pendent signals. For each powering sector, the SIS inter-
lock is TRUE if one of the following conditions is TRUE:
• The access conditions for the sectors are TRUE (=
SAFE), according to the access matrix [2],
• The BIC loop is armed (= SAFE),
• The measured current in all the monitored power con-
verters of the sectors are within the pre-defined phase
1 current limits [3],
• The power converters are in simulation mode.
The signal are combined in a OR logic and a global Re-
move Permit command is exported to the PIC of the con-
cerned sector(s) when the powering OK switches from
TRUE to FALSE, i.e. when all the 4 previous conditions
are FALSE simultaneously.
As the connection of the LASS alarms to CMW was not
planned in the design, a long chain of different software
to connect the signals is used. To provide the sum sig-
nal per powering sector, the signals are transmitted through
the LASS PLC, the DAQ, JMS and the TIM server. Then
to publish the access conditions to the SIS, from the TIM
server, the signals are going through JMS again, JAPC pub-
lisher, JAPC and finally, after evaluation of the logic tree
in the SIS, a command is sent to the PIC which then will
switch off the power converters. Part of the software are
under the responsibility of GS/ASE, the other part in BE-
CO or OP groups.
The reliability of the interlock is just as good as the long
chain of software can be.
performance
In 2009, the interlock has been tested and validated sec-
tor by sector. The interlock always worked as expected, as
it is designed to be fail-safe: in case one element of the
chain is down, the sum result is force to FALSE.
In a couple of cases, the interlock rightly aborted power-
ing tests which were launched in the wrong powering phase
conditions.
During 2009, with the first version of the interlock, we
encountered some availability problems. During the Hard-
ware Commissioning period, there was one day of down-
time because of a major TIM crash. Then during beam
operation, the whole LHC machine power converters were
switched off 2 times due to an overload of the JMS broker
by BLM data. The beam was never dumped because of the
interlock, but the protection with the BIC loop status entry
is active only when beam is present in the machine; as soon
as beam is dumped, the loop opened and if the others con-
ditions are not met (i.e. because of missing signals) then
the global remove permit command is sent.
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modifications
In order to increase the reliability of the interlock dur-
ing beam operation in 2010, the BIC loop status condition
has been replaced by the reading of the LASS status in the
BIS. This allows to ignore the sectorized access conditions
when the whole machine is in BEAM ON mode and avoid
to switch off PCs when the whole machine is empty and
SAFE, even if signals are missing.
In view of keeping the interlock running for longer than
initially expected, while waiting for a more robust solution,
a possible improvement would be to shorten the software
chain by including the JAPC publisher in the TIM server.
The JMS broker should also be made more reliable, or sep-
arated from heavy loaded system.
For a longer term, the migration of the software interlock
to a hardware interlock has to be well studied.
VENTILATION DOORS
The access matrix for powering phase 2 assumed that
some ventilation doors should be closed and some opened
to allow access in adjacent sectors when powering. Big
efforts have been put by GS/ASE team to equip the newly
installed doors and monitor all the needed doors. The status
of each door is displayed in the CCC via the LASER alarm
system and within a view in the TIM viewer tool used by
OP-TI.
In view of the operation in 2010 and later on, the inclu-
sion of these doors statuses in the software interlock (short
term) or in the Safety System (longer term) has to be stud-
ied.
SOME ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
During 2009 shut-down, the procedure of taking an EIS
out-of-chain has been well improved, even if the manipu-
lation is still delicate and risky. The management of the
request is done via an EDMS document for a clear follow-
up and summary of the status. In parallel, the management
of the access requests via the new ADI system worked far
better than in 2009.
Since the first passage of the machine in RESTRICTED
mode in 2008, the circulation through the inter-site door
is an on-going discussion. A clear procedure need to be
defined, keeping in mind that there is an issue for people
follow-up in the underground areas : with the intersite door
opened, it is possible then to enter in point 4 and to go al-
most to point 7 without being traced by the LACS system
which can only check passage through the PAD. The prob-
lem is further discussed in other presentations during the
same session.
CONCLUSIONS
The golden period for Operation of the access system is
during beam operation. Most of the problems mentioned
become significant during massive access period. During
the shut-down, there is a big increase of hardware prob-
lems and complains with the MAD usage. During the pow-
ering tests, the constraints on circulation and the long wait-
ing time due to single passage procedure is really painful
for the users as well as for the operator of the access sys-
tem. Modifications of the access console is mandatory to
increase the efficiency during the whole entry procedure.
An important issue to be followed-up is the faulty token
which, if systematic, will need a replacement of all the to-
ken distributors.
And finally, the software interlock implemented to help
applying the access restrictions during powering could be
improved for more reliability, but will never be more reli-
able than a hardware interlock.
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HOW SHOULD THE ACCESS SYSTEM BE OPERATED WHILE LHC IS 
NOT IN BEAM OPERATION? 
Julie Coupard, Katy Foraz, Serge Grillot 
 
Abstract 
There are 3 periods where the beams in the LHC 
machine are stopped; the Shutdown and Commissioning 
period and the Technical Stop. This paper defines how 
these different periods should be organized (scheduling, 
coordination, safety, access...), and explains how the 
access system will be operated for safety of personnel. 
 
ORGANIZATION 
The LHC is considered not to be in OPERATION when 
the beams are stopped. Three periods can be defined; the 
Technical Stop, the Shutdown and the Commissioning. 
 
Definitions 
Technical Stop: Period without beam during which a 
restricted number of well defined interventions are 
scheduled.  The machine is in standby mode and the 
temperature of the magnet must stay below 80 Kelvin. 
Although the equipments are in standby mode it does not 
mean necessarily fully "off". This period can last a few 
days to 2-3 weeks maximum. The aim is to restart the 
LHC as soon as possible, without re-commissioning 
anything. 
The baseline operations are: 
- radioprotection survey 
- interventions scheduled 
 
Shutdown: Period without beam during which machine 
maintenance and consolidation/upgrades are carried out. 
At the beginning of a Shutdown, the machine is put into a 
pre-agreed state (electrical locking-out, all beam related 
equipment off etc...) The minimum Shutdown period 
would be several weeks. This period is always followed 
by the powering tests of the superconducting circuits. 
The baseline operations are: 
- safety 
o radioprotection survey 
o electrical locking-out 
o cryogenic lines emptying of liquid Helium 
- interventions scheduled 
- preparation for the powering tests 
o cool-down + cryogenic conditions 
o electrical quality assurance tests (ELQA) 
o electrical unlocking asked 
- Patrols 
Commissioning: Period after a Shutdown during which 
the operation group and equipment specialists test the 
machine hardware and interlocks (without beam). Access 
is only given for activities directly related to the powering 
tests. The machine equipment should be considered as 
ON. 
The baseline is: 
- End of the preparation for the powering tests 
o Power converters ready 
o Quench protection system (QPS) ready 
- Powering tests phase 1 
- Powering tests phase 2 
 
Planning and coordination 
EN/MEF and BE/OP are the two groups in charge of 
scheduling, coordinating and following the activities in 
the LHC machine: 
- EN/MEF in charge during the Technical Stop and 
Shutdown 
- BE/OP in charge during the Commissioning and 
OPERATION 
 
As Shutdown and Commissioning are two periods 
carried out in same time in different part of the machine, 
EN/MEF is in charge of the general schedule and gives 
the time slots for the powering tests phase 2. 
 
Safety coordination 
Divisional Safety Officer: During the Shutdown period, 
the EN Divisional Safety Officer is appointed to act on in 
matters of Safety in the machine areas, while in all the 
other periods it is the BE Divisional Safety Officer. [1] 
Safety Coordinator: Four Safety Coordinators are 
ensuring the “operational safety” during the three periods 
defined without beams. [2]  
Territorial Safety Officer: For all the periods and all the 
machine areas, TSO are nominated to ensure the 
territorial safety. [1] 
 
CONTROL OF THE ACTIVITIES 
In order to prevent people to be exposed to the hazards 
existing in the LHC machine, i.e. radioactivity, electrical 




1DIMR, VIC, ALARA, consignations, hot works permit, IS37... 
2not yet implement in the process, but will be done soon 
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Current control of the activities w.r.t safety 
The activities in the LHC machine are currently 
controlled with respect to safety using two documents; the 
“Avis d’Ouverture de Chantier” (AOC) and the “Avis 
D’Intervention” (ADI) 
 
With respect to Safety Instruction IS39, the 
interventions to be carried-out have to be announced by 
means of a “Notice of start of works” (AOC), in order to 
inform, to draw attention to the hazards and problems 
induced by the works, and to obtain comments before the 
start of the works.  It is complemented by a “Visite 
d’Inspection Commune” (VIC) organized with the safety 
coordinators and the TSO, which describes the work 
method. Other permits: fire permit, cryogenic permit, 
electrical... are requested by the work responsible via 
other documents. This document is complex, does not 
integrate all permit requests and there are potentially long 
signature delays. 
 
During the hardware commissioning, the need to have a 
strict control of access was demonstrated [3]. Each 
activity has to be anounced, and access requested through 
an “Avis D’Intervention” (ADI). Even if the form 
contains a request for VIC, or “consignation”, it is too 
light to really ensure the required safety measures. 
 
With the experience of the last Shutdown, 
Commissioning and Technical Stop, the coordination 
teams would like to improve the control of the activities. 
The aim is to be sure that the people work in safety, and 
avoid the co-activities that could perturb the schedule. 
 
The “Avis d’Execution de Travaux” (AET) 
The AET is a collaborative project drawn-up and 
verified by members of all departments (BE, EN, GS, IT, 
PH, TE) and of the Safety Commission (SC). 
 
It will take the strong points of both document AOC 
and ADI, thereby creating a new one adapted to all 
stakeholders’ needs. The AET will be directly linked to 
the planning and coordination team agreements, 
according to the machine status. 
 
Concerning the safety measures that need to be taken 
into account with the intervention, all the required 
documents1 will be linked, and signatures to person in 
charge of safety will be added (radioprotection, safety 
coordinators, charge de travaux...) 
 
With these all features that need to be taken into 
account, the AET will be designed to be user-friendly and 
flexible. By linking all the actors in a unique document, it 
will improve the communication. 
 
ACCESS SYSTEM COMPATIBILITY 
Current control of the access 
The access authorization to accede in the LHC machine 
is called LHC-TNL. When the people have this access 
authorization it means that: 
- They went to the safety courses and so know the 
hazards present in the machine 
- They have a dosimeter 
- They have at least the electrical level H0B0 
- They went to the biocell training2 
There is no control about individual safety equipment as 
it is considered as own responsibility. 
 
This access authorization is enough to go into the LHC 
machine in GENERAL mode. However, if it is the 
RESTRICTED mode, an operator in the CCC gives the 
last authorization or can block the access. 
 
Access and AET 
It is possible add the list of all the people involved in the 
activities described in the AET, and add a filter of the 
names authorized to enter in the LHC machine. ADaMS 
database will take information in the AIS database. 
This would add a step in the process to enter in the 
machine: 
1. To have the access authorization (LHC-TNL) 
2. To be listed in an accepted AET  
3. In RESTRICTED the access is granted by an access 
operator 
The aim is not to make the access to the machine more 
difficult, but to enhance the control of the safety and the 
smooth progress of work. 
The features of the AET need to be well defined in 
order to be adapted to all the interventions we know for 
the next “big” Shutdown period. 
  
OPERATION OF THE ACCESS SYSTEM 
Access modes 
For the time being, 4 access modes can be used:  
- General, for which people need the access 
authorization LHC-TNL, and during which the 
inter-site doors are usually opened.  
- Restricted, for which people need the right LHC-
TNL and the access key is given by the operators. 
In this mode inter-site doors can’t be opened.  
- Closed, for which access is forbidden 
- Patrol: only patrol members can enter. 
 
Thanks to the use of the AET to enhance the control of 
activities, and thereby the access, the access mode during 
each period without beam would be: 
- Technical Stop: Restricted in order to keep the 
machine patrolled. 
- Shutdown: General in order to ease the access (and 
especially the passage through inter-site doors) 
- Commissioning: restricted in order to have a strict 
control of the access.   
 
Impact on the organization 
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For areas in restricted mode (during Technical Stop and 
Commissioning), an access operator in the Central 
Control Center (CCC) is needed to grant the access. So 
we need operator(s) in the CCC . 
Currently, BE/OP is in charge to operate the access 
console. If there are too many access in the zone 
restricted, we may need additional persons qualified to 
give access. But if the access constraints are taken into 
account in the schedule, there might be less access during 
the tests are performed. 
 
PATROLS 
The sectors of the machine will be at the end of the 
Shutdown period. 
Even if there are currently 27 patrol leaders in EN/MEF 
and BE/OP groups, the volunteers are always welcome to 
help. During the normal hours, EN/MEF is in charge of 




For the time being, the access system is only defined for 
the beam operation. The needs to strictly control the 
safety and smooth progress of work, during the periods 
without beam, have been demonstrated. The AET linked 
to the LHC access system is a very good solution for 
general and safety coordination. 
We recommend that these new features shall be in 







[1] Safety Code A9 
[2] John Etheridge’s presentation, Session 4 
[3] Rudiger Schmidt’s presentation, Session 1 
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IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW SECTORISATION OF THE LHC  
AND FOR ADDITIONAL INTERLOCKS? 
 
M. Tavlet, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
The presentation explains the objectives and 
justifications of the LASS/LACS, as well as the 
drawbacks of the current LHC sectorisation. The 
lessons learnt from the September-2008 incident 
impose more constraints. New constraints linked to 
safety as well as to exploitation are reviewed. How can 
the new requests be addressed? Should the 
sectorisation be revised? Would that imply more sector 
doors, less sector doors, other sector doors? Do the new 
constraints impose more ventilation doors? Should the 
LASS/LACS address more risks? Should we include 
additional interlocks such as ventilation doors and 
power converters in the LASS? What would be the 
consequences of such additional interlocks?  
 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE CURRENT 
SITUATION 
The current sectorisation of the LHC is based on the 
fact that the LASS/LACS (LHC Access Safety and 
Control Systems) must protect people (personnel and 
public) from the radiation hazard: the outer envelope 
prevents people to enter and stray radiation to reach 
people, as well as activated air to escape in an 
uncontrolled way; dedicated sectors or zones delimit 
areas where the radiation risk is higher or linked to the 
operation of special equipments (RF cavities, 
collimators, beam dumps…). In addition, the RP-veto 
may limit the access to the whole complex or to 
dedicated areas. 
With regard to activated air and gases, LASS/ LACS 
can grant access to service areas (that have not ‘seen’ 
the beam) while forbidding (or delaying) access to 
primary beam areas (tunnel areas). It is therefore 
necessary that the access sectorisation matches the 
ventilation sectors. This is not the case today (because 
of modifications following the 2008 incident), and this 
will have to be solved. 
From an exploitation point of view, as well as from a 
safety point of view, it might also help to reduce the 
size of the sectors: 
- In case of a loss of a “search” (or “patrol”), only 
the given sector(s) must be patrolled. 
- Smaller sectors help to localize the people 
underground, as long as people to not cross sector 
doors which are not equipped with access control. 
- It is to be noted that only “zones” can stay in 
«restricted/ patrolled» or «closed» mode when 
adjacent zones can be accessed. All sectors of a 
given zone are necessarily in the same mode. 
 
DRAWBACKS OF THE CURRENT 
SITUATION  
The current sectorisation has been defined taking into 
account the higher radiation risk which will be present 
after significant operation of some beam cleaning. The 
current sectorisation was not justified during the latest 
hardware commissioning phase, as it is not yet justified 
today (no significant radio-activation yet). Some 
sectors doors are considered as useless by workers in 
the tunnel. In restricted-access mode, these doors 
cannot be crossed without “loosing the patrol”, and the 
loss of effective counting of people in a given area. 
The 2008 incident has revealed the significant risk 
from ODH (Oxygen Deficiency Hazard) resulting from 
a major helium release. This risk is enhanced by the 
fact that the helium release route is the same as the 
human escape route. To protect people from this hazard 
when the magnets of a given sector1 are powered above 
a given threshold (phase II), it is necessary to forbid the 
access to adjacent sectors as well. This leads 
sometimes to the closing of about half of the machine 
when testing one sector (See Fig.1 which illustrates the 
case of powering (phase II) of sector 4-5 (closed of 
course), with adjacent sectors closed to cope with a 
possible major He release, plus most of sectors 3-4 and 
6-7 closed as well because there is no blast-proof sector 
doors to delimit the hazardous areas from safer areas.) 
It is to be noted that this situation can not be solved in a 
easy way; ventilation needs to be ensured in the tunnel; 
hence there should be dedicated release ways for the 
helium (see Sylvain Weisz presentation). 
 
                                                 
1  It is to be noted that the word ‘sector’ is not used in 
the same way by different teams such as the Hardware-
Commissioning team and the Access team. 




Today, to allow free movement of personnel in the 
tunnel from one LHC Point to another, including 
passing across the inter-site doors, the two adjacent 
access zones – each controlled from a different LHC 
Point – have to be put in general-access mode. This 
implies a loss of the patrol, less precise access control 
and less precise localisation of people underground. 
This option will not be acceptable after the collimators 
or other pieces of equipment will present a significant 
radiation hazard. 
 
SHOULD NEW SECTORS BE  
DEFINED ?  
From the exploitation2 point of view, defining smaller 
sectors seems to present a benefit: Some zones/sectors 
could stay in «restricted/patrolled» or «closed» modes 
when adjacent sectors can be accessed; In case of a 
“loss of patrol”, only the given sector(s) must be 
patrolled. Smaller sectors also means more sectors, and 
hence more doors to cross. The evaluation of this need 
should be done in the long run perspective, and not 
only from the recent crash-programme work. The 
conclusion should come after the analysis of the 
exploitation teams, also taking the costs into account 
(see presentation of Rui Nunes).  
From a safety point of view, the smaller-sector option 
offers one benefit: it would help to localize people 
underground (as long as people do not cross inter-site 
doors which are not equipped with access control – this 
would be too expensive and would require too much 
space.) But as the more-sectors option would increase 
the complexity of the systems, it would decrease their 
reliability and hence the overall safety level. The 
assessment of the overall benefit for safety should be 
based on a risk analysis and a fault analysis of the 
systems. 
It is to be noted that the “software interlock” (see L. 
Ponce presentation) designed to couple adjacent sectors 
to any given tested sector (8 different matrices) defined 
                                                 
2  Exploitation includes operation with and without 
beam, hardware commissioning, maintenance, etc. 
de facto a new sectorisation. In this case, the sectors 
are not smaller, but larger (Fig.1). The LACS has only 
been adapted to this situation, not redesigned, and the 
LASS (the reliable safety system) is blind with respect 
to this software interlock. 
 
MORE RISKS TO BE COVERED, MORE 
INTERLOCKS ? 
Should the LASS/LACS also protect people from other 
risks such as electricity? In particular, should the 
magnet power converter be interlocked with the LASS? 
If yes, only the cold magnets, or also the warm 
magnets? Are there live parts protected by covers? If 
yes, should the presence of the covers be checked and 
linked to the LASS? Should the magnets of the 
experiments be interlocked with LASS, as their field 
extend in accessible areas? The answers these 
questions should be based on risk analysis. 
It is to be noted that interlocking the power converters 
of the cold magnets would not only protect people from 
electricity, but from a potential major He release, and 
this is exactly the purpose of the “software interlock”. 
Today, this software interlock is not reliable enough (It 
is reliable with respect to safety, because it is fail safe, 
but it generates some unwanted cuts.) Would it be 
possible to implement a LASS_to_PC link? Where 
would the logics be integrated? What would be its 
technology? What would be the drawbacks in terms of 
operation (magnet tests, cold check-out…)?  Again, the 
answers have to come from the exploitation teams 
(taking into account the inputs from GS-ASE, and in 
agreement with the Safety Unit). 
It is generally accepted that ventilation systems have 
implication on safety; safety of equipments that need to 
be cooled during operation, and safety of people during 
access. Should LASS treat interlocks from the 
ventilation systems (including ventilation units and 
ventilation doors)? The answer this question must be 
based on a risk analysis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Today, with the exception of the ventilation aspect, the 
LASS fulfills its safety requirements. The matching of 
the access sectors to the ventilation sectors needs to be 
implemented as soon as possible.  
The performances of the LACS (in particular the 
MAD) are treated in R. Nunes and T. Hakulinen 
presentations). 
Some dedicated small sectors (e.g. the survey galleries) 
need to be adapted in detail to specific needs. 
The question whether the general sectorisation of the 
LHC must be modified must be answered by the 
exploitation teams, looking at the long-term needs, and 
taking into account all safety aspects.  
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IMPACT OF SAFETY REL




This paper will address the issues concerning
implementation impact of the main type
requirements and evolutions, in the light of 
experience of the operations in 2009. T
requirements can be divided into three
technical improvements, design modificatio
increase, and finally operational & 
improvement. The phasing in time and imp
modifications during machine operation
discussed. Possibilities and current plans fo
and modifications shall be presented as 
potential constraints for operation of the LHC
and experiments. Examples of each type of
are the Safety Element (EIS) bypas
improvement, redesign of the Material Ac
(MAD) personnel detection, and the introd
synchronization mechanism to allow for wo
management (AET). 
INTRODUCTION & MOTIVA
The LHC Access System is composed o
subsystems: the LHC Access Control System 
the LHC Access Safety System (LASS). 
The LHC Access Control System is 
authorise and authenticate the people who en
machine areas.  
Authorization is the process of verific
person has the necessary credentials to acces
area. In the case of the LHC physical access
translates into checking of several ad
credentials such as : valid working contract 
in the possession of a valid personal do
successfully passed the necessary safety train
and has been granted the necessary access p
the access area manager, etc... 
Authentication is the process of verific
actual identity of the person present in front 
point at the time of the access request. In th
LHC physical access control this is done via t
process of iris pattern recognition. 
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keys given from the various control rooms 
Access mode shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 Keys given from LHC & Expe
control rooms from Aug 2009 to Jan
Motivation for changes & evolutions 
Due to the intense usage that the LHC Ac
has been subject to in 2009, both in the fiel
control rooms, it has provided an importa
experience as we have moved from a deplo
and first start-up to a full 1 year shutdow
periods of restricted access managed by the
the events of September 19th 2008. 
As a consequence of this enlarged experie
number of improvements have been ident
various stakeholders, such as the operations 
commissioning teams, safety officers, maint
and end-users. 
We have listed in this paper the current
improvements that have the highest impact o
have classified them into 3 categories: 
• Technical improvements,  
• Design modification & scope increas
• Operational & procedural improvem
We have also classified them in accorda
impact (safety, usability, reliability, avai
maintainability) and effort for execution (cost
and delay), according to a qualitative scale 
The impact safety parameter and the cost pa
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Scale Safety Cost (CHF) Delay
0 No improvement   
1 Minor improvement >1k 6m 
2 Medium improvement >10k 1 yr 
3 Major improvement >100k 2 yrs 
4 New safety function >1’000k 3 yrs 
5 New risk covered >10’000k >3 yrs
Table 1 Qualitative scale of some i
parameters 
CURRENT MAJOR IS
The following issues have been ide
important modifications relative to safe
in the chapters below 
1. MAD detection 
2. EIS-f bypass (in/out of chain) 
3. Re-sectorisation needs 
▫ Access vs Ventilation
▫ “Overpressure” doors
▫ Maintenance 
4. New Interlocks 
5. Moving equipment due to R2E
6. New access points 
7. Other operational improvemen
MAD detection 
The main function of the Materi
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that are impossible to pass through the
Device (PAD).  
Since CCC surveillance of the MA
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that no person can enter the LHC serv
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Access system in Restricted Mode and 
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the procedural guarantee that no person
the accelerator areas undetected. 
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It has also some drawbacks by design, s
refusal rates affected by some phenomena 
lights, visible moving liquids such as water
recent winter events have shown, melting 
issues affect availability of the MAD to perf
function. 
On the other hand, if the sensitivity is tun
low, false acceptance rates can become hig
create a potential safety problem. 
The current solution is deemed insufficient
safety officers. 
Three proposed improvements have been id
are: 
IR Cells: Complement movement detection
cells to improve detection in “difficult areas”.
Remote Control: Implement a “Remo
feature to allow for a control room oper
manual control of the MAD process. 
2nd redundant system: Deploy a total
technologically diverse solution in order t
redundant, different and independent detectio
improve the safety level. 
This modification is classed as a Design 
and its expected impact illustrated in the Figu
Figure 4 MAD detection improvement imp
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This modification is classified as a
improvement and its expected impact illustra
5 above. 
Re-sectorisation needs 
Another class of modifications are the ones
new sectorisation i.e. new logic for the beha
several access elements. We have i
requirements that need to be attended to :A
vs. Ventilation, “Overpressure doors” inte
Maintenance. 
Access safety vs. Ventilation 
This is not a new requirement and concerns
of air-tightness between mainly the UA ar
RAs.  
The original sectorisation design [1] assu
ventilation and access sectorisation are a
various practical reasons this has not been
implement.  
Figure 6 Access vs Ventilation sectorisat
If the access is to be managed as initially i
essential to realign these sectors by either
cable passages air-tight or by adding/
appropriate access points.  
 
Figure 7 Modification of access for ventilat
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RA-UA air-tight by reviewing the obst
this solution is implemented, this acce
no longer necessary. 
“Overpressure doors” integration 
Following the September 19th 2008
from the Safety Task Force [4
recommendations required the ins
“overpressure” or ventilation doors in 
LHC [3]. The supervision was ma
connection with no safety interlock 
and the visualisation of the above m
available in the CCC via a TIM syn
Figure 8 below.  
Figure 8 LHC new "overpressure" d
The necessary interlock logic is sti
this date and may include the power co
interlock. 
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System was designed to address, since it is r
Maximum Credible Incident (MCI) confinem
 
Maintenance interventions vs sectorisatio
As can be seen from the numbers in Figure
used access points are the non-interlocked ac
experiment service caverns. These access p
serviced by the maintenance team anytime, 
interruption of the access system for the conc
Figure 10 Access by type from Aug 2009 t
However, in the interlocked LHC Out
category of access points, we can see that 
passing rate is still very high for a relatively l
of access points. 
These points cannot be serviced for mainte
the machine run because they are interlock
action would induce the stop of the LHC. 
during the technical stops they are subj
demand, as all technical teams precipitate th
profit from the access to the LHC, and any 
action would reduce the availability of the a
when it is most needed. 
Figure 11 Impact of sectorisation for ma
elated to the 
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For this reason a modification of the 
to allow for maintenance action on 
during the run of the LHC, by either:  
a) shifting temporarily the out
access system to stairwell s
position 
or   
b) adding an additional door/
the case in the SPS. 
This modification is classified as a D
and its impact is illustrated in Figure 11
New interlocks 
Power Converter interlocks for MC
Since the 19th September 2008 eve
much discussion on including an inter
system to address the MCI risk of the 
tests. 
In this case there would be the nee
power converters so as to be able to red
the magnets below the Phase II critica
intrusion in certain areas of the machin
could vary as the powering tests deve
machine, leaving some areas inaccess
outer envelope, and others accessible. 
This is a major scope increase 
extensive risk analysis and can be e
depending on the necessary number of 
It may also require significant mo
power converters themselves or on the 
controller. 
Figure 12 Impact of new PC inter
This modification is thus classified a
and its impact illustrated in Figure 12 a
Fresh air supply interlock 
It has also been mentioned lately 
proceedings) that a new function wou
system is proposed 
the access points 
er envelope of the 
ector door and lift 
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forbid the entrance of people in the undergro
the ventilation conditions for fresh air sup
longer guaranteed. 
This modification is not complex in the 
still classified as a scope increase, since 
another risk. 
Its implementation is however rather com
ventilation side, since the calculation of the c
fresh air supply and, more importantly, 
automatic calculation of such conditions 
complexity. 
Figure 13 Impact of modification for fresh
R2E moving Equipment 
The Radiation to Electronics Study Grou
has recalculated some of the radiation ef
diverse electronic components in the LHC a
reached new conclusions on the areas that ca
for off-the-shelf consumer-type electronics su
for the LACS/LASS equipment [7]. 
The incidence of the new results for the L
implies the relocation of some equipm
underground areas. The LASS is not affec
electronic equipment is located in the surface 
The known areas at this date that are m
include: UJ56, UJ76, UJ33 and possibly UJ14
This modification is classified as a design 
and its complexity is mainly due to the fa
locations have to be found close to the curren
the equipment and that new cable work shall 
to reconnect all elements. 
The impact of such modification is illustra
14 below. 
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Figure 14 Impact relocation d
New Access Points 
Interlocked access points 
A new access point has recently be
TZ32 for the CLIC alignment studies. 
A detailed study must be conducted
the mechanical integration issues, w
impact, moving other doors and re-s
related to this new access point. 
Figure 15 Impact of new access point
This modification is classified as a D
and its impact illustrated in Figure 15 a
Furthermore an initially foreseen ac
installed in PZ65 and also requires care
 
ue to R2E 
en requested [8]in 
 in order to verify 
ater and humidity 
ectorisation issues 
 
s TZ32 and PZ65 
esign modification 
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cess point was not 
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Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
158
justification of the need for this access poi
currently only an end-of-zone door. 
 
Non-interlocked access points 
The only non-interlocked access poin
modification is the PM54, since the initial tu
kept on request from CMS. 
However we have realised that this is a ma
when, for the purposes of operation, it is 
monitor the occupancy in these areas, online
mortem analysis, as well as for homog
supervision and maintenance tools. 
 
Figure 16 Impact for PM54 
This Technical improvement’s impact is 
Figure 16 above and it can be done during th
of the LHC machine. 
 
Other improvements 
Further to other operational improvement
minor improvements are being considered suc
a) Integration of the Autorisation d’E
Travail (AET), in the LACS to m
lists; 
b) Video improvement, technologic
avoid freezing & improve fluidity
c) IHM improvement, capability 
multiple access points simultaneou
d) Intercom improvement, due to 
reasons next to compressor areas; 
e) Improve/fluidity LACS-LASS inte
f) Improve interface with the ATLA
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HOW TO ACHIEVE SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF THE ACCESS 
SYSTEM: STABILITY, EFFICIENCY, OPERATION, FLUIDITY 
T. Hakulinen (GS/ASE) 
With contributions from the LHC Access Team (GS/ASE) 
 
Abstract 
Heavy utilisation of the access system during LHC 
hardware commissioning has uncovered shortcomings in 
the performance of the system. While generally available 
to operation as required, response of the system has 
sometimes been below expectations of its users and 
operators. Reasons for these problems are both technical 
and procedural. Issues have been found in both hardware 
and software as well as in the system's response to 
external factors, such as network problems. Real-world 
usage of the access system has also not always reflected 
its original design. Possibilities for improvement exist: It 
should be possible to automate some of the administrative 
checks by the operators in the restricted mode. The access 
cycle may be streamlined, and new lighter-weight access 
modes for specific situations may be investigated. User 
interface improvements are possible to facilitate 
management of multiple access points at busy times. The 
exact actions to be taken will need to be evaluated 
between the access and operational teams. The most 
important issues affecting the performance of the system 
should be addressed first to ensure the best possible 
service to the users during the next shutdown. 
LHC ACCESS AND SAFETY SYSTEM 
General Description of LASS and LACS 
The access and safety system of the LHC consists of 
two complementary systems: The LHC Access Safety 
System (LASS) [1] and LHC Access Control System 
(LACS) [2]. The LASS controls a number of Elements 
Important for Safety (EIS). The EIS are subdivided into 
access-related elements (EIS-a: doors, key distributors, 
patrol boxes, etc.), and machine/beam-related elements 
(EIS-m/f [f=faisceau]: electron-stoppers, access safety 
blocks, beam dumps, etc.). By interlocking the EIS, LASS 
enforces safety conditions on the LHC access zones to 
allow or deny access or beam operation. Computing in 
LASS is carried out by Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLC), which are connected by a private optical network 
for maximum independence. Redundancy is provided by 
a separate cabled loop. 
The function of the LACS is to manage the physical 
access barriers and to provide the access control of the 
LHC, subject to permission from LASS. The LACS 
consists of a number of access point devices, Personal 
Access Devices (PAD), Material Access Devices (MAD), 
card readers, intercoms, video subsystem, etc. All the 
access point devices are supervised by LACS servers and 
the overall status of the LACS is constantly kept up to 
date in the access database (centrally managed Oracle 
instance). All communication between the access point 
devices and the operator posts takes place via the 
database. The LACS database connects to the external 
HR/Adams Oracle database, which manages the access 
authorizations of all CERN users. A rough schematic of 
the LHC access and safety system is given in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of the LHC access and safety system 
 
LHC Access Modes 
The LASS manages also the different access modes of 
the LHC: General, Restricted, Patrol, Closed, Veto, and 
Test. 
• General mode is a mode, where access is granted 
automatically without explicit operator action, 
provided that the person has a pre-approved access 
authorization to the zone in question. The access 
procedure is simply: 
1. User badges. 
2. User enters the PAD, which carries out checks to 
verify that the user is alone in the PAD and not 
carrying material. If the check succeeds, the first 
PAD door closes behind the user. 
3. User looks into the iris scanner for the biometric 
verification. 
4. If the scanned iris matches the person to whom 
the badge is assigned, the second PAD door 
opens and the user enters zone. 
• Restricted mode and Patrol mode are both operator 
controlled access modes with key, where an 
additional verification is required from an access 
operator in the control centre (either CCC or 
experiment control room). The key has an attached 
safety token, whose function is to interlock the beam 
system when people are inside. To control activities 
in the LHC, an approved Avis d’Intervention (ADI) 
in EDH is normally required. However, the ultimate 
responsibility for granting access lies with the 
Engineer in Charge at the control centre, who may 
authorize or deny an access at his/her discretion. The 
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Patrol mode differs from the standard Restricted 
mode in it being used to patrol the machine, i.e., to 
verify that there are no people inside the zone and to 
arm the patrol boxes thereby allowing the zone to be 
switched into a safe state for beam operation. The 
normal access procedure in restricted mode is: 
1. User calls operator via intercom and gives the 
ADI number. 
2. Operator checks the ADI in EDH and if it checks 
out, instructs the user to badge. 
3. User badges making his/her name appear on the 
operator interface and allowing the operator to 
give a key or reject the access if necessary. 
4. Operator gives a key and the user takes it. 
5. User unlocks the PAD with the key. 
6. User enters the PAD, which carries out checks to 
verify that the user is alone in the PAD and not 
carrying material. If the check succeeds, the first 
PAD door closes behind the user. 
7. User looks into the iris scanner for the biometric 
verification. 
8. If the scanned iris matches the person to whom 
the badge is assigned, the second PAD door 
opens and the user enters zone. 
In case of a group with the same ADI, steps 3 to 8 are 
repeated until all the users have passed. 
• Closed mode and Veto are modes where no access is 
possible. Technically Veto is not an access mode but 
a system state, set automatically by LASS (EIS 
interlock) or manually by operator (access off), 
which denies all access to the zone. These modes are 
used when in beam operation or for any reason that 
makes access to a zone unsafe (high-power hardware 
tests, radiation delay, etc.). 
• Test mode exists for purposes of specific groups at 
specific access points (e.g., RF at UX451). It allows 
taking an access key without authorization by the 
access operator. The Test mode is rarely used in the 
operational LHC system. 
 
Goals of the LHC Access Control System 
The purpose of the LHC access control system (LACS) 
is to ensure safe access of the personnel to the controlled 
areas of the machine and the experiments. The general 
design goals of the LHC access system can be enumerated 
as follows: 
• Be reliable, meaning that the system should not cause 
users to be exposed to danger. It should also not 
cause the beam to stop due to spurious alarms. 
• Offer good performance to both users and operators. 
• Offer flexibility to change and reconfigure things 
when necessary. 
• Allow traceability via logging of events and the 
operational history. 
• Automate as many things as possible and reasonable. 
• Offer best possible interface to manually carry out 
things that cannot (or should not) be automated. 
EXPERIENCE FROM LACS IN 2009 
Some Statistics 
To understand the scale of the usage of the LHC access 
control system it is instructive to look at some key 
statistical figures from the last 6 months. This was a very 
busy time period with lots of accesses to the LHC. The 
observation period spans from August 1, 2009 to January 
23, 2010: 
• There were 181893 valid accesses total over all LHC 
access points in all access modes. This means on the 
average 1033 accesses per day to the controlled areas 
of the LHC. Most of these accesses were in General 
mode, mainly at experiments and non-interlocked 
areas, where operator supervision was not required. 
• Out of the above total figure, there were 33676 keys 
taken in restricted mode, which translates to 191 keys 
given by operators per day, on the average. Most of 
these restricted mode accesses were managed by 
CCC operators with a smaller portion managed by 
experiment control rooms. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of keys taken per day over the 
observation period. The week structure is clearly 
visible with weekends showing little activity as well 
as the beam test period during the month leading to 
Christmas break. It is notable, however, that even 
during holidays, there were on the average tens of 
accesses per day in the LHC with activity picking up 
strongly during the first weeks of January. 
 
 
Figure 2: Keys taken / day (Aug 1, 2009 to Jan 23, 2010) 
 
• The busiest day for the operators fell on January 14, 
2010, when there were 670 keys given in restricted 
mode. The access distribution by access point, 
presented in Figure 3, gives an idea of the hot spots 
of operation, in this case points 6 and 4 followed by 
the Atlas experiment at point 1. Days with a 
comparable number of accesses can be spotted in 
Figure 1 in the first half of October 2009.  
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Figure 3: Accesses by access point (Jan 14, 2010) 
 
• LACS logs don’t give an easy indication of user 
waiting times from the moment he/she first tries to 
contact the operators to the moment that the key is 
given. This is due to the fact that intercom calls are 
not logged, and the first indication of an access 
request by the user is when he/she badges, which 
according to the protocol, happens only after the 
operator has already acknowledged the user and 
checked the validity of the ADI. A subjective 
estimate based on operator experience can be made, 
however: 
o The best case occurs when there is no rush, the 
user’s ADI checks out without problems, and the 
access system is working nominally. In this case, 
the user can expect to get the key in less than 1 
minute. 
o Given a normal operator load, meaning more 
than one call coming in, or the operator having to 
babysit one access point while answering a call 
from another, or the user’s ADI requiring extra 
verification, delays from 1 to 5 minutes can be 
expected. 
o The worst case can occur when several factors 
coincide: technical problems in the access 
system during a big rush of large groups of 
people calling from several access points 
simultaneously. In a few cases waiting times of 
over 30 minutes have been seen, sometimes 
leading to some users abandoning their access 
attempt altogether. Intervention by the access 
team has also been required a few times to repair 
a malfunctioning piece of equipment (e.g., key 
distributor boxes with jammed shutters). 
 
A Typical Busy Day 
To demonstrate typical operator experience during a 
relatively busy day during the observation period, a 
synthesis of two separate shifts is presented below. In 
reality, the two shifts described occurred on two separate 
days, but they should nonetheless be quite representative. 
It is also to be noted, that at peak times a second operator 
managed some of the accesses, which are not taken into 
account in the present analysis. 
• There are two single-operator shifts: 1st from 7:30 to 
12:30 and 2nd from 12:30 to 17:30. 
• Two periods of peak activity can be seen: morning 
(8:45-10:30) and after lunch (13:15-15:00). 
• During a peak period one would normally have 3-5 
calls from access points in the queue all the time. 
• Following types of events occurred during the shifts: 
o Morning: 99 intercom calls, 170 user accesses. 
o Afternoon: 3 patrols, 97 intercom calls, 210 user 
accesses. 
o There were 2 persons per call on the average 
(size of the group), while the biggest group of 
the day consisted of 16 persons. While the ADI 
only needs to be checked once per group, each 
key must still be given separately, which obliges 
the operator to follow each access. 
o One system problem requiring operator 
intervention was seen, where a user could not 
exit a zone requiring an access maintenance 
intervention. 
o One hardware problem was seen requiring 
maintenance intervention. 
All calls to the operator over the course of the day are 
shown in Figure 4 with the number of persons per call on 
the y-axis. From experience it can be deduced that an 
experienced operator can expect to manage 1 call per 




Figure 4: Calls to the operator during the two shifts with 
the number of accesses given per call on the y-axis 
ISSUES AFFECTING ACCESS 
PERFORMANCE AND POSSIBLE 
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
Over time, a number of issues affecting the 
performance of the access system have been identified. 
These can roughly be divided into straightforward 
technical malfunctions in the system or its environment, 
shortcomings of the original system design with respect to 
today’s realities, and administrative overhead adding 
complexity to the access procedure. In the following 
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sections, the proposed solutions to the presented problems 




The access system has had its share of hardware 
problems. A type of unreliable position contacts was 
identified as the source of incoherent signals 
(ambivalence detected by LASS) from the PAD doors. 
Several key distributor boxes have had to be changed 
and/or repaired due to shutters getting blocked or key 
slots getting damaged. Relays are always the weak spot 
of any hardware cabled loop and several have had to be 
changed. 
Hardware problems have been dealt with as they 
have appeared. In the cases where a clear fault in 
design or implementation is identified, an alternative 
design needs to be proposed. The ongoing rigorous 
preventive maintenance program of the access system 
has already addressed some of these issues, for 
example, a campaign was launched to change the PAD 
position contacts in 2009. Another case is the campaign 
to upgrade the key distributor boxes to solve the 
recurring problem of damaged key slots. 
To solve the issues with the video from access points, 
a redesigned video architecture with new video 
recorder hardware and software is likely to be 
necessary. This will imply a major redesign of the video 
subsystem. 
The access system includes basic monitoring of the 
key hardware components. However, on some 
equipment improved monitoring will be added. 
 
Software 
Numerous problems due to software have also been 
seen. It is notable that these problems have occurred 
mainly in the parts of the access software written 
specifically for CERN, while the parts indigenous to the 
vendor’s original software solution have given 
relatively little trouble. A bug in the commercial access 
software was identified as a source of persistent 
operator interface problems in the autumn. The 
biometry subsystem suffered from considerable 
problems during the first half of 2009, which mainly 
affected the biometry enrolment process. The video 
subsystem has shown signs of instability, for which a 
temporary correction exists (restarting the video 
recorder in question). 
Software problems are mainly to be solved by 
correctives from the vendor. Sometimes this will 
require (and has required) considerable debugging and 
analysis by the CERN access team. Improvements in the 
software managing the PAD cycle are a good example. 
Workarounds to some immediate problems have been 
implemented by the access team while waiting for a 
definitive fix (e.g., automatic monitoring of the 
biometry database to spot inconsistencies to be 
manually corrected by the access team). 
The biometry subsystem can be made simpler and 
more fault tolerant by including the user’s iris imprint 
on the badge. This should considerably simplify and 
speed up the biometry subsystem. 
Improving monitoring of the various software 
components of the access system is also underway. 
 
External factors 
The correct functioning of the access system is also 
strongly dependent on a number of external systems. 
The most important of these prerequisite systems is the 
CERN TCP/IP network infrastructure. LACS devices 
are connected directly to CERN Technical Network, 
which houses most of CERN’s control systems. 
Considerable network-related problems were seen 
during the last trimester of 2009. The difficulty in 
resolving these issues stemmed from the fact that 
according to standard network monitoring metrics, the 
network appeared to be functioning correctly. A closer 
collaborative analysis between the access team and the 
CERN network team revealed a hardware problem 
related to a firmware update and a configuration issue 
in one of the routers managing connections from access 
servers to equipment. 
Other external factors that may occasionally have an 
effect on the access system are the CERN central 
Oracle service as well as the HR database service, even 
though these services have generally proven very 
resilient due to their fault-tolerant design. It has also 
happened that simple human interventions, intentional 
or not, have caused unavailability of parts of the system 
(e.g., a bent MAD door that wouldn’t close properly). 
External factors are by definition not directly under 
the control of the CERN access team. In this case, the 
only viable approach is a close collaboration with the 
respective services (example: the analysis with IT of the 
network router problems mentioned earlier). 
Again, in order to be able to react promptly, some 
monitoring of the prerequisite systems by the access 
team is necessary. 
 
Shortcomings of the System Design 
The access system was designed in the first half of the 
2000’s based on the technology of the day. It is also 
apparent today that the usage of the system differs to a 
certain extent from what was forecast and on what the 
original design assumptions were based. 
 
LACS internal communications 
The communication protocol of the LACS from 
access devices on sites to the operator posts follows a 
fundamentally four-tier model: Access devices are 
connected to local processing units (UTL), which talk 
to access servers, which update the status of the system 
in the database, with which operator-posts interact. 
Correct operation of the system is fundamentally 
dependent on the presence of the database, without 
which restricted or patrol modes cannot be operated, 
changing of operating mode is not possible, and event 
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logging and monitoring of the system is disabled. In 
this case, events are kept in local buffers of the devices 
and servers, from where they will be uploaded into the 
database once it comes back online, provided that the 
break is not overly long (of the order of days). 
Performance bottlenecks have also been identified 
related to this architecture, mainly in the 
communication between the access servers and UTLs. 
The LACS communication protocol is a fundamental 
system feature, which cannot be modified at will.  
Therefore, only limited improvement is possible.  It is 
possible to optimize the server processes somewhat by 
reorganizing the allocation of the UTLs between the 
servers. It is also possible to add server machines or to 
simply upgrade them to increase processing speed. One 
of the most important things is to make sure that 
network and database are always in good shape. 
 
LACS operator interface 
One part of the system, where the age of the design 
of the system shows, is the LACS operator interface, 
which has suffered from scaling limitations and want of 
responsiveness. The user interface is relatively complex 
with all the access points individually modelled with 
details from both LASS and LACS. This slows down 
the update speed of graphical items on screen. Adding 
even more elements (for a more intuitive interface) has 
also run into internal limitations of the maximum 
number of graphical elements in the program. 
Improvement of the LACS operator interface is a 
long time operator request. In principle the system 
should allow a considerably faster processing of 
incoming access requests. The standard interface can 
be further streamlined, but this is a limited approach. 
The most logical approach would be to go towards 
access software, which is as close to the vendor 
standard release as possible. This would mean taking 
out as many of the CERN specific features as possible, 
which would also make it much easier to follow 
vendor’s standard software releases. A special-purpose 
high-performance interface for access-operation only 
without generic overhead facilitating management of 
multiple access points could be developed. The vendor 
software would still be used for all the other functions 
that it does well. This would be a development project 
involving CERN for the interface development and the 
vendor for the parts that communicate with the rest of 
the access system. 
 
Key distribution 
Key distribution is currently part of the access cycle, 
which makes it a bottleneck at access points in 
restricted mode. As presented earlier, the operator has 
to follow each access of a group of people to assure a 
smooth passage of everyone. 
One improvement with a great potential for speeding 
up accesses is separating the key distribution phase 
from access entry cycle. In this case operator gives out 
all the keys of a group and lets the users pass through 




One of the major differences from the original 
assumptions on how the access system would be 
operated is the use of the EDH-based ADI mechanism 
to filter user accesses. While the access system operates 
on zone-based access models to which individual users 
have access authorization or not, given all the standard 
prerequisites, the ADI acts as an additional 
administrative filter, which is not integrated into the 
access system. As the ADI was never designed with 
this kind of use in mind, it has proved to be somewhat 
inflexible in practice. This is mainly due to the EDH 
approval mechanism, which locks an approved ADI 
document making no modifications possible. As a need 
for last minute modifications in case of urgent changes 
will frequently occur, automatic check of the ADI by 
the access software could not be made reliable. 
To deal with the ADI issue, a wider approach is 
necessary than what can be accomplished by modifying 
the access system only. First it must be known what the 
future “ADI” mechanism will look like. This is 
primarily operational business, but input from access 
team will be necessary. The most likely candidate is the 
proposed AET mechanism [3]. Once the new 
mechanism is in place, this information can be better 
integrated into the access interface for restricted mode: 
When user badges, the system can check and show (all) 
his/her valid AETs for the access point. For this to be 
useful, the new AET mechanism must be enforced. A 
mechanism to modify AETs rapidly will also be 
necessary. 
Another approach is to add new [partial] access 
modes to the system. Two examples: 
• General mode with AET: This would be an 
extension of the current General mode but with the 
ability of the access software to check 
automatically if the user has a valid AET for this 
zone. A downside is that automatic operation 
would not allow the system to treat exceptions. 
• General mode with operator confirmation 
(supervised without key): This would be a mode 
similar to the Restricted mode, but without a key. 
Any of the proposed modes would only require 




Another issue, which has risen occasionally, involves 
scheduling conflicts between different activities, such 
as hardware tests and access maintenance, where 
accepted ADIs may have to be rejected on the spot 
without an easy method of informing affected users in 
advance. While strictly speaking not an issue with the 
access system per se, properly automated management 
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of the administrative authorizations would alleviate this 
problem as well. 
As mentioned above, scheduling conflicts are mostly 
out of scope of the access system. However, 
improvement even in this regard would be possible with 
the new AET mechanism. 
PRIORITIES AND TIMETABLES 
Best estimates at this time of the cost, complexity, and 
required lead times of the various proposed modifications 
are presented in Table 1. However, while the items are in 
principle shown in the rough order of their priority, this 




Table 1: Cost / complexity estimates by task 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Heavy utilization of the LHC access system has 
uncovered shortcomings, which have been analyzed by 
the access team. Some of the issues have already been 
corrected either by modifications to the system by the 
vendor or through CERN-specific workarounds. Some 
issues mainly related to the overall performance of the 
system still remain. 
To achieve a better performance from the point of view 
of users and operators, both technical and administrative 
issues will need to be addressed. Several technical 
improvements are possible, but depending of the scope of 
the modifications required, considerable lead times and 
cost may be involved. Work is underway to identify and 
implement the most effective modifications to permit 
them to be available for the next machine shutdown. 
Lessons learned are also being applied in the design of 
the future access and safety system upgrades (PS, SPS), 
of which the specification of the PS Personnel Safety 
System upgrade is already well advanced. 
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Abstract 
CERN’s Safety Commission monitors radiation levels 
and releases of radioactivity from CERN’s facilities and 
experiments employing two different radiation monitoring 
systems: ARCON, which dates back to the LEP era, and 
RAMSES that has been designed for the LHC. Both are 
used as alarm and interlock systems. Thus, their reliability 
and availability has an obvious impact on the beam 
operation as the machines will be stopped in case of 
failures. RAMSES is a modern, highly reliable system, 
whereas by today’s standards the ARCON system is 
vulnerable due to its legacy technology and aging 
equipment. Countermeasures taken to compensate for the 
weaknesses of ARCON are presented, the remaining risks 




CERN has the legal obligation to protect the public and 
persons working on the site from any unjustified exposure 
to ionizing radiation. For this purpose CERN’s Safety 
Commission monitors ambient dose equivalent rates in- 
and outside of CERN’s perimeter and the releases of 
radioactivity in air and water. The results of the 
measurements allow for the preventive assessment of 
radiological risks and the minimization of individual and 
collective doses. CERN’s Safety Commission currently 
operates two installed radiation monitoring systems:  
 
• ARCON (ARea CONtroller) system which had 
been developed at CERN for LEP and has been in 
use since 1988 
• RAMSES (RAdiation Monitoring System for the 
Environment and Safety) which has been designed 
for the LHC based on current industry standards 
and has been in use since 2007  
 
About 800 monitors are employed by ARCON and 
RAMSES, about 400 by each system. Both installations 
comprise data acquisition, data storage, and the triggering 
of radiation alarms and beam interlocks. The most recent 
CERN facilities LHC, CNGS and CTF3 are equipped 
with RAMSES, whereas the entire LHC injector chain, 
the remaining facilities (e.g. ISOLDE, n-TOF, AD) and 
all experimental areas are still equipped with ARCON. In 
the long run it is envisaged to replace ARCON by the 
more recent RAMSES technology. 
 
RADIATION MONITORS 
Both, ARCON and RAMSES use the same or at least 
very similar types of radiation detectors. Environmental 
radiation protection monitors records stray radiation and 
the releases of radioactivity by air and water. Recording 
of other measured values like wind speed, wind direction 
or flow rates is required to obtain relevant input 
parameters to calculate the doses to member of the public. 
A stray radiation monitoring station consists of one high 
pressure ionization chambers filled with Argon 
(CENTRONICS) for photons and penetrating, charged 
particles like muons, one REM counter (Berthold) for 
neutrons and a locally installed unit for data acquisition, 
alarm generation and data transfer. The radiation 
protection part of a CERN water monitoring station 
consists of a NaI detector for in-situ measurements of 
gamma emitting radionuclides and a device to collect 
water samples for laboratory analyses like measurements 
of tritium or for cross-checks of the on-line results. The 
ventilation monitoring system is based on silicon surface 
detectors to measure the total activity of beta emitters 
released. In addition, removable filters are installed to 
allow for a laboratory analysis of radionuclides attached 
to aerosols using gamma spectroscopy. The active parts of 
air and water monitoring (Si-, NaI-detector) are equipped 
with alarm functions. 
 
The Radiation Protection Group uses three different 
types of monitors to measure ambient dose equivalent 
rates within CERN and/or in close neighborhood of 
CERN’s facilities. The radiation monitors employed to 
protect workers against prompt ionizing radiation [1] 
during the beam operation are special REM counters 
(WENDI/Thermo) and hydrogen filled, high pressure 
ionization chambers (CENTRONICS). Both are 
optimized to measure high energy neutrons with energies 
up to the GeV-energy range, the H-chamber responds to 
all particles contributing to high energy mixed radiation 
fields [2, 3]. These monitors are foreseen to trigger an 
alarm as soon as pre-defined radiation levels are 
exceeded. 
 
The ambient dose equivalent rates which can be 
monitored inside the machine tunnel and the experimental 
caverns after the beam has been stopped are due to 
radiation emitted during the decay of radionuclides 
induced during the beam operation. The energies of the 
emitted photons do not exceed 2.7 MeV (emitted by 24Na) 
[1]. Induced radioactivity is measured with air-filled 
plastic ionization chambers (PTW) in order to assess risks 
during maintenance and repair works [4]. The radiation 
monitoring system is completed by hand-foot monitors at 
the exits from the LHC underground areas and gate 
monitors at the exits of the CERN sites (Site Gate 
Monitor, SGM). The RAMSES system provides an option 
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to connect the SGMs to the access system, i.e. in case of 
an alarm the barriers can remain closed.  
ALARM LEVELS 
The alarm levels in areas exposed to prompt radiation 
are set according to Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Alarm levels as set for CERN’s Supervised and 
Simple Controlled Radiation Areas to protect workers 
against the exposure to prompt ionizing radiation. 
 
 
There is no single area at CERN which is accessible 
during the beam operation, exposed to prompt radiation 
and classified higher than a simple controlled radiation 
area. A typical sampling interval for a radiation 
measurement is in the range of 100 to 300 s. 
Subsequently, the value is extrapolated to 3600 s and if 
the extrapolated value is above pre-defined levels visual 
and acoustic alarms will be given. In some configurations 
the alarm signals will be used to interlock the beam of the 
LHC injectors. 
ALARM PHILOSOPHY 
Two different alarm philosophies co-exist: either the 
beam will be interlocked by the radiation monitoring 
system in case of alarms or the machine or experiments 
operator will receive an audible and/or visual signal on 
which he is supposed to take action. The interlock 
solution is preferred but the choice depends on the 
required and available reliability level and needs to be 
weighed against the impact on the machine operation. 
 




Radiation Alarm Repeater Panels transmit visual and 
audible alarms to the machine operators who are 
supposed to take immediate action. No interlock is 
created by ARCON for LINAC, Booster and PS beams 





ARCON alarms are transmitted to the LASER system, 
which will then apply software interlocks on the SPS 
beam and the SPS secondary beams. 
 
LHC 
RAMSES alarms are transmitted to the LASER system. 
No RAMSES interlock is set on the LHC beam, but on 
the RF system during RF conditioning periods. In the 
future, visual and audible alarms to the LHC operators 
will be implemented, on which they are supposed to take 
immediate action. Currently alarms from the site gate 
monitors are not transferred to the CERN Control Center 
(CCC), (Technical Control), neither by ARCON nor by 
RAMSES. However, in the future it might be of 
advantage to change the situation. 
 
Environmental alarms related to the pH and 
temperature of  water released by CERN are transferred to 
the CCC (Technical Control). The radiological 
environmental alarms are not transmitted but stay within 
ARCON or RAMSES. This approach has been endorsed 
by the Beam Facility Safety Panel. For the time being no 
technical alarms of RAMSES or ARCON are transmitted 
to the CCC (Technical Control).  
 
Obviously, the Safety Commission is supposed to 
inquire in case of alarms and to verify if pre-established 
procedures are followed. 
 
RAMSES 
The Radiation Monitoring System for the Environment 
and Safety (RAMSES) has been designed to cover all 
CERN installations. In 2002 it had first been limited to 
LHC - for various reasons. In the meantime, RAMSES is 
installed at CNGS and CTF3 and will be installed at any 
new facility or experiment (e.g. HiRadMat, LINAC4, 
NA62). RAMSES is a state-of-the-art integrated, 
decentralized monitoring system which is designed to 
meet the requirements of a SIL2 safety system for 
radiation monitoring, alarm and interlock functions. It is 
compliant with international standards for radiation 
protection instrumentation, e.g., the local monitor and 
alarm unit will continue to operate, even in case of major 
power failures or loss of the network connection. The 
local station is backed up by batteries, the data will be 
stored locally and the alarms are triggered locally as well. 




The preventive maintenance of the system foresees a 
systematic regular control of the operational reliability of 
each piece of equipment. The frequency of the checks 
ranges from two weeks to a year, depending on the 
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maintenance is jointly performed by the contractor and 
the Safety Commission. Hardware and software updates 
have been implemented in 2009 and the annual 
maintenance has been completed successfully. 
 
During working hours the corrective maintenance is 
performed by members of the Radiation Protection Group 
acting as the first level of support. Outside working hours 
interventions are performed by the RP on-call service and, 
if required, by members of the Instrumentation and 
Logistic section – on a best effort basis. For very serious 
problems a Hot-Line of the contractor should be used 
(24h/24h, 7d/7d) and in case the issue cannot be solved 
remotely, the contractor has between 8 and 48 hours to 
solve the problem on site. 
 
RAMSES operational risk 
RAMSES has already been exploited for CNGS since 
2006 and for the LHC and CTF3 since 2008. In total 
RAMSES gave 3 false alarms in 2009 caused by one 
hardware failure in the system for  the LHC and two in 
the one for  CTF3. The problems were solved 
immediately by replacing the faulty equipment. No false 
interlock signal has been produced in 2009.  
 
The LHC experimental areas are sufficiently well 
covered with monitoring stations, however, provisions are 
already made to increase their redundancy if required. 
 
ARCON operational risk 
ARCON is a CERN in-house development, 
implemented in the 80’s for LEP. It is based on VME Bus 
technology, Microware OS9 as the operating system and a 
MIL1553 field bus. Of particular criticality is the 
HPSLZ18 server whose maintenance will soon be 
stopped. 
 
The replacement of ARCON by RAMSES shall follow 
a three-step procedure: 
 
1) the project “ARCON-RAMSES interface” needs to   
be completed (foreseen for first half of 2010) – 
mainly to phase out the operation of the HPSLZ18 
server and the MIL1553 field bus. 
 
2) from 2010 to the beginning of 2011 it is foreseen 
to  replace ARCON at the LHC injector chain by 
RAMSES. The related project is called 
“RAMSES2light”. 
 
3) from 2012 onwards the replacement of all  
remaining ARCON  by the so-called “RAMSES2” 







Table 2: Summary of the main differences between 
ARCON and RAMSES 
 ARCON RAMSES 
Developed   ~1980 for LEP  ~2000 for LHC  
Standard  CERN standard  Industrial standard  
SIL  < SIL  SIL2 for alarms and 
interlocks  
Size  ~380 monitors  ~ 400 monitors  
Detectors  Same type but different electronics 
System  Grouped (several 
monitors on one 
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The following measures had been taken to increase the 
availability of ARCON at the LHC injector chain until 
RAMSES2light will be finished: 
 
1) up to a certain extent spare detectors are 
available; in case more will be needed they will 
be taken from non-LHC experimental areas. 
New spare detectors will be bought within the 
RAMSES2light project. 
 
2) electronics spare parts (from LEP) are tested and 
operational in case of need. 
 
3) ARCON-RAMSES bridge will be implemented 
to eliminate the HPSLZ18 server and MIL 1553. 
 
4) ARCON network star points are secured by UPS. 
 
5) improved battery and power supply surveillance 
had been installed on all ARCON servers.  
 
The worst case scenarios with respect to the operational 
risks related to ARCON are: 
 
1) if an ARCON monitor fails and redundancy is 
lacking, the respective injector will be stopped, 
the monitor will be exchanged and the beam 
operation resumed. 
 
2) if an entire ARCON server fails, a whole area 
(e.g. PS South Hall) will be without surveillance. 
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The respective injector will be stopped and the 
ARCON server replaced. Between one and three 
days are required for such a repair. 
 
3) the weakest point is the outdated ARCON 
software for equipment control –it is difficult to 
maintain and in addition spare equipment is very 
hard to find. This problem can only be solved by 
moving from ARCON to RAMSES.  
 
Being aware of the vulnerability of ARCON, guidelines 
had been defined by the Radiation Protection Group to 
cope with various failures and consequences. The basic 
guideline is defined in Safety Rule 16 (BE/OP). A list of 
specific actions to be taken by the operators and the 
Radiation Protection Group in case of ARCON failures 
are available either on a WWW page http://cern.ch/rp-ps 
for the PS complex or in a technical note for the SPS 
complex [6]. In the frame of RAMSES2light the number 
of monitors around the PS complex will be increased 
considerably. As the SPS is an underground installation, 
the impact of ARCON failures on the operation is less 
significant as some of the areas can be closed for access. 
 
RAMSES2LIGHT PROJECT 
The RAMSES2light project foresees the replacement 
and consolidation of ARCON by RAMSES for the entire 
LHC injector chain, new projects like LINAC4 and 
HiRadMat and the acquisition of spare parts. The budget 
was approved by the Finance Committee in March 2009 
as was the extension of the existing RAMSES contract. 
The contract amendment and related orders have been 
signed in December 2009. The project will be subdivided 
into two phases – as a function of the accessibility of 
areas during beam operation: 
 
1) commissioning and acceptance tests of 
instrumentation in accessible areas to be finished 
until October 2010. 
 
2) full commissioning and acceptance tests had been 





RAMSES-LHC has proven to be reliable and to meet 
SIL2 standards. Provisions have been made to increase 
the RAMSES-LHC redundancy for accessible areas even 
further: additional monitors can be installed at any 
moment as the required infrastructure (cables, etc.) is 
already in place.  
  
All actions within the possibilities of the Safety 
Commission or the technical sector have been taken to 
secure ARCON for the LHC injectors. Procedures to be 
followed in case of failures are in place and have been 
communicated to the operations group.  The ARCON 
RAMSES Bridge will be implemented, allowing for 
phasing out the HPSLZ18 server and MIL 1553 field bus.  
Spare monitors and electronics are prepared but the 
outdated equipment control software will remain a very 
weak point. 
 
The ARCON installations at the LHC injectors will be 
replaced and consolidated by RAMSES2light latest until 
the end of the shut-down 2010/2011-according to the 
planning before Chamonix 2010, the material will arrive 
at the end of August 2010 and will be installed as  a 
function of the accelerator schedule and as such, of the 
area accessibility. 
 
Last but not least, the technical alarms from RAMSES 
and ARCON should be transferred to TCR. The same 
holds true for radiation alarms from site gate monitors.   
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Abstract 
This paper provides an update of the radiation levels in 
the critical LHC areas, both based on updated FLUKA 
simulations as well as on early measurements. 
Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the respective particle 
energy spectra is given and put in contrast to present and 
possible future radiation sensitivities. The radiation 
monitoring improvements as performed during the 2009 
shutdown are illustrated and conclusions for the actual 
impact on LHC operation and the measured shielding 
effectiveness are presented wherever available. Based on 
this, the 2008/2009 applied mitigation actions will be 
preliminary evaluated together with additionally foreseen 
short- and medium term measures. 
INTRODUCTION 
A large spectrum of equipment and electronics is 
exposed to radiation around the various LHC areas. The 
preparation and study of long-term mitigation actions 
requires a careful analysis of various aspects: 
1. radiation levels and their evolution with LHC 
operation (based on detailed Monte-Carlo 
simulations, as well as measurements when 
available) 
2. inventory of installed electronics (designed, 
COTS) and failure consequences 
3. expected radiation sensitivity, failure cross-
section and possible failure rates 
4. early monitoring and optimization possibilities 
5. analysis of mitigation options 
a. early actions 
b. shielding (simple + complex) 
c. relocation 
d. radiation tolerant by design 
e. civil engineering options 
f. other options 
6. evaluation and comparison of required resources 
(costs, time and man power) 
 
This report focuses on points (1), (4) and (5). A first 
evaluation of (6) is further given in [3]. Point (2) is 
covered in reference [1] and reference [2] summarizes the 
2009 CNGS radiation tests for specifically designed 
electronics (partly addressing also point (3).  
MONITORING IMPROVEMENTS  
The LHC radiation field varies between the different 
locations where electronics is installed (tunnel, shielded 
areas). Depending on the location, either cumulative 
damage or single event effects will be the main source of 
radiation induced problems to electronics. The continuous 
monitoring as well as a detailed analysis of the radiation 
field (particle type and energy) are considered as 
important, in order to study and optimize the various 
mitigation options. This chapter summarizes recent 
monitor improvements and gives further updates on the 
radiation fields.  
 RadMon Improvements 
In 2009 dedicated benchmark experiments were carried 
out at the CERF facility in order to analyse the RadMon 
[4] SEU detector response to mixed fields as expected in 
LHC critical areas. A detailed FLUKA [5, 6] benchmark, 
analysed the dependency of the RadMon reading as a 
function of voltage settings (3V and 5V are used in the 
LHC according to the installation location of the 
RadMon). This is of particular importance as the voltage 
setting strongly influences the SEU sensitivity to thermal 
neutrons. This is important for both, RadMon readings in 
LHC shielded areas, as well as measurements carried out 
during the CNGS equipment tests. Based on a detailed 
analysis of both measurement campaigns [7, 8], as well as 
a dedicated calibration at a reactor in Prague [9] the 
following calibration is proposed for the RadMon high-
energy hadron fluence estimate: 
 
Table 1: RadMon high-energy hadron and thermal 
neutron SEU sensitivities for two voltage settings as 
installed in the LHC (3V: shielded areas, 5V tunnel areas). 
The listed fluences correspond to one equivalent RadMon 
SEU count.  






3V 8.47x105 cm-2 3.56x105 cm-2 0.42 
5V 2.00x106 cm-2 1.90x107 cm-2 9.5 
 
In addition, the following actions were taken in order to 
improve the early RadMon measurements in the LHC: 
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• numerous detectors were relocated in order to allow 
for a better coverage around LHC critical areas (e.g., 
US85) 
• additional detectors were added in certain locations 
(e.g., LHC Point-6 next to TCDQ) 
• when available, one of the detectors located in 
critical areas was placed towards/in the LHC tunnel 
to allow for non-zero readings during commissioning 
(e.g., RRs in P7) 
• voltage settings were updated consistently to 5V for 
all tunnel locations (except ARC) and 3V for all 
shielded ones (as well as ARC). 
Inventory and Additional Monitoring 
Through dedicated R2E iterations of critical LHC areas, 
shielding configurations and monitor locations were 
checked and documented.  This included not only the 
RadMon locations, but also installed RAMSES monitors 
(e.g., PMIs in the LHC tunnel, IG5 chambers in shielded 
areas). For this year, a monitor location visualisation tool 
is proposed to be developed, in order to allow for an 
easier interpretation of monitor readings during LHC 
operation. 
In addition, more than 200 passive detectors (‘Thermo 
Luminescence Detectors’ TLDs) detectors were placed 
around critical LHC areas [10]. They will allow for an 
early analysis of integrated dose levels at low beam-
intensities where RadMon readings would be below 
threshold or at very low statistics. They will be removed 
from the tunnel and analysed during late-summer in order 
to allow for a refined prediction for the remaining 
operation time. 
Combined Monitoring Tool 
In collaboration with the LHC operations group a 
combined monitoring tool was developed and a beta-
version was released recently [11]. The tool allows 
acquiring radiation detector readings installed in the LHC 
in an easy and combined way. A graphical interface 
provides a detector selection by area, LHC coordinate 
(DCUM) or machine element search. An user friendly 
interface allows easy navigation around the LHC layout 
to select the desired areas, get information about the 
detailed detector location, as well as set timing and other 
required input information.  
The fast retrieval of multiple detector data for the 
critical areas is a powerful tool to understand the radiation 
fields around the ring and alcoves. The tool is able to 
display multiple detector information including: BLMs, 
RADMON, RAMSES, collimator settings and beam 
intensity. The readings are combined in one framework 
only and easily allow for data extraction and combined 
visualisation.  
This way the various detectors measurements can be 
related to operational information like, for example, beam 
intensity or collimator settings, important to compare 
previous simulation results to the actual measurements.  
The monitoring tool interfaces to the measurement or 
logging database and provides an analysis GUI, as well as 
the correct time correlation. Detector readings can be 
displayed as rates as well as integrated over time intervals 
and the results can be directly displayed, as well as 
exported for further analysis. A dedicated inspector tool 
allows searching for detectors exceeding predefined 
thresholds, as well as making a first statistical analysis. 
It shall be noted that the combined monitoring tool is 
considered as useful not only for the purpose of radiation 
to electronics, but could be of general interest for all LHC 
monitoring or equipment groups. 
THE RISK OF THERMAL NEUTRONS 
Radiation effects in electronic devices can be divided 
into two main categories: cumulative effects and Single 
Event Effects (SEE). The steady accumulation of defects 
causes measurable effects that can ultimately lead to 
device failure. Stochastic failures, so-called ‘Single Event 
Effects’ (SEE) form an entirely different group as they are 
due to the direct ionization by a single particle (from 
nuclear reaction in the electronics itself), able to deposit 
sufficient energy through ionization processes in order to 
disturb the operation of the device. They can only be 
characterized in terms of their probability to occur, which 
will strongly depend on the device as well as on the flux 
and nature of the particles. 
In the current configuration, LHC alcoves equipped 
with commercial or not specifically designed electronics 
are mostly affected by the risk of SEEs, whereas 
electronics installed in the LHC tunnel will also suffer 
from accumulated damage.  
Mixed radiation fields of various particle types and a 
large range of energies are the source of radiation effects 
in both areas. Especially in shielded areas (e.g., UJs, RRs) 
an important contribution to the total particle fluence is 
coming from low-energy or thermal neutrons (e.g., UJ76, 
see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: UJ76 representative particle energy spectra. 
Usually high-energy hadrons above a certain threshold 
energy (e.g., ~20MeV for protons and a few MeV for 
neutrons) are the main source of SEEs. However, 
depending on the device electronics, low-energy neutron 
capture reaction (e.g., n-alpha) can create highly ionizing 
secondary particles that are then also the source of SEEs. 
The capture reaction cross-sections, exponentially 
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increasing with decreasing energies, lead to a possible 
high sensitivity for low-energy and thermal neutrons. This 
fact is illustrated in Table 2, showing device sensitivities 
to both, high-energy and thermal neutrons [12]. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of high-energy and thermal neutron 
SEU-cross sections [12].  
 
 
It can be seen that the thermal neutron sensitivity 
ranges over order of magnitudes depending on the tested 
device. For equipment exposed in shielded  areas this 
means that depending on the actual thermal neutron 
fluence (as opposed to the high-energy hadron one) and 
the device characteristics (unknown), a SEE contribution 
from thermal neutron will range from being a negligible 
up to being the dominant contribution.  
 
For this purpose, various critical LHC areas where 
analysed for the particle fluence ratio between thermal 
neutrons and high-energy hadrons (see Figure 2). This 
allows defining a so-called ‘risk-factor (R)’ for each area 
which shall be considered for the early analysis of 
monitor readings and possible mitigation actions. 





Φ=   
 
Figure 2: Comparison of various representative spectra of 
LHC critical areas. The ‘risk-factor (R)’ for thermal 
neutrons is defined by dividing the integrated thermal 
neutron fluence by the high-energy hadron fluence. 
A summary for all LHC critical areas of the expected 
‘R-factor’ is given in Tables 4 and 5. The respective ‘risk-
factor (R)’ as listed in the column ‘Thermal Ratio’ ranges 
from a few to a few hundred. This underlies the 
importance in closely monitoring and analysing the 
radiation fields of critical areas also for their low-energy 
neutron contribution. 
OVERVIEW OF LHC CRITICAL AREAS 
Given the so far short time of operation at low 
intensities and luminosities, the knowledge of radiation 
levels of the most critical LHC critical alcoves is mainly 
based on simulations. Continuous analysis and iterations 
are required during early operation to have detailed 
updates for all critical areas. It shall further be noted, that 
important uncertainties exist due to assumptions taken for 
respective scaling of loss terms (e.g., actual integrated 
luminosity, distribution of losses,…) as summarized in 
Table 3, as well as equipment sensitivity and effects due 
to actual layouts as compared to partly simplified 
assumptions in simulations (e.g., empty alcoves).  
 
Area priorities were assigned already in a previous 
Chamonix workshop [13] according to the radiation 
levels, the system sensitivity and criticality, as well as the 
inherent uncertainty in loss assumptions. The current 
prioritization of areas with respect to expected radiation 
levels (presented as colour coding in the last column of 
Tables 4 and 5) remains unchanged and is structured as 
follows: 
  
• started/finished work during past shutdowns  
(highest-priority which required immediate action) 
[yellow] 
• highest priority for ongoing/upcoming 
iterations/evaluations [red] 
• second priority, cross-check with measurements  and 
preparation for mid/long-term planning [blue] 
• lowest priority, layout check and continuous 
evaluation [green] 
 
For all LHC critical areas and for the respective 
considered operation period, radiation levels are given for 
high-energy hadron fluences. For each operational period 
the values refer to the respective normalisation for each 
operation period as summarized in Table 3. For each 
operational period an additional colour coding indicates 
whether integrated high-energy  hadron fluences remain 
below 106cm-2(dark green), 107cm-2(light green), 108cm-
2(orange), 109cm-2(light red) and 1010cm-2(dark red).   
 
The chosen normalisation allows to rescale values in 
case loss conditions are changing, or different annual 
scenarios are discussed in the future. It shall be noted that 
such a scaling strongly depends on the expected losses, 
the respective loss distribution, and the integrated beam 
intensity or luminosity. As outlined above, this 
dependency and the inherent uncertainties in the 
simulations suggest respecting sufficient safety margins 
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when mid/long-term mitigation options are discussed. The 
presented scaling assumptions are predominantly used to 
indicate a possible evolution of radiation levels in time. 
Continuous analysis is required in order to refine these 
predictions. 
 




Table 4: Radiation levels (dose, 1MeV-neutron-equivalent and high-energy hadron fluence) for LHC Points 1 to 5 for 
expected operational periods. In addition, an estimate for the ‘risk-factor’ of thermal neutrons is given and priority 
levels are high-lighted (yellow: advanced/partly finished work, red: highest current priority, blue: second highest 
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In this chapter, a selection of first measurement results 
from injection and beam tests, as well as early operation 
is presented. A continuous check of radiation levels 
around critical areas is mandatory and has to include a 
detailed analysis not only of the RadMon readings, but 
also of the corresponding observed beam loss pattern and 
intensity or luminosity, as well as other adjacent radiation 
monitors (e.g., RAMSES, BLMs). 
  
In this sense, expected losses during operation and 
operational constraints could be compared to measured 
ones, ideally through a dedicated controlled test setup 
where losses are provoked on critical collimators leading 
to increased radiation levels in adjacent critical areas. 
These results could then be used to compare with 
simulations and possibly allow defining ‘safe’ operation 
limits (e.g., collimator setups).  
 
Figure 3 shows a first example of the TI8 collimator 
setup (TCDIH.87904, 25.10.2009) where the losses on the 
collimators lead to streaming of radiation into UJ87 and 
where the respective monitors show an immediate signal. 
Figure 3: Radiation levels as observed on RadMons in 
UJ87 and UJ88 during collimator (TCDIH.87904) setup. 
 
Furthermore, during the setup of the TCDQ, dedicated 
loss studies allowed not only to verify possible streaming 
through the ducts between the tunnel and the UA (see 
sketch of Figure 4), but also to compare the RadMon 
readings with existing FLUKA simulation results (see 
Figure 5). For the purpose of these tests on either side of 
Point-6 during the last shut-down a RadMon was 
relocated next to the mask downstream of the TCDQ in 
order to allow for an early measurement at the tunnel side.  
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 Figure 4: Layout of the RA/UA areas at Point-6 showing 
the TCDQ position. [16] 
 
Figure 5: FLUKA results for nominal losses on the TCDQ 
and downstream elements [32]. 
 
The respective FLUKA simulations were originally 
performed for 7 TeV and assuming a nominal impact on 
the TCDQ (see Figure 5). For this comparison between 
measurements and simulations, the results had to be 
renormalized according to the observed injected 
intensities and to 450GeV. This comparison obviously 
includes significant uncertainties, however allows for an 
overall evaluation of the situation around the TCDQs in 
Point-6.  
 
Within these uncertainties, the simulation results 
compare well with the obtained measurements 
(5.6x107cm-2 as obtained by the RadMon reading on the 
tunnel side as compared to FLUKA at the same location: 
~2-3x107cm-2).  Furthermore, the RadMon placed on the 
UA side (and set to 3V, thus higher sensitivity) confirmed 
the expected attenuation through the duct of at least 1000 
as no single count was observed.  
 
This shows that beam-losses initiated on purpose 
during early operation would allow for an efficient 
analysis in order to draw important conclusions for R2E 
critical areas. Therefore, during early operation, 
controlled losses are suggested for all critical areas where 
monitors allow for an analysis during early operation. The 
radiation levels can then be cross-checked by the RadMon 
(or other monitor) being closest to the loss location and 
by then applying a respective scaling towards the critical 
area (based on simulations). As a consequence, a list of 
possible test-locations was derived (see [15]) and is 
available to the operations group and whenever beam-
time is available beam losses around critical areas could 
be initiated and the respective detector measurements be 
analysed. 
 
In addition, during extended injection tests during the 
summer of 2009 an equipment failure (‘Warm Interlock 
Controller, WIC) was observed in the TI8 injection line. 
This led to a stop of both CNGS operation and LHC 
injection. An immediate analysis of available 
measurement data and FLUKA simulations lead to a first 
estimate of expected radiation levels leading to the 
failures (108-109cm-2). A detailed review of WIC layout 
and available test measurements indicated that the 
equipment shows a much lower failure cross section, thus 
suggesting that the event not being an impossible, but 
very unlikely incident. To verify the latter, an additional 
injection test with higher intensities was carried out and 
about 4x1013 protons were lost on the same injection 
collimator. No further WIC failure was observed, 
however as only one rack is concerned by possible 
upstream losses on injection collimators, it was 
recommended to relocate it when time becomes available. 
MITIGATION OPTIONS 
In the following an overview of possible mitigation 
options is given together with a few examples where 
dedicated studies already exist. The full list of possible 
mitigation options (short/mid- and long-term) are 
continuously updated on the R2E website  
(www.cern.ch/r2e). 
 
As outlined earlier, for the most exposed areas the 
radiation levels may reach very soon values leading to 
radiation induced failures and therefore could affect the 
operation of the LHC. It was shown that for nominal 
conditions, annual fluences can reach up to a fluence of 
109 high-energy hadrons/cm2 and therefore present a 
considerable risk for the operability of the LHC.  
‘Easy’ Options 
It shall be noted that for a few cases already minor 
actions can significantly improve or solve possible 
radiation induced problems. One example is the access-
gate in UJ14/16/23/87 which can be switched off during 
operation. A respective procedure is in preparation 
together with the operations group [17]. 
 
Furthermore, equipment already developed and tested 
for the tunnel area is sufficiently radiation tolerant and 
can remain mostly in place (details can be found in 
[1,2,18]), e.g.: 
• QPS (further development possible) 
• BPM (mostly ok) 
• BLM 
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• Certain cryogenics control (which is similar to 
the one installed in the tunnel). 
Radiation Tolerant Design 
For equipment which could or is already based on a 
custom design, possible radiation tolerant redesign 
options can be considered, e.g.: 
• replacement of remote-valve-controllers in US85 
where the solution is already known from other 
areas (see [13]) 
• certain types of power-converters with a possible 
proposal discussed the first time in [18] 
• possible options for new FIP development as 
described in [19] 
 
In addition, possible pathways of common 
developments could be identified and studied further 
(e.g., collaboration with PH/ESE for a common 
development of FPGA or micro-processors to be used in 
generic field-bus application, or as acquisition module for 
temperature, pressure, and low-precision voltage 
measurement). 
Shielding 
For certain critical areas local shielding can reduce the 
radiation levels for concerned equipments. The shielding 
is of highest importance for areas where the relocation of 
equipment is difficult and the reduction of expected 
radiation levels would allow gaining time for preparing 
relocations. Therefore, for many areas additional FLUKA 
simulation studies were (or are currently) performed to 
define and optimize the shielding layout for various 
operational assumptions.  
 
Even though the installation of many of the considered 
shielding integrations can only mitigate SEE related 
problems in time, the actual attenuation of radiation levels 
in the critical areas is still considered as an important 
improvement for later local relocation options or 
requirements (e.g., relocation from the UJs into the ULs 
where higher radiation levels in the ULs would otherwise 
further limit the available space). The shielding walls 
once put in place will reduce the radiation levels not only 
in the respective critical areas, but also in the adjacent 
ones, thus allowing for a more effective use of the 
available space in the adjacent areas. 
 
For a few locations additional shielding is expected to 
fully mitigate radiation induced problems. Especially for 
the areas close to the injection lines (UJ23/87) additional 
shielding was already put in place before LHC startup 
(e.g., as shown in Figure 6 the improved shielding wall of 
UJ88/87, for details please refer to [21]) 
 
Figure 6: Shielding improvement of areas downstream the 
LHC injection lines [21]. 
During injection tests and early LHC operation the 
achieved shielding efficiency in UJ88/87 could actually 
be verified. The analysis confirmed the expected 
improvement of about a factor of 10 less radiation in 
high-energy hadron fluence. This allowed for a 
significantly relaxed situation for the current operation 
period. A long-term solution will first require further 
measurements during which possible issues with low-
energy neutrons have to be analysed and then possibly 
considered for shielding improvements.  
 
Further shielding improvements already performed 
during 2009 included the finalisation of the mobile 
shielding plugs in Point-7 (close to RRs), the shielding of 
the safe-room in the US85, as well as the lateral shielding 
wall of the UJ76. 
 
Based on a first shielding layout proposed by the 
integration team, a detailed study of shielding options was 
carried out for the UJs close to the high-luminosity 
experiments (UJ14/16/56). For the current layout nominal 
annual radiation levels of a few 109cm-2y-1 are expected 
(e.g., see Figure 7 for the UJ16). Updated FLUKA 
simulation studies [23] allowed defining the respective 
weak points of the existing layout (e.g., limited shielding 
thickness or entrance maze geometry).  
 
Various shielding options were discussed together with 
the integration team. For the UJ56 a first pre-study was 
performed [24] in order to verify possible shielding 
constraints (see Figure 8 for a transversal cross-section of 
the LHC tunnel showing the maximum shielding 
thickness). For UJ14/16 a shielding enforcement of the 
plug (concrete/iron) was proposed, however the FLUKA 
simulations showed only a minor improvement due to the 
remaining weak-points towards the entrance maze 
(UJ17/16 junction), as well as the shielding weakness 
next to the UL/UJ junction (towards the LHC tunnel). 
Especially, due to the configuration of the two caverns 
(UJ13/14 and UJ16/17 respectively) a much larger 
shielding is required to significantly reduce the radiation 
levels in the UJs.     
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Figure 7: UJ16 radiation levels (nominal annual high-
energy hadron fluence given in [cm-2/100fb-1) as 
calculated with FLUKA. Two weak-points can be 
observed: (1) the shielding thickness next to the UL/UJ 
boundary, as well as the streaming through the entrance 
maze. 
 
Figure 8: Maximum shielding thickness (30/70cm of iron) 
which can be integrated on the tunnel side of the UJ56. 
 
Including a heavy iron and concrete shielding for the 
UJ14/16 can eventually lead to significant improvement 
with a reduction factor of 10-20. This is also important in 
order to possibly use parts of the UL for later relocations. 
For this heavy shielding a staged implementation is 
considered as possible and a detailed integration study is 
to be launched as soon as possible. Further optimizations 
are required for the current study (so far requiring about 
60m3 iron and 40m3 concrete) before a possible 
integration proposal can be finalized. The above listed 
UJ56-shielding is however only effective at the lower-
floor (reduction of up to a factor of 10), thus considered 
as useful either for the protection of equipment installed 
in the safe-room, or in case a restructuring of the UJ56 
has to be considered (e.g., reshuffling with power 
converters). 
 
Other areas where shielding improvements could be 
considered are: 
• UJ76: the already installed safe-room shielding 
could be improved; however, the safe-room 
equipment remains at risk 
• UJ/UA/23/87: as described above, the installed 
shielding is already improved and further steps are 
possible; combined simulation/integration study 
required 
• RR/13/17/53/57 shielding similar to RR73/77 is 
considered as possible; a more complex shielding 
around the beam-pipe could be envisaged  
• UA63/67: RA/UA connection ducts are already 
shielded and additional rods could be added if 
required 
• UJ32 (RE32): only required in case early 
monitoring shows that beam-gas could be a long-
term issue 
• UJ84/86 – UA83/87: to be considered due to the 
weakened plug shielding (magnet transport zone) 
depending on downstream losses from LHCb, as 
well as possible TDI contributions.  
 
Equipment Relocations 
The following possibilities for early relocations have 
been identified: 
• fire/ODH control racks: relocations are already 
performed in UX/US85, but still pending for UJ76, 
UJ56. As this might have a possible impact on 
safety, the relocations are to be scheduled as soon 
as possible 
• fire detectors: might have a possible impact on the 
safety chain during operation, however without 
posing a safety risk as detectors are redundant and 
the failure will be observed. For the detectors most 
areas affected and relocations might have to be 
considered (already performed for UX/US85 and 
partly required long distance tests are ongoing) 
• it shall be noted that for other equipment groups 
scenarios are studied and partly prepared for: 
o BIC, PIC, WIC 
o Timing/Remote-Reset 
 
In absence of other mitigation options, for the 
US/UW85 a complete relocation might have to be 
considered. They might be required rather early given the 
fact that expected radiation levels next to LHCb will 
reach nominal values rather soon (due to the significantly 
lower nominal luminosity of LHCb). Therefore, a detailed 
relocation study has been started, a first iteration with the 
equipment owners is completed and possible new 
equipment locations were identified [25]. 
 
Even though a solution exists it must be noted that the 
envisaged relocation campaign would require significant 
resources (costs, time and man-power). Most of the 
installed equipment would have to be relocated including 
cryogenics, WIC, timing and remote-reset, UPS, access 
control, network, AUG control, electrical distribution 
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(control), GSM. For this, cabling and installa
be prepared with sufficient lead time (about 4
Therefore, respective emphasize must soon
planning and coordination.  
 
Other areas where shielding improvemen
considered are: 
• UJ76: preparations are in place to 
equipment to the TZ76. It’s important 
if it is required to house also the equ
the adjacent RRs, a decision is requir
before any further relocations are put i
• UJ14/16: relocation possibilities exist 
(3rd floor) and adjacent ULs. First 
performed for the upgrade installatio
have to be studied further in ord
remaining radiation levels, as we
constraints (e.g., cable lengths of exi
converters).  
• UJ56: relocation options towards th
bypass were also studied for the LHC u
Civil Engineering 
Local enlargements of caverns are consider
feasible solutions due to strong impact 
installed equipment (e.g., dust during work)
the non-accessibility during LHC operation [2
 
A first feasibility study has been perform
engineering work to build new relocations ca
the RRs at Point-1 and Point-5 [27]. Here 
the power converters is difficult to envisage a
120A and 600A also the heavy 4-6 kA c
installed. The latter cannot be easily di
redesigned. Therefore, the option to drill new
surface and create a side gallery protected fr
was considered (see Figure 9).  
 
A pre-study exists [27] with estimated high
engineering to which one has to add the co
infrastructure and actual relocation. The
confirmed that most of the civil engineering 
performed even with beam in the LHC. 
remains to be evaluated what level of vibra
accepted by the machine without perturbin
conditions.  
 
It shall be noted that the shafts would also 
possible escape path in case of a massive 
helium in the tunnel [28]. In addition, it woul
to further extend these new caverns to ha
galleries in P1 and P5, which would then 
comfortable relocation option for all the equi
UJ14/16/56 and give in addition sufficient 
the new equipment necessary for the later L
scenarios. 
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Figure 9: Preliminary layout proposal 
caverns for the RRs in P1 and P5 [29]. 
 
Other Mitigation Options 
R&D work is currently being carrie
the development of new super-conducti
• the development of semi-flexib
the powering of the triplets for 
1 (up to 100m length and about 
circuits) [30]. 
• the development of gas-co
operating at higher temperature
for vertical transfer of current [3
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before any conclusion can be drawn.
 
Furthermore, for the UJ76 and 
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• the temporary operational mov
collimation to Point-3 as propo
[32]. Especially with the 
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So far applied mitigation actions were briefly 
summarized together with additionally foreseen short- 
and medium term measures. Local shielding is supposed 
to improve the situation for several critical areas and even 
if not being a long-term solution for most areas, the 
reduction in radiation levels can allow to sufficiently gain 
time until other long-term solutions can be implemented. 
 
Early relocation options have to include all sensitive 
equipment focusing first on safety related equipment 
(e.g., Fire/ODH control rack in P5/7). For all relocation 
campaigns, first a complete relocation plan must be 
studied in detail, thus allowing for early relocation only 
when all final equipment locations have been identified.  
 
Civil engineering or other alternative mitigation options 
have to be studied in detail for areas where other solutions 
cannot be found or their implementation remains 
questionable. Whenever possible, long-term optimizations 
shall not only consider issues related to radiation damage 
to electronics, but also take into account other possible 
future requirements (e.g., accidental Helium release or 
upgrade scenarios). 
 
Due to the partly long lead time, first decisions are soon 
required, not for a final implementation plan, but rather to 
allow for gaining time through parallel preparation 
studies.   Only this detailed planning and the analysis of 
all mitigation options can allow to properly optimize the 
solutions for all critical areas. This implies an important 
inter-departmental effort to verify possible mitigation 
scenarios with respect to their feasibility, long-term 
sustainability as well as resource requirements. 
 
Due to the stringent time constraints work in parallel is 
required and it will not be enough to do things 
‘sequentially’ in the sense that if one would first observe 
and then react, the time required to implement most of the 
mitigation options, would lead to important constraints 
for LHC operation. 
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Standard radiation test methods and desig
have successfully been over the last years to 
amount of electronics for the LHC accelera
tolerant. This paper will review the underlyin
models, test procedures and the assumption
made. It will be shown how system des
managed the risk associated to radiation dam
systems and designs for the LHC tunnel. 
overview of equipment exposed to radiatio
LHC areas is presented and the most critical
high-lighted with respect to system cri
operational impact in case of failure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Already in the early phase of the design 
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First estimates of the radiation levels for th
showed that the radiation levels in the tunne
underground areas terms would be dominat
gas interactions and that they would be below
10 years operation [5]. Based on this inform
decided to use either turnkey systems
commercially available or to build radiat
electronic boards and systems from c
available parts. 
These electronics were integrated in the
tunnel, in some of the underground areas 
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of LEP operation and the subsequent remov
cavities). This resulted in a reduction of
consumption, a reduction of the cabling and
the S/N ratio of the signals. In parallel, res
made available to verify the radiation tole
electronic equipment in the tunnel.  
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were undertaken by the electronics engineer
equipment groups in the period 1999
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THEORETICAL BACKG
Soft Single Events 
In order to assess the risk of soft sin
in the LHC, the Simple Sensitive Vol
[6,7]  has been used. In this model, 
ionization from a nuclear interaction w
computed via the Monte Carlo si
generation and transport of nuclear fra
explicit device structure and the oper
not considered in this model, its usag
limited. Nevertheless, for the generat
that is used in the LHC accelerator (bas
CMOS/TTL logic at 0.35 micron) the m
impression of the soft error rate tha
operation of the accelerator.  
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Figure 2: Energy deposition probability for
different energies. The curve shows the pro
have within a SV of 1μm3 an energy depositi
equal to Edep. (figure from ref [7])
 
  Figure 2 shows the energy deposition
when protons at different energies are interac
silicon inside a sensitive volume of 1μm
observation is that the maximum energy 
deposited inside the SV is limited even if th
the incoming particles increases. In the 
maximum energy deposited by a 60 MeV pro
equal to the energy deposited by a proton o
This suggests that the soft error cross section
of the incident particle energy will eventually
given energy of the incoming particle whi
what is observed experimentally (figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Proton, neutron cross section for
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found in [8].  
Figure 4: Neutron Capture cross sec
elements that are used in the fabrication
devices. 
This particular isotope of Boron has
neutron capture cross section (figure 
the other elements that are used in 
semiconductors. After capturing a low 
Boron nuclide becomes unstable and 
alpha particle and a 0.84 MeV Lithium
particle can generate sufficient ionisat
single event in a device. 
Isotopes of Boron are extensiv
semiconductor fabrication to dope sub
while Boron Phospho Silicate Glass (
dielectric layer between the silicon an
layer of the chip (figure 5). In the late 9
that the neutrons from cosmic ray
ies of 60 200 MeV 
is very close to the 
e components, the 
 region of interest. 
here is very little 
obability for a low 
roton at 200 MeV. 
udied equally well 
 of 60 MeV. 
ns and neutrons to 
h energetic hadron 
d areas is made up 
or a few percent of 
 proton energy is 
 energy of 5 MeV 
l between neutrons 
metric. 
or rate discussed in 
n,α) reactions in 
pe of boron,  10B. 
 in the radiation 
ood review can be 
 
tion for various 
 of semiconductor 
 an extremely high 
4) as compared to 
the fabrication of 
energy neutron, the 
emits a 1.47 MeV 
 recoils. The alpha 
ion to cause a soft 
ely used in the 
strates and wells, 
BPSG) is used as 
d the metallisation 
0’s it became clear 
s were making a 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
182
considerable contribution to the soft er
consumer electronics due to the presence of B
 
 
 Figure 5: Replacing the BPSG layer 
silicon and the metallisation layer by PSG le
reduction in the soft error rate from alpha par
thermal neutron capture in Boron. 
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To achieve nevertheless a significant statistical 
certainty on the absence of hard single events, equipment 
owners were invited to expose their complete system 
under identical operating conditions as those in the LHC 
in a target area. In the period 1998-2005, the TCC2 target 
area was used (figure 7), while the CNGS target area has 
been in use since November 2007 [15]. Although it 
remains difficult to put these test in perspective against 
tests with mono energetic, single particles species, it 
helped to increase the confidence in the radiation 
tolerance of the equipment. 
 
 Total Dose 
In the baseline LHC design, radiation levels in terms of 
total dose have been a constraint in the equipment 
integration. This means that complex logic CMOS 
devices are mainly situated in the regular ARCs where the 
dose levels are low and of the order of a few Grays per 
nominal year. For these devices, no dedicated total dose 
tests were carried out. Low energy proton data was used 
instead to get a first impression on the tolerance to total 
dose. 
Some electronic equipment and some materials in the 
LHC are located in the DS or LSS regions of the tunnel 
were they are exposed to annual radiation doses of the 
order of 102 to 103 Gy (LHC nominal). For this equipment 
special total dose tests were carried out with gamma rays 




Figure 8: Threshold voltage (VT) shift on NMOS 
transistors used in the RADMON system for the LHC 
during gamma irradiation using different biasing 
conditions (Gate-source VGS voltage at -5V, 0 V and 
+5V) [16]. 
There are at least 2 major issues that have to be 
considered for radiation damage to CMOS electronics 
from total dose which are the biasing conditions of the 
device and the dose rate dependence (and subsequent 
annealing behaviour).  
Biasing conditions of the device are very important and 
in general some improvement is observed when parts are 
unbiased (figure 8). However, CMOS biasing effects 
under irradiation is a very complex subject which is why 
this needs to be checked on part-by-part basis. 
 
 
Figure 9: Dose rate effects on the Radiation Induced 
Attenuation of Ge-doped graded step index fibres for 
communication, presently in use in the LHC tunnel [17]. 
 
Some failure mechanisms can be induced by irradiation 
at different dose rates because hole traps and interface 
traps build-up and anneal on different time scales. Dose 
rate effects can be observed on almost any CMOS device 
as well as on optical fibres (figure 10). Bipolar linear 
transistors are well known to exhibit Extreme Low Dose 
Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS). This means that the device 
degradation at the end of a low dose irradiation is higher 
than the device degradation followed by a room 
temperature anneal for a sufficiently long period of time. 
 
 
Figure 10: Total dose Irradiation of paint samples for the 
TAN absorbers in the LHC to 1 MGy. 
 
Material damage from total dose is not an issue that 
will appear in the first years of LHC operation because 
materials are in general much more radiation resistant as 
compared to electronics. However, experience form other 
proton accelerators at CERN has shown that replacing 
degraded insulation for cables and magnetic coils will 
eventually be required in the LHC and that verification of 
the radiation resistance of such materials is of importance.  
For cable insulating materials, the end-point criterion  
is defined as the dose at which the elongation at break is 
100% or more. For thermosetting and thermoplastic 
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resins, the end-point criterion is the dose at which the 
ultimate flexural strength of the material is 50% or more 
of the initial value for the non- irradiated sample. For 
items such as motors, glass, oils and paints, it proved to 
be impossible to define a standard definition of the 
acceptance so irradiation test results were debated with 
the equipment owners on a case to case basis following 
operational tests and/or visual inspection of the irradiated 
materials (figure 10). In all cases, the compilations of 10 
years radiation test damage data on a wide range of 
materials was used a guideline [18]. 
Displacement Damage 
Displacement Damage (DD) in the LHC underground 
areas is caused by protons, neutrons and electrons and 
affects, for example, the gain of bipolar transistors, 
optical detectors and some types of light emitting diodes. 
The threshold for the onset of DD is rather high, around 
1011 n/cm2 (1 MeV equivalent) and this value is unlikely 
to be attained in the next few years of LHC operation. The 
underlying radiation effect is the energy transfer from an 
incoming particle to a lattice atom which creates clusters 
of damage which reduce the minority carrier lifetime. 
As with total dose damage, it is not straightforward to 
predict how if a device or system will be sensitive to DD 
without a radiation test. For the LHC, we concentrated 
mainly on the systems that make extensively use of opto 
electronics such as laser diodes in the BLM system and 
the opto-couplers in various switched mode power 
supplies.   
RADITION TESTS 
Standard Test procedures 
It is preferable to conduct all radiation tests in line with 
Standard Test procedures and in calibrated test facilities 
to have a straightforward comparison with other data and 
to allow for the sharing of data between various groups. A 
number of radiation test procedures exist for all 3 
different types of radiation damage and they vary in their 
recommendations depending on the type of application 
(military, space, consumer electronics) at hand.  
Over the last 10 years, CERN equipment groups 
undertook a considerable effort to irradiate all equipment 
“as good as practically achievable” in line with standard 
procedures. For single event studies, the standard is the 
ESA/ECC Basic specification No. 25100 (“Single Event 
Effects Test Method and guidelines”) [19] while for Total 
Dose and DD tests, the ESA/SCC Basic specification 
No.22900 (‘Total Dose Steady State Irradiation Test 
Method’) [20] is used. In practice, it appeared to be 
necessary to study each case individually as it was almost 
never possible to respect these recommendations in full. 
The use of safety factors was deliberately excluded. 
 
Test Facilities 
The use of high quality test facilities calibrated against 
international standards is mandatory to achieve a set of 
coherent results from radiation test. It is also the only way 
to compare results within the radiation community at 
large.  
For proton irradiation, CERN has collaboration 
contracts with UCL (Université Catholique de Louvain, 
UCL) in Belgium and with the PSI (Paul Scherrer 
Institute) in Switzerland. These institutes consider the use 
of their facilities by CERN equipment group as part of 
their contribution to the CERN project and to LHC in 
particular. 
The Light Ion Facility (LIF) at UCL [21] provides 
protons at energies up to 62 MeV. The energy degradation 
is achieved by inserting plastic slabs (10 different 
thicknesses, 3 of each). At the location of the DUT, the 
protons energy is between 9.3 and 62 MeV. The proton 
beam has a flat profile with homogeneity of ± 10 % on a 
circular beam spot with a diameter of 10 cm. The 
maximum proton flux is 5x108 protons/cm²s. The beam 
profile is determined using a diode in a water phantom. 
Large proton fluxes are measured with a transmission 
chambers and an annular detector calibrated against a 
precision faraday cup. For lower proton fluxes, 
scintillators are used. 
The Low energy Proton Irradiation Facility (PIF) at PSI 
[22] provides protons with energies between 6 to 71 MeV 
and a maximum proton flux of 5x108 protons/cm²s. The 
proton beam has a flat profile with homogeneity of ± 10 
% on a circular beam spot with a diameter of 5 cm while 
the beam spot has a diameter of 9 cm. 
The high energy Proton Irradiation Facility (HIF) at PSI 
provides protons with energies of 235, 200, 150, 100 and 





Figure 11: Total Dose Irradiation of cables for the 
powering of the inner triplet magnets of the LHC. 
 
Total dose test have been performed at the 60Co 
irradiators at CEA-Saclay which have the advantage of 
providing a large range in dose rates from 50 Gy/hr - 30 
kGy/hr. Irradiations take place in air and it is possible to 
irradiate very large objects (figure 11). Calibration of the 
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source is carried out with an ionisatio
calibrated against COFRAC standards. 
 
 
Figure 12: Neutron spectrum of the PROSPE
(bare core) (figure from reference [2
 
Most of the DD tests were performed 
reactor PROSPERO at the CEA-Saclay [23]
are performed in air up to a total neutron flu
n/cm2 (1 MeV eq. Si). Dosimetry is carried 
variety of passive dosimeters such as PIN di




In the absence of a strict overall review
electronics designs, the acceptance criteria fo
designs were determined on a case to case b
collaboration with the equipment groups and 
coordination of the LHC project. 
This proved to be a difficult task, first of 
awareness of the potential consequences 
damage effects was not generalised. Further
equipment groups are entirely dependen
contractor outside CERN and have no in-h
capability to fabricate an appropriate on line
Some parts or designs were not tested or had
radiation test results, others were eventua
operating conditions that were very differen
under which the radiation test was perform
cases, electronic parts were added to the des
stage without being verified on their radiation
Another important issue is the quality assu
series production and the procurement of the 
used in the designs. Although lot acceptanc
recommended, this was not always possible
the costs for the boards and the number of h
in a radiation test facility. In addition, it wa
possible to irradiate a sufficient large 
parts/designs in order to reduce the statistica
to an acceptable level. 
Finally, the risk (defined here as probabili
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radiation hard parts that were designed for the LH 
experiments (voltage regulator for the BPM system for 
example). 
EQUIPMENT OVERVIEW 
LHC Tunnel Electronics 
There are 6 distributed control systems in the tunnel 
that were build from individual parts taking radiation 
tolerance into account as a design constraint (radiation 
tolerant designing via component selection in figure 13). 
For these systems, the parts were carefully selected on 
their radiation tolerance via numerous tests. Performance 
degradation of the parts is accounted for at the level of the 
system so that part degradation does not lead to a 
decrease in system functionality. 
The Cryogenics Instrumentation Electronics was 
amongst the first electronic designs to be exposed to 
radiation in the TCC2 target area [26]. This system 
controls the temperature of the superconductor magnets, 
beam screens and the HTS current leads using more than 
10 000 cryogenic sensors and actuators. The low signal 
amplitude obtained when measuring cryogenic sensors 
require signal conditioning in close proximity to the 
sensors which is why the cryogenic instrumentation is 
distributed uniformly along the 27 Km and located in 
crates placed under the main dipoles. 
Electronic parts such as the WorldFIP interface [27] 
were tested outside CERN with single events beams 
which provided useful information for other users. 
Mitigation Techniques in the logic include Triple module 
redundancy on FPGA logic and frequent refreshment of 
WorldFIPagent’s SRAM memory. Finally, the power 
supplies and thermal dissipaters have been overdesigned 
to account for increased current consumption due to total 
dose effects [28]. 
The complete was exposed to radiation in the target 
areas of the SPS at several occasions and operated 
without any interruptions from radiation damage until it 
reached the total dose limit. 
A similar design approach was followed for the QPS 
Electronics (i.e. Quench detection system, the Quench 
Heater Powering and the Data Acquisition and 
monitoring) [29]. For the Quench Heater supplies, all 
parts (Aluminium electrolytic capacitors, NE556 bipolar 
timers & linear voltage regulators, Voltage references, 
Isolation amplifiers, Phase control thyristors) were 
carefully tested on their radiation tolerance from 1999 
onwards. 
Considerable efforts were need to qualify the electronic 
for the Local Quench Detection (1 per MB, 2 per MQ, 
2100 in total in the LHC) which is based on a Wheatstone 
bridge formed with the two apertures / coils and balancing 
resistors. The detector parts are based on analogue 
circuitry while the DAQ part is based on a 
microcontroller and a WorldFIP Interface. In 2002, 
sufficient information had been accumulated to state that 
the installation of quench protection electronics would be 
feasible [30]. Radiation testing on pre-series and series 
production continued in 2003 and this confirmed that the 
quench protection electronics was successfully designed 
and qualified to operate at the radiation levels foreseen for 
in the LHC. 
The Beam Loss Monitoring system is using some 
electronics in the tunnel to convert the variations of the 
current from the ionisation chambers to a frequency. An 
FPGA is used for the encoding and multiplexing while the 
signals are transmitted over optical fibres using laser 
diodes. The components on the BLMECF card were kept 
to a strict minimum and some radiation hardened (by 
design) parts designed and used in the LHC experiments 
were selected. In 2004, a basic set of components was 
successfully selected (FPGA, GOL/GOH, ADC Level 
converter, Current to frequency integrator (OPA627)) 
[31]. The tunnel card was produced in series [32] and 
eventually successfully tested under radiation in, amongst 
others, the CNGS test facility at CERN [33]. 
The selection of components for the Beam Position 
Monitoring system started also in a very early stage. The 
systems consist of 64 crates each equipped with power 
supplies, a Wide Band Time Normaliser (WBTN) card 
and a calibration board. 
First focus was on the power supplies and on Front End 
WBTN card [34]. Linear power supplies were chosen to 
avoid SEB effects which proved to be successful. The 
WBTN board has a minimum of logic and therefore 
already showed good radiation tolerance in an early stage. 
The calibration card is used for communication via 
WorldFIP and has logic on it. By choosing the same parts 
that are used in the instrumentation electronics, the soft 
error rate was reduced to a minimum [33]. 
Particular attention was given to the laser diodes and 
the communication by optical fibre. Displacement 
Damage resulting in a loss of the emitted light at 1310 nm 
was initially a concern. This issue was eventually solved 
by dedicated displacement damage test which showed that 
the light intensity in some laser diodes would decrease 
only by 10% over the lifetime of the LHC and that there 
was no significant variation of the jitter between adjacent 
light pulses [35]. In collaboration with the TS department, 
special radiation hard optical fibres were selected and 
installed in the LHC [36]. 
The user interfaces for the Beam Interlock Controller 
in the LHC are located at the position of the equipment 
and may have to operate under radiation. First efforts 
concentrated on the Power Supplies (Tracopower TXL-
025-25S 5V, 5A, 25W) of the user interface which 
successfully past DD test and a SEE test. The user 
interface itself has some on- board logic mainly for 
testing and monitoring but also in the user permit path 
[37]. High energy protons were used to probe the user 
permit path in particular the optocouplers, Schmidt 
triggers and the small signal-relay. It was found that the 
particle hits in the opto-couplers can induce glitches but 
that these can be filtered out with a dedicated glitch filter. 
The design was eventually accepted but all glitch counters 
are constantly being monitored to provide an early 
warning in case of radiation induced events.  
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The design of RADMON radiation monitoring 
system started only in 2002 and could therefore benefit 
from the radiation data on the components that had been 
qualified by other groups. The design is using a minimum 
amount of on board logic and is using the WorldFIP 
fieldbus interface in stand-alone mode. Standard 
triplication techniques are used to reduce the soft error 
rate. The extensive calibration runs in test beams and 
neutron facilities allowed to make the design radiation 
tolerant. In 2005, a set of 4 monitors was installed in the 
CDF detector at Fermilab during the high luminosity runs 
[38]. Radiation data was collected for the period of 1 year 
without interruption. 
The Orbit Power Converters followed a slightly 
different design methodology, which can perhaps best be 
described as a hybrid solution between component and 
system selection. A total of 752 orbit correctors are 
located in the LHC tunnel and each power converter 
consists of a powering part and a controls part which both 
contain many radiation sensitive components. First 
radiation test on the power part showed that optocouplers 
and auxiliary power supplies were amongst the weakest 
components. In 2001 a complete prototype design was 
exposed to radiation with encouraging results [39].  
During the first radiation tests on the controls part, a 
high soft error rate was observed [40].  Large efforts were 
then undertaken to reduce the SEE rate via partial 
redesign and use of error correction codes. In dedicated 
proton beam test in 2003, these correction codes were 
tested and a large reduction in the soft error rate was 
indeed observed [41]. However, in recent complete 
system test in the target area of CNGS, functional 
interrupts from single events were still observed [42]. 
Further studies are therefore needed to make this issue 
more precise. 
 
LHC Electronics in Underground areas 
An equipment inventory was carried out in order to 
collect information on the instrumentation of the LHC 
alcoves. The results of this survey are attached as an 
annex to this paper.  
According to the FLUKA simulation results, the 
analysis was focused on the equipment installed in the 
most critical areas in terms of radiation, which are the 
UJ76, US85, UJ56, RR53, RR57, UJ14, RR13, RR17. 
The inventory aimed at classifying the equipments by 
taking into account their criticality for the LHC safety and 
operations and their radiation tolerant features. Four 
categories were established and are resumed in order of 
priority: 1) safety of the personnel, 2) safety for the 
machine, 3) downtime for the machine operation, 4) 
monitoring for the machine. Since the criticality of the 
system itself is weighted by its radiation tolerant features, 
it might happen to classify equipments, which are very 
important for the LHC operations, in the category 4. This 
is the case of the WorldFip repeaters (see Annex): the 
equipment is crucial for many critical systems but it has 
priority 4 since it was proved that the equipment is 
radiation tolerant by means of dedicated tests. 
A web survey was launched to make the inventory of 
the equipment. The owner of a given equipment A must 
specify the device location and its rack name, its function, 
its failure consequences, the results of any eventual 
radiation test that was done in the past, the systems on 
which A depends, the systems that depend on A, and its 
needs in terms of infrastructure (power supply, remote 
communication bus, cooling and so on).  
The classification and the description of the equipments 
allow identifying the most suitable mitigation techniques, 
which are relocation, shielding, and radiation tolerant 
redesign.   
In most cases, for a given equipment, there is not any 
significant difference among the racks installed in 
different areas. Therefore, it was decided to group the 
equipments on the basis of their function (see Annex). 
They are sorted according to the above-said priority 
classification, and, for each of them, the location, the 
radiation tests, the failure consequences, and the proposed 
mitigation techniques are resumed. 
This work is still on going and may require other 
interactions with the equipment owners. Further updates 
of the equipment inventory will be published in [43]. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Radiation hardness studies on accelerator electronics 
have been going on for almost 12 years now and the large 
majority (80%) of the efforts have concentrated on the 
reduction of the Single Event Error rate in equipment in 
the LHC. Most of these concern (recoverable) soft SEEs 
which cause data corruption, a minor part of these efforts 
is directed toward (non-recoverable) hard SEEs which 
cause permanent loss of the data and sometimes even the 
circuit. 
The current radiation hardness policy for single events 
is based on a simple Sensitive Volume model. The model 
allows predicting the error rate in the various particle 
radiation spectra that are produced in and around the LHC 
with a single parameter which is the hadron flux with an 
energy threshold of 20 MeV (h > 20 MeV). This number 
has been used extensively for the engineering and 
integration of equipment in the LHC construction phase.  
The models also predicts that for the generation of 
electronic parts on which the LHC equipment is based,  
high energy proton beam testing (p > 20 MeV) is 
representative for soft error studies while for hard single 
events, higher energy proton beams are preferable. Under 
specific circumstances, a complete system test in a 
complex radiation field may be envisaged. 
Almost all equipment in the LHC machine relies on 
systems that are based on commercial parts which are not 
designed to be radiation hard and this automatically 
implies an increase of the associated risk. Radiation 
testing in calibrated facilities along well defined, 
internationally accepted standards is required to reduce 
the risk to a minimum. Furthermore, strict QA and lot 
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acceptance tests are needed to ensure that any changes in 
the manufacturing process of the parts are correctly 
accounted for.  
The highest success rate in radiation tolerant designing 
has been obtained when the amount of components in 
design is minimised and the parts are carefully selected on 
their radiation tolerance. This requires a considerable 
amount of effort and resources from the equipment 
groups because each prototype needs at least satisfactory 
proton beam test results and this is often obtained via trial 
and error of a variety of commercial parts. In combination 
with soft error correction techniques and QA for series 
production and spares the risk associated with radiation 
induced errors can be brought back to an acceptable 
minimum and satisfactory performance can be assured 
over a period of several years. The majority of the main 
distributed control systems in the LHC tunnel have used 
this approach and the risk of radiation damage in these 
systems can perhaps best be described to be “as low as 
reasonable achievable”. 
For some LHC equipment groups it was not possible to 
follow this design procedure since they do not have in 
house design capacity and use commercial contracts 
instead. Some decided to verify the radiation tolerance of 
complete industrial systems but the success rate has been 
extremely limited. Industrial products were eventually 
selected in some particular cases, mainly when the 
equipment does not make use of semiconductor 
electronics for controls and signal processing. 
Cumulative radiation damage effects have been studied 
in detail for systems that will be exposed to a high 
radiation dose and are located, for example, in the LHC 
cleaning areas, the LSS or the experimental caverns. For 
Total Dose damage studies, experiments were conducted 
as much as possible in line with international radiation 
test standards using a calibrated 60Co source. However, in 
some cases, only proton data was available. Displacement 
studies were carried out with a fission reactor producing 
low energetic neutrons with an average energy of 0.9 
MeV. Again, the focus was primarily on systems that 
make use of particular sensitive parts such as opto-
electronics or bipolar devices.   
In conclusion, the main distributed electronic systems 
for the LHC tunnel have a radiation hardness which is ‘as 
good as reasonable achievable’ keeping in mind that all 
systems use commercial (non radiation hard) parts and 
that statistical uncertainties will always remain. The 
possibility of radiation damage in the first operational 
period of LHC operation in these custom designed 
systems is low. In addition, sufficient experience with 
radiation tolerant designing and radiation testing is 
available in the equipment groups to react on a short 
timescale if needed.  
Despite extensive efforts from various groups, very few 
standard commercial systems have been qualified to 
operate reliable in a radiation environment without any 
modification. By minimising the amount of equipment 
under radiation, the error can be reduced but never 
eliminated. In addition, strict QA is required since there is 
no control over the manufacturing process and large 
variations in the radiation tolerance of different 
production batches are very common. Much better results 
are usually obtained when the controls logic and signal 
processing is detached and relocated in area without 
radiation and this solution may be an option for the 
equipment under radiation in the LHC underground areas 
(see annex).  
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NI PXI controller 
Data acquisition card 
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Remote- 
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Possible fast power abort sequence 
No protection for the magnets (rare) 
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60 Co for switches 
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stop of the machine Relocation 
Ethernet US85 UJ56 (l.1) Ethernet Switches No 
Loss of the Ethernet connection for the 
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PLC, remote I/O No  
No CV for Equipment and the experiments 










PLC, Remote I/O 
CCS rack 
 
No No control of cryogenics for SC magnets Relocation 
Cryogenics 
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No input for Cryogenic system that could 
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UJ14/16 PLC No 
Beam dump 
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Annex: Equipment inventory.  Red: priority 1; Yellow: priority 2; Blue: priority 3; Green: priority 4. 
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DCCT & SIGMA DELTA 
Overview 
 
   
Figure 2: various DCCT 
The DCCTs used in the LHC power converters are built 
using only analogue electronics (with the exception of the 
identification chip which is not a critical component) and  
most of the electronics is bipolar (supply regulator, 
opamps, power amplifier), therefore less sensitive to 
ionizing effects (although more sensitive to lattice 
displacement effects which can cause transistor gain 
reduction). Some junction FETs are used in the DCCTs’ 
zero flux stage. Temporary conduction of these FETs on 
the millisecond scale has no effect on the output. Passive 
components like burden resistor and measuring head are 
not critical. 
From the exposed above, one can conclude that, 
compared to high density MOS devices, the DCCTs 
electronics cannot be considered critical: there are no 
MOS circuits, and circuitry is not sensitive to 
microsecond disturbances. 
Testing on initial prototypes of the 120A DCCTs (used 
for 60A-08V and 120A-10V Power Converters) have 
confirmed this analysis although no tests were performed 
on the final DCCT versions neither on the high current 
models, which were initially foreseen to stay away from 
radiation sensitive areas. 
A summary of the situation for different types of 
DCCTs is given below: 
 
Table 2: General radiation Info 




























TID of 50Gy:  
no degradation  
of performance 
 
The 22 bit Delta sigma is a high accuracy ADC built 
with discrete components. In its design it includes both 
MOS logic and high density devices. This includes a 
CPLD which is also used in the PCs digital controller 
(FGC) and during previous radiation tests has shown 
latch-ups and even a definitive burn-out in one occasion. 
 The high accuracy of the 22 bit Delta sigma circuit 
greatly relies on good quality of the clock and on the 
pulse duration and pulse edge symmetry of the DS 
reference switches. Disturbances at the picoseconds level 
can generate errors of some parts per million. Since these 
switches are CMOS devices, they can be sensitive to 
ionizing effects and therefore performance degradation is 
likely to happen.” 
 
Table 3: General radiation Info 
Type Rad-tol @ 
Design origin 
Rad. Tests 
22 bit DS No 
@CERN 
No tests done 
CRITICAL  
DIGITAL CONTROLLER (FGC) 
Overview 
 
Figure 3: Function Generator Controller (FGC) 
The Function Generator Controller (FGC) is an 
embedded control computer used with all the power 
converters in the LHC and LHC experiments.  It was 
design at CERN and 2000 were manufactured by 




Figure 4: FGC Internal Architecture 
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Table 4: General radiation Info 


















The FGC was designed taking into account radiation.  
The SRAM was seen to be the most vulnerable to SEUs 
and error detection and correction logic was included.  
The processors are old (1993/4) and are manufactured 
with a large feature size, giving them a low cross section 
to SEEs, so corruptions of processor registers have been 
seen during tests, but very rarely.  The design includes 
watch-dogs and the ability to power cycle the complete 
FGC via a request sent over the network.  Various other 
mitigation features were included. 
The functionality of the FGC is divided into six small 
circuit boards.  One is the analogue interface which has 
two variants, while the other five have only one variant.  
One type of analogue interface uses two SRAM based 
Spartan 20 FPGAs which are known to be vulnerable to 
SEUs and for this reason a second design was made that 
has lower performance but avoids the FPGAs.  This 
variant is more tolerant to radiation and is included in the 
FGC-60 which was conceived specifically for use in the 
LHC tunnel with the 60A-8V converters.   
The high performance analogue interface is used in the 
FGC-50 which was designed to work in non-radiation 
areas.  Unfortunately 313 FGC-50s will be in radiation 
areas and may have problems due to the FPGAs 
becoming corrupted.  Remediation in software will be 
implemented with regular reprogramming of the FGPA. 
All the cards in the FGC use the 5V Xilinx 95000 series 
flash-based CPLDs for their programmable logic.  This 
device was tested in a 60MeV proton beam at Louvain la 
Neuve in 2003 without signs of latch-up.  Subsequent 
tests in CNGS showed that the device does latch up with 
higher energy particles. 
Four FGCs have been tested in CNGS, each containing 
11 CPLDs.  One device failed destructively and several 
system freezes were seen that were recovered by a power 
cycle.  The cross section based on the combined results is 
estimated to be 2.10-11/cm2 E>20MeV. 
A detailed study of the CPLD using an ion beam and a 
higher energy proton beam has suggested a figure for the 
cross section for latch-up at 4.10-12/cm2 which is 
significantly higher when the 11 CPLDs in one FGC are 
considered.  Based on this figure, the total cross section 
for the FGC should be over 4.10-11/cm2. 
 














Radiation mitigation possible options 
The consequences of radiation on the FGCs are very 
complex.  We will have crashes that can be cleared by a 
reset, and interruptions that will require a power cycle.  
Sometimes we will have component failures that will 
require replacement of the component. 
Estimating the rate of each of these for the different 
areas is very hard since the sensitivity for latch-up to the 
radiation spectra is high.   
Based on the results so far, it seems that the combined 
rate of all failures should be low enough not to impact 
significantly upon the nominal operation of the LHC, 
provided that all the shielding and relocation measures 
being considered are implemented. 
Finally, if the failure rate is worse than our estimations 
suggest, then a new design will be required.  If we are 
correct in believing that the CPLDs are the weakest link, 
and if the other components are still available with the 
same fabrication techniques as now, then it could be 
imagined to redesign the FGC by replacing only the 
CPLDs with something with a lower cross section for 
latch-up.  However, no affordable equivalent device has 
been identified so far.  Simply finding 5V devices is 
almost impossible. 
A complete redesign with a new rad-tol processor and 
only certified rad-tol devices could be done, but the 
resulting FGC would cost around 10 times more than the 
current design (25KSF rather than 2.5KSF).  The design 
and development would require substantial effort and 
several years. 
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DIAGNOSTIC INTERFACE MODULE 
Overview 
The diagnostic interface module (DIM) is a 
daughterboard that is implanted in the power converter 
electronics to recover first fault information and to 
provide basic analogue signal monitoring.  It has 24 
digital inputs, plus a trigger input, and 4 analogue inputs 
that are sampled at 50Hz with a 12-bit ADC.  When the 
trigger input is activated, the state of the 24 digital inputs 
is memorized by the CPLD, enabling the FGC to read out 
the first fault.  The trigger is created in the converter 
electronics from the OR of all the fault signals.  A 125 
kHz counter is also stopped when the trigger occurs so 
that the time of the fault can be known to 8 µs. 
 
 
Figure 5: Diagnostic Input Module 
Up to 30 DIMs can be connected to the FGC via a serial 
daisy chain, though the most used in practice is 18. 
 
Table 6: General radiation Info 
Component Rad-tol @ 
Design origin 
Rad. Tests 





The DIM was designed using the Xilinx 95144 CPLD 
in the belief that this was radiation tolerant based on the 
2003 tests results from at Louvain la Neuve.  In CNGS it 
was seen that latch-ups occur which block the operation 
of the DIM and no power-cycle ability is available since 
the DIM is powered from the power converter electronics 
card on which it is mounted. 
We can therefore anticipate losing the operation of 
some DIMs, however they provide diagnostic information 
only and are not essential for the operation of the 
converter. 
 





Events @ LHC 
Nominal Fluence 
DIM 60G 4.10-12/cm2 5.109/cm2/yr E>20MeV 
 
FGC AUXILIARY POWER SUPPLIES 
While the LHC60A-08V Power Converter is composed 
only of the Power Part and the FGC, other Power 
Converters use a fully equipped electronics crate to house 
the FGC. This electronics crate provides up to two FGC 
slots with forced air cooling (an FGC Fan Tray), and 
depending on the type chassis can also provide DCCT 
(high precision current sensor) electronics slots. Powering 
of the FGC and DCCT electronics is done by a AC-DC 
Module (3 phases – 48Vdc) followed by a dedicated DC-
DC PSU (48V input). 
The AC-DC Power Module being a traditional 3-phases 
50Hz transformer followed by rectifier and low frequency 
filtering is assumed to be rad-tolerant by design. 
On the other hand, the FGC and DCCT PSU are made 
of several DC-DCs modules with additional circuitry to 
provide a redundant system, which controls the power 
level of each DC-DC to be at 50% of the total output 
power delivered by the 2 DC-DC when both are running 
well, maintaining safe operation conditions regarding the 
lifetime of these components. In case one DC-DC fails, 
the other one will run at full power indicating through 
remote signal that conditions are not optimum anymore. 
These PSU can be susceptible from a radiation point of 
view since they use DC-DC modules and additional 
circuitry which are not rad-tolerant by design. 
 
































Some (between 2-3) DC-DCs from each type of the 
ones being used in both FGC PSU and DCCT PSU were 
tested in CERN CNGS irradiation facility. Result clearly 
shows that they are not susceptible to Single Event, but 
are affected by the Total Ionizing Dose, which is often the 
case, and often coming from the reference voltage device 
being used in the control regulation. 
Concerning the other components being commonly 
used in the PSU ensuring the redundant mode, they need 
more investigations and were not tested. 
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48V unknown unknown No Even
PSU 
DCCT 50 Gy n.a. No Even
PSU FGC 50 Gy n.a. No Even
 
Figure 6: Typical DC-DC results under radi
same reference DC-DCs 
 
LHC60A-08V POWER CONVE
Figure 7: LHC60A-08V Power Conv
Overview 
These Power Converters are placed below
the tunnel, in radioactive areas. The compact
uses a Power Part 19’’ chassis, which also i
FGC. Only one AC-DC auxiliary Power Su
for both Power Part and FGC controller. 
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LHC120A-10V POWER CO
Figure 8: LHC120A-10V Po
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Radiation status 
This Power Converter was designed at CER
if not rad-tolerant design, it was desig
advantages from LHC60A-08V developmen
could be considered as relatively safe. 
Nevertheless, the Power Part (Voltage Sou
digital card was designed using the FGC cr
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recycle of the power converter. 
• It could happen that some critical in
protection of the current leads can be n
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feature, and then deserves deeper analyze
Radiation tests 
TE-EPC doesn’t consider a radiation test o
Converter to be mandatory since being CE
corrective actions can be taken relativ
(months) in case LHC operation shows radia
the Power Part. 
Radiation mitigation possible options 
Re-design of some internal part of the pow
is highly recommended and feasible since or
design. Majority of cards are expected to run
trouble since originally designed taken in 
radiation potential issue. (CPLD base Power
card exception) 
Re-location of these converters can also
solution and would make the operation and 
of these converters a lot easier. Additional 
would not be a big problem since cables 
moment can be thicker relatively easily, and
compensate a longer length for a same 
resistance. 
N and even 
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LHC600A-10V POWER CO
Figure 9: LHC600A-10V Powe
Overview 
128 of these water-cooled Power Con
in RR1x (28), RR5x (28), RR7x (48)
(08). Both DCDC PSU for FGC and 
this Power Converter. 
 







600A-10V No @ External No 
 
Radiation status 
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A partial redesign can be a valid option co
following points: 
• Only some cards in the Power Conv
susceptible to Single Event, but they a
the most complex (up to 5x CPLDs i
control card) 
• At least 2 years are needed to develop 
(retro-engineering + electronic desig
validation + manufacturing + exchange o
Re-location option is a valid option also, 
care must be taken on the additional cable 
which would potentially lead to too h
requirements at the level of the power conver
like new cryo-lines could fix this issue. 
LHC600A-40V POWER CONVERT
Figure 10: LHC600A-40V Power Con
Overview 
These water-cooled Power Converters ar
UJ76 and UJ33 only. If the 12 units in UJ76
to a relatively high level of radiations, this 
solved thanks to TZ76 relocation. Both DCD
and DCCT are used in this Power Converter. 
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LHC4..8KA-08V POWER C
Figure 11: LHC4..8kA-08V Pow
Overview 
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in RR1x (30), RR5x (30), UJ1x (04)
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Radiation tests 
TE-EPC doesn’t envisage to test the whole Power 
Converter since too complex to organize (big size water 
cooled converter, complex design, costly units). A 
pragmatic approach is envisaged listing all possible 
sensitive devices to get a better idea of what can cause 
trouble. From this first analyze still to be done, a plan will 
then be possible. 
Radiation mitigation possible options 
A complete redesign is a considerable and costly work, 
since design is highly complex, and quantities are 
important. This option is not considered as a valid option. 
TE-EPC doesn’t have the required manpower for 
launching such a project, and a rad-tolerant design of this 
kind of converter cannot be externalized. 
A partial redesign can be a valid option considering the 
following points: 
• Only some cards in the Power Converter can be 
susceptible to Single Event, but they are obviously 
the most complex (up to 10x CPLDs of the same 
king in total). Moreover the modularity of the power 
converter makes possible to redesign some whole 
crates or modules (mainly control module) for a fast 
exchange of the units to get a rad-tolerant voltage 
source 
• Several months (14-18) are needed to develop new 
version of some sub-parts or complete modules 
(retro-engineering + electronic design + test / 
validation + manufacturing + exchange of the crates 
or removable modules) 
Re-location option is a valid option also, but a special 
care must be taken on the additional cable voltage drop 
which would potentially lead to too high voltage 
requirements at the level of the power converter. Solution 
like new cryo-lines could fix this issue. 
 
 
TE-EPC PROPOSED APPROACH 
The LHC60A-08V Power Converter is the only Power 
Converter in the LHC complex where the radiation 
susceptibility is known and considered as safe for LHC 
operation needs. 
All other Power Converters: 120A, 600A, 4-6-8kA 
present an unknown status regarding the radiation 
susceptibility. If the power part is generally using safe 
components per design, and following strict specifications 
(severe AC network conditions require over-voltage 
rating on power semiconductors), some components like 
CPLDs or integrated ones: DC-DC, AC-DC are not 
qualified versus radiation susceptibility. 
TE-EPC proposes a rational approach, mainly to limit 
re-design options, since cost and manpower would be 
extremely high: 
 
On CERN-Design converter or sub-systems, it is 
recommended  
• To analyze all possible critical components, to 
propose re-design sub-parts and to produce some 
replacement rad-tolerant cards. The goal is to use the 
following years to design, test, and produce cards to 
be ready when expected problem comes. 
• To use LHC operation as a "test-bed" to identify 
non-expected troubles if any and to solve the 
problems as they arrive. Strategy is to count on the 
design being at CERN, and on the ability to re-
design cards relatively easily and quickly. A 
redesign-test-production of a sensitive card can be 
estimated to 5-6 months for most of the cards (surely 
longer for high precision card if radiation affected). 
• Not to test the whole power converter under 
radiation, since difficult to achieve and results would 
be difficult to analyze in case of a crash. A crash 
would indeed create a possible chain of damaged 
components, making difficult to understand what the 
initial failure was. 
• Test some components like CPLDs or integrated 
ones: DC-DC, AC-DC since highly critical and 
delivery time could be potentially long. 
 
On external-Design converters, it is recommended 
• To analyse all possible critical components through a 
deep review (already organized and planned in April 
2010) and to estimate the list of possible sensitive to 
radiation devices and  their criticality with regards to 
LHC operation. (Some converters are operating in a 
redundant configuration, and some are not highly 
critical for operation which means operation could 
potentially tolerate a higher failure rate on these, in 
case a simple reset would clean the situation). 
• To organize component tests only to get the real 
sensitivity on the selected devices 
• To evaluate cost, manpower and possible sub-part 
redesign and propose some pin-to-pin replacement 
boards or modules to be ready in case of. 
• Not to test the whole power converter for same 
reasons as described above. 
 
Global approach proposed above would then lead to 
this situation 
On CERN-Design converter or sub-systems: 
• TE-EPC can be well prepared and can be proactive 
to limit the troubles for operation. 
• TE-EPC can organize the re-design of some cards 
with current manpower 
• Crash programs are still possible in case unexpected 
troubles occur. 
 
On external-Design converters: 
• Situation will always be a lot more critical, since all 
mitigation redesign of any card or sub-system will 
take time and require more manpower (additional 
retro-engineering work). 
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• Since they are medium and high current converters, 
their criticality is assumed to be very high for 
operation. 
• Even if some issues can be cured before they perturb 
converter operation, based on an analytical review of 
all possible sensitive components, the risk is not 
entirely covered since not all power converter 
components will be tested, and therefore the status of 
the power converter will only be discovered through 
LHC operation failure events.  
• Only limited cost and limited manpower are required 
since redesign action will be limited to the known 
components., but real needs still to be quantified 
following the review outputs,  
 
Proposing a more secure plan will definitively require a 
total power converter redesign, which has to be made at 
CERN (current experience shows that all CERN-Design 
are manageable while external design projects are a lot 
more complex to manage). Choosing this option would 
implicate to redesign both 600A-10V and 4-6-8kA-08V to 
get a coherent result with regards to potential risks. Such 
a choice is tremendous in term of manpower (4 man x 
year per project, not counting the required radiation test 
on all components to be used in the new design). 
CONCLUSION 
A pragmatic approach is proposed, based on test of the 
small size converters and analytic analysis of bigger ones. 
Some tests will be performed on some specific devices for 
big size power converters only. 
This approach can leave some open points untreated 
since an analytical-only approach can not be compared 
with a full test approach; on the other hand, this approach 
still seems realistic even if it surely requires substantial 
money and manpower. 
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The WorldFIP fieldbus was chosen to cover communi-
cation needs of critical LHC systems needing determin-
ism and radiation tolerance. WorldFIP slaves use the Mi-
croFIP chip produced by Alstom along with the FielDrive
transceiver and associated magnetics. After Alstom an-
nounced a progressive decline in support of WorldFIP tech-
nology, BE-CO decided to start a technology in-sourcing
program in order to guarantee local support of this strate-
gic technology during the lifetime of LHC. The first phase
of this program consists in designing an FPGA-based al-
ternative to MicroFIP, called NanoFIP. In addition, the last
generation of MicroFIP chips was manufactured using a
newer process with reduced feature sizes and there are se-
rious concerns about its radiation tolerance. The NanoFIP
development is therefore now considered a critical part in
the global strategy of providing a radiation-tolerant solu-
tion to WorldFIP users. This paper presents a status of the
NanoFIP project, as well as long-term plans for the overall
WorldFIP technology insourcing in BE-CO.
INTRODUCTION
The WorldFIP fieldbus is a strategic ingredient in the
control and data acquisition for many critical subsystems in
the LHC, including cryogenics, power converters, quench
protection and beam position monitors. It was chosen
as one of the three recommended fieldbusses in the LHC
mainly for two reasons:
• Determinism is ensured by the fact that access to the
medium is arbitrated by a master node. Slave nodes
only speak when requested by the master. This guar-
antees that, with appropriate planning, worst-case de-
lays in message transmission will not result in missed
hard real-time deadlines.
• The first-generation slave chipset performed quite
well during radiation tests. This chipset includes
the MicroFIP – where all logic resides – and the
FielDrive, a bus driver to interface with the magnet-
ics that are connected to the multi-drop bus.
Radiation resistance is of critical importance in view of
the latest results of the simulation for radiation conditions
in LHC. Unfortunately, the latest generation of MicroFIPs
coming from industry have been manufactured using a
more modern process and their radiation tolerance has been
diminished.
The organisation so far concerning WorldFIP-related ac-
tivities at CERN includes three main actors:
• Alstom is a technology provider, selling a number of
chips and complete cards, such as the PCI card used
as a master for most of the WorldFIP segments.
• BE-CO-FE organises cabling, monitoring and devel-
ops software for some of the systems. In addition, they
have a coordinating role and a privileged relationship
with the technology providers.
• Equipment groups develop systems based on technol-
ogy they buy from Alstom and rely on BE-CO-FE for
installation, qualification and general coordination.
Alstom has announced they will be gradually reducing
support of the WorldFIP technology in the coming years.
Taken into account that this happens at a time where there
are increasing concerns about the radiation hardness of the
new generation of MicroFIPs, it has been decided to in-
source the Alstom WorldFIP technology at CERN. This in-
sourcing effort will have two staged goals. In a first phase,
a rad-hard replacement of the MicroFIP has to be designed
and provided with adequate support to equipment groups.
A second phase will target complete replacement of Al-
stom as a technology provider by BE-CO-HT. This has
to include chips and cards to a degree sufficient to ensure
smooth running of LHC subsystems during their lifetime.
In 2009, the test campaigns conducted in the CNGS fa-
cility have provided more evidence that the insourcing de-
cision was right. As WorldFIP slaves always come with a
combination of a MicroFIP and FielDrive chips, there were
tests setup to discriminate between these two possible cul-
prits for SEU-related problems. A Cu-Cu repeater contain-
ing just two FielDrives and a flash-based FPGA succeeded
in the tests without problems, pointing at the new genera-
tion of MicroFIPs as the cause of the observed failures in
previous tests. In addition, the nature of the observed fail-
ures pointed in the same direction. In particular, the sce-
nario in which a system sends erroneous frames cannot be
attributed to a problem in the FielDrive.
THE NANOFIP PROJECT
To tackle the first of the two goals of the insourcing, the
NanoFIP project [1] was launched. The goal is to provide
an FPGA-based replacement for the MicroFIP as quickly
as possible. The project went through a phase of require-
ments gathering and technical specifications writing during
the first half of 2009, and is currently in the implementation
phase, with results expected during 2010. The specification
phase was driven by an effort to find the features users re-
ally needed from the MicroFIP, and drop the rest in the in-
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
202
terest of simplification and ultimately radiation-tolerance.
The resulting feature set is in most respects a subset of
MicroFIP functionality, hence the name NanoFIP, and this
new solution is neither hardware nor software compatible
with the MicroFIP. The results of the project will be usable
in two ways:
• One can take the Wishbone-compliant NanoFIP
VHDL core and instantiate it into a larger design in-
cluding application-specific logic. Then radiation test-
ing will have to be performed on the whole resulting
system under the responsibility of the user.
• Another option is to use a fully radiation-tested FPGA
containing the NanoFIP and nothing else. This has the
advantage for the user that the radiation-tolerance of
that part is guaranteed.
OTHER OPTIONS
If strict compatibility with the MicroFIP is required, both
at the functional and device packaging level, then an ASIC
type of solution would be needed. While preliminary con-
tacts with PH-ESE seem to indicate that this option is not
impossible, many open questions remain, so at this point
in time the NanoFIP is the agreed, endorsed and official
deliverable for this phase of the insourcing project. The
potential advantages of a one-to-one replacement of Mi-
croFIP, dubbed MicroFIP3, include the possibility of leav-
ing some of the current PCB designs and software inter-
faces untouched, which would be an important issue for
some of the equipment groups. The possibility of a collab-
oration with PH-ESE for a MicroFIP3 is currently being
discussed.
CONCLUSIONS
This talk was required to answer the question of whether
the WorldFIP bus can be made rad-hard during the lifetime
of LHC. The answer is ’yes’, provided a certain amount of
effort is put in the design of a replacement for the MicroFIP
chip. The NanoFIP project is well underway and will result
in an FPGA-based solution that fulfils all needs of current
users. Other options and strategies for other components
currently supported by Alstom will be considered in the
future and with a different time scale.
REFERENCES
[1] CernFIP Project website, see http://www.ohwr.org.
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Summary of the 2009 irradiation tests and perspectives for future tests and
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Abstract
Numerous radiation tests were performed during 2009,
both directly at CERN in CNGS, as well as at various out-
side facilities. This presentation gives an overview of the
test results by putting them in contrast to expected radiation
levels in the exposed areas. By applying a best guess scal-
ing of the expected development of the respective LHC ra-
diation levels, failure rates can be estimated for both short-
medium- and long-term LHC operation. Based on this, the
most critical systems and mitigation options are investi-
gated. Furthermore, future test requirements are compared
to the availability and characteristic of existing test facili-
ties.
INTRODUCTION
The electronic systems in the LHC tunnel and other un-
derground areas will suffer from radiation induced ageing
and single event effects during the operation of the acceler-
ator due to various beam loss mechanisms.
In order to estimate the risk for the machine operation
and safety, three types of information have to be known.
The failure mode(s) of the device, the failure cross section
or level at which it occurs in case of cumulative effects and
the expected radiation level [4] at the installation point.
Most of the electronics systems located in the LHC tun-
nel and only few systems from the LHC alcoves were tested
in the CNGS TSG4 area and in various external facilities in
2009. These tests provide the data on the sensitivities of the
devices as well as the likely failure modes. The resulting
numbers are combined with the Fluka simulations of the
radiation levels together with the expected operational sce-
narios.
TEST AREAS IN THE SIDE GALLERY OF
CNGS
The side gallery TSG4 beside the CNGS experiment
cavern is used as the test facility for the radiation tolerance
of the LHC electronics systems. The area was liberated in
2007 after many radiation induced failures of the electron-
ics, which is vital to the operation of CNGS.
Intense radiation showers are produced mainly in the
graphite target, horn and reflector of the CNGS exper-
iment during fast extraction from SPS. These showers
stream through the ventilation ducts connecting the TSG4
to the target chamber. Areas around two neighboring ducts
∗ daniel.kramer@cern.ch
(TSG45 and TSG46) are used as tests sites equipped with
online radiation monitoring and extensive signal connec-
tivity grouped into 4 test stations. The cables are laid up to
the CNGS control room, which is about 1.5km away. The
data acquisition and control systems of the test setups are
located in this room.
Calibration
Thanks to the excellent beam stability throughout the
year, the accumulated radiation levels are scaling linearly
with the integrated number of protons on the target (pot).
The radiation levels are measured by the RadMon de-
tectors. Each position, where electronics is being tested,
was measured either with the RadMon mother box, which
measures TID and high energy hadron fluence or with the
deported unit if the dose rate is too high. The deported
unit measures TID and 1MeV neutron eq. fluence. The re-
maining value is extrapolated using the simulated fluence
to dose ratios.
The fluence of hadrons above 20MeV is measured with
SRAM memories in the RadMon. The values measured in
the line of sight of the ducts are in a very good agreement
with the Fluka simulations. The measurements behind the
corners start to deviate because of a small sensitivity of the
memories to thermal neutrons (about 10 times lower at the
nominal voltage). The dose and 1MeV n eq. fluence are
measured with RadFets and PIN diodes respectively.
Radiation levels
The hottest spot in the TSG46 test area exhibits
3.3Gy(Si)/week assuming 1e18pot/week. The high energy
hadron fluence at this location is 1.8·1010cm−2/week. The
radiation fields around TSG45 are about 10 times higher
than for TSG46. The maximum dose is 28Gy(Si)/week and
1.9 · 1011cm−2/week. This is equivalent to about 3 years
of nominal beam operation along an ARC dipole.
TEST RESULTS AND MITIGATION
OPTIONS
In case of failures produced by Single Event Errors
(SEE) the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is calcu-
lated by the combination of the cross section and the ex-
pected radiation levels. The result has to be divided by
the total number of devices. The time to repair is assumed
as zero. The failure cross section is simply the number of
detected errors divided by the accumulated hadron fluence
above 20MeV.
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The device lifetime is calculated for the case of errors
caused by cumulative radiation effects.
Assumptions
The failure rates and lifetimes are estimated for both the
initial operation period in 2010 and for the nominal opera-
tion.
The 2010 operation scenario is assuming 0.5fb−1 of in-
tegrated luminosity and 200 days of operation. The tunnel
losses are assumed as 1/40th of nominal, which is a rather
conservative number. Energy scaling is not considered.
The nominal operation is assumed with 100 fb−1 per
year and 1015molec/m3 for the rest gas in the ARCs.
Due to the calibration uncertainties, large gradients and
large volumes of tested electronics a safety factor of at least
2 should be applied to the measured radiation levels. For
the MTBF estimation, the total number of devices is as-
sumed as placed in the worst actual location, which pro-
duces a safety factor greater than 2.
Cryo - tunnel electronics
The cryo electronics located in the tunnel was designed
with radiation as a constraint and the CNGS test results are
excellent.
In total 58 channels were tested together with several
WorldFip cards and power supplies.
No errors were observed and the test was stopped at
500 Gy(Si) with the cards fully functional. The upper limit
on the cross section was calculated assuming 1 error on a
single channel. The cards with 9500 channels in total are
installed under the MBBs in the ARCs (< 1Gy/y nomi-
nal), while several cards are located in the DS up to MBB
8 (40 Gy/y).
Table 1: cryo tunnel cards
measurement MTBF/lifetime
cross section 5 · 10−15 cm2 > 5.2 y nominal
> 200 y 2010
TID > 500Gy(Si) > 500/12 y(DS)
Cryo - alcoves
The AC supply of the QRL heater (45 in LHC) and Insu-
lated temperature conditioners (2400 in LHC) were tested.
The supply failed very soon, but shielding will help to mit-
igate in the UJs (relocation could be needed in 1st floor of
UJ56). The heaters are required only during the cool down
of the LHC. The conditioners are OK for TID but suffer
from SEEs in the digital isolator. The errors are mitigated
through an automatic reset via the WorldFip interface.
Table 2: cryo cards in alcoves
QRL heater measurement lifetime
TID 10Gy(Si) 2 y nominal
400 y 2010
Conditioner measurement lifetime/MTBF
TID 140Gy(Si) 28 y nominal
cross section 2 · 10−9 cm2 0.2 h nominal
1.7 days 2010
Interlock Controllers
The two types of XILINX CPLDs used in the interlock
controllers were tested in CNGS.
The XC9500XL part is powered at 3.3V and is used in
the signal path of the Beam Interlock Controller. This de-
vice has a very high cross section, but the 36 concerned
systems are installed in relatively low radiation areas (i.e.
UA87,23). In 80% of cases the SEE leads to a false dump
but in 20% of the cases, the crate fails in an unsafe way
(blind to incoming dump request). Nevertheless, the risk
for the machine is marginal thanks to the redundancy of
the system. The shielding of the concerned areas should
considerably decrease the risk.
Table 3: CPLD test for interlock controllers
BIS controllers (CPLD at 3.3V)
SEE cross section 2.8 · 10−10 cm2
MTBF redundancy loss 10 y nominal
MTBF false dump 2.5 y nominal
BIC/PIC (CPLD at 5V)
SEE cross section 3.8 · 10−13 cm2
MTBF monitoring problem 8 y nominal
MTBF false dump 72 y nominal
The XC9500 CPLD is powered at 5V and is a part of
the monitoring paths in the power interlock controllers (36
in LHC) and the BIC CIBUs (300 mostly in RRs). The
measured failure cross section is very small. 90% of the
SEEs cause only a monitoring problem and the remaining
percentage issues a false dump. Given the low failure rate,
no mitigation is needed.
The CPLDs can be subject to destructive Single Event
Latchups (SEL) as observed in CNGS in 2008 and con-
firmed by recent heavy ion tests[1]. Nevertheless, the prob-
ability of such event in shielded environments should be
very low, as high energy hadrons are required (i.e. no SEL
observed with 60MeV p+ beam[3]).
BLM tunnel electronics
The BLM tunnel card (BLECF) was designed with radia-
tion as a constraint. Two types of handmade power supplies
located in the RRs were also tested (Haltec 2.5 and 5V).
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The power supplies failed after more than 30Gy(Si)
which results in more than 30 years of lifetime in the RRs.
Only one SEFI (single event functional interrupt) was
observed during the whole irradiation period. The fault is-
sued a false dump and a remote reset via the HV line was
required. An ionisation chamber was connected to the card
to constantly verify the functionality of the system.
Table 4: BLM tunnel card and power supplies
Haltec power supplies (2.5/3V)
TID 85/33 Gy(Si)
lifetime in RRs 85/33 y nominal
BLECF tunnel card
SEE cross section 1.9 · 10−13 cm2
MTBF false dump 44 days nominal
MTBF false dump 8.8 y 2010
TID 750 Gy(Si)
lifetime under MQ 75 y nominal
BPM tunnel cards
Two samples of the WBTN tunnel cards (2160 in LHC)
which are located under the MQs in the ARCs were tested
in CNGS together with Intensity cards (330x in LHC),
WorldFip cards and power supplies.
The intensity card failed (probably due to a hard SEE)
very soon, which brought its output out of range. The card
is anyway required only for the initial commissioning of
LHC at low intensities, so its failure will not impact on the
later operation. For the calculation, the failure is assumed
as cumulative effect.
Table 5: BPM and intensity cards and power supply
WBTN, power supply, WorldFip
TID > 230Gy(Si)
lifetime under MQ > 23 y nominal
Intensity card [if cumul eff.]
TID 4Gy(Si)
lifetime under MQ 0.4 y nominal
lifetime under MQ 16 y 2010
Intensity card [if hard SEE]
SEE cross section 4 · 10−11 cm2
MTBF 0.4 days nominal
MTBF 15 days 2010
WorldFip card
SEE cross section 4 · 10−12 cm2
MTBF calib. lost 3.8 days nominal
MTBF calib. lost 152 days 2010
The WorldFip card has a moderate sensitivity to SEE,
in which case the WBTN card looses the calibration and
switches to a high gain state. Thus the worst possible error
is 250µm offset for 1 minute. This offset can be automati-
cally masked by the beam orbit feedback system.
The test was stopped when 230Gy were accumulated
and the WBTN cards including the power supply were still
functional and no errors were observed.
nQPS
The new QPS layer electronics of type DQAMGS (450
cards under MBBs in ARCs) was tested at CNGS in 2009
together with power supplies behind a corner at TSG46.
The cards use the new batch of the µFipTM and
FieldDriveTM WorldFipTM communication chips, which
have a high SEE cross section. In case of error, the su-
pervision path is frozen and an access is required prior to
next fill to restart the card. The total dose resistance of the
cards was not tested in CNGS and the detailed evaluation
of the results still has to be done.
A temporary hardware solution was found to mitigate
the SEE problem. It consists in regular resets of the µFipTM
chip, which is not influencing the operation of the card. The
solution was validated in CNGS and will be implemented
as soon as the errors start to appear in the system.
Table 6: nQPS tunnel cards
DQAMGS tunnel card
SEE cross section 2.8 · 10−10 cm2
MTBF blocked supervision 10 h nominal
MTBF blocked supervision 16 d 2010
CL heaters
The Current Lead (CL) heater system (408 devices in
UJs and RRs) is measuring the temperature of the top of the
CL and turns on a heating via a solid state relay to prevent
the formation of ice when the current is too low i.e. after a
dump. 7 commercial regulators together with several relays
were tested in CNGS at low dose rate behind a corner in
TSG46.
Table 7: CL heater regulators
SEE cross section 2 · 10−11 cm2
MTBF broken regulator 5 days nominal
MTBF broken regulator 5 years 2010
The regulators have an elevated susceptibility to destruc-
tive single events. In case of such event the card has to be
replaced otherwise the ”CryoStart” is most likely removed.
The system relies on shielding for the nominal operation.
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WorldFipTM repeaters
Two samples of the Cu-Cu repeaters from the LHC tun-
nel (320 units on the cable trays in ARCs) were tested in
CNGS in 2009 at high dose rate in TSG45.
One device failed after 165Gy(Si), while the second ac-
cumulated 250Gy and remained functional. The analysis
found a too large drift in an auxiliary circuit, which caused
the malfunction of the device. The annual dose in the ARCs
is conservatively assumed alongside the dipoles and the re-
sulting lifetime is satisfactory.
Table 8: Cu-Cu WorldFipTM Repeaters
TID (2 samples) 165 / > 250Gy(Si)
lifetime 16 years nominal
Power Converters
The Generic Function Generator Controller (FGC - 189
units in UJs and 256 in RRs) of the power converters (PC)
was tested together with the COD (752 units of 60 A orbit
correctors under MBBs) version of the FGC in a high dose
rate area of TSG45 in CNGS. A prototype high precision
card SD360 was tested as well.
The memories of the FGC are protected by EDAC and
have shown no problems. There were however several un-
explained system crashes, which required a power cycle.
The most likely cause is a non destructive half-SEL in the
CPLD (or an SEU in registers). All the crashes occurred
only at relatively low fluence. If the total fluence was con-
sidered, the MTBF would increase by almost a factor 4.
The FGCs in the alcoves will have to profit from en-
hanced shielding, which is not possible for the tunnel sys-
tems. But the PCs of the correctors are redundant and a
crash of one doesn’t lead to a beam dump in contrary to the
generic FGC. All the FGCs have a remote reset capability,
however in case a SEL occurs in the voltage source, the
power cycle has to be done in-situ.
Table 9: FGCs of Power Converter systems
TID 100 Gy(Si)
lifetime in UJs/ARC 100/20 y nominal
SEE cross section 2.3 · 10−11 cm2
MTBF 1.8 days nominal
MTBF 72 days 2010
The prototype card SD360 exhibited no errors during the
test, so it is a potential candidate for the replacement of the
SD350 containing the SPARTANTM FPGA, which is very
sensitive to SEEs.
Survey
There are 6 controller crates for the Survey system in-
stalled in UJ56 and one was tested in CNGS in 2009 in the
high dose rate environment of TSG45.
The system failed after 100Gy(Si) which is satisfactory
for UJ56. There were several crashes of the system most
likely due to an SEE in the µFipTMchip. As the system is
not critical, no dump will be issued and only a remote reset
is required.
Table 10: Survey controller crate
TID 100 Gy(Si)
lifetime in UJ56 20 y nominal
SEE cross section 8 · 10−12 cm2
MTBF 4 years nominal
The crate in UJ56 contains also the triplet motor driver
electronics and its radiation tolerance should be studied as
well.
TESTS IN EXTERNAL FACILITIES
There were several component or system tests performed
in outside irradiation facilities in 2009 and coordinated
through RadWG [5].
The PSI 60 and 250 MeV proton beams have a relatively
good availability and were used for
• nQPS components tests
• Siemens remote I/Os of the Warm Interlock Con-
trollers
• calibrations of the RadMon detectors
The CEA Valduc [8] facility offers a 1MeV neutron
field from an air cooled 235U Prospero reactor and 14 or
2.5 MeV high intensity beams in the SAMES accelerator.
The facilities were used for the tests of
• the BLM tunnel cards
• the CRYO tunnel cards
• the calibration of the RadMon hadron counters
The heavy ion tests of the Xilinx CPLD were performed
in UCL [7] in order to determine the latchup cross-sections.
The epithermal neutron reactor beam in NRI [9] was
used for the thermal neutron tests for
• the RadMon hadron counter calibration
• WorldFip Cu-Cu repeater SEE test
The RadMon detectors were calibrated with a very pre-
cise low dose rate 60Co source in IRA [10] Lausanne.
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Possible future facilities
The CNGS TSG4 radiation facility was found to be very
useful for the system tests of the LHC electronics. The
doses to the personnel during the interventions are very low
and certainly much smaller than in the former TCC2 facil-
ity.
In case if the facility cannot handle the future test de-
mands, a similar facility could be set up in the HiRadMat
test area. Another option is the n TOF facility where a
mixed field test area could be set up close to the target and
a low flux neutron beam area could be available upstream
of the experimental area for small devices.
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CONCLUSIONS
Most of the electronics systems located in the LHC tun-
nel and only few systems from the LHC alcoves were tested
in the CNGS TSG4 area and in various external facilities in
2009.
The overview of the results from the CNGS campaign
was presented and put in contrast to the expected radia-
tion levels in the exposed areas. By applying a best guess
scaling of the expected development of the respective LHC
radiation levels, failure rates were estimated for both the
initial operation in 2010 and for the nominal operation.
The errors resulting from cumulative effects were trans-
lated into the device lifetime estimations. The statistics of
the single event errors was translated into the correspond-
ing failure rates taking into account the total number of de-
vices in the critical areas. Mitigation actions were iden-
tified for the systems with too low lifetime or high fail-
ure rate. Many systems will profit from the radiation level
reduction thanks to the foreseen shielding to extend their
lifetime beyond 20 years. Several groups implemented
firmware or hardware modifications mostly allowing for
automatic resets.
Many systems suffer from the WorldFIP client card er-
rors, which aggravated by at least two orders for the new
batch used in the nQPS layer. The mitigation of the SEE
induced crashes of the FGC in the power converters should
be further studied. The tests in CNGS TSG4 will continue
in 2010 and will include mostly the potentially very sen-
sitive systems from the LHC alcoves. At the same time
many test facilities are available outside CERN for compo-
nent or system tests. If necessary, n TOF and HiRadMat
could provide dedicated electronics test areas, however the
respective need would have to be brought forward in the
RadWG.
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EXPERIENCE WITH THE ATLAS RADIATION TOLERANCE POLICY 
F. Anghinolfi, Ph. Farthouat 
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
Abstract 
ATLAS, as the other experiments, had to take into 
account the radiation effect on the electronics installed in 
the experimental cavern. It appeared very rapidly that 
putting in place a formal policy, based on constraints 
evaluation, standardised test procedures and reviews 
would help in getting sufficiently radiation hard 
electronics systems.  
INTRODUCTION 
The radiation constraints in ATLAS are very different 
for the electronics involved in the inner tracker than for 
the electronics located in the muon spectrometer or at the 
periphery of the detector on services balconies. For ten 
year operation at nominal luminosity, total ionising dose 
(TID) ranges from 1MGy to 7kGy while non ionising 
energy loss (NIEL) ranges from 2 1015 n.cm-2 to 2 1010. 
The radiation levels were such in the tracker that the 
problem was taken into account in the very early phases 
of the designs as full custom electronics was needed and 
only a few radiation hard processes were available at that 
time. As of 1996, warning were addressed to those 
designing electronics for the calorimeters and the muon 
spectrometer and a very crude policy had been defined. 
At the same time RD49 was launched with the aims of 
studying the radiation tolerance of ASICs for LHC 
(leading to the development of special lay-out techniques 
for deep sub-micron technologies) and of coordinating the 
selection, evaluation and procurement of Commercial-
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components. However this was 
not sufficient to enforce good practices in the experiment 
and a formal policy was put in place. 
POLICY DEFINITION 
The goal of this policy is to obtain a good reliability 
with respect to radiation. The estimated lifetime of the 
components must cover the foreseen lifetime of the 
experiment or at least a large fraction of it. The rates of 
transient or destructive Single Event Effects (SEE) must 
be acceptable. The safety systems must remains always 
functional. All sub-systems had to follow the same rules 
and the tests to be performed were defined and based on 
recognised test methods (e.g. US-DOD MIL-STD-883E, 
ESE SCC basic spec. 22900 and 25100). 
The policy [1,2] defines a strategy for components 
procurement, the radiation tolerance criteria’s to be 
applied and the radiation test methods. It also provides a 
list of radiation facilities and some standard test report 
forms. The most important message is that every single 
component or system must be tested against radiation. 
Procurement of components 
It is important to take into account the radiation 
constraints early enough in the design phase and in 
particular to use components which are radiation hard 
enough.  
The first step will consist in testing pre-selected 
(generic) components. The design will be done with those 
components. At the time of production the components 
will preferably be procured from single fabrication lots. In 
any case a sample of components bought for production 
will be tested.  
Determination of the radiation tolerance 
criteria 
The radiation constraints to be defined are:  
-Total Ionising Dose (TID, unit: Gray);  
-Non-Ionising Energy Loss (NIEL, unit: 1 MeV 
equivalent neutron per cm2);  
-Total fluence of hadrons having an energy higher than 
20 MeV (unit: hadron per cm2) and which are esponsible 
for various Single Event Effects (SEE). 
These radiation constraints have been simulated using 
GCALOR and FLUKA, for the various locations of 
electronics in each ATLAS Sub-systems.  
Inaccuracies in the simulations result from inaccuracies 
in the event generation models, in the transport models 
and in the physical description of the detector, and from 
limited statistics (especially in the external regions of the 
detector). Some safety factors had to be applied to the 
simulated and are ranging from 1.5 to 5 depending on the 
type of radiation and location in the experiment. 
Low dose rate effect can increase the damage produced 
by TID on CMOS, JFET or bipolar devices when 
irradiation is applied at low rate. This effect increases 
when the dose rate decreases; it becomes significant for 
dose rates below about 0.01 rad/s, depending on the 
technology [3,4]. The dose rate effect can be taken into 
account during the test by annealing at high temperature. 
If this is not been done during the tests, a safety factor 
should be applied on the TID constraint. 
When using COTS, variation of radiation tolerance 
from batch to batch may result from process or equipment 
changes which do not affect the electrical features but 
which could degrade uncontrolled parameters such as 
radiation tolerance in standard technologies. In case the 
qualification of batches could not be done, a safety factor 
had to be applied on TID and NIEL constraints. 
Test procedures and radiation facilities 
Test methods, derived from DOD or ESA test methods 
[5-7] for CMOS devices and from ref. [8] for bipolar or 
BiCMOS devices were defined.  They include an optional 
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accelerated ageing that simulates the increase in damage 
produced by TID applied at low dose rate.  
Based on [9], protons with an energy comprised 
between 60 MeV and 200 MeV enable seeking soft SEE 
as well as most of the hard and destructive SEEs. Latch-
up or destructive events lead to the discard of the device. 
Only radiation facilities providing a good dosimetry 
can be used. 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLICY AND 
EXPERIENCE 
This very strict policy has generated a substantial 
amount of work and also a substantial amount of 
complains… 
It has been essential to have a dedicated person to the 
subject following the work done in the different sub-
detector groups, giving advices and making sure the tests 
were properly done.  
It has also been essential to get the support of the 
ATLAS management and to have the policy as an official 
ATLAS document. 
The question of radiation hardness was specifically 
addressed during the review process. 
Some actions were taken and tools put in place to make 
the people aware of the problems and to help them in their 
work. Tutorial sessions were done, common irradiation 
campaigns were organised, tools to compute the radiation 
constraint in any place of the experiment were developed 
(see 
http://atlas.web.cern.ch/Atlas/GROUPS/FRONTEND/rad
hard.htm#Radiation%20Constraints) and a data base to 
store the tests results. This data base was then extended to 
RD49. However the amount of available data is limited 
and its relevance is very often limited in time. (see 
https://oraweb.cern.ch/pls/RADHARDCOMPS/radhardco
mps_public.frames). 
Radiation hardness has proven to be a real burden and a 
lot of modifications in designs had to be done. A good 
example is what happened for the liquid argon 
calorimeter readout electronics. The initial design 
included a lot of COTS that proved to be marginal in 
terms of radiation hardness. Ten  ASICs in either DMILL 
or 0.25µm CMOS technology had to be developed.  
 
ARE WE SAFE? 
We have some knowledge of how the different 
electronic systems will react to radiation. However there 
are still some uncertainties and worries.  
The main  uncertainty concerns the simulation. How 
accurate, pessimistic or optimistic have we been? The 
next months of running will probably give some answers 
to these questions.  
In terms of total dose we are probably safe for a while 
and in addition total dose effects are not appearing as 
sudden failures and replacement of some components can 
be done.  
The situation is slightly different for the SEE. The 
effects were measured and there is a knowledge of the 
failure frequency. However, the measurements give only 
some limits and it has not always been possible to make 
tests with a lot of components to increase the statistics. 
Counter measures have been implemented (triple 
redundancy, redundancy in DC-DC converters,…) and an 
SEE should only lead to the loss of a small fraction of the 
detector for a small period of time. However this will 
haven to be verified. 
We can still have unexpected effects. One of them 
concerns the role of thermal neutron. It was discovered 
that the bipolar devices of one radiation hard technology 
is extremely sensitive to thermal neutron (when NIEL 
effects are tested with 1MeV neutrons). Recently we 
learnt that under certain conditions [10] these thermal 
neutrons can generate SEE. We have only taken into 
account hadrons of more than 20MeV energy for the SEE 
estimation and the amount of thermal neutrons is orders 
of magnitude higher. 
CONCL USION 
ATLAS had defined a formal policy on radiation 
tolerant electronics which defined tests and procurement 
procedures. To be enforced it required support from the 
ATLAS management and the dedication of one person to 
it. Specific actions and tools were taken and put in place. 
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WHERE ARE WE WITH THE LONG-TERM PLANS AND THE CERN-
WIDE RADIATION POLICY 
R. Losito, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
Abstract 
The different options for the long term consolidation 
plan are presented, which should ensure that the risk of 
SEE in control electronics installed in the LHC is 
minimized. The plan will imply full (or partly) relocation 
of the installed electronics for some locations like US85 
or UJ56 and UJ76, additional shielding in different areas 
where relocation is not convenient and may imply major 
civil engineering for Point 1 and Point 5. The possibility 
to avoid some of this heavy works by modifying the loss 
pattern or by redesigning some of the control systems to 
be radiation tolerant will be summarized for the major 
systems. Finally, the basic principles to be fixed in a 
CERN wide radiation policy at CERN will be proposed, 
with the aim of ensuring that we will never in the future 
be obliged again to consolidate further exposed 
underground installations. 
CONSOLIDATION PLAN 
Scope and objectives 
In order to achieve a successful consolidation it is 
important to fix precisely its objective. Specifically we 
need to fix a radiation level that can be considered safe 
for electronics that is not proved to be radiation tolerant, 
and then develop a strategy to either reduce radiation 
levels in the underground areas below that limit, or to 
impose to the systems installed a strict policy to ensure 
radiation tolerance at the level to which they are exposed. 
Estimating the MTBF due to radiation damage of 
electronics for the LHC machine at any level of radiation 
is impossible, due to the fact that too many electronic 
systems are installed in areas exposed to radiation and 
that it will be impossible to measure the sensitivity of all 
of them. 
Apart from electronics installed directly in the tunnel 
and in UJ56, where total Ionization Dose (TID) and 
Displacement Damage from Non Ionising Energy Loss 
(NIEL) may represents a serious issue, the main risk for 
exposure of electronics to radiation in the LHC 
underground areas comes from stochastic effects (Single 
Event Effects - SEE).   
For this reason the limit fixed by the Radiation To 
Electronics (R2E) study group should not be intended as 
an absolute value below which there is no risk of 
occurrence of SEE, but rather as the upper value for 
which normally a single non rad-hard electronic device, 
either Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) or Custom 
designed has good chances to have an MTBF well above 
one year. It cannot be excluded that very sensitive 
electronics may present dramatic failures already at this 
level, but R2E considered that the number of equipments 
presenting this risk is rather limited and a workaround in 
case of problems can be found in a reasonable time. 
Reducing further the limit to come close to the yearly  
value  normally registered at ground level (~105 
hadrons/cm2) would represent an investment well beyond 
what is reasonable. The consolidation program described 
below however aims at minimising the number of 
equipment exposed by relocating those for which no 
radiation tolerance data is available in properly shielded 
areas. For a more detailed discussion on the choice of the 
limit see ref. [1]. For the purpose of this paper it is 
sufficient to know that in the LHC we will aim at 
reducing the annual fluence of high energy hadrons 
(>20 MeV) below 107 hadrons/cm2 for every year (200 
days) at nominal luminosity and intensity. Where this is 
not possible (e.g. RRs, some of the UJs) we propose 
either the relocation of equipment or its replacement with 
radiation tolerant equipment to be designed on purpose. 
Can we displace losses? 
It has not been possible yet to study in details the 
possibility to displace losses in the machine by e.g. 
moving collimators. A study was conducted in 2008 by 
R. Assmann and his team to temporarily move the 
betatron cleaning from IR7 to IR3. This option would be 
extremely attractive if it was possible to implement it as a 
long term solution, but today this is not envisaged. 
Moreover, as presented in 2008 it will imply a further 
limitation by a factor 2 in intensity and use some of the 
positions reserved for phase 2 collimators, spoiling 
therefore the objective to increase the intensity to nominal 
within a few years. Further ideas to reduce the losses in 
other areas by changing the operational scenario could not 
unfortunately be found. 
The strategy to follow to reduce the risk has therefore 
to rely on more pragmatic actions: 
• Shielding 
• Relocation to safe areas 
• Creation of new safe areas 
• Redesign of some of the critical systems 
In the following paragraph the possible scenario to 
mitigate the risk in each of the exposed underground area 
will be presented. 
  
Equipment installed in the tunnel 
The LHC paradox consists in the fact that all the 
equipments directly installed in the tunnel and that are 
therefore the ones exposed to the highest doses and 
fluencies, are also those that can be considered safer for 
tolerance to SEE. This is because the tunnel was the only 
area that had been clearly identified as critical for 
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radiation and therefore appropriate actions in terms of 
design, procurement of components and irradiation test 
were taken in due time. The most relevant systems 
concerned are: QPS, Power converters, Beam Loss 
monitors, Beam Position Monitors, some cryogenic 
monitoring devices, Warm Magnet Interlocks (in the 
transfer lines). All those equipment have been tested in 
the CNGS facilities or in TCC2 and they either survived 
the radiation level specified for the tunnel or the problems 
are understood and a workaround is being found. No 
interference with operation in 2010 and beyond is 
expected.  
In the long term a serious concern might come from the 
FIP communication cards installed in Power converters 
and QPS. In fact while the old chip provided by Alstom as 
FIP client had been selected for its radiation hardness and 
proved to work well in several irradiation tests, its new 
version (so-called microFIP) is much less tolerant and 
cannot be used as such in the tunnel. The new QPS 
system that includes the MicroFIP chip in its design had 
to provide a workaround to reset the chip when a SEE 
occurs. In this case a SEE affects only the monitoring of 
QPS parameters and not the safety of the machine [2]. 
However a long term solution is being seeked through the 
insourcing of the WorldFIP technology and the design of 
a new FIP device is now a high priority project for 
BE/CO [3] that coordinates an interdepartmental working 
group to address the problem. 
The safe underground areas 
The equipment installed in the underground areas of 
P2, P3, P4 and P6 are considered safe. In details: 
P2: Following the installation of dedicated shielding in 
UJ23 at the exit of TI2, the initial part of the UA 
where power converters are installed is now below 
the reference limit. 
P3: Levels in UJ33 are well below the reference value. 
UJ32 may become a problem if excessive beam-
gas interaction occurs, however there is sufficient 
room for shielding if necessary. Dedicated 
radiation monitoring has been installed in the area 
and will tell us (in 2011?) whether we need to take 
any action. 
P4: The level of radiation in the cavern will depend 
mainly on beam-gas interaction. With the assumed 
maximum gas density of 1015 molecules/cm3 the 
levels of fluence will remain well below the 
reference value. Radiation monitors have been 
added to verify the assumptions. 
P6: The main source of concern is the radiation 
coming from TCDQ and TCDD that could stream 
through the cable ducts and affect the controls of 
the Beam Dump system. To avoid that, the ducts 
have been filled with iron rods in 2009 therefore 
UA63 and UA67 are now considered safe. 
Dedicated radiation monitoring through 
RADMONs and TLD detectors has been 
implemented to confirm that the intervention has 
effectively solved the problem. 
Early actions to gain time 
In the most exposed areas the radiation levels may 
reach very soon the reference value and therefore affect at 
an early stage the operation of the LHC. At nominal 
conditions, the fluence can reach several 109 hadrons/cm2 
and therefore present a considerable risk for the 
operability of the LHC, probably preventing it 
completely. Solving the problem at the same time in all 
the areas is impossible since this would involve 
considerable financial resources and parallel work in too 
many areas from the equipment groups concerned. A 
pragmatic proposal is therefore to first reduce the 
radiation levels by shielding to the lowest possible level 
in order to push in time the moment where the fluence 
will be equal to the reference value. It has been concluded 
however that one cannot reduce only by shielding the 
radiation levels down to the reference level. The measures 
proposed in this section therefore, apart from the 
relocation in P8, only aim at giving more time to develop 
long term solutions as described in the following 
paragraphs and that may require a minimum of 3 to 4 
years to be implemented. In details we propose: 
• Full relocation of electronics installed in UX85, 
and protection of cryogenic controls by shielding 
in UX85. The integration study is almost 
completed and the action could be performed 
during the next shutdown (the minimum time 
necessary is under study). This action should solve 
completely the problem in P8, pending 
confirmation of the efficiency of the different 
shielding installed through analysis of RADMON 
and RAMSES data during operation and from the 
TLD installed for that purpose. 
• Heavy shielding of UJ14 and UJ16: will allow 
decreasing the radiation levels to about 108 
hadrons/cm2/year (at nominal) and therefore give 
the time to implement a solution for the full 
relocation of all the equipment. 
• Relocation of ODH and Fire detectors everywhere, 
and shutdown of underground access doors 
controls during operation. 
UJ76, RR73 and RR77 
UJ76 has been the first area addressed already in 2008. 
A partial relocation of the most sensitive equipment has 
already been prepared by enlarging the TZ76 and 
installing part of the needed infrastructure. The actual 
relocation will take place in the next long shutdown. At 
the same time it is necessary to further optimize the 
shielding of the safe room, that for its specificity cannot 
be moved from UJ76. 
RR73 and RR77 are very difficult to address. The main 
systems installed there are the 120A and 600A power 
converters which are not radiation tolerant. It is not 
possible to imagine any civil engineering work in surface 
since the RRs are below the urban area of Ferney-Voltaire 
therefore we are left with the following options: 
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• Leave the power converters in place 
the most sensitive parts (the FGC at
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will represent an important workload 
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the radiation performance of the entire
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ready at the earliest in 2013/2014. 
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can be shielded to reduce the annual fluence to 
108 hadrons/cm2, and can therefore be used to host SEE 
tolerant equipment (new power converters?). At the level 
of dose foreseen today without additional shielding (~10 
Gray/year), the materials of electronic systems would 
very quickly degrade for TID effects. 
In conclusion: 
P1: UJs can be shielded to reduce the fluence down to 
108 hadrons/cm2/year at nominal. This is not 
sufficient for standard electronics therefore full 
relocation has to be foreseen. A detailed 
integration study needs to be done, however it is 
probable that by using the space reserved for the 
LHC IR upgrade all the presently installed 
electronics should fit, while a small part (4-6 
kAmp converters) cannot be relocated but can be 
further shielded locally once the UJs are emptied. 
If such a scenario would be accepted, a new 
strategy for the upgrade shall have to be studied. 
This might include new civil engineering works. 
P5: The critical installation is UJ56. There is no 
integration study available today, but a possibility 
is to use PM56 to host all the electronics. A 
detailed integration and safety study has to be 
launched quickly. 
In both points  it will be necessary to create new areas 
in correspondence of the RRs, by major civil engineering 
work. 
With full relocation the underground installation in P1 
and P5 will become extremely crowded, and their 
operability and maintainability may become a concern on 
the long term. A safer and more flexible approach calls for 
further civil engineering works, that would solve at the 
same time all the problems of the approved and future 
upgrades, including eventually the possibility to install 




RADIATION POLICY FOR THE LHC 
MACHINE 
Most of the problems listed in the previous section 
were originated by the lack of consciousness that some of 
the areas foreseen for control electronics were exposed to 
high levels of high energy hadrons even if the total annual 
dose was quite low. When the problem became clear, 
several groups were also missing the know-how necessary 
to quantify their own risk and to prepare an action plan to 
solve eventual problems. While a small team has been 
built in EN-STI to centralise some activities (mainly 
simulation, coordination and testing), a considerable 
effort still remain to be done by every group.  
The policy for the radiation tolerance of electronics in 
the LHC machine proposed in this section aims at helping 
the electronic and controls engineer with guidelines of 
good practice to satisfy all the requirements of the 
underground areas. At the same time, it gives the rules for 
quality assurance, including test procedures to ensure that 
a common approach is used to qualify the exposed 
systems. It is largely inspired by the radiation policy 
adopted by ATLAS [6]. 
The policy will be organised in a main document, 
providing all the definitions and the principles, and then 
in addenda that will give all the information specific to 
the LHC (e.g. limits, procedures, working groups). In this 
way the policy can be adopted as is, if necessary, by other 
projects, installations or experiments, by only adapting 
the addenda. The following sections describe the main 
points that will be detailed in the policy. 
 
Principle “0”: responsibility 
Every equipment owner is responsible for assuring the 
radiation tolerance of its own equipment. It is the 
equipment owner’s responsibility to decide on the best 
strategy to avoid problems (typically he will have to 
decide whether to (re)design or (re)locate at distance his 
system in a safe area). It is the responsibility of the 
Organisation to set-up centralised working groups and 
services to help the equipment owners in this process.  
 
Principle “1”: Knowledge of the environment. 
The radiation fields to which the equipment will be 
exposed have to be understood in order to decide on the 
strategy for a given equipment. In particular the different 
mechanisms of damage that a designer shall take into 
account are defined by the following parameters: 
• Total Ionising Dose (TID): cumulative effect of 
ionising energy loss in the lattice caused by 
coulomb scattering from energetic particles or by 
gamma radiation. It is a quite predictable effect and 
should be tested for equipment exposed to high 
level of dose (> few Grays), typically by exposing 
it to a Co source. Standard electronics normally 
fails at levels starting from few  Grays up to 
hundreds of Grays for rad-tolerant equipment. 
Measured in Grays. 
• Non Ionising Energy Loss (NIEL): caused by 
accumulation of displacement damage in the lattice 
following collision with neutrons or very low 
energy heavy ions. It is a cumulative and 
reproducible (predictable) effect, measured in 
fluence of 1 MeV equivalent neutrons. Can be 
tested in reactors with neutrons at a fixed energy.  
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• Single Event Effects (SEE): stochastic effect 
created by a localised energy deposition from a 
single high energy hadron (>20 MeV). In the last 
years however a certain sensitivity to thermal 
neutrons has been observed, for example in  
devices powered with low voltage (3V) without 
specific precautions. For this reason this 
mechanism is described with two parameters: 
o High energy hadron flux: measured in  
hadrons/cm2; 
o Ratio thermal neutrons vs. High energy 
hadrons flux: dimensionless number that 
provides a figure of merit to decide 
whether to test against sensitivity to 
thermal neutrons. 
The project, or installation responsible, will be 
responsible to provide the values for the above parameters 
via simulations or measurements (for existing 
installations). For the LHC this process will be 
coordinated through the R2E study group, and the 
information made available through the R2E website [7]. 
The equipment owner shall be responsible to evaluate the 
failure rate for a given radiation field and take a decision 
on how to reduce it down to an acceptable level. 
 
Principle “2”: Component selection. 
Radiation levels in the LHC machine are generally 
lower than those found in the detectors. Use of “hard-by-
design” components is generally not a necessity and 
therefore most of the systems that will have to remain in 
radiation areas may use COTS components properly 
selected to resist to a given level of fluence. This section 
will provide guidelines on how to proceed with the 
selection. In practice: 
• Only known (tested) rad-tolerant components shall 
be used.   
• When planning a design, the designer shall acquire 
a sufficient number of components from a same 
batch to ensure that all the components to install 
and all spares come from the same batch.  
• A statistically relevant number of components 
needs to be tested (at least 10). 
• Depending on the level of TID, NIEL and 
>20 MeV to which the component will be exposed 
during operation, perform test to assess each 
relevant parameter. 
 
It is the responsibility of the equipment owner to test 
the components he wants to use, in this process he will be 
supported by the RADWG, while test organisation shall 
be centralised in the EN/STI group. A central 
procurement of the most popular components (e.g. 
FPGAs, CPLDs etc...) is under discussion. 
 
Principle “3”: Classification of systems and 
their reviews. 
While all the systems deserve identical attention from 
the project and equipment owners, it is important to 
establish a priority criteria in order to be able to assign the 
available common resources (design support, test etc..) 
according to a well established guideline. 
The proposed priority order is based on the function of 
the system: 
 
1) Systems relevant for personnel security: e.g. fire 
detectors, oxygen detectors, access etc... 
2)  Systems relevant for machine protection: e.g. 
BIS/BIC, LBDS, collimators, BLMs etc... 
3) System relevant for beam downtime: e.g. power 
converters, instrumentation used for feedback, RF 
etc... 
4) Systems used for monitoring: e.g. some beam 
instrumentation, some cryogenic instrumentation, 
etc... 
Systems for personnel and machine protection should 
never be installed in radiation area if possible. Where this 
is not possible, the equipment owners shall have to 
demonstrate the radiation tolerance. They shall have to 
pass reviews, organised by the RADWG, in particular 
design reviews before starting the prototyping, but more 
important the readiness review, that will give the green 
light for final production and installation. During 
readiness reviews the equipment owners shall have to 
produce test results as described in the next paragraph.  
Principle “4”: System test. 
Component and system test are the most important 
basic element of quality assurance. Procedures for 
component and system test will depend on the radiation 
levels that one wants to address, and on the nature of the 
component itself, therefore they will be specified either in 
addenda or discussed in details in the RADWG when 
necessary. On the contrary, the final test that can validate 
the design of the entire systems (or of the most sensitive 
part of it) has to be performed in a facility with a radiation 
field very similar to the final environment. For the LHC 
the reference facility will be the CNGS irradiation 
facility. Other similar facilities may be needed if redesign 
work has to be done, and additional facilities might be 
made available if necessary in nTOF and HiRadMat. 
It is important that test results are well documented to 
be able to trace back the real limitation of every system. It 
is a general experience that it is extremely difficult to 
provide a generic template for the test reports since every 
system has different specificities. All the people working 
on this subject since years [8, 9] agree that it is more 
efficient to have presentations either in working groups 
(RADWG for the LHC) or in annual events (like the 
radiation days) 
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Principle “5”: Quality assurance. 
Quality assurance is a key factor to ensure the tolerance 
of electronics to radiation. For example once a component 
is tested to be radiation tolerant, one has to ensure that 
only components from the same batch are used, since 
significant changes can occur from batch to batch in the 
architecture without modifying the external 
characteristics. Strict respect of the LHC (or equivalent 
for other machines) quality assurance plan will have to be 
enforced. The main guidelines will be: 
•  establishment of a comprehensive MTF folder to 
track all the design, production and test history of a 
given system. 
• Provide a clear procedure to ensure that operational 
limitations are known to the operation’s team. 
• Properly document test campaigns, providing 
information that can be used from anybody or for 
future reference in case of problems. This means 
mainly to provide test reports including all the test 
conditions, procedures and results. 
Resorting to the experience of ATLAS, it will be 
fundamental for the success of the policy to have enough 
resources (at least 1 person at full time: Mr “Radiation 
Tolerance”) to follow up and control that the full 
documentation is produced and properly stored. Also it is 
necessary to control that test procedures are relevant to 
reveal the effect under test. Depending on the workload, 
another person might be necessary for that. 
 
Implementation of the policy. 
 
While the main body of the policy defines the general 
principle, its application to the LHC will require detailed 
specification of test procedures, of information flow and 
responsibilities. This will be specified in the annexes. In 
particular the structure coordinating and supporting the 
mitigation effort which is already in place for the LHC 
(see fig. 2) will be clearly explained in one of the 
annexes. In practice: 
 
• For LHC Machine, the LMC will oversee and give 
priorities. 
• R2E will coordinate technical work at different level 
and give coherence between simulations, design,  
test, machine integration. 
• RADWG will support equipment groups for design 
(component selection, design reviews) and radiation 
test. 
• Equipment owners are responsible for 
implementation and quality assurance.  
• Point owners (or persons to be identified)  shall be 
informed of installed equipment and in charge of 
organising control. Ensure that OP is aware of special 
procedures suggested for a given equipment. 
 
Fig. 2: organisation of the coordination of mitigation 
efforts in the LHC. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a relevant risk of occurrence of Single Event 
Effects in several areas of the LHC machine. A dedicated 
strategy is required to reduce it to a level that will allow a 
smooth operation at nominal and ultimate luminosity. 
Very relevant resources, both in terms of material and of 
personnel, will be needed to implement it. The main lines 
have been presented in the first part of the paper, while a 
radiation tolerance policy, aimed at giving guidelines and 
define a proper structure to avoid problems in the future 
has been outlined in the second part. A more detailed 
policy document to be approved by all the parties 
involved and by CERN management will be produced 
soon.  
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WHAT WILL LP-SPL AND PS2 PROVIDE FOR THE LHC 
M. Benedikt, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland for the LP-SPL and PS2 study groups 
Abstract 
The construction of LP-SPL and PS2 is proposed as 
upgrade for the injection chain of the LHC. The 
motivation and the benefits for the LHC and the operation 
of the complete accelerator complex are discussed. The 
beam parameter space for LHC operation is outlined. A 
realistic schedule for construction of the new machines is 
presented, including timeline and strategy for 
commissioning until at least the present ultimate beam 
can be delivered. Reliability issues as well as the cost of 
construction are also addressed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Low-Power version of the Superconducting Proton 
Linac (LP-SPL) and the PS2 synchrotron are proposed to 
replace PS-Booster and PS in the chain of LHC injectors, 
within the framework of the CERN accelerator complex 
upgrade programme [1], to fully exploit the LHC 
potential. 
The first stage of the injector upgrade started in 2008 
with the construction of Linac4 [2], which will supply an 
H- beam at 160 MeV to the existing chain Booster-PS-
SPS from 2013 onwards, replacing Linac2 and removing 
the space charge bottleneck at 50 MeV Booster injection. 
The second stage is planned to start in 2013 and will 
see the construction of the 50 GeV PS2 and its injector, 
the LP-SPL, replacing the 25 GeV PS and the 1.4 GeV 
Booster. The LP-SPL [3] will use Linac4 as front-end and 
deliver a 4 GeV H- beam to the PS2 [4]. The SPS will 
also have to undergo a substantial upgrade programme [5] 
to be able to digest the beams with higher brightness and 
intensity delivered by the new complex at up to 50 GeV 
injection energy. An overview on the two-stage injector 
upgrade programme for protons is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the CERN proton injector complex 
upgrade programme: stage 1 (green), stage 2 (orange). 
For operation with ions from Linac3/LEIR, the PS2 
will replace the PS, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Overview on the CERN ion injector complex 
with PS2 upgrade.  
DESIGN GOALS, OPERATION ASPECTS 
AND MAIN PARAMETERS  
The present injector complex, with the ageing PS in its 
centre, is operating far beyond initial parameters and 
stretched to the limit for reaching ultimate performance 
for the LHC. This performance could only be established 
with complex operation modes (e.g. LHC bunch train 
production in the PS) requiring manpower intense tuning, 
a large diversity of specific hardware and the related 
expert knowledge for setting-up and maintenance. 
The new injector complex aims at simplified operation 
procedures and will be based on state-of-the-art hardware 
with a high multiplicity, to reduce tuning needs and to 
minimize specialist manpower requirements for operation 
and maintenance. LP-SPL and PS2 will also provide 
sufficient performance margin for a safe and efficient 
exploitation of the higher energy machines and in 
particular the LHC.  
The LHC luminosity upgrade [6] defines the overall 
requirements on LP-SPL and PS2 and thus the main 
parameters and design choices.  
The main design goals for LHC operation are: 
• Significantly increased beam brightness. 
• Flexibility for generating bunch patterns and spacing. 
• Sufficient operation margin for full exploitation of 
the LHC. 
General design goals are: 
• High reliability and availability. 
• Simplification of operation schemes. 
• Reduced beam losses for operation. 
• Potential for future upgrades of the complex. 
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Beam brightness 
The target figure for beam brightness has been set at 
twice that of the so-called “ultimate” LHC beam [7]. This 
corresponds to 4×1011 protons per LHC bunch at PS2 
ejection and incorporates an intensity reserve of 20%. 
Limiting the vertical incoherent space charge tune spread 
at PS2 injection to below 0.2 requires a transfer energy 
LP-SPL to PS2 of 4 GeV [8]. Doubling the available 
beam brightness has several beneficial aspects:  
• The new injector complex will have a reasonable 
margin for LHC operation, in contrast to the present 
complex, where the ageing machines all have to be 
stretched up to their limits, to provide the “ultimate” 
beam. This will be an important asset for full 
exploitation of the LHC. 
• The increased brightness opens up the way for LHC 
operation with so-called low-emittance schemes [9], 
where the higher brightness is not used to increase 
the intensity within constant emittances but rather to 
reduce the transverse emittances while keeping the 
intensity unchanged. This might become particularly 
important for luminosity upgrades, if it turns out that 
the LHC is intensity limited.  
• With the increased brightness the new injectors will 
also have the potential for supplying higher intensity 
beams with smaller losses and less activation than 
today. It will provide CERN with the capability to 
address a competitive fixed-target physics 
programme either directly or through the SPS.  
Generation of LHC beams 
The flexible generation of any proton bunch train for 
LHC operation is an inherent feature of the new injector 
complex. The LP-SPL will provide a beam with a micro 
structure of 352 MHz and a macro structure of up to 
40 MHz that can be adjusted with the 3 MeV 
chopper [10]. The PS2 will feature a tuneable 40 MHz RF 
system as main accelerating system [11]. Consequently, 
bunch trains of any spacing (multiples of 25 ns) and 
pattern can be “painted” directly into the PS2 40 MHz RF 
buckets using the LP-SPL chopper. 
This straightforward and flexible method does not only 
ease operation significantly but also avoids the additional 
RF systems required for splitting in the present PS [12]. 
The main benefits are: 
• Minimisation of RF systems and correspondingly 
reduced manpower needs. 
• Minimisation of machine impedance. 
• Simplification of operation since no longitudinal 
splitting and gymnastics are required. 
For ion operation, the beam production scheme with the 
PS2 is identical to the nominal ion beam in the PS [13]. 
General operation aspects 
With extraction energy at 50 GeV from the PS2, the 
new injector complex will provide beams at significantly 
higher energy than the present complex. This will lead, 
via adiabatic damping, to smaller beam sizes and reduced 
losses when transferring to the SPS. SPS injection will 
take place significantly above the transition energy of 
22 GeV, which is expected to reduce the impact of 
instabilities and collective effects. The higher transfer 
energy also opens the way for an SPS upgrade at a later 
stage, aiming at an LHC injection energy around 1 TeV. 
Doubling the top energy compared to the PS entails a 
larger PS2 circumference of around twice the PS, or about 
one fifth of the SPS, which represents an optimum since it 
halves the number of PS2 pulses to fill the SPS for the 
LHC. Assuming an LHC filling scheme similar to the 
present nominal scheme [14], the SPS will receive two 
batches each of 168 bunches with 25 ns bunch spacing 
and 2.4 s between injections. This is to be compared with 
four batches today from the PS with 3.6 s between 
batches. This represents an important shortening of the 
SPS injection plateau from 10.8 s to ~2.4 s nearly halving 
the SPS cycle for the LHC, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: LHC cycle in SPS with present (PSB – PS) and 
new (LP-SPL – PS2) injector complex.  
The circumference ratio PS2 – SPS will also allow 
filling the SPS circumference completely, for fixed target 
operation, with a single five-turn extraction from the PS2. 
Presently this is achieved with two consecutive ejections 
from the PS, forcing the SPS to wait 1.2 s with a high 
intensity beam at low energy for the second batch.  
The new injector complex will supply all proton beams 
for the SPS with a 40 MHz structure with bunches 
shortened to 4 ns total length to fit the SPS 200 MHz 
system. Presently this is done for the LHC [12] but not for 
the Fixed-Target (FT) beam, where instead a debunched 
beam with a 200 MHz pre-structure is transferred. 
Because of the clean bunch-to-bucket transfer, a reduction 
of injection losses for the FT beam is expected in the SPS.  
Operation of the PS2 will also be simplified as 
compared to the PS, by avoiding transition crossing, 
which will also be beneficial for reduction of beam losses. 
The magnet and power systems of the PS2 will be 
designed for a cycle length of around 2.4 s for 50 GeV, so 
that the overall cycling scheme of the new injector 
complex will be similar to today’s operation.  
The main parameters of the new injector complex are 
summarized in Table 1 for LP-SPL and Table 2 for PS2. 
Table 1: Main parameters of LP-SPL.  
Parameter (maximum) Unit LP-SPL
Beam energy (kinetic) GeV 4.0
Average beam current during pulse mA 20 
Pulsing rate Hz 2 
Pulse duration ms 0.9 
Beam power kW 140 
1  2 Booster
SPS injection plateau 3x3.6 s = 10.8 s
up to 4 consecutive injections
1  2 Booster 1  2 Booster 1  2 Booster
PS
LPSPL LPSPL
SPS plateau ~2.5 s
2 injections
PS2
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Table 2: Main parameters of PS2, compared to PS.  
Parameter Unit PS2 PS
p injection energy (kinetic) GeV 4.0 1.4
p extraction energy (kinetic) GeV 20-50 13-25 
Circumference m 1346.4 628.3 
LHC bunch intensity (max.) ppb 4.0×1011 1.7×1011 
LHC pulse intensity (max.) ppp 6.7×1013 1.2×1013 
FT pulse intensity (max.) ppp 1.0×1014 3.2×1013 
Cycle time s ~2.4 1.2 / 2.4 
Energy per pulse (max.) kJ 800 70 
Beam power (max.) kW 320 60 
IMPLEMENTATION AND 
COMMISSIONING STRATEGY 
Layout and implementation aspects 
Figure 4 shows the layout of the new injectors and the 
implementation in the existing complex. 
 
Figure 4: Layout of LP-SPL and PS2 and implementation 
in the existing CERN accelerator complex. 
The LP-SPL follows Linac4 in straight prolongation.  
The transfer line from LP-SPL to PS2 is also in the same 
direction but descends to the level of the SPS. The PS2 is 
positioned tangentially to the end of the existing TT10 
transfer line that links PS and SPS. This layout is 
considered the optimum choice and has the following 
advantages: 
• Avoiding large bending radii in the H- injection line 
from LP-SPL to minimise Lorentz stripping losses.  
• Minimum length of high-energy transfer line PS2 to 
SPS and use of existing SPS injection channel. 
• Minimum length of the injection line from existing 
TT10 line for ions from LEIR. 
As a consequence, all PS2 injection and extraction 
systems can be concentrated in a single straight section 
suggesting a racetrack shape of the machine. 
Civil engineering work 
The excavation and civil engineering work for most of 
the tunnels for the new injector complex can take place in 
parallel to machine operation with the present complex, 
without impact on the LHC schedule. This concerns the 
following underground areas: 
• LP-SPL tunnel 
• LP-SPL to PS2 transfer line 
• PS2 ring tunnel and access shafts 
• PS2 injection/extraction cavern 
The requirements of a later connection of Linac4 to the 
LP-SPL are already being taken into account in the 
presently ongoing construction of the Linac4 building so 
that only minor civil engineering work will be needed. 
The civil engineering connections from the PS2 to the 
existing TT10 transfer line (for the ion injection line and 
the extraction line towards the SPS) can however only be 
established while the TT10 transfer tunnel is accessible 
and the SPS is in shut-down. The estimated time for 
establishing the two connections is about 4 months during 
which the following activities will take place: 
• Dismantling and protection of around 100 m of TT10 
equipment in each of the two regions concerned. 
• Establishing the tunnel connections and related civil 
engineering and technical infrastructure work. 
• Installation of removable radiation shielding in the 
tunnel connections. 
• Reinstallation of (old) TT10 equipment. 
After this work, beam operation with the present 
injector complex can resume, while installation work of 
the new injectors can take place independently. The only 
exceptions are the short beam line segments between 
Linac4 and LP-SPL and the two connections between 
TT10 and PS2 that are blocked with removable radiation 
shielding. 
Commissioning strategy 
Once the new injectors are installed, commissioning of 
LP-SPL and PS2 will be done in a staged way, without 
interference with the physics operation of the present 
injector complex.  
In a first stage, the shielding between Linac4 and the 
LP-SPL will be removed and the transfer line equipment 
will be installed. This will take a few weeks and it can 
easily fit within a regular accelerators’ shutdown. The 
transfer line Linac4 – LP-SPL will be equipped with a 
switching dipole that will either deflect the Linac4 beam 
to the PS-Booster, for physics operation, or let it pass 
straight through, for commissioning of the LP-SPL, as 
indicated in Figure 5. This way, every second Linac4 
pulse will be used for LP-SPL commissioning while the 
PSB will be served with a beam for physics operation at a 
repetition rate of 1 Hz. 
In a second stage, once LP-SPL commissioning has 
reached a satisfactory level, the beam from the LP-SPL 
will be passed further on, via the transfer line LP-SPL – 
PS2, towards the PS2. PS2 commissioning will then take 
place, again completely independent of and without any 
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Figure 5: Layout and connection of Linac4 to PS-Booster 
and LP-SPL. 
Putting the new injectors in operation  
When the performance of the new injectors in 
standalone mode will have reached the desired level, i.e. 
at least identical to the top performance of the existing 
complex, the switch over from existing to new injector 
complex for physics operation will be prepared. It is 
assumed that at this stage most of the SPS upgrades will 
have already been implemented, in particular electron 
cloud mitigation measures, RF system upgrades and 
possibly even new injection system. The remaining 
modifications in the TT10 transfer line and the SPS will 
then be: 
• Removal of radiation shielding in the two transfer 
tunnels between TT10 and PS2. 
• TT10 beam line rearrangement and installation of 
new beam line elements for the connections with 
PS2. 
• Replacement of the SPS injection system with a new 
50 GeV injection system, if not already done. 
A regular shutdown of at least 4 months duration is 
considered compatible with the above modifications.  
Once the last part of the TT10 transfer line will have been 
rearranged to guide the PS2 beam towards the SPS, it will 
no longer be possible to send a beam from the PS to the 
SPS and the new injectors will provide the beams for 
physics. The beam commissioning phase is expected to be 
rather short and similar to an ordinary setting-up, since it 
concerns only transfer line modifications and the new 
SPS injection system. Once in physics operation, the 
further increase of LP-SPL, PS2 and SPS performance to 
the expected final level will take place in parasitic mode 
in parallel to physics operation. 
PROJECT SCHEDULE  
The preliminary project schedule for the construction of 
LP-SPL and PS2 is shown in Figure 6 [15]. The schedule 
assumes project approval by end 2012 and start of civil 
engineering work in 2013. Most of the time critical items 
in the preparatory phase are civil engineering related and 
substantial activities will have to take place even before 
full project approval, e.g. preparation of the large civil 
engineering tenders. Another important and time critical 
item is the environmental impact study. A total period of 
about 6 years is estimated for construction and 
commissioning of the new injectors, so that operation for 
physics could start in 2020. 
Figure 6: Provisional project schedule for construction and commissioning of the new injectors LP-SPL and PS2. 
 
COST ESTIMATE 
Even though the study of the new injector chain is well-
engaged [3, 4, 5], prototypes and tests have hardly started. 
Hence the design of the future accelerators is not 
completed and not all families of equipment have been 
specified. The construction cost estimate made in 
November 2009 [16] shall therefore be considered as 
preliminary, with a significant uncertainty margin 
(~20%). A total material budget of 890 MCHF was 
estimated necessary for the new accelerators during a      
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1  All SPL and PS2 Parameters defined
2  Integration layout (sufficient staff number)
3  Definition of main parameters for all tunnels and buildings
4  Call for tender for CE Consultancy
5  CE preliminary study and geological investigations
6  Design CE totaly frozen
7  Environmental impact study
8  Preparation of tender drawings and cost estimation
9  Cost Estimate / Project Proposal
10  Call for tender for CE works
11  Civil Engineering works - underground
12  Civil Engineering works - surface
13  CV, EL, Handling & lifting, access syste, safety systems
14  Delivery of the infrastructure and equipment
15  SPL and PS2 machine installation 
16  SPL and PS2 commisionning
15  Installation TL PS2 - TT10 and SPS 50 MeV inejction system
16  SPS and TT10 commisssioning with PS2
17  Start operation for physics
2009 2010 2014 20152011 2012 2013 20202016 2018 20192017
Projects approved
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6-7 years construction period, resulting explicitly from 
481 MCHF for the LP-SPL and 410 MCHF for PS2. In 
addition, the necessary upgrades of the SPS are estimated 
at 66 MCHF.  
The following comments have to be taken into account: 
• Cost figures are given in CHF for 2009. 
• The R&D until the end of 2012 and the 
corresponding resources are not included in the 
estimated cost of construction. 
• CERN manpower has not been estimated (although 
industrial support personnel is included). 
• The cost of dismantling the present and future 
accelerators has not been analyzed and is not 
included. 
LP-SPL construction cost estimate 
The main SPL cost items are quoted in Table 3.  
 




RF equipment (80 klystrons for 160 b=1 
cavities + 66 IOTs for 66 b=0.65 cavities + 
power supplies, waveguides, LLRF, interlocks 
& controls, etc.) and 2 test places for 
cryomodules. 
219 45.6%
Civil Engineering (underground & surface 
buildings) + cooling/ventilation & electrical 
infrastructure. 
113 23.5%
Cryomodules (20 cryomodules with 8 b=1 
cavities + 11 cryomodules with 6 b=0.65 
cavities + 226 tuners & couplers + 80 
quadrupoles + 30 BPMs). 
79 16.4%
Cryogenics (6.4 kW at 4.5 K + distribution). 17 3.5% 
Dumps (~1.4 and 4 GeV) and ejection system 
to ISOLDE (20 ms rise/fall time deflection 
system + stripping foil and H0 dump). 
15 3.1% 
Beam instrumentation (transformers, beam loss 
monitors, laser wire profile monitors, screens). 15 3.1% 
Controls (including machine interlocks). 10 2.1% 
Accelerator vacuum (including isolation 
vacuum in cryomodules) 8.5 1.8% 
Safety & access (monitors, alarms, access 
doors with control system). 3 0.6% 
Magnets (normal conducting in the transfer line 
+ power supplies). 1.3 0.3% 
TOTAL 481 100% 
 
Using information from the SNS project [17, 18, 19], a 
comparison has been made for RF, cryomodules and 
cryogenics, which contribute to approximate two thirds of 
the SPL cost. These three subjects add up to 304 MCHF 
or 63% of the estimated total cost of the LP-SPL. 
Extrapolation of the SNS figures gives a total of 371 M$ 
(or ~378 MCHF at the current exchange rate). This 
number is somewhat larger than the CERN estimate, but it 
includes manpower and it assumes an RF system capable 
of 6 % duty factor instead of 0.04 % for the LP-SPL.  
This comparison underlines the credibility of the LP-
SPL estimate. 
PS2 construction cost estimate 
The main PS2 cost items are quoted in Table 4.  





Civil Engineering (underground buildings for 
PS2 and related transfer lines & surface 
buildings, environment shaping).  
90 22.0%
Main magnets (dipoles, quadrupoles, linear 
and non-linear corrector magnets).  70 17.1%
RF equipment (40 MHz: cavities + power 
supplies, waveguides, LLRF, transv.damper). 58 14.1%
Injection and extraction elements (H- 
injection, fast injection, fast ejection, slow 
extraction, tune kickers, internal dump kickers 
and beam dump, dump line and beam dump, 
PFNs for fast kickers and bumpers, electronics 
and controls, cabling). 
45 10.9%
Technical infrastructure (electrical 
distribution, cabling, cooling and ventilation, 
piping, plants, access, safety, heavy handling). 
43 10.5%
Transfer lines (SPL to PS2 (H-), existing 
TT10 to PS2 (ions from LEIR), PS2 to SPS 
and PS2 to and injection dump); all equipment 
included (scaled from CNGS transfer line). 
36 8.8% 
Power converters (main dipole & quadrupole 
converters, auxiliary and correction magnets 
converters, septa converters). 
29 7.1% 
Vacuum system (coated vacuum chambers, 
gauges, valves, pumping modules, ion and 
NEG pumps, cabling, bakeout equipment).  
13 3.2% 
Beam instrumentation (110 beam position 
monitors, 250 fast beam loss monitors, wire 
scanner, dc and fast beam current 
transformers, wall current monitors, tune 
measurement, controls & electronics, cabling). 
10 2.4% 
Control system (control HW and software, 
racks, interlock & timing systems, cabling).  10 2.4% 
Collimation and machine protection (primary 
and secondary collimators for TLs and PS2 




The injector upgrade with LP-SPL and PS2 has been 
designed to provide a large flexibility and sufficient 
operational margin for full exploitation of the LHC and a 
large potential for upgrades.  
The total material budget for the construction of both 
machines and the associated transfer lines is estimated at 
900 MCHF. With a project approval in 2012, the new 
injectors could be available for physics operation by 
2020.  Construction and commissioning of the new 
injectors can be done without impact on LHC operation. .  
The new injectors will not only bring large flexibility 
but also significant simplification of operation processes, 
e.g. straightforward  generation of LHC bunch patterns or  
absence of transition crossing, hereby reducing beam 
losses and minimizing breakdowns, beam quality 
fluctuations and experts intervention and tuning needs. 
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The use of reliable and state-of-the-art equipment with 
high multiplicity will have a positive impact on hardware 
and machine availability and will also result in an 
efficient spare part policy and a reduction of manpower 
needs for exploitation.  
Moreover, the new injector complex will have one 
circular machine less than the present one which will 
further simplify operation reduce the exploitation 
workload.  
The new injector complex will be a solid basis for 
future proton operation at CERN, offering a large 
potential for the LHC during its lifetime, and allowing for 
other applications and future upgrades long after the LHC 
is stopped. 
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KEEPING THE PRESENT LHC INJECTOR COMPLEX RUNNING FOR 25 
YEARS 
S. Baird CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
Abstract 
Even if SPL and PS2 go ahead, it is unlikely that 
they will deliver nominal LHC beams before the early 
2020’s. This means that the existing LHC Injector 
chain, SPS, PS & PSB, with LINAC4 replacing 
LINAC2, will have to continue to run with high 
reliability for more than 10 more years. This talk will 
examine what additional actions would need to be 
taken to ensure that the same Injector chain will 
continue to run reliably for the next 20-25 years i.e. the 
lifetime of the LHC. 
 
Introduction 
I have summarised information that has been 
received from CERN equipment groups concerning the 
consolidation activities that would be necessary to keep 
the current LHC proton Injector chain (PSB, PS & 
SPS) running at the current reliability and performance 
levels for the lifetime of the LHC (i.e. around 25 
years). Potential upgrades and improvements in beam 
intensity/quality are not included. In addition, as 
LINAC4 will replace LINAC2 around 2015 issues 
concerning LINAC2 are not addressed. 
 
Vacuum systems 
It is estimated that some 50-70% of the vacuum 
system hardware will need to be systematically 
replaced for operation until 2025 and the remaining 
hardware should be replaced for operation until 2035. 
It will also be advisable to develop new target windows 
for the NORTH AREA targets. Finally it should be 
noted that any hardware consolidation campaign in the 
Injectors will require major vacuum system 
intervention (including replacing magnets, septa, 
kickers, RF cavities, scrappers etc…) 
 
RF 
At the PSB major work will be needed on the C02, 4 
& 16 systems. This includes HV power supplies, cavity 
tuning systems, interlocks and low-level systems. The 
total cost is estimated at 12-15MCHf. Similar work is 
needed at the PS, where the present system of 10MHz 
RF power tubers will also need complete replacement. 
At the SPS the consolidation work will have to be 
coordinated with the upgrade scenarios that are 
proposed for the SPS [1], [2] 
 
Magnets 
The magnet group strongly recommends maintaining 
a vigorous maintenance plan. Some spares are needed 
at the PSB, but these are included in the current 
consolidation programs and will be completed by 2013.  
For the PS it is not felt necessary to fully renovate 
the remaining 50 main magnet units. However, it is 
proposed to obtain additional spare PS main magnet 
bus bars and 50 sets of PFW’s.   
Under these conditions PSB & PS magnets should be 
able to continue for another 25 years of operation. This 
is true for PSB operation at 1.4Gev but this statement 
will have to be re-examined if it is decided to increase 
the PSB extraction energy from 1.4 to 2.0GeV. 
At the SPS there are some concerns with erosion 
inside the water cooling manifolds due to the high 
cooling water velocity, and with the mechanical fixing 
of the pole face shims. Both of these problems will 
need to be addressed and consolidation actions 
proposed. 244 of the SPS dipole water cooling 
manifolds have already been refurbished over the last 3 
shutdowns. [3] 
 
Beam Transfer systems 
PSB injection systems will be replaced as part of the 
LINAC4 project. On top of this a list of replacement 
and additional spare parts requirements has been 
established. One urgent item is the study for a new PS 
extraction septum 16 with a thinner blade to reduce the 




A new fast wire scanner prototype has been 
developed, which will be ready for deployment from 
2014. The new BLM system will be installed at the 
PSB as part of the LINAC4 project. This system should 
also be extended to PS and SPS. The PS beam 
trajectory measurement has recently been replaced and 
it is planned to replace the SPS system from 2013. 
Additional hardware such as BCT torroids will need 
replacing in the coming 5 years. 
 
Electrical Network 
There is an existing consolidation plan of some 
44MCHf, which targets the most urgent items, 
However, for a further 25 years of operation the 
following items should be considered [4 ]:-  
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PSB & PS 
• Replace all cabling (48 MCHF) 
• Replace low voltage switchboards, UPS, safety 
lighting etc. (14MCHf) 
• Renovate HV substations ME16, ME49 & M76 
(2MChF) 
 
SPS (not including 18kV loops which are already 
covered in the existing consolidation program) 
• Replace 2 400/18kV transformers (8MCHf) 
• Replace SMB 18kV cable network (7MCHf) 
• Replace all TGBT switchboards (7MCHf) 
• Replace 40/72 18/4kV transformers (2.3MCHf) 
• Cable replacement in tunnel (40MCHf) 
• Remove unused cables (30MCHf) 
 
The replacement of the SPS SMD cabling is felt to 
be a most urgent item and should be started as soon as 
possible 
The proposed cable replacement campaigns are also 
very important in the long run as many installed cables 
are no longer in use and should be removed to make 
space for new installations.  These campaigns are very 
labour intensive and therefore very expensive. A 
careful analysis is needed to decide which cables 
should be removed. This work also includes the regular 
replacement of irradiated cables in particular at the SPS 
LSS2 & 6.  
 
Power Converters 
Approximately 50% of the installed converters for 
the PSB will need to be replaced at a cost of around 
7MCHf. The news POPS main PS power supply will 
replace the old PS motor generator set by 2012. The 
renovation of the SPS main power converters has 
started and the main SPS transfer line supplies were 
recently upgraded. A considerable amount of work will 
be needed in the North and East areas if these 
experimental areas will continue long-term operation.  
 
Access & Safety systems 
The replacement of the PS Personnel Protection 
System (PPS) has started, but the current obsolete 
system will have to be maintained until the new one is 
fully operational in 2014. It is planned to start 
replacing the SPS PPS system in 2011. The safety and 
fire alarms will be maintained as long as is necessary.  
 
Interlocks 
Today the PSB and PS do not have beam interlock 
systems. Studies are starting on the possible 
deployment of the LHC Beam Interlock Controller 
(BIC) for the PS as part of the new PPS project. The 
PSB and PS still have their original hard-wired magnet 
interlock systems. These could be replaced with the 
LHC Warm Interlock Controller (WIC) as installed at 
LEIR. At the SPS the LHC-style BIC is already in 
operation and the WIC could be used to replace the 
ageing SPS magnet interlock chain. 
 
Dumps & Collimators 
Again the importance of maintenance of safety 
system items such as beam stoppers etc. is essential. 
The PS and SPS beam dumps are already under 
consolidation. The SPS scrapers will be critical for 
clean injection into the LHC, and their refurbishment is 
already planned. Other critical items are the PSB beam 
dump and certain slits which are extremely radio-active 
and therefore cannot be repaired. In the experimental 
areas target stations, collimators and other motorised 
devices also need urgent attention [5 ] 
 
Cooling & Ventilation 
Major consolidation work has started (mainly for the 
“ex-LEP” LHC installations). Additional items to be 
considered for a further 25 years of Injector operation 
include [6]:- 
• PS & PSB Ventilation systems. Here there are also 
radio-protection considerations, which may mean a 
redesign of the system concept rather than a simple 
replacement. 
• Replacement of PS chilled water circuits, 
compressed air systems and demineralised water 
production 
• Replacement of certain heat exchangers on the 
Meyrin cooling stations 
 
Other systems 
The Control system renovation project ACCOR has 
started. Cranes and other handling equipment are 
covered under the existing consolidation plans. The 
replacement of the ARCON radiation monitoring 
system with RAMSES is underway. Studies have been 
started to examine tunnel and underground 




A more detailed analysis of all these points is 
planned for the IEFC workshop in February 2010 [7], 
and the following actions are planned:- 
 
• Pull all the information together to make a 
coherent plan for the coming 15 years. 
• Performa risk analysis of the proposed actions and 
their beneficial effect in order to assign priorities 
• The plan should separate LHC Injector backbone, 
East & North experimental areas & the ion chain. 
AD Consolidation is not included as this is 
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approved to 2016 and an extension will be linked 
to the ELENA project 
• Perform a risk analysis of the proposed actions and 
their beneficial effect in order to assign priorities 
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POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE EXISTING PRE-INJECTOR 
COMPLEX IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTINUED CONSOLIDATION 
G. Arduini, J. Borburgh, J.-P. Burnet, C. Carli, M. Chanel, J.-M. Cravero, H. Damerau, T. Fowler, 
S. Gilardoni, M. Giovannozzi, S. Hancock, E. Métral, A. Newborough, S. Pittet, L. Sermeus, 
R. Steerenberg, D. Tommasini, M. Vretenar, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
The situation of the present pre-injection complex will 
be discussed with particular emphasis on the performance 
limitations. Mitigation measures will be discussed 
assuming that substantial consolidation work can be 
devoted to such improvements. Possible scenarios for the 
implementation of these measures will be outlined, 
together with an analysis of the impact on the 
performance of the LHC machine. 
SPACE CHARGE LIMITS IN PSB AND PS 
For relatively low-energy machines, such as the PS 
Booster (PSB) and the PS, it is customary to consider 
space charge, and in particular the incoherent tune shift at 
injection, as the main limitation of the machine 
performance. 
It is recalled here that the tune shift generated by space 




εγβ−∝Δ   (1) 
where Nb represents the bunch intensity, βγ2 the 
relativistic factors, and εn the transverse normalised 
emittance. 
The analysis of space charge limits was considered in 
the past to propose an increase of the PSB extraction 
energy to adapt the PSB and PS to the performance 
required to operate as LHC injectors [1]. Such an energy 
upgrade became one of main changes performed in the 
PSB in view of preparing the pre-injectors to the LHC [2]. 
At that time the key PS parameters used for the 
computations were: 
• εn(1σ)=2.5 μm 
• Total bunch length = 180 ns 
• Harmonic number = 8 
• Nb, max=1.7×1011 p 
• |ΔQ| less than 0.3 
The preservation of the transverse emittance all along the 
injectors’ chain was a source of concern, which explains 
the rather tight limit imposed. Also, it is important to 
stress that the maximum intensity/bunch was determined 
by the specification of the ultimate LHC beam, which, in 
turn, was based on the maximum beam-beam tune shift 
tolerable in the LHC. The ultimate intensity was felt as a 
real hard limit for the LHC. The use of these parameters 
provided the value of the PSB extraction energy increase 
from 1 GeV (kinetic energy) to 1.4 GeV, which is the 
current value. 
It is also important to mention that since that time the 
scheme to generate the nominal LHC beam in the 
injectors was changed [3], mainly due to a longitudinal 
microwave instability inducing a momentum blow-up 
during de-bunching at high energy in the PS [4]. In 
particular, the number of injected bunches in the PS was 
reduced to six, leaving one of the seven buckets in the PS 
empty at injection. These changes will not be considered 
in the following and, for the sake of comparison, the same 
parameters as those used in the past will be applied. 
The approval of the Linac4 project [5] will push further 
the PSB performance. In fact, the increase of the injection 
energy in the PSB from 50 MeV to the proposed value of 
160 MeV will bring, in terms of the relativistic factors 
βγ2, an increase of a factor two. This automatically 
decreases the space charge tune shift proportionally, 
hence doubling the intensity that can be injected into the 
PSB within unchanged normalised transverse emittances. 
However, even if the space charge limit in the PSB will 
be lifted by Linac4, the next bottleneck, namely the 
limitations in the PS, will become visible.  
A detailed analysis on the performance level of the 
current PSB/PS complex and of the new capabilities with 
the Linac4 was carried out in Ref. [6]. The current 
situation is such that the space charge limit is well-
balanced between the PSB and the PS (neglecting a small 
margin due to the change of harmonic number from 8 to 7 
since the increase of PSB extraction energy in preparation 
for the LHC). Therefore, the improved performance 
related to the advent of the Linac4 can be fully exploited 
only lifting the space charge limit in the PS, hence 
increasing the PSB extraction energy. The key figure, 
assuming Linac4 in operation, is then 3.6×1012p per PSB 
ring, which corresponds to the maximum intensity that 
can be injected into the PSB while remaining within 
acceptable space charge limits.  
In Fig. 1 the key quantities, namely the maximum space 
charge tune shift, the relative variation of the relativistic 
factors βγ2, and the reduction of beam size are shown as a 
function of the relative strength increase in the PSB main 
dipole magnets.  
Ideally, one should recover the factor of two in βγ2 due 
to Linac4 in order to restore the equal limitation of the 
two machines. However, this is certainly excluded by 
hardware considerations. Hence, the region of interest is 
limited between an increase of magnet strength of 30-
40 %. The choice of the actual value is mainly dictated by 
the capabilities of the PSB magnets, i.e., their remaining 
strength margin after already two energy upgrades (from 
initially 800 MeV to 1 GeV and then to 1.4 GeV for the 
LHC).  
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For the two limiting values of the PSB upgrade, the 
corresponding bunch intensity at PS extraction for a 25 ns 
spacing LHC beam might be: 
• PSB main dipoles strength increase of 40 % 
(2.17 GeV kinetic energy) : Nb = 3×1011p 
• PSB main dipoles strength increase of 30 % (2 GeV 
kinetic energy): Nb = 2.7×1011p 
 
Figure 1: Key quantities for the proposed extraction 
energy upgrade of the PSB, namely maximum space 
charge tune shift (scale on right axis), relative variation of 
βγ2, and relative change of beam size due to a variation of 
βγ (scale on the left axis). 
These two figures can be directly compared with the 
ultimate LHC beam intensity.  
Nevertheless, the previous considerations concerning 
the changes in the generation of the LHC-type beams 
could be applied to push even a bit further the intensity 
limit. Indeed, the reduction in harmonic in the PS, from 8 
to 7, makes it possible to inject slightly longer bunches. In 
principle bunch lengths of about 200 ns should be 
possible (to be confirmed, in any case, by dedicated 
experimental studies). Therefore, it is conceivable to use 
longer bunches and to increase the intensity estimates 
provided for the PSB energy upgrade by a factor of about 
10 % (corresponding to the ratio 200/180).  
BEAM DYNAMICS CHALLENGES 
The estimated intensity reach derived in the previous 
section is simply based on considerations about the 
maximum space charge tune shift tolerable. This is 
certainly an important criterion, but does not ensure that 
the derived bunch intensity will be achievable without a 
number of additional measures.  
The PSB should be capable of making use of the 
intensity at higher energy delivered by the Linac4, 
independently on whether an extraction energy upgrade 
takes place. Such an upgrade allows improving the PS 
performance by lifting the space charge limit at PS 
injection. 
Therefore, the overview of beam dynamics challenges 
presented here focuses on the PS machine, only. A list of 
potential issues will be discussed, based on the current 
knowledge of PS performance and the results of 
numerous Machine Development (MD) studies performed 
in the past years. These results will serve as a basis for a 
preliminary estimate of the bottlenecks and required cures 
to overcome them. It is clear that a vigorous campaign of 
MDs should be planned in order to define the most 
appropriate strategy to make use of the increased 
performance due to the PSB upgrade.  
Transverse issues 
The injection process in the PS machine for LHC 
beams with 25 ns bunch spacing is based on the double-
batch technique. This implies that a number of bunches 
remain at injection energy for 1.2 s while waiting for a 
second batch to be injected. Then the seven bunches are 
split and accelerated to top energy. During the long period 
at injection energy, space charge effects can lead to slow 
beam losses. This phenomenon can also be seeded by 
coupling between longitudinal and transverse motion 
induced by space charge. A transverse trapping/de-
trapping mechanism was proposed to explain the slow 
losses at injection energy combined with bunch 
shortening (see Ref. [7] and references therein).  
When reaching 26 GeV/c the beam is affected by 
transverse instabilities, whose type (single or coupled 
bunch) requires still some detailed analysis, but is 
certainly linked with electron could effects [8, 9]. An 
example of beam observation with an LHC-like beam 
made with a pick-up in the TT2 transfer line is shown in 
Fig. 2, where the impact of a solenoidal field in the 
suppression of the baseline drift is clearly visible. Such a 
drift is considered to be the signature of electron-cloud 
formation (see, e.g., the references in [10] for an overview 
of this topic).  
 
Figure 2: Sum signal from a pick-up in the TT2 transfer 
line without (upper) and with solenoid field (lower) due to 
the passage of 72 LHC-type proton bunches. 
The signal from a LHC beam after bunch splittings and 
compression prior to ejection measured with a pick-up in 
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vertical, and sum signals are visible. The signs of 
instability in the horizontal plane are clearly visible. 
 
Figure 3: Horizontal, vertical, and sum signal from a pick-
up in the PS ring for a LHC-like beam. The bunch 
intensity is 0.55×1011p. 
The performance achieved so far corresponds to a 
bunch intensity of about 1.3×1011p with 25 ns bunch 
spacing, which becomes unstable at top energy whenever 
the bunch length is shorter than about 12 ns. The 
instability rise time is of a few ms [9].  
Any extrapolation of such performance to higher bunch 
intensities is certainly not easy. However, it is definitely 
possible to list potential cures, namely: 
• Injection energy: 
o Improved working point control (tune and 
chromaticity). 
• Top energy: 
o Control bunch length in order to avoid too short 
bunches for a too long time. Therefore, a faster 
bunch rotation scheme (double bunch rotation) 
than the nominal gymnastics would be highly 
beneficial [11] (see Fig. 4 for a sketch of the 
nominal bunch rotation gymnastics at top 
energy). 
o Transverse damper to stabilise the beam (single 
and coupled bunch instabilities). 
o Cure electron-cloud effects with, e.g., 
appropriate coating of the PS vacuum chamber. 
Longitudinal issues 
The nominal LHC beam suffers from longitudinal 
coupled bunch instabilities of dipole mode. Presently, a 
mostly analogue longitudinal feedback is currently in 
operation in the PS machine, and the instabilities are 
cured by means of two 10 MHz cavities in sections 86 
and 96. These two cavities are operated for acceleration 
and as longitudinal feedback kickers simultaneously, 
which limits the possible modes to be damped to those 
close to the RF harmonic. This is certainly non-optimal. 
In 2009 stabilisation through acceleration to top energy of 
a 25 ns spacing beam, 1.4×1011p/bunch with a 
longitudinal emittance twice as small with respect to the 
nominal value, was achieved [12]. It is worth mentioning 
that this was made possible thanks to the spare 10 MHz 
cavity in section 11 used as dedicated longitudinal kicker 




Figure 4: Sketch of the nominal bunch rotation 
gymnastics at top energy (upper) and final stage after the 
double bunch rotation as from numerical simulations 
(lower). The final bunch length is comparable to the 
nominal one, but the time to rotate the bunches is about 
4.5 ms faster [11]. 
To extrapolate such a result to higher intensity needs 
some assumptions such as a scaling of the instability 
threshold with intensity and longitudinal emittance. A 
scaling according to Nb/εl seems justified as similar 
coupled-bunch instabilities are presently observed with 
25 ns and 50 ns variants. Both of them are accelerated at 
the same harmonic number, but the 50 ns variant has 
twice less intensity and twice less longitudinal emittance 
compared to the 25 ns beam. Hence, intensity up to about 
2.8×1011p/b with a nominal longitudinal emittance might 
be stabilised during acceleration with a dedicated 
longitudinal feedback. It is essential to stress that during 
the dedicated MDs devoted to this topic further splitting 
in the longitudinal plane on the flat top was never 
attempted because of the small longitudinal emittance 
(twice too small). Furthermore, especially beam-loading 
issues in all RF systems will become much more 
important at higher intensities than at present, which must 
be carefully investigated. Therefore, even if the 
experimental observations provided encouraging results 
concerning the possibility of stabilising a higher-than-
nominal bunch intensity, still numerous efforts need to be 
devoted to MD studies and theoretical analysis for 
specifying the requirements for the systems needed to 
stabilise the beam and to assess the actual intensity limit 
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Figure 5: Overall layout of the PSB, the injection and extraction lines, and the transfer lines to ISOLDE and PS (upper 
part). Details of the BT line (lower left) and of the BTP and BTY lines (lower right). 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF PSB ENERGY 
UPGRADE 
The increase of the PSB extraction energy will have a 
deep impact on numerous systems in the PSB itself, but 
also in the transfer line to PS, the beam dump and 
possibly ISOLDE, as well as the injection process in the 
PS. It is important to stress that in this context it was 
assumed that the energy of the beam delivered to 
ISOLDE would not be changed. Of course, this scenario 
should be discussed with the ISOLDE management, 
which was not done in the framework of this study. 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that leaving the 
energy of ISOLDE beam at 1.4 GeV would have the 
beneficial side effect of roughly doubling the beam 
intensity produced for the facility. Indeed, the faster 
pulsing imposed by the requirement of accelerating to 
2 GeV within 1.2 s would imply that the 1.4 GeV could 
be delivered on a 0.6 s basis. Tests with the present PSB 
main power supply confirmed the feasibility of 0.6 s 
pulsing [13], hence this should be a fortiori possible with 
the new main power supply. Since the 0.6 s tests were 
performed, the Linac4 was approved and the new H- 
injection hardware is designed in order to be compatible 
with 0.9 s pulsing of the PSB. This fact, together with the 
extraction septa performance (a novel septum coil fixation 
would be needed), the RMS current in the PSB main 
magnets, cooling capacity, RF systems performance, 
saturation effects due to the different extraction energies, 
and the transfer line elements should be carefully 
analysed in order to assess what needs to be changed to 
enable 0.6 s pulsing capabilities. The need of delivering 
1 GeV beams to ISOLDE should also be re-discussed as it 
could have important impact in the PSB extraction energy 
upgrade, in particular, for the operation of the transfer 
lines (double of triple pulse-to-pulse modulation - PPM) 
PSB magnets and main power converter 
Numerical simulations have been performed to 
determine the actual capabilities of the PSB main magnets 
(dipoles and quadrupoles). In Fig. 6 the distribution of the 
field lines in the main dipoles is plotted for the proposed 
increased energy to 2 GeV.  
The evaluation of the impact of the higher energy on 
the field quality is shown in Fig. 7, where the magnetic 
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field errors are reported as a function of the horizontal 
amplitude for Ring 3 and 4. In terms of magnetic 
multipoles, this would generate non-linear components, 
but the magnitude of these effects seems small and the 
impact on beam dynamics should be negligible. Of 
course, this qualitative statement must be confirmed by 
detailed numerical simulations. Different saturation 
effects in outer and inner rings lead to a lower magnetic 
field (dipolar component at the centre of the gap) in the 
outer rings in addition to multipolar effects. In order to 
obtain the same magnetic field in all four rings, the 
current exciting the magnetic field is increased for the 
outer rings by adding a trim power supply. This implies 
that a higher current differential should be applied with 
respect to the situation in operation nowadays.  
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of field lines in the PSB main 
dipoles. 
The findings are summarised in Table 1. 
The main point to stress is that from the computations 
made the situation of the cooling power available will 
need to be reviewed. In principle, the additional cooling 
capacity as from Table 1 could be partially provided by 
an upgraded cooling station, the remaining fraction of 
heat load being absorbed by an increase of the operation 
temperature of the dipoles or an optimisation of the 
magnet cooling circuits and the magnetic cycle. Particular 
care shall be devoted to the analysis of the impact of a 
higher water flow rate to avoid corrosion issues as those 
observed in the SPS. 
The situation for the main quadrupoles is very similar 
and the main results are summarised in Fig. 8, where the 
field lines, the quadrupolar gradient, and the magnetic 
errors are shown.  
Also in this case no particular issue was found and the 
results are listed in Table 2 for focusing and defocusing 
quadrupoles. The situation of the cooling power does not 
seem to be a source of concern, but further studies are 
ongoing.  
Lastly, it is believed that the orbit and the multipole 
correctors with nested quadrupoles, sextupole, and 
octupole windings have enough margins to allow 
increasing the extraction energy. However, more detailed 
studies are needed to confirm this.  
 
Figure 7: Magnetic field errors in units of 10-4 for Ring 3 
and Ring 4. The situation for the current level of magnetic 
field as well as for the proposed one is shown in this plot. 
 
Table 1: Main parameters for PSB main dipoles (current 
situation and proposed upgrade) 
 Present +30% 
Field strength (T) 0.86 1.12 
Peak current (A)     
Inner Rings 4032  5255 
Outer Rings 4065 5515 
Power consumption (kW) 49  83 
Q (at ΔT= 8 K) (l/min) 26 44 
ΔT at Q = 26 l/min) (K) 28 47 
 
It is clear that such a major upgrade cannot take place 
without a revision also of the power supplies of the main 
magnets. Indeed, the currently installed main power 
converter cannot cope with the increased extraction 
energy. A new one is required as well as a new trim 
power converter for the gaps of the outer rings. The 
multipole magnets should not require any new power 
converter. 
PSB RF 
The proposed increase in extraction energy would bring 
frev to 1.81 MHz, hence slightly outside the range of the 
C02 cavities. However, this can be brought easily within 
the tuning range capabilities by shifting up the frequency 
interval of the cavities. This is made possible by the 
increased injection energy with the advent of the Linac4. 
Apart from this point it is clear that the increased 
intensity in the PSB would require re-considering the 
whole system, in particular in terms of power 
requirements. This consideration applies also to the C04 
cavities, which do not suffer from any need to shift the 
frequency range, but might need revision of the power 
part. In this respect, however, it will be easy to find 
synergies with the vigorous consolidation programme 
required in any case for maintaining in operation the PSB 
for the coming 25 years [14] and upgrades needed to fully 
profit of Linac4 for high intensity beams. 
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Figure 8: Field lines for the PSB main quadrupoles (left);
quadrupolar gradient vs. amplitude (upper right);
magnetic field error in units of 10-4 vs. amplitude for Ring
3 and Ring 4 (lower right). 
Table 2: Main parameters for PSB main quadrupoles 
(current situation and proposed upgrade) estimated from 
the main power supply current without taking into 
account trims. 
Focusing quadrupoles Present +30% 
Field gradient (T/m) 5.60 7.66 
Peak current (A) 4032  5255 
Power consumption (kW) 16  27 
Q (at ΔT= 20 K) (l/min) 12 20 
ΔT at Q = 12 l/min) (K) 20 34 
Defocusing quadrupoles   
Field gradient (T/m) 5.60 7.66 
Peak current (A) 4032  5255 
Power consumption (kW) 11  19 
Q (at ΔT= 20 K) (l/min) 8 14 
ΔT at Q = 8.3 l/min) (K) 20 34 
 
Transfer line magnets and power converters 
The proposed strategy implies to review the situation of 
the transfer line magnets for the BT, BTP, and BTM lines 
(see Fig. 5). Under these assumptions the BTY transfer 
line (see Fig. 5) should remain in its current state. A 
detailed analysis of the situation, namely which magnets 
can be re-used and which ones should be replaced, is not 
done to-date. Still, it is worth stressing that saturation 
effects due to the two extraction energies (transfer to PS 
or ISOLDE) should be looked at carefully once the 
analysis will be made. 
The original specification of the power converters can 
be found in Ref. [2]. The current performance, i.e., the 
minimum and maximum operational current values of the 
common part of the lines was adapted to the need of a 
PPM use of the transfer lines between ISOLDE and PS as 
final destination of the beams. This means that there is 
margin on the BTP line for re-adjusting the operational 
interval of the power converter to re-use at least some of 
them in the scenario of an increased PSB extraction 
energy. The gap between a 1.4 GeV ISOLDE cycle and a 
2 GeV PS cycle will drastically increase the power 
needed for the BT and BTM power converters. As already 
mentioned, the need to deliver 1 GeV beams to ISOLDE 
would require triple PPM operation. 
Kickers 
Kicker magnets are needed for extracting the beam 
from the PSB, for recombining bunches from the four 
PSB rings prior to PS injection, and for injecting into the 
PS ring. 
Booster extraction BE.KFA14L1: The kicker consists 
of 4 delay line magnets (Z0 = 25 Ω) pulsed in parallel for 
each PSB ring. Their generator consists of a gas filled 
Pulse Forming Line (PFL) rated 60 kV and discharged by 
a 60 kV thyratron. 
The maximum PFL voltage required at 1.4 GeV is 
about 42.5 kV. At 2 GeV the voltage required will be 
about 55 kV. The kicker rise time is expected to be longer 
by a few nanoseconds as a consequence of the voltage 
increase. The thyratron lifetime is also expected to 
decrease due to a higher current. A new ejection kicker 
tank will be required due to magnet ferrite saturation and 
the actual tank should also be upgraded to serve as a spare 
which does not exist for the moment. No operational 
margin will be left. 
Booster extraction bumpers BE.BSW14L4, 15L1, 
15L4: The magnet current at 1.4 GeV is 525 A. At 2 GeV 
the current will be within the limits of booster magnet 
type 5 (Imax = 765 A) and type 6 (Imax = 845 A) and can be 
used. Also the generator voltage will be within the 
capabilities of the current system. 
Booster transfer kickers BT1.KFA10, BT4.KFA10: 
Each kicker consists of 2 delay line magnets 
(Z0 = 12.5 Ω) pulsed in parallel. Each generator consists 
of a gas filled PFL discharged by a 60 kV thyratron. The 
pulse generators have the same limitations as the BE.KFA 
ones. Hence, all considerations already made would apply 
for this case. In particular it is recommended a change of 
ferrite grade, which would have also a positive impact on 
the vacuum performance.  
Booster transfer kickers BT.KFA20: The kicker 
consists of 2 delay line magnets (Z0 = 12.5 Ω) pulsed in 
parallel. The magnets are identical to the BTI.KFA10 
ones, except the ferrite that has already been upgraded, 
but the pulse generator configuration is not. In order to 
gain a few nanosecond rise time, the magnets are part of 
the PFL and are then charged to the full PFL voltage. 
Operation at 2 GeV requires a PFL voltage of 37 kV, 
which is at the limit of the magnet voltage hold-off. 
If necessary, the system could be reconfigured to be 
identical to the BTI.KFA with a loss of about 13 ns rise 
time. 
PS injection kicker PI.KFA45: Each of the four magnet 
modules can be used in terminated or short-circuit mode. 
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Table 3: Main parameters and comments concerning kickers’ upgrade 





Magnet Switch PFN Required current 
(A) 
Magnet Generator 
1.4 42.5 Ok Ok Ok 525 Ok ok 
2.0 55.25 New magnets and 
tank 
Ok Ok 682.5 Ok ok 
 






Magnet Switch PFN Required 
voltage (kV) 
Magnet Switch PFN 
1.4 42.5 Ok Ok Ok 28 Ok Ok Ok 
2.0 55.25 Ok, but ferrite change 
recommended and new tank 
possibly 
Ok Ok 36.4 Ok Ok Ok 
 
PI.KFA45 
Required voltage (kV/module) Magnet Switch PFN Module in short-circuit mode 
80 Ok Ok Ok No 
104 Ok Ok Ok Yes 
 
 
The generators consist of a gas filled PFL discharged 
by a 100 kV thyratron. Another thyratron is used to short-
circuit the magnet terminator when the short-circuit mode 
is requested. When used in short-circuit mode, the kick is 
increased by 82 % at full PFL voltage (80 kV). The main 
drawbacks of the short-circuit mode are:  
• increase of flattop ripple from ± 2 % to ± 3 % 
• increase of post pulse ripple from  ± 1.25 % to 
± 1.5 % 
• increase of rise time (2-98)% from 42 to 68 ns 
• increase of fall time (98-2)% from 68 to 87 ns 
The first two items might have an impact on the 
emittance blow-up of the injected beams. Preliminary 
computations seem to indicate that such an impact is 
negligible. The longer PS injection kicker fall times have 
no impact since they are still shorter than the 
recombination kicker rise times (and, in particular for 
LHC beams, since a longer gap - one missing bunch - is 
available for the kicker). 
If the short-circuit mode is deemed not suitable, then 
two new 80 kV magnet – generator systems have to be 
added to the present one. The main concerns are:  
• Unavailability of high voltage gas filled cables used 
for the PFL and transmission. At present, no 
potential manufacturer has been identified. 
• No space available in the present 365 building 
Therefore, if more detailed analysis indicates that the 
system cannot be used in short-circuit mode then 
development of new generators with PFL or Pulse 
Forming Network (PFN) is required. The solution with 
PFL is highly desirable for complexity reduction and 
optimized performance but it depends on the availability 
of critical components from industry.  
A summary of the kicker capabilities and upgrades 
required is reported in Table 3. 
Septa 
Septa magnets are needed for extracting the beam from 
the PSB, for recombining bunches from the four PSB 
rings prior to PS injection, and for injecting into the PS 
ring. 
PSB extraction: Up to 40 % strength margin is 
available. This makes it possible to re-use the septa with 
only modifications at the level of the internal bus bars and 
cooling.  
BT: Up to 20% strength margin is available, which is 
not enough for re-using the septa.  
PS injection: the septum has definitely no strength 
margin and it is not possible to envisage increasing the 
magnetic field any more. Therefore, the upgrade should 
be based on increasing the magnet length. This has rather 
serious impact on the overall layout of the PS injection.  
The septum is located in straight section 42 in which 
there is no room for any additional device (see Fig. 9). 
Therefore, two options should be studied, namely: 
• Displace the bumper magnet elsewhere. This would 
leave an empty short straight section for a stronger 
septum. However, a new layout of the slow bump 
should be evaluated (see Fig. 10 for a plot of the 
current version of the slow bump). 
• Displace the septum magnet elsewhere. This would 
imply changing the geometry of the transfer line 
between PSB and PS.  
In general, more detailed studies are needed to assess 
whether the septa power converters can be re-used.  
IMPACT ON OTHER SYSTEMS 
In the previous sections the main systems were 
reviewed to assess the type of changes and upgrade 
required to increase the PSB extraction energy. It is clear 
that a global analysis should be performed including also, 
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e.g., beam instrumentation, controls, and machine 
protection. 
 
Figure 9: Layout of the PS straight section 42 where the 
injection septum is located. Two main magnets (unit 41 
and 42) are visible on the left and right part of the picture. 
The bumper dipole is visible on the left side of the 
straight section, while the septum tank is visible on the 
right side of the straight section. 
Figure 10: Layout of the PS slow injection bump. Such a 
bump is generated by means of magnets located in 
straight sections 40, 42, 43, 44. 
TIMELINE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
In general, the hardware modifications or the design of 
brand new hardware should require between three to four 
years before having the devices ready for installation. 
The actual installation should need about eight months 
of work. This means that either two standard shutdown 
periods or one single long shutdown should be scheduled 
for the completion of the upgrade.  
It is important to stress that these rather approximate 
estimates would need a more detailed study to be 
confirmed. Furthermore, they assume full availability of 
resources, meaning that in case of sharing between the 
upgrade activities and normal shutdown or design 
activities, the overall length of the upgrade task should be 
increased.  
OTHER AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT 
In addition to the increase of the PSB extraction energy, 
there are a number of measures that could be considered 
in view of lifting performance limitations in the PS. The 
situation of the main magnets is currently under control 
thanks to the vigorous maintenance and refurbishment 
programme put in place in the last years [15-17]. 
Therefore, in the analysis presented here it will be 
assumed that the PS can be maintained for the coming 25 
year in good operational state.  
It is worth stressing that in some cases it is difficult to 
quantify the current limitation and, consequently, to 
evaluate the potential improvement. Therefore, detailed 
studies should be carried out to quantify the limitation, 
prior to any consideration on whether mitigation measures 
might be useful. 
PS working point control 
It is well-known that the PS main magnets are made of 
combined function magnets. Each dipole consists of two 
half-unit with focusing and defocusing quadrupole 
components [18]. A schematic view of the main magnet is 
plotted in Fig. 11.  
The horizontal and vertical tunes are controlled by two 
families of quadrupoles at low energy, while at higher 
energies a set of special coils are used. These coils allow 
introducing a non-linear dependence with amplitude of 
the field in the main magnets, thus generating both 
quadrupolar and sextupolar fields. This enables 
controlling not only the tunes, but also the chromaticities. 
Three main circuits are available, namely the figure-of-
eight and pole-face-windings, which are divided into a 
focusing and a defocusing circuit. Each of these is then 
split into a narrow and a wide component according to the 
type of windings. A sketch of these additional coils is 
shown in Fig. 12, while in Fig. 13 a picture is reported. 
 
Figure 11: Layout of the PS main magnet with a side view 
of the pole profile. 
Originally, only three circuits were available for 
controlling the four physical observables, which imposed 
to set up the machine by leaving one of the four quantities 
floating. 
Then, the narrow and wide components of the circuits 
were split to provide five independent control knobs [19]. 
Even if the flexibility of tuning the working point of the 
PS has been greatly increased, there is still a difficulty 
due to the choice to be made about the use of the fifth 
degree-of-freedom. Furthermore, to-date no predictive 
magnetic model exists to determine the currents to be 
used to obtain a given working point. From an operational 
point of view a set of matrices representing the variation 
of the tunes and chromaticities in the neighbourhood of 
predefined current settings were measured at different 
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care imposed by the fact that these matrices are not 
square, allows controlling the PS working point. High-
intensity and high brightness beams are the most 
demanding in terms of working point control. Therefore, 
an improvement in the way the tunes and the 
chromaticities are set-up would be highly welcome. It is 
certainly very beneficial to pursue the efforts put in the 
development of a reliable magnetic model of these 
circuits in view of making more effective the setting up of 
the machine.  
 
 
Figure 12: Schematic layout of the additional coils used to 
control the tunes and the chromaticities of the PS. 
Faster ramping of PS 
As it is stated in the document specifying the new PS 
power converter [20], pulsing the PS magnets to 
26 GeV/c in 1.2 s should be possible at least from the 
point of view of the main power supply (indeed flat top 
length is a bit too short for any beam manipulation 
different from a simple fast extraction without any 
longitudinal or transverse manipulation). Still, one might 
wonder what would be the gain in case of pulsing the PS 
faster for, e.g., the filling time of the LHC. It turns out 
that a marginal reduction (about 15 %) should be 
expected. Hence, this option does not seem particularly 
useful, also taking into account the potential adverse 
consequence this could have on the magnet lifetime, due 
to the increased mechanical stress, and the higher voltage. 
The only interesting application for pulsing the PS faster 
might be for a new way of generating the fixed target 
beams (see later). 
Vacuum pipe layout 
It is proposed to pursue a review of the vacuum system 
layout (see Fig. 14 for an example of the horizontal cross-
section of the PS vacuum chambers) in order to 
• Analyse the potential aperture bottleneck in view of 
proposing mitigation measures. This review was 
already started in the framework of the PS Multi-
Turn Extraction (MTE) project [21] where a number 
of limitations were considered and improved. The 
proposed upgrade of the PSB extraction energy will 
have a marginal beneficial impact on the beam size 
(reduction at the level of 10 %) at PS injection, but a 
detailed analysis is certainly important. 
• Evaluate the impact on the longitudinal impedance 
of the missing tapering between vacuum chambers 
of different cross-section. This analysis should 
indicate whether an impedance reduction campaign 
should be launched. 
• Study means to combat e-could effects, which will 




Figure 13: Picture of the pole-face-windings before being 
embedded in the plastic support. 
Losses at PS extraction 
The MTE beam has removed the losses on the 
electrostatic septum in straight section 31 due to the 
Continuous Transfer (CT) beam. The choice of the 
longitudinal structure, de-bunched beam, imposed by the 
optimisation of the SPS performance [22] has introduced 
localised beam losses on the magnetic septum in straight 
section 16. Under these conditions, the beam losses are 
unavoidable and systematic at each extraction, 
corresponding to about 2-3 % of the total beam intensity. 
Mitigation measures were already anticipated in the MTE 
design report [21] and consist essentially in replacing the 
magnetic septum with a thinner one, still magnetic. Of 
course, the use of an electrostatic septum would be even 
more appropriate due to its reduced thickness. However, 
it is worth listing the many constraints to be considered in 
view of finding an appropriate solution to this problem, 
namely: 
• The electrostatic septum in section 31 (or its spare) 
cannot be re-used. In fact, it fits a long straight 
section, which, in the extraction region, corresponds 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
236
to section 11. Even neglecting that a spare RF cavity 
is installed there (it could be moved to section 31) 
both the slow and fast bumps have zero amplitude in 
section 11, thus making useless the presence of a 
septum there.  
• A new electrostatic septum could be installed only 
in section 15 (the others being already filled or with 
a very small bump amplitude). Nonetheless, in 
section 15 only about 0.4 m are available and 
displacement of the bumper and the gamma-jump 
quadrupole does not seem possible. 
In any case a detailed study is mandatory before drawing 
any conclusions.  
 
 
Figure 14: Horizontal cross section of the PS vacuum 
chambers. 
New generation of Fixed Target physics beams 
from PS 
It is sometimes mentioned [23] that the SPS could 
profit from higher extraction energy from the PS of the 
beam for the fixed target physics programme. The reason 
behind this request is that transition crossing in the SPS 
would be avoided. This argument immediately fixes the 
value of the PS extraction energy to 26 GeV/c. This is the 
first source of limitations, as the strength of the kickers 
for MTE is adapted to 14 GeV/c with no margin. 
Upgrading the kickers would be extremely expensive, not 
to mention the difficulty in finding the place for 
additional elements. On the other hand, adding few more 
magnets could be an easy way to increase the strength of 
the non-linear magnets (sextupoles and octupoles) used to 
generate the stable islands) It is important to stress, 
however, that the strength is not the only limitation. 
Indeed, in particular for the neutrino experiments, what 
counts is the flux of protons. Hence, unless with the new 
PS main power supply it is possible to pulse faster (with 
the warnings already mentioned in previous sections), the 
beneficial effect of increasing the extraction energy would 
be quickly lost by the reduced duty factor imposed by the 
2.4 s period between PS extractions. Mitigation measures 
would involve a study of potential optimisation of the PS 
and SPS cycles in view of reducing the overhead imposed 
by the longer time between extractions. This because, as 
already mentioned, the option of pulsing the PS faster 
does not seem feasible. 
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper the limiting factors of the PSB and PS 
machines have been analysed in view of improving the 
performance of the proton beams for the LHC.  
With the advent of the Linac4, the beam intensity will 
be limited by space charge effects at PS injection, thus 
making an increase of the PSB extraction energy an 
attractive option in view of lifting this fundamental limit.  
The analysis made shows that the PSB main magnets 
can indeed sustain an energy upgrade to 2 GeV, and this 
would enable generating LHC beams with about 
2.7×1011 p/b. This potential improvement entails a 
number of beam dynamics challenges that have been 
outlined in the paper. It is worth mentioning that a 
positive side effect of this upgrade would be a reduction 
of the losses at injection in the PS for the fixed target 
physics beams. 
In terms of hardware modifications, the PSB upgrade 
features attractive synergies with the ongoing and already 
planned consolidation programme aimed at keeping the 
CERN machines in good operational state for the next 25 
years. In this paper a detailed analysis of the changes to 
be carried out was presented. 
It is clear that this proposal aims at pushing further the 
performance of the existing machines, while not 
improving the situation in terms of age of the low energy 
LHC injectors.  
Other areas of study of potential limitations of the PS 
machine have been outlined and should be further studied 
in the future to assess their relevance for machine 
performance. 
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SPS UPGRADE POSSIBILITIES
E. Shaposhnikova, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
The LHC beam with characteristics close to nominal
was already obtained in the SPS a few years ago. The
main beam-quality limitation comes from the e-cloud effect
which seems also to be responsible for high beam losses.
During MD sessions in 2008 and 2009 the total intensity of
the LHC beam was limited to three PS batches. Intensities
above nominal have not yet been seen in the SPS and possi-
ble limitations can only be estimated from the scaling laws
and machine studies. Future upgrades aimed at removal of
the known bottlenecks in the SPS are presented. The con-
sequences of operating with SPL and PS2 as pre-injectors
are also considered.
PRESENT STATUS AND MOTIVATION
FOR UPGRADE
Various LHC upgrade scenarios which are presently un-
der consideration [1] are based on the ultimate LHC beam
with bunches of 1.7 × 1011 pp spaced at 25 ns. One
scenario, called “LPA” - Large Piwinski Angle, requires
bunches spaced by 50 ns with much higher bunch inten-
sity. All schemes have their own challenges in LHC. The
SPS should be able to reliably accelerate much higher beam
intensity than achieved so far and therefore significant im-
provements to the machine performance should be found
and implemented on the same time scale as LHC upgrade.
At the moment the SPS is able to deliver at top energy
the LHC beam (4 batches of 72 bunches spaced at 25 ns)
with nominal intensity of 1.2× 1011 per bunch. This beam
has nominal longitudinal emittance (0.63 ± 0.1 eVs [2])
and close to nominal 3.5 μm transverse emittances (εh =
3.0 ± 0.3 μm and εv = 3.6 ± 0.3 μm [3]). The maximum
total intensity was obtained for the CNGS type beam in
2004 [4]. A single bunch with 1.8 × 1011 (ultimate LHC
intensity) was seen in the SPS at 26 GeV/c in 2006.
In 2008 4 batches of 36 bunches spaced at 50 ns were
injected into the SPS for the first time. The nominal bunch
intensity (1.1×1011) was achieved at 450 GeV/c with very
small longitudinal and transverse emittances. This beam
was stable on the SPS flat top without the controlled emit-
tance blow-up required for stabilisation of the 25 ns spaced
beam and had an average bunch length of 1.3 ns (emit-
tance of 0.4 eVs) [2]. Transverse (V&H) emittances of
1.2&1.5 μm were measured on the flat top. Beam losses
were also significantly less than for nominal beam with 25
ns spacing. No e-cloud signal could be observed in the spe-
cial diagnostic systems installed in the SPS (see below).
In all LHC upgrade scenarios it is assumed that the SPS
will be able to reliably provide a beam with characteristics
significantly exceeding those obtained up to now. From a
comparison of what has been achieved so far and what is
expected from the SPS in the future, see Table 1, it is clear
that a significant SPS upgrade is mandatory.
SPS LHC
record request
450 GeV/c 450 GeV/c
parameter LHC CNGS nom. ultim.
spacing ns 25 5 25 25
Nb 1011 1.2 0.13 1.2 1.8
nbunch 288 4200 288 288
Ntot 1013 3.5 5.3 3.5 5.2
εL eVs 0.6 0.8 < 1 < 1
εh/v μm 3.6/3.5 8/5 3.5 3.5
Table 1: Maximum intensities achieved in the SPS up to
now and future requests. 5% beam loss assumed for SPS-
LHC beam transfer. The CNGS beam has a maximum en-
ergy of 400 GeV.
The intensities from the injector chain based on the new
accelerators Linac4-LPSPL-PS2 [5], [6] are even more
challenging for the SPS.
The main tasks of the interdepartmental Study Group,
SPSU [7], created in 2007 were first to identify limitations
in the existing SPS, then study and propose solutions with a
Design Report to be issued in 2011. This Study Group con-
sists of some permanent members but contributions from
different hardware group (in form of presentations) are also
very important for both identifying limitations and their
mitigations. A separate impedance team [8] led by E. Me-




Possible intensity limitations for a single bunch in the
SPS are from space charge, TMCI (transverse mode cou-
pling instability) and microwave instability.
For the LHC bunch at 26 GeV/c the space-charge tune
spread ΔQsc is 0.05 for the nominal intensity and 0.07 for
the ultimate intensity [9]. The tolerable limit for the space-
charge tune spread in the SPS from past experience (ppbar)
is believed to be around 0.07. At an injection energy of 50
GeV/c the space charge tune spread is less by a factor 4.
After the impedance reduction achieved in 2001 the mi-
crowave instability has no longer been observed in the SPS.
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This is true even for very small longitudinal emittances
(0.15 eVs) with nominal bunch intensity, indicating that
this instability should not be a problem for bunch inten-
sities significantly higher than ultimate.
On the other hand, after the impedance reduction cam-
paign, targeted mainly on the longitudinal impedance, an-
other instability, the TMCI, has been observed in the SPS
for proton bunches with small longitudinal emittances [10].
With the impedance model obtained from a best fit to mea-
surements for the LHC bunch at 26 GeV/c (2006) the
threshold intensity at zero chromaticity is Nth ∼ 1.4×1011
[11].
Multi-bunch effects
The e-cloud, generated by the presence of many bunches
in the ring, is at the origin of the single bunch vertical in-
stability. Other multi-bunch limitations are beam losses,
coupled bunch instabilities, beam loading in the 200 MHz
and 800 MHz RF systems as well as heating of different
machine elements (e.g. MKE and MKDV kickers) and vac-
uum issues (beam dump, MKDV and MKDH outgassing,
ZS septum sparking).
Beam losses In 2003 an LHC beam with nominal in-
tensity and longitudinal parameters was accelerated in the
SPS to top energy. However this could be achieved only by
injecting 15% more particles due to significant beam loss.
After intensive MD studies, a reduction of losses to 7% was
obtained at the end of 2004 with a new working point and
additional RF gymnastics on the flat bottom [3], [12].
During MDs in 2008-2009 particle loss (flat bottom plus
capture) reduced from 20% at the beginning of year to 10%
at the end probably due to scrubbing of the ring by the e-
cloud (however machine tuning cannot be eliminated as a
possible reason). In general the injection and capture losses
of the LHC beam in the SPS have a strong dependence on
the batch intensity and less on the number of batches in the
ring. After some time in coast the LHC batch has a trian-
gular shape due to a poor lifetime of bunches in the batch
tail [12]. A reduction in relative loss to 3% for a beam with
75 ns bunch spacing and nominal bunch intensity shows
that losses are most probably not due to a single bunch ef-
fect (e.g. space charge).
Usually the relative beam loss increases with intensity
due to different collective effects (space charge, beam load-




To keep the same absolute loss ΔNloss, responsible for the
radiological impact, the relative loss should be reduced at
higher intensity proportional to 1/Ntot. As a result, for
higher beam intensities, significantly improved machine
performance and radioprotection will be required. Beam
collimation for beam loss control could be necessary as
well.
e-cloud The effects caused by the presence of the elec-
tron cloud are considered at the moment to be the most im-
portant intensity limitations in the SPS. They lead to trans-
verse emittance blow-up (above the nominal LHC value)
and instabilities - coupled bunch in the horizontal plane
(seen at a few MHz) and single bunch in the vertical plane
in the batch tail. They could also be at the origin of beam
losses [13].
Present cures include an annual scrubbing run at the end
of each SPS shutdown, operation with high chromaticity in
the vertical plane and transverse damping in the horizontal
plane.
Studies done with 1.1 × 1011 p/bunch on the coupled-
bunch instability in the H-plane at different energies [14]
suggest that the instability growth rate scales as ∼ 1/γ and
improvement can be expected at higher injection energy.
On the other hand, e-cloud simulations done for the verti-
cal plane predict threshold reduction with energy which can
be explained by the transverse beam size reduction with en-
ergy at constant normalised emittance. The intensive ma-
chine studies on the vertical e-cloud instability at different
SPS energies in 2006 and 2007 (on a specially created mag-
netic cycle) confirmed this scaling law [15].
The simulations [16] of e-cloud build-up for 25 ns and
50 ns bunch spacings and intensities relevant to future SPS
beams show non-monotonic dependence on bunch inten-
sity for 25 ns bunch spacing and a fixed SEY (Second Elec-
tron Yield) value. For 50 ns bunch spacing a higher inten-
sity (above the nominal LHC intensity) always seems to be
better.
Impedance The SPS impedance was significantly re-
duced during the 2000/2001 shutdown in preparation for
nominal LHC beam intensities. No microwave instability
has been observed since then. However during the period
2003-2006 the SPS impedance has increased, mainly due
to the re-installation of 8 extraction kickers (MKE) for the
LHC beam. The longitudinal impedance change can be fol-
lowed by measurements of the quadrupole oscillation fre-
quency shift with intensity, Fig. 1. The slope, being propor-
tional to the effective longitudinal impedance, shows the
expected variation. Similar measurements done in the ver-
tical plane show changes in impedance with even higher
precision, however only 50% of the transverse impedance
budget is identified and a search for the rest continues [17].
The impedance budget of the SPS is under construction by
the Impedance team [8], [18].
The longitudinal impedance model of the SPS which in-
cludes contributions from the two TW RF systems (200
MHz and 800 MHz) and 18 different kickers is in good
agreement with beam measurements. Indeed from mea-
sured synchronous phase [20] and synchrotron frequency
[19] shifts with intensity the resistive and reactive parts of
impedance could be evaluated. The largest contributors to
the inductive impedance are the MKE kickers [21]. The
reactive impedance is responsible for the loss of Landau
damping stabilising the beam. The resistive impedance de-
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Figure 1: The slope b from measured (symbols) and calcu-
lated (solid lines) quadrupole synchrotron frequency shift
with bunch intensity as a function of average bunch length
(during oscillations in the SPS), data from 2001 and 2007-
2008. Calculated slope b for known longitudinal SPS
impedance in 2001 and 2008 [19].
termines the instability growth rate and leads to heating.
The narrow-band impedance responsible for the longitu-
dinal coupled bunch instability (see below) is not known.
Possible impedance sources of this instability are the fun-
damental and HOMs (at 629, 912 MHz...) of the 200 MHz
and 800 MHz RF systems.
Longitudinal coupled bunch instabilities The longi-
tudinal coupled-bunch instability of the LHC beam in the
SPS is characterised by a very low intensity threshold [22].
A single LHC batch with 2× 1010 p/bunch becomes unsta-
ble during acceleration at ∼ 280 GeV/c.
To stabilise the beam controlled emittance blow-up is
performed twice during the cycle, in addition to the use
of the 800 MHz RF system as a Landau cavity in bunch-
shortening mode throughout the cycle. The first blow-up is
with mismatched voltage at injection; due to filamentation
the initial emittance of 0.35 eVs is increased to 0.42 eVs.
The second takes place at around 200 GeV/c, with band-
limited noise which blows up the emittance to 0.6 eVs. The
emittance blow-up in a double RF system has its own limi-
tations due to the presence of beam loading [23]. The Beam
Quality Monitor, in operation from the end of 2009 [24],
controls the longitudinal bunch parameters prior to the ex-
traction to LHC.
At injection the coupled-bunch instability is observed at
∼ 1.1 × 1011/bunch (with 800 MHz off). No significant
change in threshold due to injection at 50 GeV/c is ex-
pected.
For ultimate LHC intensities controlled emittance blow-
up to at least 0.75 eVs will be needed to stabilise the beam.
It is also possible that for these high intensities larger lon-
gitudinal emittances are required at 450 GeV in LHC itself
(IBS growth rate [25]). Then beam transfer to the LHC
400 MHz RF system from the SPS 200 MHz RF system
becomes critical and two solutions are possible:
(1) to install the 200 MHz RF system in LHC (see [26]);
(2) to increase the voltage at extraction in the SPS 200
MHz RF system.
To have the same bunch length at the larger emittance,
which is ∝ √N , one would need a voltage Nult/Nnom
times higher than the present 7.5 MV, which means 10.5
MV for the ultimate bunch intensity. This in turn will re-
quire an upgrade of the SPS RF system as discussed in the
next section.
Beam loading There are two RF systems in the SPS,
200 MHz and 800 MHz, both of TW (travelling wave) type.
The 200 MHz RF system consists of 2 cavities of 5 sec-
tions and 2 cavities of 4 sections. Each section has 11 cells.
Presently the total voltage available at nominal LHC inten-
sity is 8 MV. The power per cavity is limited to 750 kW
in continuous operation (full ring, CNGS type beam) by
power amplifiers, couplers and feeder lines [27]. Theoret-
ically, a higher value (1 or even 1.4 MW) is possible in
pulsed mode for an LHC beam filling less than half of the
ring. However this mode of operation is not fully tested
yet. The power per 200 MHz cavity during the LHC cycle
in the SPS is shown in Fig. 2 for different beam intensities.
It corresponds to the voltage program with maximum of 4.5






















Figure 2: Power per SPS 200 MHz cavity having 4 or 5
sections for different beam currents during the LHC cycle.
The 800 MHz voltage during the cycle usually follows
the 200 MHz voltage program at 1/10 level. After the on-
going upgrade, the required power for the 800 MHz RF
system will be well below limitations [28].




The TMCI threshold scales as ε|η| (for a matched volt-
age), where η = 1/γ2 − 1/γ2t and therefore has its mini-
mum at injection (above transition γt = 22.8).
Possible measures to remove this potential bottle-neck
are
• increased longitudinal emittance
• increased vertical chromaticity
• increased voltage at injection
• impedance reduction (after identification)
• transverse feedback [29]
• high harmonic (800 MHz) RF system
• increased injection energy (at 50 GeV/c the TMCI
threshold is higher than at 26 GeV/c by a factor 2.5)
As already seen in MD studies devoted to loss reduction
of LHC beam in the SPS [12] the first three options above
could lead to slow particle loss on the flat bottom.
MD studies in 2010 with the maximum bunch inten-
sity available from the PS would help to refine the TMCI
threshold and possible cures.
e-cloud
Possible e-cloud mitigation is under extensive investiga-
tion by the SPSU Study Group [7]. The main options stud-
ied include
• grooves
• clearing electrodes along the beam pipe
• active damping system in the vertical plane
• surface coating
The positive effect of grooves was shown both in simu-
lations [30] and measurements of the SEY [31]. However
their manufacture and installation as well as the resulting
aperture reduction and impedance are still unsolved prob-
lems for this option.
The installation of clearing electrodes (enamel based) all
along the SPS ring requires heating to 600-800 deg [32]
and is not feasible for the existing vacuum chamber inside
SPS magnets. The impedance of the electrodes is another
serious issue.
A feasibility study of active damping of the single bunch
vertical instability using a wide-band feedback system [29]
is also under way in collaboration with LARP [33]. Signif-
icant progress was achieved in improving beam diagnos-
tics in 2009. The main problem for this option, apart from
the technical challenges, are incoherent effects (emittance
blow-up) below the instability threshold.
The last, but the most promising option at the moment,
is a surface coating which should significantly reduce the
SEY (secondary electron yield) without need for future re-
activation, which could be done in-situ, without baking
above 120 deg C, and which would not reduce the aperture.
The best candidates found so far are a-C (amorphous car-
bon) coatings produced by magnetron sputtering on smooth
or rough surfaces [34]. A SEY below 1 has been obtained
- 1.3 is the critical value for the SPS.
The special experimental set-up in the SPS used for dif-
ferent e-cloud measurements from 2008 [35] includes a
clearing electrode with button pick-ups and 4 strip-line de-
tectors: one monitor with stainless steel liner without any
coating for reference, and three others with different coat-
ings under study (a-C, a-C on rough surface and StSt from
2010 for local pressure measurements). In addition a spe-
cial vacuum chamber with removeable under UHV sample
(StSt in 2008 and a-C in 2009) was used for analysis in
the lab of surface conditioning with beam. This special
vacuum chamber and all electron cloud monitors are in-
stalled in dipole magnets having a field variation from 0 to
2 kGauss (1.2 kGauss is the SPS injection value).
Main results obtained from liners [36]:
• 300 times smaller e-cloud signal in a-C than in StSt
• conditioning (scrubbing) effect observed even for
small SEY (a-C)
• no ageing for a-C liners exposed to the beam (but not
to e-cloud)
At the beginning of 2009 the vacuum chamber (60 mm
on the top and bottom) of the three spare dipole MBB mag-
nets was coated with a specially developed (crash program)
coating system [37] which uses the dipole field of the mag-
nets for sputtering. These magnets were installed in the
ring (LSS5) with microwave transmission [38] and vacuum
diagnostics (arranged for comparison in 3 pairs: coated-
coated, coated-uncoated and uncoated-uncoated). Absence
of e-cloud in coated magnets was finally confirmed by mi-
crowave measurements after overcoming a lot of difficul-
ties in clean signal detection [39]. However no significant
reduction in pressure rise was observed between coated
magnets in comparison with reference uncoated magnets
nearby. This was also true when at the end of the year the
inter-magnet region (pumping port shield) was coated in
addition. In general pressure in the coated magnets with-
out beam is higher than in the uncoated. Note that a large
variation (more than factor 10) in maximum pressure exists
between the uncoated MBB magnets.
During the recent shutdown one coated MBB magnet
(MBB51490) was removed and replaced by uncoated. Af-
ter cooling down it will be open and carefully inspected.
Endoscopy shows a lot of different traces, difficult to iden-
tify at the moment. Design of a new coating system (based
on permanent magnets) is under way.
The infrastructure for implementation of magnet coating
in the SPS tunnel already partially exists due to refurbish-
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ing of the SPS dipoles. According to the estimates (see
[40] for more detailed information on cost and planning)
∼ 750 vacuum chambers inside the magnets can be coated
during 3-4 normal (14 weeks of access) SPS shutdowns.
Without any serious modifications the capacity of the un-
derground workshop ECX5 (plus 100 m2 floor in ECA5) is
for 16 dipoles and would be 24 magnets with the additional
300 m2 floor space in ECA5. The detailed comparison of
work planning for 3 and 4 years, based on consultations
with all groups involved in the project, shows that a 4-year
scenario has many advantages and is also ∼ 30% less ex-
pensive (by 2 MCHF). It is expected that a 5 year-scenario
will be again more expensive due to non-optimum use of
manpower. With 4 days required for coating (with cleaning
and installation) of one magnet and 4 magnets produced
per day we will need 8 coating benches working simulta-
neously. One of the potential problems is the large quan-
tity of contaminated water (after rinsing). Radiation level
(ALARA) should be also taken into account for work plan-
ning after a beam stop.
Open questions presently under study are surface age-
ing with venting and scrubbing, magnet coating quality and
outgassing. In addition, it is still not decided what else
in the ring should be coated (quadrupoles, inter-magnet
pumping port shields...)
These and other important issues related to coatings
were addressed during the AEC0’9 workshop ”Anti e-
cloud coatings (that do not require activation)” organised
by the SPSU SG together with ACCNET at CERN in Oc-
tober 2009 [41].
Venting must be avoided in future if coating is to be ap-
plied to the SPS vacuum chamber. This means also modi-
fications to the SPS vacuum system.
Vacuum system
Future modifications to the SPS vacuum system, see
[42], required for carbon coated magnets are mainly deter-
mined by the need to minimise ageing of the coating due
to the air exposure of magnets which happens during shut-
down work and interventions. Existing practice with paral-
lel work in several sectors, transportation in the tunnel, dis-
connected or removed equipment, magnet’s interchange-
ability, alignment procedure - all should be reconsidered
from this point of view. Storage and transport of mag-
nets will be done under vacuum or in N2. Probably there
is no necessity to refine sectorisation, delicate equipment
is already protected. The list of required studies includes
many issues (such as shutdown work-flow, installation pro-
cedures, monitoring, mobile pumping...) and should be pri-
oritised.
Impedance reduction
Machine elements with high impedance become inten-
sity limitations in two ways: by leading to beam instabili-
ties and by their own heating and outgassing. The previous
impedance reduction campaign was mainly looking after
longitudinal impedance. Now it should be the turn for the
transverse impedance, especially due to the now observed
TMCI.
To reduce the MKE kicker beam coupling impedance
a technical solution based on an inter-digital comb struc-
ture printed on ferrite has been developed and is now im-
plemented on 3 (MKE6) kickers [21]. Measurements in
the lab show a significant improvement for the longitudi-
nal impedance below 1.5 GHz and this is also confirmed
by measurements of kicker heating by the beam (factor 4
reduction in temperature rise for LHC beam) [43]. The re-
duction in the transverse plane is smaller. It is planned to
equip 5 more MKE kickers during the next 3 shutdowns.
All MKE kickers and one MKDV magnet have transition
pieces between magnet and tank. Transition pieces are still
to be installed in all MKDH and MKDV2 which show now
(in 2009) more outgassing with 50 ns beam than MKDV1
(problem in 2008) [44]. The impedance reduction of other
SPS kickers is also now under investigation.
Search for unknown impedances is a very important is-
sue for the prediction power of the existing impedance
models. The impedance reduction required for future SPS
intensities assumes first of all its identification.
The impedance of the 800 MHz RF system is also seen
by the beam. Beam loading in this RF system makes diffi-
cult precise control of the phase required for beam stabili-
sation. It is planned to have RF feedback and feedforward
systems at the end of 2010. This requires installation of
probes in each cell (37/cavity).
Another significant reduction in impedance can be
achieved by rearranging the existing four 200 MHz cavi-
ties (see below).
RF upgrade
As was discussed above, more voltage is required for
transfer of beams with larger emittance to LHC. On the
other hand, the existing two 5-section cavities can provide
much less voltage at ultimate LHC current for power limit
of 1.4 MW/cavity [45] and become practically useless with
1 MW/cavity, Fig.3.
A possible solution to this problem is to rearrange the
existing 4 cavities (with 2 spare sections) into 5 or 6 cavi-
ties of shorter length with 1 or 2 extra power plants which
allow simultaneously to reduce beam loading per cavity,
increase available voltage and even reduce total beam cou-
pling impedance. The price to pay (for having more volt-
age) is corresponding total power increase by 25% or 50%.
Total beam coupling impedance of the 200 MHz TW RF






where R = 27.1 kOhm/m2, Ln = L0(11n − 1), L0 =
0.374 m and n is number of sections per cavity. The two
most promising options for RF configuration are presented
in Table 2 together with the actual situation. Even with two
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Figure 3: Voltage from one SPS 200 MHz TW cavity hav-
ing different number of sections for nominal (top circles)
and ultimate (bottom circles) beam current.
extra (spare at the moment) sections (the case of 6 cavities)
the total impedance of shorter cavities will be ∼ 20% less
than now.
total ncav Z V [MV]
number with nsect MΩ for 1 MW
ncav 3 4 5 2.4 A 3.0 A
4 0 2 2 4.5 3.7 0
5 2 3 0 3.6 8.0 3.6
6 4 2 0 3.7 9.6 5.9
Table 2: Beam coupling fundamental impedance Z and
voltage V available at 450 GeV/c (for ultimate and twice
nominal current with 1 MW power limit) with possible fu-
ture configurations of the 200 MHz RF system in the SPS
and the actual one (first row).
The present power limitation applied in operation is
750 kW/cavity [27]. The existing configuration can only
provide 4 MV at ultimate current even at 1 MW/cavity
(possible in pulsed mode, but not tested yet). The same
voltage for ultimate current as now for nominal can be ob-
tained with 6 cavities and power of 1 MW, Fig. 4. Note that
nominal and ultimate LHC intensities (plus 10% for losses)
correspond in the SPS to the RF current of 1.5 A and 2.4 A
(shown with dashed lines).
In Fig. 5 maximum total voltage achievable for nomi-
nal and ultimate current with different RF configurations is
shown as a function of RF power available per cavity.
For the 6 cavity option the gain in available voltage (for
a given current) is even more significant for fast cycles (FT
and CNGS) with short acceleration time. Presently both
voltage and power are at the limit since 7.5 MV are used
after transition crossing. With 6 cavities almost 30% more
voltage will be available for a given current or twice higher
current can be accelerated with the same voltage (implies
longitudinal emittance control), Fig. 6. Similar improve-
ment can be expected with 6 cavities for the fast LHC cy-
cle.
Much higher RF power per cavity (3.3-4.5 MW) is re-

















Figure 4: Total voltage possible with maximum power of 1
MW/cavity for different RF configurations with 4 (present
situation), 5 or 6 cavities as a function of beam current.
Total number of sections is 18 for 4 and 5 cavities option
and 20 for 6 cavities. Nominal and ultimate beam currents
are shown with a dashed line.





















Figure 5: Total voltage possible for nominal and ultimate
LHC intensity for different RF configurations from Table 2
with 4 (present situation), 5 or 6 cavities as a function of
power limit per cavity.
quired for the maximum PS2 intensities (RF current of
5.2 A). This implies more short cavities and power with
2 power plants (2 feeder lines) per cavity [27].
Internal beam dump
The TIDVG is one of 4 beam dumps/collimators in-
stalled in LSS1. It serves to absorb all types of the SPS
beam dumped with energy above 105 GeV/c. Below 37
GeV/c beam is dumped at the TIDH. No dumping is possi-
ble between these two limits. In a design made in 2000 for
high intensity beams, the Aluminum core (primary dump)
was replaced by Graphite and the cooling system was mod-
ified [47]. The Graphite was covered by Titanium foil
which was damaged during operation and became an SPS
aperture limitation. Due to the high radioactivity repair was
not possible and the dump was replaced in 2006 by one of
the two spares produced in 2000. This time the Graphite
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Figure 6: Total voltage possible at maximum acceleration
during FT/CNGS cycle for CNGS type beam (5 ns bunch
spacing) as a function of RF current (0.73 A corresponds to
total intensity of 4.8×1013) for different RF configurations
from Table 2.
was baked to 1000 deg before coating and to 150 deg in situ
(250 deg was recommended but could not be achieved due
to limitations in the bake-out system). From 2006 dumping
of the LHC beam during MDs caused significant pressure
rises and beam interlocks, in particular from that protect-
ing the MKP. This is explained by the fact that operational
temperatures (T) are higher than the final bake-out T (150
deg).
The limits of TIDGV for dumping current and future
LHC and CNGS-type beams in the SPS were explored us-
ing ANSYS and FLUKA simulations [48]. The main limi-
tation is the Antico (aluminum) temperature which should
not exceed 450 deg. The proposed slight design modifi-
cation should increase the number of allowed consecutive
dumps by up to 50%. Currently the dump absorbs at 450
GeV only 155 GeV/p.
New design and materials can significantly increase per-
formance and should be used for the long-term solution.
Hardware modifications needed
• ZS (electrostatic septa) - show-stopper for nominal
LHC beam in 2008 and 2009
• Impedance reduction: MKE, MKDV, MKDH and
other (as identified)
• SPS magnet coating after successful tests
• Vacuum system (for coated chamber)
• 200 MHz RF system and beam control
• Transverse damper low-level control [49]
• Beam dump (TIDVG)
• Beam instrumentation (MOPOS, BCT and BWS) [50]
• Beam collimation (under investigation)
• Radioprotection
SUMMARY
The main SPS limitations for ultimate intensity have
been identified. They are the e-cloud effect, beam load-
ing in the 200 MHz RF system, transverse mode coupling
(TMCI) and longitudinal coupled bunch instabilities.
Machine development sessions with higher than nomi-
nal intensity are needed to see other possible limitations
(obtained by scaling laws and simulations so far).
Proposed measures to overcome the known limitations
are under study; they could help even for nominal LHC
beam operation and can be implemented earlier. Main pro-
posals are e-cloud mitigation, impedance reduction and RF
upgrade. Recent work in the SPSU SG has mainly concen-
trated on e-cloud mitigation; amorphous carbon coating of
vacuum chamber is the best candidate for implementation
in the SPS. The increased number of shorter (than present)
200 MHz cavities with 2 extra power plants should restore
the performance for ultimate LHC intensities, this modifi-
cation will also reduce the pressure for the installation of
the capture (200 MHz) RF system in LHC.
In the injector upgrade plan with LPSPL and PS2, the
SPS would have a higher injection energy which helps to
overcome some intensity limitations (single bunch, injec-
tion losses) and avoid transition crossing for CNGS/FT
beams. This path needs many extra studies and hardware
modifications.
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OTHER SCENARIOS FOR A PARTIAL UPGRADE  
OF THE INJECTOR COMPLEX 
C. Carli, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
Other partial upgrade options than the proposed 
scenario consisting of the construction of a 4GeV SPL 
and PS2, together with substantial SPS upgrades, are 
investigated.  Based on the observation that, after the PS 
main magnets are believed to be this study concentrates 
on options for a new injector for the existing PS.  
INTRODUCTION 
Motivations for SPL, PS2 and SPS Upgrade 
The “standard” LHC injector upgrade path, consisting 
of SPL, PS2 and SPS upgrades, is based on consistent set 
of arguments [1,2]: 
• One of the main arguments brought up to support the 
construction of PS2 was the impression that the PS 
magnets come close to the end of their life-time and 
thus the need for a fast replacement of this machine. 
The maximum energy of PS2 should be significantly 
higher than the one of the present PS to mitigate some 
of the limitations like TMCI. This requires either to 
increase the magnetic field of the magnets or to 
increase the circumference, the solution adopted for 
the PS2 study.  
• The replacement of the PS by a longer machine 
implies that the present Booster cannot be kept 
temporarily, but must be replaced by a new injector 
providing higher energies to avoid a reduction of the 
performance of the whole complex. A 4 GeV kinetic 
energy SPL has been adopted as proposed PS2 injector 
with the argument that it offers many options for 
physics after the LHC era at a modest price increase 
compared to a rapid cycling synchrotron RCS. 
• Finally, extensive upgrades of the SPS, which will be 
the main performance limitation of the complex with 
Linac4, are required to make use of the performance 
possible with SPL and PS2. 
Scope of this Study 
Latest investigations have shown that after a successful 
renovation program, the status of the PS main magnets 
allows operating them for a long duration comparable 
with the requirements for LHC, provided appropriate 
continued maintenance is carried out. Moreover, the 
present main limitation of the SPS for LHC beams is the 
electron cloud effect, which would even be increased with 
the increased injection energy envisaged with PS2. Only 
after curing the electron cloud effect, the SPS could profit 
from a higher injection energy increasing the TMCI 
threshold.  
These two observations motivate studies on an 
upgraded LHC injector complex comprising the existing 
PS. This study concentrates on options for new PS 
injectors for the existing PS. It is assumed that a Linac4 
extension to the energy required for the new injector, 
possibly improvements of the PS to cure intensity 
limitations other than direct space charge detuning and an 
SPS upgrade will be implemented as well. 
Other possible alternative upgrade scenarios like 
replacing the PS by a superconducting machine of the 
same circumference or starting a renovation of the 
injector complex by replacing the SPS with a new 
machine have not been considered due to lack of study 
time. 
REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Assumptions on LHC Requirements and 
maximum direct space charge tune shifts 
For the moment, no clear scenario, but several 
proposals exist for a phase two upgrade of the LHC 






. Thus, several 
sets of beam parameters with rather different 
requirements, in terms of beam brightness, exist for the 
injector complex. Finally, for this study, requirements 
assumed are similar to the ones for the PS2 study, since 
this allows a direct comparison: 
• N = 4.0
11
 protons per LHC bunch spaced by 25 ns 
within transverse emittances of ?T* = 2.5 μm 
corresponding to a beam brilliance of  
N/?T* = 1.6 1011 μm-1. Note that this brilliance is 
compatible with most LHC “small emittance schemes” 
requiring smaller intensities as well. 
• The maximum tolerable direct space charge tune shift 
at PS injection is ?QPS=-0.3. In case of new injector 
synchrotrons with shorter acceleration times, larger 
maximum tolerable tune shifts of ?QINJ=-0.35 and 
?QINJ=-0.45 have been assumed. 
• Bunching factors: For the PS and fast cycling injector 
synchrotrons, the bunching factor has been estimated 
assuming that 70% of the RF bucket are filled by the 
beam. Note that for the PS injection flat bottom, this 
procedure yields a bunching of Bf = 0.425. 
 
Note that, for this report, more pessimistic bunching 
factors, but larger maximum direct space charge tune 
shifts than for the PS2 study have been assumed. 
Altogether, similar injection energies as function of 
requirements are obtained for both cases. 
Implications for the PS 
It is assumed that the performance of the PS for LHC 
type beams is limited by direct space charge effects and 
that other effects like instabilities are not a concern or can 
be cured by appropriate measures. The minimum 
injection energy as a function of beam brightness is 
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plotted in Fig. 1. To fulfil the assumed requirements, the 
PS injection energy (kinetic) has to be raised to about 
2.5 GeV. For comparison, the data underlying the 
preparation of the PS complex for LHC in the 90’ies are 
highlighted as well: the brightness of ultimate LHC 
beams
*
 requires a minimum injection energy of about 
1.4 GeV, i.e. the one chosen at that time. 
Injecting into the PS above transition energy could be 
envisaged in principle in order to cure losses and 
problems associated with transition crossing.  However, 
this option is not investigated here, since then the PS 
injection (kinetic) energy would have to be raised to 5 or 
6 GeV implying higher cost and, in case of a new PS 




Figure1: PS injection (kinetic) energy required as function 
of beam brightness. 
SPL AS PS INJECTOR 
A Superconducting Proton Linac (LP-SPL) with a 
lower energy than the version proposed for PS2 could 
provide H
-
 injected directly into the existing PS. The 
length of such a LP-SPL solution has been interpolated 
from Fig. 5 in reference [3] to about 300 m in addition to 
Linac4 to reach 2.5 GeV.  A possible limitation of such a 
solution is Lorentz stripping in the transfer line, in 
particular, if this SPL is constructed as prolongation of 
Linac4 at the location proposed for PS2. Loss rates due to 
Lorentz stripping computed with empirical formulas 
given in [4] are plotted in Fig. 2. Assuming an average 




 per second, a maximum heat 
deposition of 1 W/m, the peak magnetic field in a bending 
section should remain below 0.214 T. Assuming an 
maximum average bending field of about 0.15 T gives an 
minimum average radius of transfer line of about 75 m. A 
possible geometry of a 2.5 GeV SPL located as an 
extension of Linac4 and the transfer line to the PS is 
shown in Fig. 3. 
                                                           
*
 At that time it has been assumed that the transfer up to collisions in 
LHC will be loss free and that the Booster with Linac2 can provide the 
required brilliance with the initial scheme filling eight PS buckets with 
eight PSB bunches with transfers. 
An SPL as PS injector allows, in principle, replacing 
the low frequency “10 MHz” PS RF system by a tunable 
40 MHz system (as proposed and studied for PS2) to 
generate LHC bunch trains already at injection. Such a 
40 MHz RF system would simplify the PS operation for 
LHC beams, because the RF gymnastics applied at 
present to generate the LHC bunch patterns are not 
required any more, but may be incompatible with the 
generation of many other physics beams delivered by the 
PS. 
The implementation of a new H
-
 charge exchange 
injection would have to be studied and designed and, may 
well turn out to be a challenge. 
 
 
Figure 2: Loss rates due to Lorentz stripping using 
formulas given in ref. [4]. The dot-dashed lines connect 
points with constant 1 W/m energy deposition and for a 









Figure 3: Possible geometry of a 2.5 GeV SPL injecting 
into the PS. 
OPTIONS FOR A NEW PS INJECTOR 
RING 
General Considerations on new PS Injector 
Rings 
For the case of a new PS injector ring, the required 
LHC beam structure at ejection has to be generated by RF 
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gymnastics (various double and triple splittings and bunch 
compression) similar to the ones applied at present. Thus 
the following restriction apply for the harmonic number 
of the PS hPS at injection of LHC bunch trains: 
• The PS harmonic number hPS must be a multiple of the 
factor 7. 
• The maximum harmonic number is assumed to be 
hPS = 21. This corresponds to a bunch spacing of 
100 ns and a PS injection kicker rise time
†
 of less than 
40 ns, i.e. even a bit less than the one available at 
present with a lower strength. 
 
The longitudinal emittance at PS injection for 25 ns 
LHC trains is at present limited by the Booster RF 
system, but not the by the RF voltage available in the PS. 
In rapid cycling synchrotrons, larger longitudinal 
emittances require larger RF voltages and, thus, lead to 
smaller synchronous phase and larger bunching factors. 
Thus, longitudinal emittances per bunch of ?l = 2.5 eVs 
and ?l = 0.9 eVs are assumed for transfer with PS 
harmonic number hPS = 7 and hPS = 21, respectively. 
Resulting RF buckets and bunches after transfer into the 
PS are plotted in Fig. 4. 
 
  
      hPS = 7, VRF = 14 kV              hPS = 21, VRF = 51 kV 
Figure 4: RF bucket and bunch after PS injection on a 
2.5 GeV plateau. 
Rapid Cycling Synchrotron (RCS) with hRCS = 1 
 
 
Figure 5: Example for filling the PS with an RCS with 
harmonic number hRCS = 1. 
The principle of a Rapid Cycling Synchrotron with 
harmonic number hRCS=1 is depicted in Fig. 4.  In this 
example, 12 out of 14 PS buckets are filled for LHC 
operation. Since every RCS cycle generates only one 
bunch, the distance between bunches in the receiving PS 
is not given be the geometry of the two machines.  
The advantage of filling the PS with many shots is that 
the RCS intensity per transfer and, thus, the required 
beam brightness, are lowered.  On the other hand, PS 
                                                           
†
 The creation of additional gaps in the LHC bunch train for the PS 
injection kicker is ruled out. 
filling time tends to increase and, thus, an RCS should 
pulse with a high repetition rate in particular for a PS 
operating with a large harmonic number.  
 
Table 1: Main parameter of a RCS with harmonic number 
hRCS = 1 filling 6 out of 7 PS buckets for the generation of 
LHC bunch trains. 
N in 2.5μm (1011) 4.0 8.5 
Ekin,ej (MeV) 2500 4000 
(B?)ej /R (T) 0.44 0.65 
fRF,ej (MHz) 1.84 1.87 
?long (eVs) 2.5 2.5 1.3 2.5 2.5 
?Q -0.35 -0.45 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 
Tacc (ms) 50 50 50 25 50 
Ekin,inj (MeV) 675 510 840 760 1550 
(B?)inj /R (T) 0.175 0.147 0.201 0.188 0.308 
fRF,inj (MHz) 1.55 1.45 1.62 1.59 1.77 
Bf,inf 0.279 0.289 0.219 0.246 02.16 
VRF (kV) 52 62 31 77 44 
?s (degree) 24 22 37 31 37 
fs,inj (kHz) 2.40 3.11 1.51 2.64 1.07 
 
Table 2: Main parameter of a RCS with harmonic number 
hRCS = 1 filling 12 out of 14 PS buckets for LHC buckets 
for the generation of LHC bunch trains. 
N in 2.5μm (1011) 4.0 8.5 
Ekin,ej (MeV) 2500 4000 
(B?)ej /R (T) 0.44 0.65 
fRF,ej (MHz) 1.84 1.87 
?long (eVs) 1.25 1.25 0.65 1.25 1.25 
?Q -0.35 -0.45 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 
Tacc (ms) 50 50 50 25 50 
Ekin,inj (MeV) 385 270 505 445 1010 
(B?)inj /R (T) 0.124 0.102 0.146 0.135 0.228 
fRF,inj (MHz) 1.34 1.21 1.45 1.40 1.67 
Bf,inf 0.239 0.247 0.184 0.209 0.186 
VRF (kV) 46 52 33 76 47 
?s (degree) 32 30 45 39 44 
fs,inj (kHz) 2.95 3.60 1.99 3.38 1.52 
 
Main machine parameters for an RCS with hRCS=1, a 
circumference which is one forth of the PS
‡
, 1/?tr2 = 0 and 
for a single harmonic RF system
§
 are given Tabs. 1 and 2 
for filling six out of seven PS buckets and 12 out of 14 PS 
buckets, respectively. Despite gaining from a large 
number of transfers, the required injection energies are 
large, because fast acceleration leads to large synchronous 
angles and, thus, small bunching factors. In consequence, 
                                                           
‡
 The circumference can be easily adjusted since the circumference ratio 
is not fixed by the harmonic numbers, but can be any “simple” rational 
number  
§
 In principle, a second harmonic RF system for bunch flattening could 
increase the bunching factor and, thus, decrease the required RCS 
injection energy. However, this has not been considered due to the large 
voltages required. 
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the typical magnetic field swings are small. With the full 
RF voltage, bunches arrive at the ejection plateau with too 
short bunch lengths even for the hPS = 14 case. It has to be 
verified that the bunch length can be adjusted simply by 
reducing the RF voltage during the last part of the cycle 
or by other RF manipulations. 
 
Rapid Cycling Synchrotron (RCS) for 
“geometric PS filling” 
 
Figure 6: Example for “geometric filling of the PS” with 
an RCS with harmonic number larger than one hRCS > 1. 
The principle of “geometric” PS filling with a Rapid 
Cycling Synchrotron is depicted in Fig. 6. The harmonic 
number of the RCS is larger than one (6 in the example 
shown, but other harmonics are possible) and, thus, the 
distance between extracted bunches has to match the 
spacing between PS buckets. The advantage of harmonic 
numbers larger than one in the RCS is that the bunching 
factor tends to increase for fixed total longitudinal 
emittances; the RF voltage increases and the synchronous 
phase decreases.  Still, the required injection energies are 
higher than with a hRCS = 1 RCS, but on the other hand 
less transfers are needed speeding up PS filling. 
Ruling out special RF gymnastics generating an 
irregular bunch pattern in the RCS to adapt the bunch 
spacing (similar to the procedures applied with the 
present Booster for the generation of LHC bunch trains 
with single batch Booster to PS transfers [5]), the 
circumference ratio between the two machines is 
determined by the harmonic numbers. A natural choice is 
an RCS with 2/7 of the PS circumference
**
.  This allows 
harmonic numbers hRCS = 2 and hPS = 7 or hRCS = 6 and 
hPS = 21 (as sketched in Fig. 6) in the RCS and the PS. 
Three transfers are required to fill the PS for the 
generation of LHC bunch trains with RF gymnastics 
analogous to the ones applied at present. 
Main machine parameters of an RCS for “geometric PS 
filling”, a circumference which is 2/7 of the PS, 1/?tr2 = 0 
and for a single harmonic RF system are given Tabs. 3 
and 4 for harmonic numbers hRCS = 2 and hRCS = 6, 
respectively.  As expected, the required injection energies 
are even larger than for the hRCS = 1 case. The larger 
harmonic number hRCS = 6 leads as expected to larger RF 
voltages, but the decrease of the required injection energy 
is small. 
                                                           
**
An RCS with 1/3 of the PS circumference with harmonic numbers 
hRCS = 7 and hPS = 21 are another possible option allowing filling the 
whole PS circumference with three transfers for other beam than LHC. 
Table 3: Main parameter of a RCS with hRCS = 2 for 
“geometric filling” of 6 out of hPS = 7 PS buckets with 
three transfers for the generation of LHC bunch trains. 
N in 2.5μm (1011) 4.0 8.5 
Ekin,ej (MeV) 2500 4000 
(B?)ej /R (T) 0.39 0.57 
fRF,ej (MHz) 3.21 3.28 
?long (eVs) 2.5 2.5 1.3 2.5 2.5 
?Q -0.35 -0.45 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 
Tacc (ms) 50 50 50 100 50 
Ekin,inj (MeV) 1070 840 1250 990 2190 
(B?)inj /R (T) 0.207 0.177 0.231 0.197 0.348 
fRF,inj (MHz) 2.95 2.84 3.02 2.92 3.19 
Bf,inf 0.333 0.340 0.273 0.361 0.269 
VRF (kV) 79 102 38 64 51 
?s (degree) 13 12 25 8.7 26 
fs,inj (kHz) 2.7 3.7 1.6 2.6 1.1 
 
Table 4: Main parameter of a RCS with hRCS = 6 for 
“geometric filling” of 18 out of hPS = 21 PS buckets with 
three transfers for the generation of LHC bunch trains. 
N in 2.5μm (1011) 4.0 8.5 
Ekin,ej (MeV) 2500 4000 
(B?)ej /R (T) 0.39 0.57 
fRF,ej (MHz) 9.64 9.84 
?long (eVs) 0.9 0.9 0.45 0.9 0.9 
?Q -0.35 -0.45 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 
Tacc (ms) 50 50 50 100 50 
Ekin,inj (MeV) 950 750 1080 910 1910 
(B?)inj /R (T) 0.191 0.164 0.209 0.186 0.315 
fRF,inj (MHz) 8.70 8.33 8.87 8.64 9.46 
Bf,inf 0.380 0.385 0.327 0.398 0.326 
VRF (kV) 196 259 72 175 103 
?s (degree) 5.8 5.0 14.5 3.3 14.6 
fs,inj (kHz) 8.2 11.2 4.5 8.0 3.2 
 
”SuperBooster” SB as PS Injector 
 
Figure 7: Example for PS filling with a “SuperBooster”, 
i.e. several superimposed synchrotrons with moderate 
cycle times. 
Another option for a new PS injector is stack of 
superimposed synchrotrons similar to the existing 
Booster, but with higher maximum energy. This could be 
obtained easily with a machine with a size similar to the 
present Booster, but a larger bending magnet-filling factor 
and a higher maximum magnetic field. 
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A natural choice for the generation of LHC bunch 
trains is to operate three superimposed rings with 
harmonic numbers hSB = 2 and hPS = 7 in this 
SuperBooster and the PS; this avoids special gymnastics 
in the SuperBooster similar to the ones required for the 
generation of LHC bunch trains with the present Booster 
and single batch PSB to PS transfer [5]. Note that this 
scheme with three such superimposed rings is designed to 
fill six out of seven buckets and, thus, it is not easily 
possible to fill the entire PS circumference for high 
intensity beams with one transfer
††
.  Solutions to 
overcome this limitation are the construction of a forth 
ring (producing only one bunch) or to lower the PS 
harmonics and to adjust the bunch spacing in this 
SuperBooster by adding first harmonic RF component. 
In case of a slowly cycling SuperBooster, the beam is 
accelerated with smaller RF voltages and smaller 
synchronous angles. A double harmonic RF system for 
bunch flattening and, extrapolating from the present 
Booster, a bunching factor of Bf = 0.55 is assumed.  Then 
an injection energy of 680 MeV and 530 MeV is 
required
‡‡
 assuming a maximum direct space charge tune 
shift of ?Q = -0.35 or ?Q = -0.45, respectively.   
FFAG as new PS Injector 
The magnetic field swing of possible PS injector 
synchrotrons, appropriate to obtain the assumed beam 
brightness required for the LHC, is relatively small. 
Furthermore, for RCS options and, in particular for an 
RCS with harmonic number hRCS = 1, high repetition rates 
are of interest to keep the PS filling time at an acceptable 
level. With these observations, a Fixed Field Alternate 
Gradient (FFAG) accelerator appears as possibly 
interesting option. However, the in general large 
transverse acceptances of FFAGs are not of interest for 
the generation of small emittance LHC type beams. 
FFAGs have gained renewed interest during the last 
years for different applications and different approaches 
to design the magnetic field have been proposed. This 
makes the question whether one of the various FFAG 
types [6] may be an attractive solution as PS injector not 
easier. 
FFAG have a magnetic field, which is not ramped, but 
remains fixed during acceleration and, thus, have many 
similarities and analogies with cyclotrons. The advantage 
is that complications associated with rapid cycling 
magnetic structures are not present and the acceleration 
time is limited only by the RF system. However, the beam 
position varies during acceleration requiring large 
aperture magnets and RF cavities.  
Within this study, it has not been possible to design an 
FFAG as PS injector. Thus, to roughly estimate how such 
                                                           
††
Another option avoiding this problem, but requiring faster kickers, 
would be three superimposed SuperBooster rings with one third of the 
PS circumference operating with hSB = 7 and hPS = 21.  
‡‡
A SuperBooster (operated with harmonic hSB = 1) with double batch 
PS filling for LHC beams would allow reducing the required injection 
energy, but as well lengthen PS filling and, thus, has not been 
considered as new injector.  
an FFAG could look like, selected proposed designs 
based on normal conducting magnets
§§
 are scaled to reach 
the energy required for the PS: 
• Fig. 8 shows a so-called “scaling FFAG” proposed for 
medical applications [7]. In case of scaling FFAG, the 
magnetic field increases proportional to the radius to 
the power of a “field index”, which should be large for 
strong horizontal focusing and, thus, small orbit 
variations with energy. Vertical focusing is obtained 
by azimuthal variations of the magnetic field (in some 
proposals even with sections bending the beam 
outwards) and, possibly spiralling structures. The 
intention of scaling FFAGs is to keep the focusing 
structure and, thus, the working point, constant during 
acceleration.  If the geometry of the example in Fig. 8 
is scaled up by a factor 5.6, one obtains roughly the 
required energy swing 440 MeV to 2500 MeV. 
However, with such a scaled up version, transition 
would have to be crossed [9] and the aperture width 
becomes almost 4 m. The pole rotation angle and the 
“field index” can be increased [9] to raise the 
transition energy to above the ejection energy and to 
reduce the orbit excursion to about 0.8 m. However, 
non-linearities experienced by the beam increase. 
• Fig. 8 sketches a so-called non-linear non-scaling 
FFAG proposed as proton driver for high beam power 
application [8] and with an energy swing similar to 
what would be required for a new PS injector.  In case 
of nonscaling FFAGs, the idea to keep the focusing 
structure constant during acceleration is abandoned to 
gain more flexibility to increase horizontal (and 
vertical) focusing for reduced orbit variations and to 
avoid sections bending outwards.  Non-scaling linear 
FFAGs have only dipolar and quadrupolar field 
components; the working point moves during 
acceleration often even over integer resonances.  The 
example sketched in Fig. 8 is a non-scaling non-linear 
FFAG, where additional non-linearities have been 
added to keep the tunes fixed throughout acceleration. 
 
 
Figure 8: Scaling FFAG proposed (see e.g. ref [7]) for 
medical applications. 
                                                           
§§
A superconducting magnetic structure could, in principle, be 
envisaged, since the magnetic field is nit ramped, and would reduce the 
size and the apertures required..  
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 Figure 9: Non-linear non-scaling FFAG proposed in ref. 
[8] to generate a high power proton beam. 
 
For any FFAG type (ruling out strong variations of the 
working point moving across many resonances), a 
compromise between magnet non-linearities, which have 
to be acceptable for beam dynamics aspects in particular 
for high intensity beams, and orbit excursions has to be 
found. To assess the feasibility of an FFAG as PS 
injector, limitations due to direct space charge effects 
have to be investigated for such a machine with strong 
non-linearities and technical solutions e.g. for the 
implementation of an H
-
 charge exchange injection and 
large aperture RF system have to be found. 
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
Possible PS injectors have been enumerated and basic 
parameters have been estimated. Requirements for future 
LHC beams similar to the ones underlying the PS2 study 
have been assumed and led to the conclusion that the PS 
injection energy should be raised to about 2.5 GeV. 
However, for the moment different LHC upgrade 
scenarios with rather different beam requirements exist. 
Thus, the required beam brightness and, in consequence, 
PS injection energy could become smaller than assumed 
here. Furthermore, it has been assumed that direct space 
charge effects are limiting the machine performances and, 
thus, that other potential limitations like instabilities and, 
in particular, the limitations at low energy in the SPS are 
cured by appropriate actions. 
Options investigated for a new PS injectors comprise: 
(i) an SPL type solution accelerating H
-
 ions to the 
required 2.5 GeV and implying that a technical solution to 
implement a charge exchange injection must be found, (ii) 
rapid cycling synchrotrons operated with hRCS = 1 or 
“geometric PS filling, (iii) a stack of several accelerators 
similar to the present PSB, but with a higher maximum 
energy and (iv) FFAGs.  
Injection energies in possible new PS injector rings are 
rather high in the range of slightly below 0.5 GeV and 
above 1.0 GeV depending on the option chosen. In case 
of fast cycling machines, the bunching factors are reduced 
due to a large synchronous angle and since only a single 
harmonic RF system has been assumed. Even for a 
“superbooster” solution, the required injection energy is 
high since for a new injector, double batch PS filling has 
been ruled out. 
For the moment, only basic parameters of possible PS 
injectors have been estimated. Even the feasibility of 
certain options, like e.g. FFAGs, is not guaranteed. For a 
fair comparison, the feasibility and cost has to be 
estimated for the different options. Furthermore, possible 
additional limitations like instabilities and impact on other 
beams than the one required for LHC are required. 
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OVERVIEW OF LHC INTERACTION REGION UPGRADE – PHASE-1  
R. Ostojic, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
Abstract 
The LHC and its experiments are ready for the first 
long physics run. The primary goal of CERN is to ensure 
that the collider is operated efficiently and that it achieves 
design performance in the shortest term. Since several 
years the HEP community has been discussing the 
directions for maximizing the physics reach of the LHC 
by upgrading the ATLAS and CMS experiments, the LHC 
machine and the CERN proton injector complex. The first 
phase of the LHC interaction region upgrade was 
approved by Council in December 2007. This phase relies 
on the mature Nb-Ti superconducting magnet technology 
with the goal of achieving reliable operation of the LHC 
at the luminosity of 2 1034 cm-2s-1 while maximising the 
use of the existing infrastructure. This report gives an 
overview of the Phase-1 Upgrade of the LHC interaction 
regions. 
GOALS OF THE PHASE-1 UPGRADE 
The LHC and its experiments are ready for the first 
long physics run. The LHC construction effort has been 
considerable and has involved important international 
participation. The primary goal of the HEP community is 
to ensure that the collider is operated efficiently and that 
the scientific reach of this unique scientific facility is 
maximised [1]. In the first years of LHC running, any 
consolidation activities in the LHC must therefore comply 
with the operations schedule and use of the existing 
infrastructure. On the other hand, the LHC relies on the 
injectors and their reliability, and these accelerators must 
have similar priority in maintenance and upgrade. These 
considerations have lead to a staged approach to the 
upgrade of the LHC accelerator complex, which includes 
as the first phase the construction of a 160 MeV H- proton 
linac (Linac4) and the Phase-1 Upgrade of the LHC 
interaction regions. 
The goal of the Phase-1 Upgrade is to provide more 
flexibility for focusing of the beams in the ATLAS and 
CMS insertions, and enable reliable operation of the LHC 
at the luminosity of 2 1034 cm-2s-1. The upgrade concerns 
in the first place the low-β triplets and assumes the same 
interface boundaries with ATLAS and CMS as at present. 
The new low-β quadrupoles feature a 120 mm aperture 
(as compared to 70 mm of the present ones) and use the 
technology of Nb-Ti superconductor cables cooled at 
1.9 K developed for the LHC dipoles. The D1 separation 
dipoles, TAS and TAN as well as other elements in the 
insertions will also be modified so as to comply with the 
larger beam aperture of the triplet. However, the present 
cooling capacity of the cryogenic system and other main 
infrastructure will remain unchanged. 
The Phase-1 Upgrade is organized as a CERN project 
since January 2008. The upgrade relies on information 
and technical alternatives discussed in dedicated 
workshops held in the past several years. The conceptual 
design of the Phase-1 Upgrade has been presented in a 
review in July 2008, and the completion of the technical 
design is foreseen for the end of 2010. A planning 
exercise has indicated that under realistic conditions all 
major equipment can be available by the end of 2014. The 
readiness for installation will be confirmed by the 
completion of the tests on a complete triplet string that 
should resolve any outstanding issue and minimize the 
commissioning time of the new magnet systems. 
UPGRADE CONSTRAINTS 
The low-β triplets presently installed in the LHC, 
shown in Fig. 1, were built by a collaboration of CERN, 
Fermilab, KEK and LBNL. The quadrupoles have a coil 
aperture of 70 mm and use Nb-Ti superconductor cables 
that allow an operating gradient of 205 T/m. The 1.9 K 
cooling, electrical powering and all protection and control 
signals are fed to the triplet by an in-line feed-box, shown 
in the foreground in Fig. 1. The triplets are positioned at 
L* of 23 m from the interaction point, and allow a β* of 




Figure 1:  The low-β triplet in the ATLAS insertion. 
 
The cryogenic services are brought to the triplets in 
ATLAS and CMS insertions by the QRL compound cryo-
line from the cryogenic islands located in the LHC even 
points. Since the triplets are at the extremities of the QRL, 
the total cooling power available for their cooling will 
depend on the as-built heat loads in the adjacent arcs. In 
any case, the total power available for each triplet is 
limited to 500 W at 1.9 K, which is the maximum power 
provided by the sub-cooler unit installed at the entry of 
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the triplet. It should be noted that at present the cooling 
capacity available for the triplet in Sector 4-5 (left of 
CMS) is smaller than for the other triplets as the RF 
cavities in IR4 use about 4 kW of the total capacity of the 
cryo-plant servicing this sector (23 kW at 4.5-20 K). This 
lack of symmetry between ATLAS and CMS triplets 
could be effectively resolved by providing a separate 
cryo-plant for the RF system in IR4. 
It is clear that any increase of cooling requirements, in 
particular those related to the increase of luminosity 
above 3 1034 cm-2s-1 will need dedicated cryogenic plants 
serving the triplets around ATLAS and CMS. Their 
installation will most likely require additional 
underground areas. These changes are best done as part of 
the overall consolidation of these areas of the LHC. 
As shown in Fig. 1, all major equipment of the triplets 
is located in the LHC tunnel, with the exception of the 
power converters which are housed in the alcoves 
adjacent to the tunnel. Access for maintenance of the 
equipment in the tunnel, in particular of the feed-boxes, is 
difficult and may have consequences on scheduling of the 
LHC operation. In view of the even higher radiation 
levels after the Phase-1 Upgrade, it is considered 
necessary to install all new equipment, including the feed-
boxes, in low radiation areas. Such areas are very scarce 
around the ATLAS and CMS triplets. 
LAYOUT AND OPTICS 
The present LHC low-β triplet, shown in Fig. 2, is of 
the symmetric type where two outer magnets Q1 and Q3 
have a magnetic length of 6.6 m, while the two inner 
magnets, Q2A and Q2B (forming a single cold mass Q2), 
have a length of 5.7 m. The quadrupoles for the Phase-1 
Upgrade will necessarily be longer, as the operating 
gradient that the Nb-Ti conductor can provide is smaller 
for a larger aperture coil. Nevertheless, the intention is to 
follow the symmetric layout as much as possible, as it 
offers a number of important advantages. A layout of the 
new triplet is shown in Fig. 2, and features four magnets, 
having magnetic lengths of 9.1 m and 7.7 m. The 
multipole correctors are grouped in a separate cryo-unit 
placed on the upstream side of the triplet. Finally, a 
superconducting D1 dipole replaces the present normal 
conducting magnets, such that the full length of the new 
magnet string is almost identical to the present one. 
The present matching sections comprise stand-alone 
superconducting magnets (D2-Q6) separated by warm 
sections, which contain the collimators, beam 
instrumentation and vacuum equipment. The area is also 
used for forward physics experiments that need direct 
access to the beam. Most of this equipment will remain in 
service after the Phase-1 Upgrade. Due to the complexity 
of the magnet cooling and powering, and the lengthy 
intervention needed to reposition the magnets, it has been 
decided that the magnets in the matching sections will 
remain unchanged in the Phase-1 Upgrade. 
Reduction of β* inevitably leads to tighter aperture in 
the matching sections. Protection against beam halo, 
which is at present assured by tertiary collimators 
designed to protect the triplets, will need to be extended 
to other magnets as well. In addition, the TAN will 
require extensive modifications to handle the higher 
debris power and provide appropriate aperture for the 




 Figure 2: Layout of the present LHC triplet (top) and of the conceptual layout of the Phase-1 triplet (bottom). 
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account the implications on the background in the 
experiments, which is expected to be an important issue 
for high-luminosity runs of the LHC. 
It is well known from the beam studies made during the 
LHC design phase that a reduction of β* has a number of 
consequences on the performance of the machine. The 
chromatic aberrations are particularly serious and must be 
carefully compensated.  As chromatic aberrations concern 
the LHC as a whole, new optics solutions for all the arcs 
and insertions need to be devised. 
MAGNETS AND CRYOGENICS 
Low-β quadrupoles 
The magnets for the Phase-1 Upgrade will extensively 
use the technological developments made for the LHC. 
Nevertheless, the design of the new magnets is not 
without concerns due to higher stored energy, forces and 
stresses, and increased heat loads and radiation dose. 
The new low-β quadrupoles uses the existing LHC 
dipole cables arranged in a 120 mm aperture coil. The 
magnet design will also include as much as possible other 
materials available from the LHC production, in 
particular the high-strength steel for the collars and 
magnetic iron for the laminations. The outer diameter of 
the magnet is 570 mm, equal to the outer diameter of the 
LHC dipole. 
 
Figure 3: Cross-section of the 120 mm low-β quadrupole. 
 
The quadrupoles are cooled in static pressurized helium 
bath at 1.9 K with a single heat exchanger of the bayonet-
type. The heat exchanger has an internal diameter of 
95 mm, dimensioned for the maximal cooling capacity of 
500 W. The cable and coil insulation, the stand-alone 
collars and yoke laminations are designed to maximize 
the heat transfer from the coil. The cross-section of the 
magnet is shown in Fig. 3.  
The design of the magnet yoke and its helium vessel 
follows the design of the LHC insertion quadrupoles. A 
single piece yoke is used to provide the return path for the 
magnetic flux and magnetic shielding. The mechanical 
function of the yoke is to align the collared coils, and it 
does not participate in reacting the internal forces. The 
final alignment of the magnet is provided by the full 
length shells, welded at the median plane. This technique 
has proven to be very reliable, giving excellent results in 
aligning the magnets. The helium vessel is completed 
with end-domes, much in the style of the LHC dipoles. 
D1 dipoles 
The present D1 separation dipole in the ATLAS and 
CMS insertions comprises six normal conducting magnets 
with a pole gap of 63 mm, which has to be increased to 
match the aperture of the triplet. Cost estimates have 
shown that the most effective solution for the D1 dipole is 
a superconducting magnet with a field in the 4 T range. 
As part of the US contribution to the Phase-1 Upgrade, 
BNL has proposed to build D1 dipoles based on the 
optimised design of the RHIC DX dipole, This magnet 
has a coil aperture of 180 mm, magnetic length of 3.7 m 
and operating field of 4.4 T. Two such magnets are 
combined in a single cold mass to produce the necessary 
field strength. 
Correctors 
In the proposed layout the corrector magnets are 
grouped in a separate cryo-unit, located between Q3 and 
D1. The assembly is cooled in line with the triplet at 
1.9 K, and contains horizontal and vertical orbit 
correctors, skew quadrupole and sextupole correctors, as 
well as multipole correctors up to dodecapole. The 
correctors have an aperture of 140 mm, which is needed 
for their protection from particle debris. Additional dipole 
correctors will be installed at the upstream and 
downstream extremities of the Q2A and Q2B quadrupoles 
for better orbit control in the common beam region 
between the two triplets. The orbit correctors are also 
used for generating the crossing angle for the beams and 
their separation at the interaction point. 
The nested dipole correctors based on epoxy-
impregnated coils of the type used in the present triplets 
are not considered appropriate for the performance goals 
of the Phase-1 Upgrade and an alternative solution using 
Rutherford-type cables has been developed. Besides 
helium transparency, this type of coil profits from the 
larger temperature margin offered by 1.9 K cooling. 
However, the design requires careful optimization of the 
complete powering circuit, including the power 
convertors, since bipolar powering in the 2 to 3 kA range 
is necessary. 




The low-β triplets and correctors operate in pressurized 
static superfluid helium at 1.3 bar, cooled by two-phase 
flow of saturated helium in a bayonet heat exchanger. As 
the triplets in ATLAS and CMS are at the furthest 
extremity of the QRL (3.3 km from the cold 
refrigerators), the pressure increase in the 15 mbar header 
is such that the temperature of the superfluid bath of the 
triplets rises above 1.9 K as the extracted power increases, 
reducing sharply the effective thermal conductivity of the 
superfluid helium. This fundamental feature of the LHC 
cryogenic system limits the extracted power (and 
luminosity) in the triplet, irrespective of the magnet 
technology. Dedicated cryo-plants in both insertions 
would be needed to circumvent this limitation. 
The main 1.9 K cooling loop for the new triplets 
includes all the features developed for the LHC. In 
addition, a significant fraction of the dynamic heat load is 
taken by the beam screen, cooled at 4.5-20 K. The D1 
dipole is also cooled at 1.9 K. However, it is not cooled 
actively, but by heat conduction to the corrector package. 
A very effective solution was developed for the cooling of 
the cryogenic feed-box and its superconducting link 
which needs only a single supply of supercritical helium 
at 4.5 K. All the control and safety valves are housed in 
the service module. This architecture allows warm-up and 
interventions on the triplets independently of the arcs, 
which is not possible at present. Full sectorization is also 
provided for the cryogenic feed-box. 
Protection from particle debris 
As soon as the LHC luminosity approaches the design 
value of 1034 cm-2s-1, particle debris generated in the 
collisions and beam losses in the machine become the 
single most important issue for the LHC operation, 
equipment protection and personnel safety. Careful 
preparations and robotised tooling have to be included 
thereon for any intervention and maintenance work. 
Due to larger aperture of the low-β quadrupoles in the 
Phase-1 Upgrade, the overall protection efficiency of the 
magnets is increased by a factor of 2.5 with respect to the 
present LHC triplets. The improved protection therefore 
allows increasing the luminosity by the same factor, while 
the power density inside the coils, which determines the 
risk of quench in the magnets, remains as in the present 
triplets. Improvements in the heat transport properties of 
the cable insulation for the new low-β quadrupoles are 
foreseen, which will further increase the protection 
margin. 
The debris power in the magnets is also a generator of 
considerable radiation dose. The peak dose in the 
quadrupole is estimated at 1.5 MGy/100 fb-1, which 
corresponds to a lifetime of 1000 fb-1 in case insulating 
components similar to those in the LHC dipoles are used 
in magnet construction. This level of integrated 
luminosity is greater than the estimated lifetime of the 
ATLAS and CMS inner detectors. 
Powering and equipment integration 
In view of the higher radiation levels in the LHC tunnel 
expected after the Phase-1 Upgrade, it is considered 
necessary to place the power converters, the cryogenic 
feed-boxes with their current leads, and all control 
electronics in low radiation areas. The feed-boxes are 
connected to the magnets via a superconducting link, 
carrying 14 kA for the main quadrupole circuits, as well 
as lower currents for the D1 and the correctors. Such a 
system allows easier access to the power converters and 
the leads, which need to be accessed frequently during the 
LHC operation and shutdown periods. 
The available space in the LHC tunnel is almost fully 
occupied, and integration of the new equipment required 
lengthy studies. Solutions for ATLAS have been found, 
where the major part of the equipment can be located in 
the UL passageway. The situation in CMS is more 
difficult, and at present the most promising solution is to 
place all the equipment in the UL by-pass. As a result, 
although the power convertors and feed-boxes are 
identical, details of equipment location and the routing of 
the superconducting link are specific for each 
experimental area. 
PROJECT STRUCTURE AND 
COLLABORATIONS 
The Phase-1 Upgrade was approved by Council in 
December 2007 and is organized as a CERN project since 
January 2008. Twenty work-packages have been 
identified, following the breakdown structure of the 
hardware systems. The coordination of the design 
activities in 2008/09 was done by the Technical Design 
Group, which included all project engineers. As basis of 
the technical design report, several functional 
specifications were prepared and approved following the 
established mechanisms in the EDMS. Elements of the 
quality control system and earned value management 
were also put in place in 2009. 
The available resources at CERN for the construction 
of the magnets and other equipment for the Phase-1 
Upgrade are limited and the project relies on a strong 
international effort. The collaborations with European and 
US laboratories, which bring in their expertise and 
resources, have been secured for a considerable part of 
the new equipment. Nevertheless, the effort at CERN is 
considerable and the availability of resources in the next 
few years is a serious concern in view of other priorities 
for LHC consolidation. 
PERFORMANCE REACH 
The triplets installed in the LHC were optimized for 
7 TeV proton beams and luminosity of 1034 cm-2s-1. The 
minimal β* is 55 cm due to a late decision to include the 
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beam screens, when the production of the magnets was 
already well advanced. The triplet cooling system, tested 
in several triplets in the LHC tunnel, provides sufficient 
cooling power so that luminosity slightly higher than 
1034 cm-2s-1 could in principle be achieved if the LHC 
could accept beam intensities larger than the nominal 
1.15 1011 ppb. However, such operation would most 
likely be unstable in long term, as all of the design 
margins would be exhausted. 
The studies for the Phase-1 Upgrade confirmed that it is 
difficult to improve certain features of the present low-β 
triplets and that compromises between various parameters 
have to be made. The main advantage of replacing the 
present 70 mm aperture low-β quadrupoles with 120 mm 
ones is a twofold increase in the clear beam aperture and 
the improvement of the triplet protection by a factor of 
2.5. This leads to a considerably larger flexibility in the 
choice of the crossing scheme and β*. The minimal β* 
accepted by the new triplets is 30 cm for 7 TeV proton 
beams. The reliability in operation and the lifetime of the 
triplet at 2 1034 cm-2s-1 are considerably improved. The 
new magnet system allows in principle to increase the 
luminosity up to 3 1034 cm-2s-1, which is the hard limit 
given by the available cryogenics power in ATLAS and 
CMS. The highest luminosity achievable depends, 
however, on the ability of the injectors to provide and of 
the LHC to accept beam intensities in the range from 1 to 
1.7 1011 ppb. In case the beam intensity in the LHC is 
limited to considerably less than nominal, the new triplets 
would allow to double the integrated luminosity 
accumulated in a typical annual run. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In order to allow continuous improvement of the LHC 
performance, two upgrade projects have been approved 
by Council in 2008, for the construction of Linac4 and for 
the LHC IR Upgrade Phase-1. The goal of the Phase-1 
Upgrade of the ATLAS and CMS interaction regions is to 
remove the known bottlenecks in the low-β triplets and to 
enable reliable operation of the collider at the luminosity 
of 2 1034 cm-2s-1 while maximising the use of the existing 
infrastructure The installation of the upgrade is foreseen 
during a coordinated CERN-wide shutdown, which will 
also allow to connect Linac4 into the injector chain and to 
prepare ATLAS and CMS for higher event rates. 
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INSTALLATION SCHEDULE AND EXPECTED PERFORMANCE FOR THE 
PS COMPLEX WITH LINAC4 
M. Vretenar, C. Carli, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
The main part of the Linac4 facility can be 
commissioned in parallel to the operation of the CERN 
injectors for the LHC, while the modifications to the 
existing transfer line and to the PS Booster (PSB) 
injection region require a long shut-down. The project 
planning is presented, together with considerations on 
shut-down length and flexibility of the schedule, which 
will allow coordinating the Linac4 installation schedule 
with the LHC operation schedule for the next years. The 
expected performance for the LHC of the PS complex 
with Linac4 (Linac4, PSB and PS) is presented. 
EXTENSION OF THE LINAC4 PROJECT 
The Linac4 Project, whose layout is presented in Fig. 1, 
is composed of three main parts [1]: 
1. Construction and commissioning of the Linac4 linear 
accelerator (160 MeV), up to a dump placed in a 
straight line at the end of the linac (Fig. 2). 
2. Construction and commissioning of a new transfer 
line, from a bending magnet in front of the linac 
dump up to the LT.BHZ20 magnet in the present 
Linac2 to PSB line, plus upgrades and modifications 
of the existing LTB line (Linac to Booster) and of the 
LBE and LBS measurement lines (beam emittance 
and energy spread at PSB entrance) (Fig. 3). 
Transport of the beam to the measurement lines and 
commissioning of the lines. 
 
Figure 1: The three main parts of the Linac4 project 
3. Modification of the PSB injection region, including 
the implementation of a H- charge exchange injection 
and upgrade of magnetic elements and power 
supplies for 160 MeV (Fig. 4). Commissioning of the 
PSB up to “nominal” performance (production of the 
same beams as before the Linac4 installation) in 
dedicated mode, and to “ultimate” performance 
(production of the maximum beam brightness 
possible in the PSB with Linac4) in parasitic mode. 
 
The linac constitutes the main part of the project in 
terms of extension, complexity and cost, however the 
modifications to the line and to the PSB injection region 
present a not negligible cost (almost 20% of the overall 
project material cost, civil engineering and infrastructure 
excluded) and complexity. Whereas a basic requirement 
in the design of Linac4 was the capability to build and 
commission the linac without any interference with the 
operating CERN accelerators, the connection to the LTB 
line, the modifications to PSB and its re-commissioning 
























Figure 4: Overview of the modifications to the PSB 
injection region. 
FLEXIBILITY IN THE LINAC4 
SCHEDULE 
The present Linac4 Master Plan (Fig. 5), as approved in 
April 2009, is divided into three main parts: a) a 
construction phase covering the period 2009-2012; b) an 
installation and commissioning phase in 2011-2013 (with 
an overlap between construction and installation) and c) 
the phase of connection to the PSB and of PSB re-
commissioning, in 2013-14.This plan is consistent with 
the delay of the project by one year decided in 2009. It 
foresees end of commissioning in September 2013. So far 
there are some minor delays, but the project follows in the 




Figure 5: Linac4 Master Plan (2009 version). 
 
However, it should be noticed that the recent risk 
analysis has underlined the risk of delays of the order of 
few months, mainly due to missing manpower resources, 
and of initial reliability issues. In conclusion, a delay by 
one year of the connection to PSB would provide a safety 
margin against possible delays, allowing to reduce the 
pressure on the teams, and at the same time could allow to 
add in the planning a “reliability run” at the end of the 
commissioning, meant to test the equipment with beam 
over time and to assess and solve possible reliability 
issues. The main consequences on Linac4 would be a 
change in the design of the main dump, which should be 
able to stand beam over a period of several weeks. An 
additional commissioning dump in the transfer line to the 
PSB could be considered too, in order to allow profiting 
of the additional time to commission the new part of the 
transfer line. Another concern would be the availability of 
manpower during the additional commissioning-
reliability run, the same people having to run both Linac2 
and Linac4. 
In more general terms, it can be stated that Linac4 can 
continue to operate and to improve reliability and 
performance until the moment when the injector complex 
is ready for the long shut-down required by the 
connection to the PSB. 
     DURATION OF THE LINAC4 SHUT-
DOWN 
The long LHC shut-down required for the connection 
of Linac4 to PSB is composed of the following parts: 
1. One month of cooling time for the radiation in the 
PSB injection area, to minimise the dose to the 
personnel involved in the PSB modifications. During 
this period the Linac4 line will be connected to the 
old LTB line and the measurement lines LBE and 
LBS will be modified, the radiation levels in the linac 
lines being much lower than in the PSB.  
2. Three months for the modification of the PSB 
injection hardware (detailed in Fig. 4).  
3. Three months for the re-commissioning of the PSB 
with the new hardware, with the goal of providing at 
least the same performance in the PSB as before the 
connection of Linac4 for all the standard PSB users. 
4. One month (2+2 weeks) for starting up PS and SPS 
after the shut-down. This corresponds to the usual 
allocation after a long shut-down period. 
The total time required for the above activities 
corresponds to 8 months, which is the duration of the 
LHC proton shut-down required for the connection of 
Linac4. It should be noticed that there is almost no 
interference between the ion complex (Linac3-LEIR-PS) 
and the connection of Linac4 to PSB, because access to 
the LTB line and to the PSB is possible during ion runs 
and work on the measurement lines can be anticipated to 
a previous shut-down. The duration of the LHC shut-
down for Linac4 can therefore be reduced by the duration 
of an ion run at the end of the LHC run. It would be also 
possible to start the following run with ions; this would 
further reduce the duration of the LHC shut-down but 
would require sorting some issues concerning starting the 
injectors with a low-intensity beam. The overall schedule 
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PERFORMANCE FOR LHC OF THE PS 
COMPLEX WITH LINAC4 
The main challenge of the LHC beams in the PS 
complex consists in creating high brightness beams, i.e. in 
accumulating the highest possible beam current within the 
small emittances specified for the LHC. The reference 
emittances in this context are 2.5 μm for the PSB and 
3 μm for the PS, rms (1σ) normalised values.  Linac4 is 
designed to deliver a current of 40 mA during 400 μs 
(corresponding to 1014 particles per pulse) within 0.45 μm 
emittance, i.e. much more than what is required by the 
LHC beam. Instead, the place where the beam brightness 
is generated is the PSB injection, where space charge 
forces define the minimum achievable emittance for a 
given beam intensity, or the maximum achievable 
intensity for a given emittance. Increasing the PSB 
intensity and brightness limitation is the main motivation 
for the construction of Linac4, whose energy of 160 MeV 
provides exactly a factor of 2 higher βγ2 at injection with 
respect to the present 50 MeV Linac2. The accumulated 
intensity being limited by the incoherent tune shift, which 
scales as 1/ βγ2, for the same tune shift Linac4 should 
make possible accumulating twice the present intensity 
within the same normalized transverse emittances. Since 
it is presently accepted that the PSB limit for LHC beams 
corresponds to about 1.8 x1012 protons per ring (ppr), 
Linac4 should allow bringing this limit to 3.6 x1012 ppr. 
It is not straightforward to analyse how this 
improvement in the PSB will impact the PS (and the 
SPS), the intensity out of the PS depending on the transfer 
scheme between PSB and PS, on the particular intensity 
limitations of the PS and on beam loss. An attempt to give 
a global view of the present and future situation for the 
25 ns LHC bunch train, the most challenging for the PS 
complex, is presented in Table 1.  
In the first two columns the present achieved intensities 
during the LHC tests and the expected maximum values 
[2] are given. For the PS, the intensities in protons per 
pulse (ppp) and in protons per LHC 25 ns bunch (ppb) 
after bunch splitting are reported in the Table. The ppp 








Original proposal, 1997 
Nominal 
Original proposal, 1997 
Ultimate 
PSB out 
(ε* ≤ 2.5 μm) 
ppr 1.62 x1012 (1bunch/ring) 
↓ (6 bunches, h=7) 
1.8 x1012 (1bunch/ring) 
↓ (6 bunches, h=7) 
1.05 x1012 (1bunch/ring) 
↓ (8 bunches, h=8) 
1.8 x1012 (1bunch/ring) 
↓ (8 bunches, h=8) 
PS out, per pulse ppp 9.72 x1012 10.8 x1012 8.4 x1012 14.4 x1012 
PS out, per bunch 
(ε* ≤ 3 μm) 
ppb 1.35 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ 15% loss 
1.5 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ 15% loss 
1.0 x1011 (84 bunches) 
↓ no loss 
1.7 x1011 (84 bunches) 
↓ no loss 










Single batch + PS h=14, 
 12 bunches scheme 
PSB out 
(ε* ≤ 2.5 μm) 
ppr 3.25 x1012 (2bunch/ring) 
↓ (6 bunches, h=7) 
3.6 x1012 (2bunch/ring) 
↓ (6 bunches, h=7) 
2.05 x1012 (1bunch/ring)  
↓ (6 bunches, h=7) 
3.6 x1012 (3bunch/ring) 
↓ (12 bunches, h=14) 
PS out, per pulse ppp 9.72 x1012 10.8 x1012 12.3 x1012 (scaled 1998 
limit, 206ns bunches) 
14.4 x1012 (larger ΔQ 
possible  in single batch) 
PS out, per bunch 
(ε* ≤ 3 μm) 
ppb 1.35 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ 15% loss 
1.5 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ <15% loss 
1.7 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ 20% loss 
2.0 x1011 (72 bunches) 
↓ 20% loss 
SPS out ppb 1.15 x1011 >1.3 x1011 1.37 x1011 1.6 x1011 
Goal:  Nominal intensity in single 
batch: shorter filling time, 
lower losses and emittance 
growth. 
 Potential for ultimate 
intensity out of PS in 
double batch. 
Potential for > ultimate with 
a new PS scheme (in PSB: 
new recombination kicker, 
new RF gymnastics). 
 
Table 1: Expected maximum performance in the PS complex (with estimates for the SPS) without and with Linac4, in 
terms of intensity for LHC. Limitations are highlighted in yellow; values to be demonstrated are in italic. 
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scheme, where two trains of three bunches coming from 
three different PSB rings are transferred to the PS, which 
operates on h=7. The remaining empty bucket in the PS 
provides a gap for the extraction kicker. The ppb value 
comes from the subsequent splitting of the 6 PS bunches 
into 72 bunches, obtained with RF gymnastics. This beam 
is then transferred to the SPS. Using a usual convention 
for the LHC beams in PS and SPS, the losses in the 
process are given by an overall loss factor, applied at the 
transfer between PS and SPS. Most of this loss (~10%) is 
in the SPS, but other losses (~5%) take place between 
PSB ejection and PS transition [2]. Column 2 shows how 
in the present conditions only intensities 10% higher than 
the so called “LHC nominal” 1.15 x1011 ppb can be 
obtained from the SPS. In the Table, limiting values (i.e. 
intensities where the corresponding machine is at its 
maximum, while the other machines still have a margin) 
are highlighted in yellow. From column 2, it is clear that 
in the present configuration the limitation in the PS 
complex comes from PSB, justifying the construction of a 
new linac to overcome it. 
The third and fourth columns present, for comparison, 
the intensities that were assumed in the original proposal 
from the beginning of the 90ies for the injector upgrade 
for LHC, for the “nominal” and “ultimate” case 
respectively, the latter corresponding to 1.7 x1011 [3]. The 
original idea was that for the production of the ultimate 
beam, both PSB and PS would operate at their space 
charge limit. The new PSB energy (1.4 GeV) was defined 
based on pure beam dynamics considerations, in order to 
bring the PS limit at what was available from the PSB. 
The first reason why the PS cannot presently provide the 
ultimate intensity is that because of a microwave 
instability discovered during the LHC beam preparation 
the transfer scheme was changed.  Instead of filling eight 
h=8 buckets of the PS with two transfers and one bunch 
provided by all four Booster rings, only 6 out of h=7 
buckets in the PS are filled and not all Booster rings 
provide beam for both transfers. The second reason for 
the lower intensity is the beam loss in the process, which 
was not considered in the original scheme. It should be 
noticed that at the time, based on the experience with the 
PS, the maximum achievable intensity (i.e. the space 
charge limit) was estimated at 14.4 x1012 ppp.  
With Linac4 and twice higher intensity in the PSB it 
will be possible reaching and slightly exceeding the 
nominal intensity (column 5 and 6) with single batch 
transfer instead of double batch transfer. The single batch 
transfer will reduce the filling time and will reduce the 
emittance growth in the PS because the PS beam does not 
have to wait 1.2 s on a flat porch for the second batch to 
come, with an expected reduction in beam loss and a 
higher intensity with respect to the present maximum 
(column 6). 
The way to push the PS complex to its limit with 
Linac4 is to come back to double batch transfer. In this 
case the limitation will come from the PS, and column 7 
assumes bringing the PS to its limit, obtained scaling the 
PS limitation of column 4 to the present case (h=7), which 
in turns assumes that we operate with the same bunching 
factor and with slightly longer bunches that at present, 
206 ns instead of 170 ns. For this case, it is expected to 
obtain the ultimate intensity out of the PS. 
In order to increase even further the intensity while 
keeping the present machines, there are only two ways. 
The first is to change the transfer scheme, and the second 
is to increase the PS limit by further raising the PSB 
energy. The last column presents a possible case using a 
different transfer scheme [3]. By changing the PS 
harmonic number in order have a single batch transfer 
using all 4 PSB rings instead of only 3, one could use all 
the available PSB intensity profiting at the same time of 
the advantages of the single batch transfer. In column 8 is 
presented a case with h=14 in the PS and 12 bunch 
transferred from the PSB, 3 per each PSB ring. The 
intensity out of PS could be then increased to 2.0 x1011 
ppb, at the cost of a new PSB RF system for h=3, new 
recombination kickers in the PSB, new RF gymnastics in 
the PS and provided that the beam can support a larger 
direct space charge tune shift for a short duration. 
The second option, increasing the PSB energy, is the 
subject of a dedicated paper and will not be presented 
here [4]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Linac4 schedule provides enough flexibility to 
allow the connection to the PSB to take place any time 
after September 2013, with a shut-down of the LHC of a 
total duration of 8 months (in case there is no LHC ion 
run) or of 8 months minus the duration of the ion run. 
It is foreseen that Linac4 will allow reaching the 
nominal LHC intensity in PS single batch mode and the 
ultimate intensity out of the PS in double batch mode. 
Further improvements could come from a change in the 
transfer scheme or from an increase in the PSB energy. 
The ultimate intensity will be reached about one year after 
the connection of Linac4. 
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Optics Challenges and Solutions for the LHC Insertion Upgrade Phase I
Ste´phane Fartoukh, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
The goal of the LHC Insertion (IR) Upgrade Phase-I is
to enable a reliable operation of the machine with a perfor-
mance at least doubled with respect to its design luminos-
ity. One key ingredient is ideally a reduction of β ∗ down
to 25 cm, using a new inner triplet (IT) with longer Nb-Ti
quadrupoles operating at a lower gradient (∼ 120 T/m) and
therefore offering a larger aperture (120 mm). Reducing
β∗, but also operating at a lower IT gradient (which, at a
given β∗, further increases the size of the β-functions all
over the long straight section), has however a certain num-
ber of drawbacks which cannot be solved by only increas-
ing the aperture of the new low-β quadrupoles. Without
modifying the current layout of the matching section (MS)
and assuming that the arc sextupoles cannot safely operate
above nominal current (550A), optics solutions with a β ∗ of
30 cm are already at the edge of feasibility, both in terms of
mechanical aperture in the MS and new IT (assuming 120
mm aperture), in terms of gradients for some MS and DS
quadrupoles and in terms of chromatic correction. These
limitations will be analyzed in detail, in particular concern-
ing the chromatic correction of the new inner triplet which
requires a global modification of the present LHC optics.
Concerning the high luminosity insertions, the layout of the
new IT and the corresponding injection and collision optics
(with β∗ ≥ 30 cm) will be presented and studied in detail
both in terms of mechanical aperture, chromatic correction,
squeeze-ability, dynamic aperture and beam-beam effects.
FACTS AND NUMBERS
Triplet aperture
Reducing the beam sizes at the interaction point, that is
acting on β∗ at constant transverse beam emittances, is a
key ingredient to boost the performance of any collider.
The first limit reached in this case is related to the avail-
able aperture of the inner triplet (IT) where the horizontal
and vertical peak β-functions, namely βmaxIT , vary approxi-
mately as follows with β∗ and with the operational gradient







About five years ago, the LHC Upgrade community
starts then to realize that long enough quadrupoles with a
weaker gradient (that is at more or less constant integrated
gradient) could always offer more aperture than actually
needed by the beam, regardless of the choice of β ∗, of the
layout of the interaction region and of the technology cho-
sen for the inner triplet [1]. This observation was based on
the two following facts.
• For a given technology, the inner diameter (ID) of
the coils and the operating gradient are roughly con-




with Bpeak being the peak magnetic field reached in
the quadrupole coils (typically 80-85% of the short
sample limit). Then, one can empirically observe that,
in the LHC, the inner dimension of the beam-screen
(if any) scales almost linearly with the coil aperture:
BSID ∼ 83%× CoilID ∝ Bpeak
G
. (3)
• Assuming a given β∗ and an operating gradient G
for the inner triplet, the beam requirement in terms
of available IT aperture can be estimated based on
the peak β-function reached in the inner triplet β maxIT ,
with of course some preliminary assumptions con-
cerning the minimum crossing angle needed to sep-
arate the beams after the collision (e.g. θc = 10σ) and
the extension of the secondary halo in units of σ (e.g.
8.5 σ corresponding to a so-called normalised aperture











with  the transverse physical emittance of the beam
at the design energy of the machine. It is worth men-
tioning that the above scaling law remains approxi-
mative within let say 10%. This is due to the fact
that specific contributions to the beam aperture bud-
get are either constant with βmaxIT , as the budget re-
served for the closed orbit, or vary more rapidly with
the increase of βmaxIT such as the contribution of the
spurious dispersion induced by the crossing angle in
one high luminosity insertion and then exported to the
other insertion (∝ θc [σ]× (βmaxIT )3/2).
Combining the scaling laws (3) and (4), it was then con-
cluded that, to some extent, β∗ could be chosen as a free
parameter for the design of the new inner triplet and could
even be minimized going in the direction of decreasing the
operational gradient of the new IT:




where the coefficient λ1 only depends on the operational
margins injected into the design goal, that is typically a
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normalised aperture n1 and a crossing angle θc equivalent
or larger than the ones chosen for the nominal LHC.
Based on this observation, a first upgrade of the LHC could
therefore be envisaged (see e.g. [3] and [4] for the latest
proposals) counting on a substantial decrease of β ∗ while
still keeping the Nb-Ti technology for a new inner triplet.
One of the two proposals [3] consisted in the exchange
of the existing LHC inner triplet by about 10 m long Nb-Ti
quadrupoles, operating at a gradient of 120 T/m with a coil
aperture of 130 mm corresponding to an effective clearance
of about 120 mm for the beam (beam-screen inner dimen-
sions). Such an inner triplet aimed to be compatible with
a β∗ as low as 25 cm at nominal emittance, corresponding
to a peak β-function βmaxIT of about 13 km, while still of-
fering a very substantial aperture margin of about 6σ (3σ
per beam) for collimation. At posteriori, a beam clearance
of 120 mm was however found to be quite optimistic by
about 20 mm1 with respect to the performance of Nb-Ti
quadrupoles at an operating gradient of 120 T/m.
The second proposal [4] envisaged even longer and
weaker Nb-Ti quadrupoles with coil aperture as large as
190 mm, therefore eliminating any potential aperture re-
strictions in the inner triplet (at least down to a β∗ of 25
cm) while still offering huge margins, either for collima-
tion, for operating the machine with a crossing angle larger
than 10σ or, in case of need, for shielding the IT against the
debris coming from the IP at large peak luminosity.
Optics limitations coming from the rest of the ring
However, the two above proposals were ruled out by
hard limits coming from the rest of the machine [7], ei-
ther not yet identified at the time of the project approval,
as the severe aperture restrictions in the matching section
at low β∗ [5], or known but only solved a posteriori, as
the huge chromatic aberrations induced by the inner triplet
when the optics is squeezed [6]. As we will see later
on, these two limits can be nicely quantified by a single
constraint imposed on the maximum acceptable peak β-
function, namely βmaxRing , reached in the inner triplet. This
limit amounts to about 11-12km in the existing nominal
machine, assuming no modification of the matching sec-
tion and supposing that the lattice sextupoles cannot safely
operate above the nominal current of 550A:
βmaxIT ≤ βmaxRing ∼ 11− 12km . (6)
This limit is already a factor of 2.5 higher than the peak β
function actually reached in the existing inner triplet, oper-
ating at a gradient of 205 T/m with a β ∗ of 55 cm. Never-
theless this limit imposed by the ring is still below a peak
β-function of 13km which, as mentioned above, would cor-
respond to β∗=25 cm and a triplet gradient of 120 T/m.
Coming back to Eq. 1, such a limitation clearly imposes a
1out of which 10 mm comes from the fact that, in practice, both the
thickness and the mechanical tolerances of the cold bore and the beam-
screen are found to scale linearly with the coil aperture (see Eq. 3).
severe limitation on the minimum possible β ∗:






where the proportionality coefficient λ2 depends only very
moderately on the triplet layout 2. This coefficient may
vary or not with the physical emittance of the beam depend-
ing on whether the βmaxRing limit is induced by aperture re-
strictions or by strength limitations in the magnets located
on the non-triplet side of the machine. Finally, it is gen-
erally recommended to tune carefully the λ2 coefficient,
in practice increase it by let say 20%, such that the corre-
sponding collision optics does not exceed a certain fraction
of the βmaxRing limit (ideally 80%) in order to preserve some
flexibility in terms of optics adjustment or chromatic cor-
rection. This being said, contrary to the condition (5), the
relation (7) imposes an increase of the minimum β ∗ when
decreasing the operating gradient G of the inner triplet.
Optimum IT parameters and min. possible β∗
Combining the conditions (5) and (7) imposed by the
inner triplet on one side and by the rest of the machine on
the other side, it is then clear that the minimum possible
β∗ can no longer be chosen as a free parameter to design
the new inner triplet. More precisely an optimum gradient
(corresponding to given coil aperture at a given technology)























This last relation deserves a very special attention. With-
out even talking about operational margins (implicitly in-
cluded in the proportionality coefficients λ1,2 here above),
both the triplet technology and the limitations coming from
the rest of the machine (quantified by Bpeak and βmaxRing , re-
spectively, in Eq. 8) play a very similar role in the mini-
mization process of β∗. However none of these ingredients
are actually included in the scope of the Phase-I upgrade
project. As a result, in order to still obtain a decent re-
duction on β∗, there was no other solution than giving up
the second main motivation of the Phase-I project, which
was to guaranty a substantial aperture margin in the new
inner triplet. De facto, it was then decided to base the
design of the new triplet onto the current LHC standards
in terms of normalised aperture (n1 ∼ 7) and full cross-
ing angle (θc ∼ 10σ). It was also assumed that no spe-
cific margins were needed in terms of peak β-functions
2As an example, at constant peak β-function in the inner triplet, and
assuming that the distance between Q2a and Q2b has been minimized
as much as possible, β∗ can only be reduced by about 7% and then by
hardly more than 10% assuming two or three different lengths for the Q1,
Q2 and Q3 inner triplet quadrupoles, compared to a situation where all
low-β quadrupoles would have exactly the same magnetic length.
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reached in the inner triplet in comparison with the hard
limit of βmaxRing ∼ 11 − 12 km given by the rest of the
machine. Under these conditions the minimum possible
β∗ is found to be around β∗min = 30 cm corresponding
to a peak β-function of about β ITmax ∼ 11 km reached in
the new triplet. This minimum β∗ can actually be met as-
suming an operating gradient of about G = 120 T/m for
the new triplet which is compatible with a coil aperture of
CoilID = 120 mm for the Nb-Ti technology, that is a beam
clearance estimated to about 100 mm for the inner dimen-
sion of the new beam-screen [8].
Should we have used the same assumptions as the ones of
Ref. [3] (i.e. only 10 mm aperture needed to accommo-
date the cold bore and beam-screen, optimistic Nb-Ti per-
formance by about 10% at a given coil aperture), the same
analysis would have concluded to a 110 mm - 140 T/m
triplet corresponding to a minimum possible β ∗ of about
28 cm, still above the initial target of 25 cm.
Of course both aperture margin and optics flexibility can
simultaneously be restored a posteriori operating with a β ∗
larger than 30 cm, typically at the level of 35-40 cm, but
then degrading more or less the peak luminosity of the ma-
chine. This will form the subject of the next section, while
the second part of the paper will focus on the various op-
tics limitations mentioned here above, envisaging possible
cures whenever possible. The last part will then describe
in detail the solution proposed for the Phase-I upgrade in
terms of layout, optics, correction of the chromatic aberra-




One of the key parameters to quantify the performance of
a collider is its design peak luminosity. Assuming a gaus-
sian bunch distribution and round beams, the latter is given






1 + φ2w︸ ︷︷ ︸
geometric luminosity loss factor
(9)
with n the number of bunches, Nb the number of particles
per bunch, f0 the revolution frequency,  the r.m.s. trans-
verse physical emittance of the beam, β∗ the size of the
β-function at the interaction point and φw the so-called Pi-
winsky angle. This angle depends on β ∗, on the r.m.s bunch
length σz and on the full crossing angle θc required to sep-
arate the beams after the collision:
φw ≡ θc [σ]× σz [m]2 β∗ [m] . (10)
These parameters are summarized in Tab. 1 both for the
nominal optics and beam parameters of the LHC and for
possible scenarios which have been or are currently envis-
aged for the IR upgrade phase I. Most of the beam param-
Parameters LHC sLHC Phase I
Energy [TeV] 7 7
Number of bunches 2808 2808
Bunch length [cm] 7.55 7.55
Normalised emittance [μrad] 3.75 3.75
β-function at IP [cm] 55 25 30 40
Full crossing angle [μrad] 285 450 410 560
Piwinsky angle [rad] 0.65 1 .51 1.26 1.49





1.15 1 .70 1.70 1.70
Peak lumi [1034 cm−2s−1] 1.01 3 .19 2.99 2.01
Table 1: Optics and beam parameter list for the nominal
LHC and for the sLHC Phase I.
eters (energy, number of bunches, bunch length, transverse
emittance) are not expected to change for Phase I. The re-
maining parameters to boost the machine performance are
then the bunch charge and the optics, i.e. the choice of β ∗
and of the crossing angle.
As shown in Tab. 1, the gain of luminosity becomes
rapidly marginal when decreasing β ∗ below 30 cm, of the
order of 6.6% in relative between 30 cm and 25 cm as-
suming the same bunch charge and the same crossing angle
in units of sigma (θc = 10 σ in both cases). Furthermore,
as already mentioned and discussed in more detail in the
next section, optics solutions with a β∗ of 30cm are already
at the limit of feasibility with a operating gradient of 120
T/m for the new triplet, due to gradient and aperture limi-
tations in the matching section but also strength limitations
in the lattice sextupoles of the arcs in order to warrant a
proper compensation of the chromatic aberrations induced
by the inner triplet (linear but also non-linear chromaticity
and off-momentum β-beating).
Under these conditions, assuming a reliable operation of
the machine with the so-called “ultimate LHC beam” (i.e.
Nb = 1.70 1011 p/bunch) is then the only route to push
the peak luminosity by a decent factor, that is let say by
a factor of two. Pushing the beam intensity has certainly
several drawbacks, most of them being beyond the scope
of this paper except the beam-beam effect which could be
mitigated by a better balance between the choice of β ∗ and
that of the the crossing angle. Working in a regime where
the available aperture is fully utilized in the inner triplet
and in the rest of the insertion, an increase of the crossing
angle will obviously further degrade the peak luminosity
at constant bunch intensity, both due to the increase of β ∗
imposed by the preservation of the mechanical acceptance
of the insertion, but also due the further increase of the Pi-
winsky angle. On the other hand, increasing the crossing
angle can rapidly mitigate the long-range beam-beam inter-
actions and may therefore contribute to gain faster in peak
luminosity by increasing the bunch intensity.
Assuming an optimized orbit correction scheme equipping
the new inner triplet [9] and supposing that no additional
non-common orbit corrector will be installed in the match-
ing section for the Phase-I upgrade, the maximum possible
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crossing angle is found to be of the order of 560 μrad. In
this configuration, β∗ shall be relaxed to 40 cm in order
to preserve the mechanical acceptance of the inner triplet
and the matching section. At nominal bunch intensity (i.e.
Nb = 1.15 1011 p/bunch), the peak luminosity is slightly
below 1034 cm−2 s−1. On the other hand, it is exactly dou-
bled at ultimate intensity (see fourth column of Tab. 1),
while the crossing angle reaches about 16σ, which should
eliminate in practice any intensity limitation coming from
the beam-beam effect.
A natural target for the collision optics of the sLHC
Phase-I is then a β∗ ranging in between 30 cm and 40 cm
with a crossing angle as large as possible, chosen in prac-
tice in between 410μrad and 560μrad depending on the
normalised aperture of the new triplet at a given β ∗. Then,
in all cases, an increase of the bunch charge beyond nom-
inal will be necessary in order to gain a factor of at least 2
for the peak luminosity of the machine with respect to its
design luminosity of 1034 cm−1s−1.
The next section will discuss in much more detail several
optics related limitations imposed on the choice of β ∗. A
complete solution for the layout and optics of the new in-
sertion will then be presented in the last section, discussing
as well first tracking results obtained at injection and in col-
lision, including or not the beam-beam effect, in a moderate
or large Piwinsky angle regime as described in Tab. 1 for
the two cases β∗ = 30 cm and β∗ = 40 cm.
LIMITATIONS
In this section we have tried to draw an exhaustive list
of the various optics or performance related limitations ex-
pected for the LHC Insertion Upgrade Phase-I. Whenever
possible, specific cures will be suggested.
Aperture of the inner triplet (IT)
Figure 1: Schematic cross-section of the new beam screen.
Courtesy of N. Kos.
The coil aperture of the new inner triplet has been chosen
to be 120 mm [10], corresponding to an operating gradient
of 120 T/m at 80% of the short sample limit [11].
The existing triplet is equipped with horizontally or ver-
tically oriented race-track shape beam-screens. This im-
poses an hard limitation on the orientation of the beam
crossing planes in each of the four experimental insertions
of the LHC. The full flexibility will then be restored for
the new triplet by choosing a so-called “rounded octago-
nal” cross-section for the new beam-screens (see Fig. 1).
In particular, the new inner triplets will then be equipped
with strictly identical beam-screens in the two high lumi-
nosity insertions ATLAS and CMS.
More quantitatively, assuming a proper correction of the
spurious dispersion produced by the crossing scheme in
IR1 and IR5 (see later) and within maximum variations of
the order of Δn1 ∼ ±0.1, the normalised aperture of the
new inner triplets will no longer depend on the actual ori-
entation of the crossing planes in IR1 and IR5 while, in
this case, aperture reductions down to Δn1 ∼ 1 would be
observed with a race-track shape beam-screen [12]. Then,
in the standard configuration of a vertical and horizontal
crossing scheme in IR1 and IR5, respectively, the nor-
malised aperture of the new triplet is expected to be of
the order of n1 ∼ 7.4 with a β∗ of 30 cm and a crossing
angle of 10σ (410μrad). It is worth mentioning that the
above estimate assumes the nominal LHC aperture budget
[2] for the closed orbit (3mm) and the β-beating (20%), and
without any specific correction of the horizontal and verti-
cal spurious dispersion, either coming from the arcs (27%
budget in terms of normalised dispersion) or induced by
the crossing angles in IR1 and IR5. For any other config-
urations in terms of polarity or orientation of the crossing
scheme (e.g. ±90◦ in IR1 and IR5 which is found to be the
worst configuration), the normalised aperture of the new
triplet remains above n1,min = 6.8 [12].
At this stage two specific measures of different nature
can be envisaged to restore a more or less substantial aper-
ture margin in the new triplet at β∗=30 cm.
Ordering the beam-screen and cold bore production.
The new beam-screen offers a beam clearance estimated to
99.2 mm in the horizontal and vertical planes. This clear-
ance is reduced to 88.8 mm at 45 degrees in order to leave
enough room for the four cooling tubes which will equip
the new beam-screens [8]. The loss of beam clearance
w.r.t. to the coil aperture is therefore quite substantial, ap-
proximately 20 mm compared to ∼ 10 mm in the existing
triplets. This is due to the fact that, for mechanical reasons,
the cold bore and beam-screen thickness shall be more or
less doubled, but also and mainly due to a linear increase of
the manufacturing tolerances of these two objects. Without
going to much into the details, an appropriate step could be
to produce and measure the cold bore first before fixing the
final outer dimension of the beam-screen. In this case an
aperture gain ranging in between 2.5 mm and 5 mm could
be obtained depending on where the inner diameter of the
new cold bore will actually range inside its ±1.2 mm tol-
erance band [13]. At a β∗ of 30 cm (βmaxIT ∼ 11 km), this
would correspond to an increase of the beam clearance by
up to 2σ to be used for collimation (1σ margin per beam)
or for pushing the crossing angle up to 12σ in order to mit-
igate the long range beam-beam interactions. This strategy
is of course not excluded but, strictly speaking, not yet in-
serted in the baseline of the Phase-I project.
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Correcting the spurious dispersion. There are two
possible sources of spurious dispersion. The first one is
created in the LHC arcs mainly due to random a2 and b2
errors in the LHC main dipoles and quadrupoles. Its con-
tribution to the aperture of the inner triplet therefore in-
creases moderately when reducing β ∗ (∝ 1/√β∗). At least
in the vertical plane, there is no mean foreseen for its cor-
rection. The second source is the dispersion induced by
the crossing scheme in one of the two high luminosity in-
sertions and then propagating to the other insertion. The
magnitude of this dispersion wave increases rather rapidly
when decreasing β∗ ((∝ 1/β∗3/2), possibly reaching 4-5 m
when β∗ is squeezed down to 30cm. Considering the nom-
inal minimum momentum window of ±0.86 × 10−3 re-
quested for the LHC at flat top energy [2], the spurious
dispersion induced by the crossing angle then corresponds
to a substantial loss of aperture, up to 4mm per beam (that
is Δn1 ∼ 1.3 at β∗=30 cm).
On the other hand, contrary to the first source, this wave of
dispersion arrives at the triplet with a well determined be-
tatron phase. Then, thanks to the new overall optics needed
for the chromatic correction of the new triplet (see later),
a compensation is also theoretically possible both for the
horizontal and vertical spurious dispersion induced by the
crossing scheme in IR1 and IR5 [6]. This correction as-
sumes however the generation of orbit bumps with maxi-
mum amplitude of the order of 4-5 mm in the four LHC
sectors located on either side of each of the two high lu-
minosity insertions 3. This strategy would then impose a
squeeze at non constant closed orbit in the LHC arcs and
then an operation of the machine with a non zero nominal
closed orbit with all the drawbacks this implies in terms
of feed-down effects and non-orthogonality of global cor-
rection knobs for the tune, the linear coupling, the chro-
maticity or even the amplitude detuning controlled via the
Landau octupoles. It is nevertheless not at all excluded that
at some stage the LHC will have reached enough maturity
to be operated in such “exotic” conditions at flat top energy.
To summarise a substantial margin could in theory be
restored in the new triplet, up to 13 mm in terms of full
aperture, that is almost 3 nominal σ’s per beam at a β ∗ of
30 cm. This margin could then eventually be used for
• reestablishing a less stringent budget for the closed or-
bit and the β-beating when operating the machine with
a peak β-function of more than 10 km in the new IT,
• increasing the operational margins of the collimation
system, for instance increasing the 1σ retraction be-
tween secondary (n2) and primary (n1) collimators
and, by this mean, reducing as well the impedances of
the secondary collimators (working at constant n1),
3It is worth mentioning that this strategy is not operational in the exist-
ing machine due to the fact that the nominal LHC optics does not possess
the required properties in terms of phase advance from mid-arc to mid-
arc and between mid-arc and interaction points of the ATLAS and CMS
experiments.
• substantially increasing the full crossing angle above
the 10 σ standard value in order to mitigate the long
range beam beam interactions,
• or sacrificing a big fraction if not all this aperture
margin to an additional reduction of β ∗ down to 25
cm, but for a very moderate gain of performance (see
Tab. 1). This would assume of course that no other op-
tics limitations would be hit when following this way,
which is actually not the case as we will see later on.
However, pending some clarification, discussion and/or
dedicated MD’s to validate or not the viability of the two
possible remedies proposed here above, this potential aper-
ture margin will no longer be taken into account in all the
rest of the paper.
Aperture of the matching section (MS)
Possible optics limitations coming from aperture restric-
tions in the matching section [5] were discussed rather
late during the feasibility study of the Phase-I upgrade and
ruled out all the proposals made in the early stage of the
project [7].
Before entering into the discussion, it is worth reminding
that the existing low β-insertions of the LHC have been
fully validated in terms of quadrupole strength and aper-
ture for a β∗ down to 25 cm, that is corresponding to a peak
β-functions βmaxIT of the order of 10 km for the 205 T/m op-
erating gradient of the existing triplet. These checks were
however performed at a time where it was still not clear
whether beam-screens would equip or not the magnets of
the long straight section.
For the new triplet (G ∼ 120 T/m), a β∗ of 25 cm would
correspond to peak β-functions of the order of 13 km, to-
gether with orbit excursions of the order of 12-13 mm
due to the crossing angle, therefore almost doubled com-
pared to the nominal LHC. Then the matching section
quadrupoles (Q4, Q5 and Q6) and the D2 separation dipole
are actually equipped with race-track shape beam-screens.
Finally, due to the fact that the mechanical acceptance
of the matching section is still very comfortable (n1 >∼
12 − 14) for the nominal collision optics of the LHC (see
Fig. 2), the orientation of the beam-screens in the MS mag-
nets were only optimized based on aperture constraints at
injection (H or V oriented beam-screens depending on the
polarity of Q5 and Q6) or not optimized at all when it was
not strictly needed (natural dipole-like H orientation for the
beam-screens equipping all Q4’s and D2’s) [14]. It is there-
fore not at all surprising that the mechanical acceptance of
the matching section will impose severe limitations below
a certain β∗ or, more precisely, above a certain βmaxIT .
At this stage, it is relevant to introduce the so-called co-
focal length or parameter P of the inner triplet which, in a











Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
266
0.0 300. 600. 900. 1200.
                               s (m)
































)β x β y Dx
13.05 13.25 13.45
s (m) [*10**(  3)]




















Figure 2: Nominal collision optics (β∗ = 55 cm) in IR1
and IR5 (from Q13.L to Q13.R) and typical aperture plot
from Q7.L to Q7.R at 7 TeV.





Twiss parameters at the exit of Q3 (non-IP side). In each of
the two planes, this parameter would then determine the po-
sition of an hypothetical waist of the β-function on the non-
IP side of the triplet, assuming of course all matching sec-
tion and dispersion suppressor quadrupoles switched off.
In view of the above formula, the P parameter of the in-
ner triplet is almost independent of β∗ when the optics is
squeezed. At low β∗, this invariant then only depends on
the detailed layout of the inner triplet (magnetic lengths,
interconnect lengths) and possible small gradient unbal-
ances (<∼ 1 − 2 T/m) imposed between Q1, Q2 and/or Q3.
More precisely, while the β-functions β outx,y at the IT exit
are quite rigid quantities for a given β ∗ and operating gra-
dient G of the inner triplet, their convergence (Twiss pa-
rameter αoutx,y ) can be more or less arbitrarily chosen via a
fine tuning of the layout and/or powering scheme of the in-
ner triplet. Therefore, in the plane relevant for the aperture
of the matching section (i.e. the vertical plane for beam1
on the right side of the IR, conversely for the left side and
conversely for beam2 due to the optics antisymmetry of
the LHC insertions, see Fig. 2), the lowest is the parame-
ter P , the highest is the convergence of the β-function at
the triplet exit and then the better is the mechanical accep-
tance of the matching section. On the other hand a triplet
with a too short cofocal length (ideally corresponding to
waist of the β-functions at Q4) may no longer be match-
able to the LHC arcs unless deeply modifying the layout
of the matching section. For the LHC low-β insertions,
the limit is reached in practice when some magnets of the
dispersion suppressor (typically Q7) reaches their nominal
strength and/or some quadrupoles of the matching section
go to extremely low field (typically Q5 and Q6).
More quantitatively, the layout of the existing triplet cor-
responds to a rather large parameter P of the order of 1 km
(in the plane impacting on the mechanical acceptance of
the MS), which then leads to a β-function of the order of
1500m and 900m in the MQY and MQM type magnets Q4
and Q5, respectively (see Fig. 2), for a peak β-function of
βmaxIT ∼ 4.5 km reached in the inner triplet. In such a con-
figuration, the optics is found to be extremely flexible in
the sens that collision optics with a β∗ as low as 15 cm [5]
can actually be matched while still fulfilling the nominal
gradient limits of the IR quadrupoles but then, obviously,
exceeding other limits in this case (MS and IT aperture and
chromatic aberrations). In this respect, designing the lay-
out of the new inner triplet with a similar cofocal length
would be natural goal for the new insertion and gives actu-
ally quite a lot of flexibility in terms of gradients of the IR
quadrupoles. However, as illustrated in Fig. 3, severe aper-
ture bottle-necks are then observed in the matching section
at the locations of the TAN, D2, Q4 and Q5.
At constant matching section (i.e. layout and magnet
aperture), there is then no other choice than tuning the lay-
out of the new triplet to a shorter or much shorter cofocal
length, sacrificing the optics flexibility to the optimization
of the mechanical acceptance of the matching section. By
readjusting by 10 to 30 cm the magnetic or interconnect
lengths of the inner triplet quadrupoles, it is then quite easy
to reach short enough cofocal lengths, typically down to
∼ 350 m for a βmaxIT of the order of 12 km. In such a
configuration, the mechanical acceptance of the matching
section can be preserved (except for the TAN), while still
finding a solution for the optics within the gradient limits
of the IR quadrupoles (see Fig. 4). However such a com-
promise between MS aperture and IR quadrupole gradients
using ”low-P optics” configuration can no longer be found
as soon as the peak β-function typically exceed 13 km in
the inner triplet (i.e. β∗ ≈ 25 cm at a gradient of 120 T/m
for the new IT) or even only 12 km (β ∗≈27 cm) taking into
account additional matching constraints imposed on the left
and right phase advances of the insertion and related to the
chromatic correction of the new triplet (see later):
βmaxIT <∼ 12 km (MS aperture and IR quad. strength). (12)
Operating the machine with a margin of only 10% below
this limit, that is with a βmaxIT not larger than 10.8 km (cor-
responding to β∗ ≥ 30 cm for the new IT), looks therefore
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Figure 3: ”High-P optics” configuration (P ∼ 900 m) for
the new triplet and corresponding aperture plot from Q7.L
to Q7.R (worst case obtained for beam2 in IR1). Severe
aperture restrictions are observed in the matching section.
As already announced, a peak β-function of the order of
12 km in the inner triplet slightly exceeds the limit imposed
by the 120 mm coil aperture of the new low-β quadrupoles.
already challenging.
It is then clear that new magnets with larger aperture are
required in the matching section as soon as the target β ∗
corresponds to a peak β-function higher than 12-13 km in
the inner triplet. This is however beyond the mandate of
the Phase-I project where one of the main guidelines is to
maximize the use of the existing LHC infrastructure except,
obviously, concerning the inner triplet and other adjacent
equipments such as the TAS, the separation dipole D1 and
then, more recently, the TAN.
On the other hand, in order to preserve some optics flexi-
bility while operating the machine with a βmaxIT of the order
of 11-12 km (β∗=27− 30 cm), a satisfactory compromise
can still be found by ”re-adjusting” the layout of the exist-
ing matching section to the new length of the inner triplet
(typically pushing the D2-Q4 and Q5 assemblies by 10-
15 m towards the arcs) and, eventually, by re-optimizing
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Figure 4: ”Low-P optics” configuration (P ∼ 350 m) for
the new triplet and corresponding aperture plot from Q7.L
to Q7.R (worst case obtained for beam2 in IR1). The me-
chanical acceptance of the matching section is preserved
(except at the TAN) but the gradients of Q5, Q6 and Q7
are close to the limits. As already announced, a peak β-
function of the order of 12 km in the inner triplet slightly
exceeds the limit imposed by the 120 mm coil aperture of
the new low-β quadrupoles.
the beam-screen orientation in the existing D2, Q4 and Q5
magnets [6]. In 2008, the Phase-I conceptual review [10]
concluded however that such an intervention was also not
compatible with the agenda of the project.
Crossing angle
The crossing angle is without any doubt a critical param-
eter if the beam-beam effects become dominant, a fortiori
at higher than nominal intensity, and a fortiori for the new
triplet, which is longer than the existing one and then in-
duces an increase of the number of parasitic beam-beam
encounters on either side of the IP (see later). Preserving a
nominal normalised crossing angle of the order of 10σ for
the minimum possible β∗ (that is a full crossing angle of
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θc = 410μrad for β∗ = 30 cm compared to θc = 285μrad
for the nominal LHC collision optics) or leaving open the
possibility to operate the machine with even higher cross-
ing angle at intermediate β∗ (e.g. ∼ 16σ corresponding to
θc = 560μrad for β∗ = 40 cm) will then inevitably use a
big fraction of if not all the margins of the orbit correc-
tor magnets participating to the crossing scheme (MCBY
and MCBC magnets at Q4 and Q5/Q6 respectively). This
is even more true for the “low-P ” configuration which is
imposed on the optics of the new insertions (see previous
sub-section) where the peak β-function is more than dou-
bled in the inner triplet while the β-functions at Q4, Q5
and Q6 are more moderately increased with respect to the
nominal LHC collision optics.
More quantitatively, assuming that the new triplet will be
equipped with three pairs of H/V orbit correctors (which
guaranties an almost local correction of the IT misalign-
ment with only a marginal contribution coming from the
non-common orbit correctors at Q4, Q5 and Q6), and pre-
serving 50% of the strength of the MCBC correctors at
Q5 and Q6 (which, by design, must also participate to the
correction of the closed orbit leaking from the dispersion
suppressor), the limit found for the maximum possible full
crossing angle is of the order of [9]
θmaxc <∼ 560μrad (MCBY strength limit). (13)
Then, it is worth mentioning that such a crossing angle does
not offer any margin left for performing Vernier scans or IP
steering at 7 TeV, which are also known to be key ingredi-
ents to optimize the machine performance in operation.
To summarize, not only an optimized orbit correction
scheme shall be foreseen for the new triplet [9], but ap-
propriate steps must also be taken in order to reinforce
the non-common orbit correctors, essentially the MCBY’s
at Q4, in order to guaranty sufficient margins when op-
erating the machine with a full crossing angle as high as
θc ∼ 0.5 mrad, that is almost doubled w.r.t. to the nominal
LHC crossing angle of 285μrad. Additional dipole correc-
tor magnets are however not yet included in the baseline of
the Phase-I project.
Chromatic aberrations
Reducing β∗ inevitably increases the chromatic aberra-
tions induced by the inner triplet, in terms of linear and
non-linear chromaticities such as Q′′ and Q′′′, but also
in terms of chromatic variations of the β-functions (so-
called “off-momentum β-beating”). In order to evaluate
any degradation with respect to the nominal LHC optics, it





where K(s) represents the normalized strengths of the in-
ner triplet quadrupoles. At constant l∗ (distance between
the IP and the entry of Q1), these integrals are found
to scale approximately with the peak β-function βmaxIT
reached in the inner triplet, that is inversely proportionally





∝ βmaxIT . (15)
Linear chromaticity. Within a factor of 4π, the inte-
grals Ix,y give directly the contribution of the inner triplet
to the linear chromaticity of the ring, that is for instance
Q′IT (β
∗=55 cm; G=205 T/m) = 25 units and
Q′IT (β
∗=30 cm; G=120 T/m) = 58 units ,
obtained with the existing (205 T/m) and new (120 T/m) in-
ner triplet and for the nominal and new collision optics with
β∗ = 55 cm and β∗ = 30 cm, respectively. A degradation
by a factor of more than 2 is then expected when β ∗ is re-
duced by a factor of less than 2 with respect to the nominal
LHC collision optics. The chromaticity correction system
of the LHC was however designed to be able to compensate
for the linear chromaticity induced by four low-β insertions
squeezed to β∗ = 25 cm [15] (i.e. corresponding to βmaxIT
of about 10 km for the existing triplets). The strength of the
lattice sextupoles is then more than sufficient to correct the
contribution of the four new triplets (two high luminosity
insertions) to the linear chromaticity of the ring, down to a
β∗ of 30 cm or even well below.
Off-momentum β-beating and non-linear chromatic-
ity. The other chromatic aberrations induced by the inner
triplets scale with more or less high powers of βmaxIT de-
pending on the effect under consideration:
Q′′x,y ∝ I2x,y ∝ (βmaxIT )2 , Q′′′ ∝ (βmaxIT )3 , . . .
∂β/∂δ ∝ βmaxIT , ∂2β/∂δ2 ∝ (βmaxIT )2 , . . . .
A net degradation is then expected with the new inner
triplet for which the peak β-function is more than dou-
bled compared to βmaxIT ≈ 4.5 km reached in the existing
IT. One possible and well-known strategy would consist in
imposing in both planes a phase advance of π/2 [π] be-
tween the two high luminosity insertions IR1 and IR5. In
this configuration, a self-compensation takes place between
the two insertions, canceling the second order chromaticity
Q” and minimizing the off-momentum β-beating at least to
first order in δ and in the second half of the LHC ring, let
say in between IP5 and IP1. This strategy is not foreseen
for the latest optics and layout version of the LHC (V6.503
[16]) but could be easily implemented by retuning the beta-
tron phase advances in the arc cells of several LHC sectors.
Trying this strategy for the new triplet, it is then obvious
that the off-momentum β-beating can be minimized in only
one of the two collimation insertions (IR7 in our case). It is
then maximized in the other collimation insertion, possibly
reaching 160% at a momentum deviation of δp=10−3 (see
Fig. 5). This value is considered large enough to corrupt the
hierarchy of the multi-stage collimation system of the LHC
[17], at least in IR3. In addition, while the second order
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Figure 5: Typical chromatic variations of the β-functions
[%] in between IP1 and IP5, in particular in the momen-
tum collimation insertion IR3 (top), and chromatic varia-
tions of the tunes (linear chromaticity matched to 2 units).
The horizontal and vertical betatron phase advances are
assumed to be matched to π/2 [π] between IP1 and IP5; the
squeezed optics of IR1 and IR5 are supposed to be strictly
identical (with βmaxIT ≈ 12 km in the new triplets).
chromaticity Q′′ can be nicely canceled via the IR phasing
strategy, the third order chromaticity Q ′′′ is large enough to
push the working point towards the third order resonances
at a momentum deviation of only one permil (see Fig. 5).
Even if the half height of the nominal RF bucket is about
three times less at flat top energy (δbucket =0.36× 10−3),
this effect will then impose rather tight constraints on the
possibility of performing off-momentum beam measure-
ments when the optics is squeezed. A rather precise in-
terlock system on the beam energy will also have to be set
up, with a level of accuracy of the order of a few 10−4 and
therefore possible implications on the machine operation at
flat top energy. Finally it is worth mentioning that the effi-
ciency of the IR phasing strategy can be easily corrupted in
the presence of β-beating or β∗ unbalance between the two
high luminosity insertions IR1 and IR5. In particular this
∼ −Δ   /8  [π]IR5−left+ 2 μcell45δN
cell45 =μ cell45 −π/2δwith
cell34 =μ cell34 −π/2δwith
Triplet
μIR4 + Nδcell45 + μIR5−leftδcell34 +2(N
IR4Sector 34 Sector 45




In−coming off−momentum beta−beating wave
coherently excited in two consecutive LHC sectors
SD1                   SD1                    SD1 SD1                   SD1                    SD1 SD2        SD2             SD2 ..... SD2        SD2             SD2 .....
Average setting for Q’ correction only
) ∼Δ   /8  [π] QQ
Figure 6: “Chromatic phasing conditions” w.r.t. IP5 (a
simplified version without using the tune shift quadrupoles
MQT’s, see later) and schematic powering scheme of the
(SD) sextupole families in arcs 34 and 45 in order to excite
coherently a (vertical) off-momentum β-beating wave.
strategy pre-supposes obviously a simultaneous squeeze of
the two insertions.
Correction strategy and global impact on the LHC
optics. The correction of the chromatic aberrations in-
duced by the inner triplets in collision has been an unsolved
well-known issue during the last two decades. Pending a
solution to this problem, specific sextupole corrector cir-
cuits were nevertheless foreseen in the early design of the
machine and are actually installed in the LHC: two inter-
leaved sextupole families per plane in each of the 8 LHC
sectors (instead of one single family per plane which is
actually needed for the only correction of the linear chro-
maticity). However, considered for a long time at the limit
of acceptability for the nominal LHC, no clear strategy was
proposed to correct these effects: in particular how to make
the best use of the 32 lattice sextupole circuits per beam
available in the LHC and, then, what could be the impact
in terms of strength requirements for the arc sextupoles but
also in terms of optics constraints for the overall machine?
Only very recently, a complete solution was found [18]
based on an up and down excitation scheme of the focus-
ing (SF) and defocusing (SD) lattice sextupoles around an
average value (the same for all SF and SD families) which
is tuned to correct the linear chromaticity of the ring (see
Fig. 6). As a result, a wave of off-momentum β-beating
is generated in each of the 8 LHC sectors. Concerning the
amplitude of the off-momentum β-beating induced, above
a certain βmaxIT of the order of 5 km (i.e. below a certain
β∗), two sectors of sextupoles are needed to compensate for
the “chromatic betatron kick” given by one single triplet.
Then half of the defocusing sextupole circuits4 are pushed
up to nominal current (550A) as soon as the the peak β-
function reaches the following limit in the inner triplet:
βmaxIT <∼ 11 km (550A in the lattice sextupoles). (16)
4A specificity of the LHC is that the defocusing sextupoles SD’s are
approximately twice less efficient than the focusing sextupoles SF’s due
to the fact that the dispersion function is halved at the arc QD’s while the
SD’s and SF’s have exactly the same magnetic length.
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This limit corresponds to a β∗ of the order of 30 cm for
the new triplet (G ∼ 120T/m). To summarise, while the
LHC chromatic correction scheme was dimensioned based
on the compensation, still with some margin, of the lin-
ear chromaticity induced by four low-β insertions running
simultaneously at a β∗ of 25 cm, a full chromatic correc-
tion, including as well the non-linear chromaticity and the
off-momentum β-beating, limits severely the operational
mode of the machine in collision, to only two new high-
luminosity insertions running at a minimum β ∗ of 30 cm
and with strictly no margin. The reason is simple. The op-
erating gradient of the new triplet is reduced by about 70%
(which means an increase of the Ix,y integrals by about
30% at constant β∗, see Eq. 15) and, as illustrated in Fig. 6,
only half of the sextupole circuits participate effectively to
the chromatic correction of the inner triplets.
This being said, contrary the Q′ correction, the compen-
sation of the chromatic aberrations requires that specific
phasing conditions are fulfilled all around of the ring.
First of all, the phase advance in the LHC arc cells shall
be as close as possible to π/2. This target maximizes the
coherence of the off-momentum β-beating waves excited
in the 8 LHC sectors but also minimizes any possible side
effects as the residual second order chromaticity induced





dsK2(s)Dx(s) (∂β/∂δ)(δ=0;s) , (17)
where K2(s) and Dx(s) denotes the normalised sextupole
strength and the dispersion function along the machine, and
∂δβ(δ=0; s) represents the first order chromatic derivative
of the β functions at the sextupole locations. This deriva-
tive is null at all the sextupoles for a phase advance of
strictly π/2 in the FODO cells of the LHC arcs. In this
case the chromatic correction does not generate any addi-
tional second order chromaticity according to Eq. 17.
Then two consecutive sectors participating to the chromatic
correction of one given triplet (e.g. sectors 34 and 45 in
Fig. 6) must combine in phase with respect to the off-
momentum β-beating wave that each of them generates
separately. Finally the resulting overall wave shall arrive
in quadrature of phase at the location of the inner triplet
for a proper compensation of the betatron chromatic kick
induced by the low-β quadrupoles. The correction of the
chromatic aberrations therefore requires to completely re-
visit the nominal LHC optics, with specific phasing condi-
tions imposed on both beam and connecting together
• the betatron phase advances in the arc cells of the 8
LHC sectors,
• the betatron phase advances across the four insertions
IR2, IR4, IR6 and IR8 (from Q13.L to Q13.R) which
plays the role of trombone insertions w.r.t. to the off-
momentum β-beating,
• the left and right phase advances (from Q13.L to the IP
and from the IP to Q13.R) of the two high luminosity
insertions IR1 and IR5,
• and, last but not least, possibly non-zero settings im-
posed to the tune shift quadrupoles MQT (from Q14
to Q22) which, as soon as the LHC insertions have
reached their tunability limits, remains the only avail-
able knobs in order to adjust the betatron phases of
each beam individually.
These phasing conditions are detailed in Ref. [18] and re-
ported on Fig. 6, illustrating as well that still some flexibil-
ity is left for a fine tuning of the working point.
A new overall LHC optics has then be built up accord-
ingly [19], which was relatively tricky as explained here-
after. Without going too much into the details, the main
differences with the nominal optics is a tune split reduced
from 5 to 3 while preserving the fractional part of the work-
ing point (Qx,y = 63.28/60.31 for the new optics at injec-
tion instead of 64.28/59.31 for the nominal LHC optics).
This reduction is due to the fact that the arc cell phase ad-
vances are now closer to π/2 for the new optics. As ex-
plained previously, horizontal and vertical phase advances
of strictly π/2 in the LHC arc cells or, let say, even smaller
tune split would have been preferable for the chromatic cor-
rection of the inner triplet. However, in order to satisfy the
phasing conditions reported on Fig. 6, a “chromatic aber-
ration free optics” with even smaller tune split has been
found to be out of reach due to the accumulation of several
reasons:
• the limited tunability of the trombone insertions IR2,
IR4, IR6 and IR8 driven by aperture related con-
straints at injection (essentially IR4 and IR6 due to
missing quadrupoles, Q4 and Q7, respectively),
• the quasi-null flexibility of the collimation insertions
IR3 and IR7 which therefore cannot be used as global
knobs to preserve the fractional part of the betatron
tunes,
• and, last but not least, the quite rigid left and right
phase advances of the high luminosity insertions in
collision which, in the horizontal plane, depends
strongly on the layout of the triplet itself, more pre-
cisely on its co-focal length that is the P parameter
introduced previously in Eq. 11.
The potential of this new optics is illustrated in Fig. 7. Af-
ter an active correction by the lattice sextupoles, the off-
momentum β-beating envelop is nicely vanishing in the
two collimation insertions IR3 and IR7 but also in the new
inner triplets equipping IR1 and IR5. The chromatic varia-
tions of the betatron tunes become almost linear up to mo-
mentum deviation of 1.5 permil and after an eventual fine
tuning of the residual Q′′ using the Landau octupoles of the
LHC arcs (see next section and Ref. [18] for more details).
A complete solution can then be found ”in extremis” for
the correction of the large chromatic aberrations induced by
the new inner triplet in collision. This however limits the
minimum possible β∗ to 30 cm when half of the defocus-
ing sextupole circuits shall be powered with a current very
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Figure 7: Off-momentum β-beat envelop (|(∂δβ(δ=0; s)|)
along the LHC ring (top) and chromatic variation of the
betatron tunes (bottom) in collision (β ∗ = 30 cm) for the
SLHCV2.0 optics and layout [19].
close to nominal. Unless these well-identified families are
recommissioned with higher than nominal current, ideally
up to 600A or even beyond, linear optics distortions (typ-
ically phase errors randomly distributed in the machine)
may then further limit the minimum possible β ∗ in the real
machine, to let say β∗min ≈ 35− 40cm.
Field quality
While the field quality of the new triplet and of the new
D1 separation dipole has no impact on the dynamic aper-
ture (DA) of the machine at injection, the situation is quite
different in collision when the optics is squeezed in the two
high luminosity insertions IR1 and IR5. As far as only ran-
dom multipoles are concerned, general scaling laws predict
an improvement of the field quality with the coil aperture
of the new magnets [20]:
bn (Rr = αCoilID) ∝ 1CoilID , (18)
with Rr a reference radius corresponding to a given frac-
tion of the coil aperture, typically one third (that is a refer-
ence radius of 40 mm for the new triplet). Starting from the
field quality measured in the existing MQXA and MQXB
low-β quadrupoles and applying the above scaling law to
extrapolate the field quality of the new triplet, assuming
that any possible sources of systematic multipoles could be
detected early enough and then corrected during the pro-
duction, and neglecting any possible contributions coming
from the D1 separation dipole, preliminary dynamic aper-
ture studies showed extremely encouraging results [21]. In
particular, a very decent dynamic aperture of the order of or
larger than 12σ was found with a 130 mm aperture triplet,
operating with a βmaxIT of the order of 12-13 km, and with-
out any specific correction. A minimal correction scheme
containing only shew quadrupole and sextupole corrector
magnets, MQSX and MCSX, respectively, was then in-
cluded in the first schematic layout of the new triplet [10].
Then less optimistic estimates were derived for the field
quality of the new triplets, based on the multipole compo-
nents measured in the main quadrupoles MQ of the LHC
(since the new IT will be equipped with the same Nb-Ti ca-
bles) and then rescaled to the 120 mm aperture of the new
MQXC quadrupoles. Possible non-zero systematic mul-
tipoles (uncertainty) were also included in the field error
table expected for the new triplet [22]. Finally the new su-
perconducting separation dipole [23] was also taken into
account in the simulations, being said that very significant
low order multipole errors (i.e. from one unit up to one
permil) such as a2, a3, b3 and b5 are presently expected in
the new D1. Under these conditions, a dynamic aperture as
low as 6σ cannot be excluded (see red solid lines in Fig. 8).
It was then made very clear that
• the new IT should be equipped at least with the same
corrector package as the one installed in the existing
triplet, that is not only a2 and b3 but also a3, a4, b4
and b6 corrector coils and, in addition,
• an effort should be made to improve the field quality
of the new triplet and D1 in order to met a target dy-
namic aperture of about 12σ in collision [24].
New triplet. A preliminary target error table has then
been established for the new triplet, starting from the field
quality measured in the existing MQXB type magnets and














with Rrold ≡ 17 mm and Rrnew ≡ 40 mm denoting the
reference radius used to define the multipole components
of the MQXB and new MQXC type magnets, and where
(βmaxIT )new = 4.5 km and (βmaxIT )new = 11 km represent
the peak β-functions reached in the existing triplet and in
the new one when operating the machine at a β ∗ of 55 cm























Figure 8: Minimum 100’000 turns dynamic aperture [σ]
of the sLHC Phase-I in collision (β∗ = 30 cm at IP1 and
IP5) as a function of the phase space angle [◦], obtained
for 60 different error realizations in the new IT and D1
(seeds). From bottom to top, the following three cases
have been considered: a-) expected error table for the new
triplet[22] and D1[23] and minimal correction scheme (a2
and b3) as proposed in [10], b-) idem but assuming a
more complete set of low-order multipole corrector mag-
nets (a2, b3, a3, b4, a4, b6), c-) idem but assuming a bet-
ter field quality for the triplet (derived from Eq. 19 for the
multipoles of order n ≤ 6) and using the so-called error
table target10 for the new D1 [26]. Courtesy of B. Holzer.
and 30 cm, respectively. A target DA of about 12σ is then
easily reached under these conditions (blue dotted line in
Fig. 8). The strategy is presently to relax one by one the
target multipoles obtained via the above formula, in order
to identify the ones which are really detrimental for the dy-
namic aperture of the machine in collision and then start
an iterative process with the magnet builders. The work
should be completed and published in the coming months
but preliminary results seems to indicate that only a few
low order multipoles are actually found critical for the DA
in collision and would need to be further optimized, apply-
ing a reduction factor of not more than 2 with respect to the
error table given in Ref. [22]. This is in particular the case
for the b6 uncertainty where about 1 unit seems to be tol-
erable compared to 1.77 units expected in Ref. [22], or for
random and/or systematic multipoles such as a5, b5 or a6
for which no specific correction is presently foreseen [25].
D1 separation dipole. The new separation dipole D1
contains two superconducting DX RHIC magnets [23]. It is
found to be critical not only for its possible impact on the
dynamic aperture in collision but also and mainly for the
rather large linear imperfections that it may generate when
the optics is squeezed and in the presence of the crossing
scheme. In this respect, a detailed target field error table
has been established for the new D1 [26], taking into ac-
count the possible linear optics distortions directly induced















Figure 9: Two-dimensional tune distribution versus am-
plitude (particles with betatron amplitudes up to 6 σ are
showed) at nominal intensity per bunch (Nb =1.15×1011).
Comparison between the nominal LHC collision optics
(β∗=55 cm at IP1 and IP5, β∗=10 m at IP2 and IP8, halo
collision in IP2) and the new optics and layout SLHCV2.0
[19] with β∗ = 30 cm at IP1 and IP5 (and no change of
configuration in IP2 and IP8). Courtesy of E. Laface.
effects from b3 and a3. The latter are particularly rele-
vant since they represent a dynamic source of tune shift,
coupling or β-beating during a fill, when operating Vernier
scans, fine tuning the crossing angle or simply collapsing
the parallel separation in order to put the two beams into
collision. While a maximum of 2-3 units is still tolerable
for a2, the level of 1 unit shall be reached for the b2, b3 and
a3 harmonics, that is a factor of 2 to 6 below the 3σ level
deduced from the D1 error table presented in Ref. [23]. It
is therefore not yet clear whether a simple sorting (pairing)
strategy for the two DX magnets forming the D1 assem-
bly will be sufficient or whether additional actions will be
needed in order to meet the above targets.
Beam-beam effects
Several indicators are generally used to qualify the
beam-beam effect in circular colliders. As far as only in-
coherent effects are concerned, the first one is the well-
known tune footprint (beam-beam induced tune shift or
tune spread) which, at constant intensity per bunch and at
constant normalised crossing angle, is reduced when oper-
ating the machine at lower β∗ (see Fig. 9). In the case of
the LHC Insertion Upgrade Phase-I, the following scaling















using the same notations as the ones introduced in Eq. 9,
assuming an alternated HV or VH crossing scheme in IR1
and IR5, supposing that Alice (IR2) operates in halo colli-
sion and that the optics is not squeezed (β∗≈10 m) for the
LHCb experiment (IR8).
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SLHC Nominal
Figure 10: Normalised beam-beam separation up to D1
in IR5 (horizontal crossing) for the nominal LHC (θc =
9.5 σ), and for the new collision optics (θc = 10 σ) and
latest layout of the new triplet. In the second case, the last
two parasitic encounters before D1 have been artificially
removed. Courtesy of E. Laface.
Another extremely relevant indicator is the degradation
of the dynamic aperture due to the beam-beam effects and,
in particular, due to the long-range beam-beam interac-
tions. In the case of the LHC, these interactions take place
on either side of the IP till D1 when the two beams start
to be fully separated. For the nominal 25 ns bunch spacing
of the LHC beam, the existing high luminosity insertions
IR1 and IR5 contain 15 parasitic beam-beam encounters,
spaced by 3.74 m, up to the entry of D1. The latest layout
of the new triplet corresponds to a total of 21 parasitic en-
counters on either side of the IP (see later). This number
will possibly rise to 22 when additional non-linear correc-
tor magnets (see previous sub-section) will be added the IT
corrector package (CP) located on the non-IP side of Q3
(see Fig. 12). A more reasonable target of 18 or possibly
19 should however be reachable in view of the moderate
lengthening of the new triplet by about 10 m and taking
into account that the triplet corrector magnets shall also be
longer (at constant integrated strength but larger aperture).
Dedicated dynamic aperture studies have then been per-
formed both using the nominal collision optics and layout
of the LHC (V6.503 [16]) and the new optics SLHCV2.0
[19], switching off any possible field imperfections in the
magnets of the ring and treating the beam-beam effects in
the so-called “weak-strong approximation” 5. Even if the
above target of 19 parasitic encounters can be met, and tak-
ing into account the slight increase of the normalised cross-
ing angle from 9.5 σ to 10 σ for the new collision optics
(see Fig. 10), a net degradation of the dynamic aperture is
observed, of the order of 1-1.5 σ at nominal intensity (see
Fig 11). This reduction can however be mitigated activat-
ing the correction of the chromatic aberrations induced by
5In the “weak-strong” approximation, the beam-beam effect induced
on the “weak” beam is modeled by installing single and multiple 4D
beam-beam lenses at each of the parasitic encounters and around the four
interaction points of the machine, respectively, in order to simulate the

























Figure 11: 1’000’000 turns dynamic aperture of the ma-
chine in collision considering only the beam-beam effect
(long-range and head-on) at nominal intensity per bunch
(Nb = 1.15 × 1011). Comparison between the nominal
LHC optics and layout (dotted line) and the new optics and
layout of IR1 and IR5 with (solid line) and without (dashed
line) activating the correction of the chromatic aberrations.
It is assumed that the layout of the new triplet can be op-
timized such that only 19 parasitic beam-beam encounters
take place on either side of the IP up to D1 (compared to
15 in the case of the existing low-β insertions IR1 and IR5).
Courtesy of E. Laface.
the inner triplet (see Fig. 6) which possibly plays a sig-
nificant role in terms of excitation of synchrotron-betatron
resonances as soon as the beam-beam effect is switched on.
More complete simulations combining the beam-beam ef-
fect and the multipole imperfections of the LHC magnets,
in particular of the new IT and D1, will be presented at the
end of the paper.
Two or three additional parasitic encounters, that is 21
or 22 instead of 19, will not represent a clear obstacle for
the LHC IR Upgrade Phase-I. However, this will certainly
not go in the right direction, in order to operate the ma-
chine with an as low as possible normalised crossing angle
and therefore preserve the luminosity gain coming from the
reduction of β∗ (see Eq. 9).
A COMPLETE SOLUTION
WITH β∗ ≥ 30 CM
Having integrated all the possible optics limitations de-
scribed in the previous section, this section will describe
the solution proposed for the IR Upgrade Phase-I, in terms
of layout, optics and dynamic aperture at injection and in
collision including or not the beam-beam effect.
Layout
Two different versions were developed in 2009 for the
optics and layout of the new triplets. These two versions
correspond to very similar peak β-function β maxIT , of the
order of 10.6-10.8 km at β ∗ = 30 cm, and P parameter of
the order of 320 m (see Eq. 11). The distance between the





Figure 12: Schematic layout of the new triplet. Courtesy of
H. Prin
IP and the magnetic entry of Q1 is assumed to be fixed to
l∗=23 m for the LHC IR Upgrade Phase-I.
New low-β quadrupoles MQXC and MQXD. As
mentioned previously, the new triplet will have an aper-
ture of 120 mm with an operating gradient ranging in be-
tween 120 T/m and 127 T/m [11] (80-85% of the short
sample limit). The latest layout is based on a gradient of
123 T/m for Q1 and Q2 which has been fine tuned in order
to find an acceptable compromise for the positioning of the
bi-directionnal BPMS in each of the interconnects of the
new triplet (see later). The gradient of Q3 is slightly lower
(122.2 T/m) for optics related reasons (P parameter im-
pacting on the gradients and the mechanical aperture of the
matching section quadrupoles). Contrary to the first pro-
posal of having exactly the same magnetic length for the
four quadrupoles Q1, Q2a, Q2b and Q3 equipping the new
triplet [10], it was rapidly agreed to stick to the design of
the existing triplet with two different lengths for Q1/Q3 and
Q2a/Q2b (9.145 m and 7.735 m, respectively, for the lat-
est layout SLHCV2.0 [19], compared to 6.37m and 5.50m
for the existing MQXA and MQXB type quadrupoles). In-
deed, at constant β∗, the gain was of the order of 7-8% in
terms of peak β-function reached in the inner triplet, there-
fore substantial due to the severe limitations imposed on
this quantity as previously described.
Orbit corrector magnets and other triplet corrector.
A corrector package (CP) will be installed on the non-IP
side of Q3. This assembly will contain one pair of H/V
orbit corrector magnets (MCBX), a skew quadrupole cor-
rector MQSX and a sextupole corrector MCSX [10]. As
mentioned previously, additional corrector coils such as a 3,
a4, b4 and b6 multipole corrector magnets have been found
mandatory to preserve the dynamic aperture of the ma-
chine in collision. The latter are not yet implemented in the
schematic layout showed in Fig. 12. Then, the main differ-
ence between the first and second IT layout, SLHCV1 and
SLHCV2 developed in 2009, is the implementation of addi-
tional orbit corrector magnets inside the triplet itself, more
precisely in the cold masses of Q2a (IP side) and Q2b (non
IP side). In order to guaranty a local correction of the triplet
misalignments, therefore of good quality and without inter-
fering with the generation of the crossing scheme, as short
as possible double plane orbit corrector magnets are highly
desirable at those two locations [9]. Nested dipole cor-
rectors, based on epoxy-impregnated coils, as used in the
present triplet, are however not considered appropriate for
the performance goals of the Phase-I upgrade (1000 fb−1
life time). A specific R&D effort will be then deployed [27]
in order to find an appropriate technical solution for the or-
bit correctors of the new triplet (about 1.5m long, offering
an integrated strength of 1.5 Tm in both planes).
BPM. As for the four existing experimental insertions
of the LHC, a slot just upstream the TAS in IR1 and IR5
will be reserved for a warm bidirectional BPM (BPMSW)
which is considered as one of the most suitable instru-
ments to find the collision. Then each interconnect of the
new triplet will be standardized in order to host a cold bi-
directionnal BPM (BPMS), that is four BPMS’s per triplet
in the Q1-Q2a, Q2a-Q2b, Q2b-Q3 and Q3-CP intercon-
nects. Except for the BPMS in between Q1 and Q2a, the
three other BPMS’s are close or even very close to opti-
mal positions, that is in between two parasitic beam-beam
encounters with a tolerance estimated to ±75 cm for the
nominal machine (in order to preserve a measurement ac-
curacy of the order of∼ 50μm in the presence of two nom-
inal counter-rotating LHC beams, see e.g. [28]). Finally, it
would be advisable to add a last BPM on the non-IP side
of D1 which, combined with the BPMWB on the IP-side
of D2 and the BPMS on the non-IP side of Q3, will offer
a robust measurement method for the extremely sensitive
parameter P of the inner triplet.
Separation dipole D1. The existing warm D1 mag-
nets installed in the high luminosity insertions IR1 and IR5
do not offer enough aperture for the beam below a β ∗ of
about 50 cm, especially when the crossing angle is chosen
to be vertical. The proposal for Phase-I is based on a su-
perconducting assembly containing two 3.7 m long RHIC
DX magnets. This magnet will work at the 1.9K tempera-
ture of the inner triplet and will offer an integrated strength
of about 30 Tm [29], increased with respect to 26.3 T/m
needed for the existing D1 due to the lengthening of the
new triplet and therefore the reduction of the distance be-
tween D1 and D2. While the mechanical acceptance of
the new D1 (180mm ID) is more than sufficient compared
to the beam aperture requirements6, its field quality would
need to be substantially optimize with respect to the present
expectations and monitor with a very special care during
the production (see [26] and previous discussion).
TAS, TAN and other protection devices. The exist-
ing TAS (34 mm ID) will be replaced by a new object with
an aperture increased to 50 mm. The aperture of the TAN,
or more precisely the separation between the two bores of
the existing TAN, is no longer suitable to the new distance
between D1 and D2. In particular the TAN becomes a se-
vere aperture bottle-neck in the new insertion (n1 ∼ 5.5)
6A cold D1 equipped with the IT beam-screen would still give a nor-
malised aperture of slightly more than n1∼7 at β∗=30 cm.
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when the crossing angle is chosen to be vertical and the op-
tics is squeezed down to β∗=30 cm (see later). As soon as
the D1-D2 distance will be frozen, the cross-section of the
new TAN will be specified together with the design of the
new Y-chamber. New collimation devices will certainly be
needed in the matching section, either to protect the disper-
sion suppressor from the out-going beam as already fore-
seen (TCL at Q5) or to protect Q5, Q4 and D2 from the
in-coming beam. In this second case, loss maps studies are
however not completed yet to fully justify the need (see e.g.
[30]) and then to validate a possible remedy (e.g. TCT-like
absorber installed upstream Q5).
Matching section. Except for additional collimation
devices installed close to Q5 and possibly warm dipole cor-
rector magnets added close to Q4 to reinforce the MCBY’s
(see previous discussion), the matching section is assumed
to be kept unchanged for the LHC IR Upgrade Phase-I.
Other considerations. The latest layout of the new
triplet corresponds to 21 parasitic beam-beam encounters
on either side of the IP up to D1, out of which about 4 are
located downstream Q3 considering a total length of about
14 m estimated for the corrector package (CP) and the
triplet service module (QDXS). As mentioned above, this
number will further increase when additional non-linear
corrector magnets will be implemented in the design of the
corrector package. Any specific measure will then be more
than welcome to keep the IT-CP-D1 assembly as compact
as possible, starting from a suitable solution with only a
few nested corrector coils for the corrector package (e.g.
MCBXHV, MQSX, MCSTX and MCOSX type magnets
as in the existing triplet), envisaging a configuration where
the CP and IT bus-bars would transit through D1 (QDXS
installed on the non-IP side of D1), or even studying the
pros and cons of a solution where the CP and D1 would
occupy the same cryostat which would eliminate a second
interconnect in between Q3 and D1.
Optics, crossing scheme and mechanical aper-
ture of the new insertions
The main parameters related to the new inner triplet and
to the injection and collision optics of the new insertions
IR1 and IR5 are summarized in Tab. 2. A back-up collision
optics with an higher β∗ and a larger than 10 σ normalised
crossing angle is also mentioned. A detailed discussion
concerning the gradients of the various quadrupoles of the
new insertion will take place later on when the squeeze of
the optics will be presented.
Injection. β∗ is chosen to be 14 m at injection (see
Fig. 13(a)) in order to limit the peak β-functions to be less
than 250-300 m in the inner triplet (as in the present triplet
with β∗=11 m), and therefore minimise any possible im-
pact of the IT and D1 field quality on the dynamic aperture
of the machine at injection.
Parameters Injection Collision Back-up
Energy [GeV] 450 7000 7000
Q1/Q2 gradient [T/m] (at 7 TeV) 119.01 123.00 122.81
Q3 gradient [T/m] (at 7 TeV) 119.01 122.22 122.22
β∗ [m] 14.00 0.30 0.40
βmaxIT [km] 0.3 10.8 8.1






[2π] for beam1 Irrelevant 1.070/1.754
ΔμR
x/y
[2π] for beam1 Irrelevant 1.600/0.890
ΔμL
x/y
[2π] for beam2 Irrelevant 1.605/0.890
ΔμR
x/y
[2π] for beam2 Irrelevant 1.065/1.754
Full X-angle [μrad] 410 410 560
Full parallel sep. [mm] 5.0 1.5 1.5
Table 2: Main optics parameters for the new insertions IR1
and IR5 at injection and in collision.
Contrary to the collision optics, the left and right beta-
tron phase advances of the insertion (ΔμL/R
x/y
in Tab. 2) can
be arbitrarily chosen. Only the overall phase across the in-
sertion (namely ΔμTot
x/y
from Q13.L to Q13.R) is imposed
by the choice of the working point.
The full crossing angle is fixed to θc = 410μrad, that is
slightly more than 17 σ for β∗ = 14 m, and a full parallel
separation of 5 mm is imposed at injection (see Fig. 13(b)).
As illustrated in Fig. 13(c), the mechanical aperture of
the new IR exhibits the following properties:
• a normalised aperture of n1 ∼6.7/7 at the defocus-
ing/focusing quadrupoles of the dispersion suppressor
which is a general feature of the nominal injection op-
tics of the LHC (see e.g. [31]),
• a rather comfortable clearance in the matching section
(except at the location of the present TAN),
• and a huge margin in the inner triplet and in the ex-
perimental beam-pipes (assuming an aperture model
where the inner diameter of the central part has been
reduced from 59 mm to 50 mm over ±2 m on either
side of the IP [32]).
It is worth mentioning that a certain freedom still exists
in the choice of the injection optics of the new insertions.
Said differently, both β∗ and/or the crossing scheme might
be subject to modifications in case additional criteria will
have to be considered such as, for instance, the minimiza-
tion of the squeeze duration. In this case, β ∗ would have
to be further reduced at injection within certain limits im-
posed by the preservation of the mechanical and dynamic
aperture of the machine.
Collision. As described in detail in the previous sec-
tion, severe limitations are imposed on the maximum pos-
sible peak β-function βITmax reached in the inner triplet
(see conditions (12) and (16)). The tightest limitation,
βITmax <∼ 11 km, comes from the strength available in the





Figure 13: Optics, crossing scheme and aperture plot (from
Q13.L to Q13.R) for the new high-luminosity insertions of
the LHC at injection (β∗=14 m).
lattice sextupoles (at nominal current) in order to perform
a full chromatic correction of the inner triplet. Choos-
ing β∗ = 30 cm in collision is already very close to this
limit since corresponding to a peak β-function of the or-
der of 10.8 km reached the new triplet. The IT layout
and slight gradient imbalances imposed on the new low-
β quadrupoles (123T/m for Q1/Q2 and 122.2 T/m for Q3,
see Tab. 2) have then been fine-tuned in order to minimise
the co-focal length of the new triplet (P =312 m as defined
in Eq. 11) and therefore optimize the aperture of the match-
ing section, leading to a β-function of less than 2 km at the
entry of Q4 (see Fig. 14(a)).
As for the nominal LHC, the passage from the injec-
tion tune (Qx,y = .28/.31) to the collision tune (Qx,y =
.31/.32) is performed at the beginning of the squeeze by
applying a small shift of ΔQx = 0.015 and ΔQy = 0.005
to the betatron phase advances of each of the two low-β
insertions IR1 and IR5. These phase advances are then
kept constant during the overall squeeze in order to pre-
serve the collision tune of the machine down to the colli-
sion β∗ of 30 cm. In addtion, below a certain transition β ∗
(β∗trans=1.5 m, see later), the left and right phase advances
of the two insertions (i.e. ΔμL/R
x/y
from Q13.L to the IP and
from IP to Q13.R, respectively) are also constrained to very
specific values depending on the overall optics of the rest
of the ring (see next sub-section) and then kept constant till
the end of the squeeze (see Tab. 2).
The full crossing angle is also fixed to θc = 410μrad
in collision (β∗== 30 cm), corresponding to a normalised
value of exactly 10 σ limited by the available aperture of the
inner triplet. Before putting the two beams into collision, a
full parallel separation of 1.5 mm at the IP is found to be
appropriate (see Fig. 14(b)).
Under these conditions, the normalised IT aperture is
n1 =7.4 assuming a standard HV or VH alternated crossing
scheme in IR1 and IR5. The matching section still offers a
comfortable clearance for the beam (so-called “low-P op-
tics configuration”), but at the price that the gradients of
several IR quadrupoles are very close to their limits, in par-
ticular Q7 close to 200 T/m, and Q5 and Q6 running at 20-
30 T/m (see later). Then, as shown in Fig. 14(c), the only
aperture bottle-neck occurs at the location of the existing
TAN, when the crossing angle is chosen to be vertical.
A second collision optics is also mentioned in Tab. 2, en-
visaging a β∗ increased up to 40 cm and a full crossing an-
gle as large as 560 μrad, that is almost 16 σ at β∗=40 cm.
This crossing angle corresponds to the strength limit of the
MCBY orbit corrector magnets at Q4 (see condition (13))
but is still compatible with the aperture of the new triplet
(n1 ∼ 7.5). The difference of performance between the
two collision optics has been already discussed and sum-
marized in Tab. 1. The second optics shall however not be
interpreted as the one proposed for the Phase-I Upgrade of
the LHC, but more as a back-up solution in case the first
one would be found not flexible enough when operating
the machine (since very close to the “βmaxIT -limit”) and/or
limited by the beam-beam effect at ultimate intensity.





Figure 14: Optics, crossing scheme and aperture plot (from
Q7.L to Q7.R) for the new high-luminosity insertions of the
LHC in collision (β∗ = 30 cm). When the crossing angle
is chosen to be vertical, a severe aperture bottle-neck is
observed at the location of existing TAN (see Fig.(c))
A new overall LHC optics for the chromatic cor-
rection of the new triplet
As discussed previously, a complete rephasing of the
eight arcs and insertions of the LHC is required in order
to correct the huge chromatic aberrations induced by the
new triplets in collision (see Fig. 6). The principle pro-
posed for this correction was indeed not known when the
design of LHC optics was made and, a fortiori, when cer-
tain decisions were taken concerning the layout of the LHC
insertions, such as IR4 and IR6 where the Q4 and Q6/Q7
quadrupoles, respectively, are missing. In this particular
case, but also in general for all the insertions of the LHC
ring, the tunability (in phase) is rather limited, essentially
in the horizontal plane where the matching of the disper-
sion adds additional constraints which do not exist in the
vertical plane. As a result, as we will see later on, optimal
IR phases which would have been required for an as clean
as possible chromatic correction of the inner triplet can ac-
tually not be reached and compromises are needed pushing
sometimes the LHC insertions very close to their tunabil-
ity limit. The main differences between the nominal LHC
optics V6.503 [16] and the new overall optics SLHCV2.0
[19] are summarized in Tab. 3 and Tab. 4 and justified in
detail hereafter.
Rephasing the arcs of the LHC. One of the main cri-
teria which was used to build up the present optics of the
LHC arcs was the minimization of the non-linear driving
terms c(p, q) potentially induced by large systematic mul-





















Generally 1 when Δμcellx,y =π/2
,
(21)
where Δμcellx/y represent the horizontal and vertical betatron
phase advances per arc cell and Ncell = 23 the total num-
ber of cells per sector (from Q11 to Q11). A natural cure
was then to adjust individually the horizontal and vertical
phase advances of the arc cell on either side of π/2. This
was done in practice by imposing slightly different settings
for the RQF and RQD main circuits within some limits im-
posed by the mechanical aperture of the machine at injec-
tion and the nominal gradient of the main quadrupoles MQ
(∼ 220 T/m). Since the last twelve years the nominal op-
tics of the LHC arcs has no longer been modified. This
optics corresponds to the same betatron phase advances of
Δμcellx/y =94.86
◦/87.52◦ per cell in each of the eight sectors
of the machine (see Tab. 3). This gives a total phase split
of about π per sector and an overall tune split of 5 (taking
into account the additional x − y phase split coming from
the LHC insertions).
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Arc cell betatron phases
Δμcellx /Δμ
cell
y [2π] V6.503 SLHCV2.0
and MQT settings
Sectors adjacent to the low-β insertions IR1 and IR5
Sector 81 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2600 / 0.2504
Sector 12 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2598 / 0.2500
Sector 45 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2600 / 0.2504
Sector 56 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2598 / 0.2500
Sectors adjacent to the collimation insertions IR3 and IR7
Sector 23 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2531 / 0.2489
Sector 34 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2530 / 0.2486
Sector 67 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2541 / 0.2488
Sector 78 0.2635 / 0.2431 0.2525 / 0.2483
Tune shift quadrupole circuits RQT’s
RQTF 0 9→ 12 A at 450 GeV
RQTD 0 2 → 3 A at 450 GeV
Table 3: Comparison between the nominal LHC optics
V6.503 [16] and the new optics SLHCV2.0 [19] in terms
of betatron phase advances per arc cell and settings of the
arc tune shift quadrupoles MQT’s.
Taking into account the excellent field quality of the
magnets produced, in particular for the even order multi-
poles such as b4 (almost vanishing in the MB’s at injection),
it is therefore no longer excluded to go back to betatron
phase advances of π/2 or at least closer to π/2 in the LHC
arc cells. In addition, as discussed previously, imposing a
π/2 phase advance in the arc cells is interesting to maxi-
mize the quality (see e.g. Eq. 17) and the efficiency of the
chromatic correction of the inner triplet in collision. This
requirement is particularly relevant in the vertical plane due
to the fact that the defocusing sextupoles are twice less effi-
cient than the focusing ones (simply because the dispersion
function is halved at the QD’s) and will therefore be limited
more rapidly when reducing β ∗.
Thanks to the appropriate tunability of the LHC inser-
tions in the vertical plane, the chromatic phasing condi-
tions, derived in detail in Ref. [18] and reminded in Fig. 6,
can be achieved with vertical phase advances very close to
π/2 in the LHC arc cells while preserving the fractional
part of the vertical betatron tune (see Tab. 3). The LHC in-
sertions are much less tunable in the other plane but the fo-
cusing sextupoles twice more efficient. Fulfilling the chro-
matic phasing conditions in the horizontal plane while pre-
serving the fractional part of the horizontal tune basically
imposes to split the LHC sectors into two categories: the
four sectors adjacent to the collimation insertions (sectors
23, 34, 67 and 78) with both an horizontal and a verti-
cal phase advance per arc cell very close to π/2 and the
other four sectors, adjacent to the high luminosity inser-
tions, where the arc cell phase advance is still of the order
of 93.5◦ in the horizontal plane. This corresponds to a total
phase split of about π/2 across these four sectors. Then,
taking into account the additional x − y phase split com-
ing from the LHC insertions (see later), the new optics now
corresponds to an integer tune split of 3 (compared to a tune
split of 5 for the nominal LHC optics).
Finally, as shown in Tab. 3 and contrary to the nominal
optics of the LHC, non-zero settings are imposed to the arc
tune shift quadrupoles MQT’s equipping the short-straight
sections from Q14 to Q22. This is especially true for the
focusing quadrupole circuits RQTF’s. Without going too
much into the details, the complication comes from the fact
that the chromatic phasing conditions must be fulfilled si-
multaneously for both beams. Taking the example of the
horizontal chromatic correction of the inner triplet on the
left side of IP5 (see Fig. 6), one of the two phasing condi-
tions connects the horizontal phase advance of the arc cell
of sector 45, namely Δμcell45x , to the horizontal phase ad-
vance on the left side of IR5 or, more precisely, between
IP5 and the last focusing sextupole of sector 45 (located at
Q12.L5 for beam1 and Q11.L5 for beam2):
Ncell(Δμcell45x − π/2) + 2Δμlast SF→IP5x ≡ 0 [π] . (22)
Then, it is worth reminding that the main quadrupole cir-
cuits act simultaneously on both beams. It is also impor-
tant to know that, especially in the horizontal plane, the left
and right phase advances of the high-luminosity insertions
(defined from Q13.L to the IP and from the IP to Q13.R)
cannot be arbitrarily tuned when the optics is squeezed.
Therefore, a priori, the previous condition cannot be ful-
filled individually for each beam but at least minimized for
the two beams by retuning accordingly the arc cell phase
advances (Δμcell45x in the case of Eq. 22). The LHC in-
sertions are however conceptually defined from Q13.L to
Q13.R which means that the β and dispersion functions are
generally matched to the periodic structure of the LHC arcs
at the exit of Q13. Extending this concept from Q22.L to
Q22.R, that is using the arc tune shift quadrupole circuits
with non-zero nominal settings, is then the only possibility
to restore enough tunability on the left and right sides of the
low-β insertions and then enable in practice the chromatic
correction of each beam individually.
Modifying the optics of the LHC arcs as described here-
above may have some draw-backs to be qualified in terms
of mechanical and dynamic aperture of the machine at in-
jection. As we will see later on, the impact on the dy-
namic aperture (DA) at injection is at the limit of signifi-
cance, with a DA of 10.2 σ for the new optics, that is re-
duced by ∼ 0.5 −1σ with respect to the usual values of
10.5−11σ obtained when tracking the as-built machine at
450 GeV and using the nominal optics of the LHC. Then,
powering the MQT’s with moderate currents, as summa-
rized in Tab. 3, and rematching accordingly the LHC inser-
tions from Q22.L to Q22.R, is also found to have a marginal
impact in terms the mechanical aperture. In practice, re-
ducing by a few tenths of millimeters the 4 mm aperture
budget reserved for the closed orbit at injection, helps to
fully recover the nominal beam clearance of the LHC arcs
at 450 GeV.
Rephasing all the insertions of the LHC. The chro-
matic phasing conditions (see Fig. 6) have as well a di-
rect impact on the betatron phases of the 8 insertions of the
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ring taking into account that, in addition, the fractional part
of the betatron tunes shall be preserved and that phase ad-
vances very close to 90◦ are highly desirable in the cells
of the LHC arcs. Furthermore, since both beams and the
four new inner triplets shall be treated in a similar way in
terms of chromatic correction, the new optics SLHCV2.0
[19] will exhibit the following symmetries.
Beam1-Beam2 IR phase split. The new optics of the LHC
insertions are matched without any phase split between
beam1 and beam2 contrary to the nominal optics of IR2,
IR3, IR4, IR7 and IR8 (see Tab. 4).
The “trombone insertions”. The insertions IR2, IR4, IR6
and IR8 have now (almost) exactly the same betatron phase
advances modulo π/2, which means the same phase as far
as only the off-momentum β-beating is concerned (since
oscillating at twice the betatron frequency).
Within the tunability limits of these four insertions, an op-
timal phase advance very close to π/4 [π/2] can actually
be reached from Q13.L to Q13.R in the vertical plane (see
Tab. 4). This then corresponds to a phase advance very
close to π/2 [π/2] for both beams between the last and
the first defocusing sextupole on the left and right side
of the insertion7. This configuration is indeed optimal
for maximizing the coherence of the overall wave of off-
momentum β-beating generated by the two sectors adja-
cent to IR2, IR4, IR6 or IR8, each of them being tuned
with Δμcelly ≈ π/2 (see Tab. 3).
Similar phase advances cannot be reached in the horizontal
plane. This is due to the fact that the matching of the dis-
persion at Q13.L/R, but also at IP2 and IP8 and, to some
extent, at IP4 and IP6 as well, adds additional constraints
which does not exist in the vertical plane. However, “re-
inforcing” the layout of IR4 and IR6 (where the Q4 and
Q6/Q7 quadrupoles, respectively, are missing) or modify-
ing the gradients of the Q4 and Q5 quadrupoles on the in-
jection side of IR2 and IR8 (presently kept unchanged in
order to preserve the matching of the transfer lines to the
LHC ring), there are a priori no specific reasons why an op-
timal phase advance of π/4 [π/2] could also not be reached
in the horizontal plane for these four insertions.
The high luminosity insertions. As explained previously,
the chromatic phasing conditions also impose rather severe
constraints on the left and right phase advances of the high
luminosity insertions IR1 and IR5. These constraints are
only relevant when the optics is squeezed below a certain
β∗, in which case the chromatic aberrations induced by the
inner triplet starts to exceed certain acceptability limit and
the chromatic correction via the lattice sextupoles needs to
be activated (see Fig. 6). None of these conditions are cur-
rently taken into account for the nominal collision optics of
IR1 and IR5 (see Tab. 4).
7Depending on the beam, these sextupoles are installed close to
Q11.L/R or Q12.L/R due to the beam1-beam2 and left/right optics an-






tunes Qx/y Beam1 Beam2 Beam1 Beam2
“Trombone insertions” IR2, IR4, IR6 and IR8
ΔμIR8x 3.183 3.059 3.020
ΔμIR2x 2.986 2.991 3.020
ΔμIR4x 2.045 2.125 2.260
ΔμIR6x 2.015 2.015 2.010
ΔμIR8y 2.974 2.782 2.900
ΔμIR2y 2.809 2.844 2.900
ΔμIR4y 1.941 1.934 1.650
ΔμIR6y 1.780 1.780 1.900
Collimation insertions IR3 and IR7
ΔμIR3x 2.261 2.260 2.255
ΔμIR7x 2.450 2.489 2.455
ΔμIR3y 1.905 1.990 1.955
ΔμIR7y 1.924 2.003 1.970
High-luminosity insertions IR1 and IR5: left, right














(col.) Not specified 1.070/1.754 1.605/0.890
ΔμR
x/y




Table 4: Comparison between the nominal LHC optics
V6.503 [16] and the new optics SLHCV2.0 [19] in terms of
working point and phase advances (from Q13.L to Q13.R)
over the 8 insertions of the machine.
Depending on the beam, optimal horizontal and vertical
phase advances of π/4 [π/2] or π/2 [π/2] would ideally
be required from Q13.L to the IP and from the IP to Q13.R.
This configuration, indeed, corresponds to phase advances
close to π/2 [π/2] in both planes between the left or right
inner triplet and the first or last sextupole, focusing or de-
focusing, on either side of the insertion. As showed in
Tab. 4, these optimal left and right IR phases can actually
be reached in the vertical plane. Furthermore, these addi-
tional matching constraints are found to have only a small
impact on the maximum peak β-function βmaxIT which is
matchable to the LHC arcs within the IR quadrupole gra-
dient limits and the aperture constraints of the matching
section.
The situation is then quite different in the horizontal plane
where the left and right phases of the insertion are basically
fixed as soon as the P parameter of the inner triplet (see
Eq. 11) has been chosen based on other criteria (match-
ing section aperture, IR quadrupole gradients, see previous
section). Furthermore the missing phase advance (w.r.t. to
the optimal left and right IR phases) is not the same for the
two beams in the horizontal plane. More precisely, on the
left side of the insertion, the missing horizontal phase is
0.055× 2π for beam1, comparing the value of 1.07 quoted
in Tab. 4 and the closest target of 1.125, i.e. π/4 [π/2]
from Q13.L to the IP, considering that Q13.L is defocusing
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for beam1 in IR1 and IR5. On the other hand, this miss-
ing phase is 0.15 × 2π for beam2, comparing the value of
1.60 quoted in Tab. 4 and a target of 1.75, i.e. π/2 [π/2]
from Q13.L to the IP, considering that Q13.L is focusing
for beam2 in IR1 and IR5. The situation is then very similar
on the right side of the low-β-insertion. This explains why
the sectors 81, 12, 45 and 56 are tuned with an horizontal
phase advance per arc cell which is substantially different
from 90◦ (see Tab. 3) in order to compensate a missing hor-
izontal phase advance of about 0.1 × 2π, when averaged
over the two beams. Then, as already mentioned, this also
explains why the trim focusing quadrupoles MQTF’s, from
Q14 to Q22, must be powered with a sizable current (with
an opposite sign for beam1 and beam2 on a given side of
the low-β insertion) in order to ensure that the chromatic
phasing conditions can be fulfilled for each beam individu-
ally.
Finally, as showed in Tab. 4, it is worth noticing the almost
perfect symmetry in terms of L/R phase advances specified
for the two beams in IR1 and IR5:{
ΔμL,b1x ≈ ΔμR,b2x and ΔμR,b1x ≈ ΔμL,b2x
ΔμL,b1y ≡ ΔμR,b2y and ΔμR,b1y ≡ ΔμL,b2y .
Other considerations. It goes without saying that specific
precautions have been taken when rematching the eight in-
sertions of the LHC but additional checks are still needed
to fully validate the new optics proposed (see below). In
this respect the 8 insertions of the machine have been re-
matched according to the new optics defined in Tab. 3 for
the LHC arcs and the new phase advances specified in
Tab. 4, but also taken into account
• the preservation of the mechanical aperture at injec-
tion. This is granted within Δn1 ∼ 0.1 in the inser-
tion magnets, that is a few tenths of millimeters at 450
GeV. These verifications are however still missing for
the non-magnetic components of the LHC insertions
such as, for instance, the empty cryostats replacing the
missing dipoles close to Q11 (and the missing Q7’s in
IR6), the warm beam pipes of the LHC long straight
sections or the warm-to-cold or cold-to-cold transi-
tions which have been modeled very recently by in-
serting so-called vacuum markers into the LHC MAD
sequence.
• the preservation of the functionality of the different
LHC insertions. In this respect, the rephasing of
the collimation insertions IR3 and IR7 has been per-
formed by fixing the Twiss parameters at Q6 and then
acting only on the dispersion suppressor quadrupoles.
As a result, the new optics of IR3 and IR7 remain un-
perturbed in between Q6.L and Q6.R, that is in the
region containing the momentum and betatron colli-
mation systems of the LHC. Concerning IR2 and IR8
where the two beams are injected, the optics have been
modified keeping unchanged the strength of the inner
triplet but also, for the injected beam, the gradients of
Figure 15: SLHCV2.0 optics in collision (β∗ = 30 cm.
Chromatic variations of the β-functions [%] for beam1 at
IP1, IP3, IP5 and IP8 after correction.
the Q4 and Q5 quadrupoles. Under these conditions,
the LHC transfer lines does not need to be rematched
and, in addition, the vertical phase advances between
the MKI and the TDI and TCLI absorbers are kept un-
changed. The dump insertion IR6 has been rematched
at more or less constant Twiss parameters at the IP (in
order to preserve the aperture of the extracted beam),
and also fixing the gradient of the Q4 quadrupole on
the MKD side (which also participates to the extrac-
tion kick and therefore has a direct impact on the ge-
ometrical positioning of the extraction septa). Finally
the optics of the RF insertion IR4 have been modified
taking care of preserving the size of the β-functions
but also the dispersion at some key instruments and
equipments of the insertion such as, of course, the RF
cavities but also the transverse dampers or the tune
and aperture kickers.
In all cases, however, a second series of checks should be
performed by the different equipment groups and the IR
responsibles in order to fully validate the new optics pro-
posed.
Residual Q′′ as a signature of a lack of tunability in
the LHC IR’s. As already illustrated in Fig. 7, this new
optics enable a correction of the off-momentum β-beating
simultaneously in the collimation insertions IR3 and IR7
but also in the four inner triplets of IR1 and IR5. More
precisely, the off-momentum β-beating after correction by
the lattice sextupoles can be controlled within less than 2-
3% at those critical locations up to a momentum deviation
as large as 1.5 permil (see Fig. 15). The situation is not
as clean concerning the non-linear chromaticity. More pre-





Figure 16: SLHCV2.0 optics in collision (β∗ = 30 cm).
Chromatic variations of the betatron tunes for beam1,
before any correction (a), after correction of the off-
momentum beta-beating by the lattice sextupoles (b) and
after fine tuning of Q′′ by the lattice octupoles (c).
cisely, as explained previously, the lack of tunability of the
LHC insertions, essentially in the horizontal plane, are not
compatible with a π/2 phase advance in the FODO cells
of all the LHC sectors. As a result the residual second
order chromaticity Q′′ induced by the lattice sextupoles
themselves (see Eq. 17) is not completely negligible (see
Fig. 16(b)). This effect can however still be corrected, if
needed, via the Landau octupole circuits ROF and ROD of
the LHC arcs (see Fig. 16(c)), being noted that the currents
required in the OF and OD families are then of the order of
200A and 450A, respectively.
Squeeze
Just before starting the squeeze at flat top energy, the op-
tics of the two low β-insertions IR1 and IR5 are slowly and
slightly modified in order to perform a small jump from
the injection tunes (.28/.31) to the collision tunes (.31/.32).
Then the reduction of β∗ is achieved at constant betatron
phase advances, from Q13.L to Q13.R across the low-β
insertions, in order to keep unchanged the betatron tunes
during the squeeze.
The LHC experimental insertions were however not de-
signed to be “squeezable” at constant left and right phase
advances individually, that is from Q13.L to the IP and
from the IP to Q13.R. On the other hand, as explained pre-
viously, this functionality is one of the key ingredients for
the chromatic correction of the inner triplet. Strictly speak-
ing, these additional matching constraints are however only
imposed below a certain β∗ when the chromatic aberra-
tions, in particular the off-momentum β-beating, exceeds
a certain limit. Fixing this limit to∣∣∣∣Δββ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 20% at δ = ±10−3 , (23)
the specified left and right IR phases shall then be reached
and kept constant, and the chromatic correction activated,
below a transition β∗ of about 1.5 m 8:
β∗ ≤ β∗trans = 1.5 m ⇒ ΔμL/Rx,y ≡ Cst .
IT settings and cofocal length, and Left/Right IR
phases during the squeeze. The above condition adds
two additional matching constraints per beam (one per
plane), at least below β∗ = 1.5 m during the squeeze of
the new insertions. These additional requirements go be-
yond the capability of the dispersion suppressors which are
basically the only source of IR tunability at low β ∗. A good
compromise would then to also involve the trim quadrupole
circuits RQTF and RQTD during the squeeze, located on
either side of the each insertion from Q14 to Q22. This
possibility would however add another degree of complex-
ity due to the fact that these circuits connect in series the
tune shift quadrupoles MQT on either side of a given sec-
tor. More precisely, in this configuration, the optics of the
8The condition (23) is already twice more demanding than the uncor-
rected 40% off-momentum β-beating actually reached with the nominal
collision optics of the LHC.

















































 for beam1 (right side)
Py for beam1 (right side)
(b)
Figure 17: Low-β quadrupole gradients [T/m] (top) and
horizontal and vertical cofocal lengths Px,y [m] of the new
triplet (bottom) as a function of β∗[m] (logarithmic scale).
The IT parameters Px,y are defined in Eq. 11 and are plot-
ted hereabove for beam1 and for the right triplet. Us-
ing this convention, the P parameter of the inner triplet,
impacting directly on the mechanical acceptance of the
matching section, corresponds to Py . It is almost dou-
bled when “unsqueezing” the optics from β∗ = 30 cm to
β∗=1.5 m at non-constant triplet settings but constant left
and right phase advances from Q13.L to the IP and from



























Horizontal IR phase for beam1: left side
Horizontal IR phase for beam2: right side
Horizontal IR phase for beam1: right side
Horizontal IR phase for beam2: left side
Vertical IR phase for beam1: left side
Vertical IR phase for beam2: right side
Vertical IR phase for beam1: right side
Vertical IR phase for beam2: left side
Figure 18: Left and right phase advances of the new in-
sertion (from Q13.L to the IP and from the IP to Q13.R)
for beam1 and beam2 as a function of β ∗. Just after the
phase jump to go from the injection tunes to the collision
tunes, the squeeze is performed at constant phase advances
across the overall insertion (from Q13.L to Q13.R). The left
and right IR phases are then kept constant individually be-
low the transition β∗ of 1.5 m.
insertions IR8, IR2, IR4 and IR6 would then be intrinsi-
cally coupled to the squeeze of the low-β insertions IR1
and IR5. The only solution found is then to modify the
settings of the inner triplet itself (within a few T/m) in a
non-monotonous way during the squeeze and with a clear
transition at β∗=β∗trans=1.5 m (see Fig. 17(a)). As shown
in Fig. 17(b), this strategy has a clear impact on the co-focal
length of the new triplet (parameter P , see Eq. 11) during
the last part of the squeeze. Indeed this parameter would
be otherwise more or less constant at low β∗ as it is the
case for the nominal squeeze of the present insertions IR1
and IR5 when the IT gradient is no longer modified below
β∗=2 m.
Within the constraints of the existing arcs and dispersion
suppressors of the LHC, this strategy is then the only one
found suitable in order to keep constant individually the left
and right phase advances of the high-luminosity insertions
during the last part of the squeeze (see Fig. 18). More pre-
cisely, starting from the collision optics with β∗=30 cm, it
is found that the P parameter of the inner triplet has to be
increased in order to “unsqueeze” the insertion at constant
left and right phase advance up to the transition β ∗ of 1.5 m.
As previously explained and clearly illustrated in Fig. 19,
the normalised aperture of the matching section can then
be lower than that of the low-β quadrupoles when the P
parameter of the inner triplet is not sufficiently minimized.





Figure 19: Optics (a) and corresponding normalised aper-
ture from Q13.L to Q13.R (b) for the new insertion at the
transition β∗ of 1.5 m where the chromatic correction starts
to be activated. The bottom figure shows the off-momentum
β-beating envelop around the LHC ring (starting from IP3)
just before activating the chromatic correction of the inner
triplet: Wx,y = 200 is equivalent to a peak off-momentum
β-beating of 20% at δ=±10−3.
This feature, occurring only at intermediate β ∗ (and down
to β∗ ≈ 60 cm) will then have to be kept in mind when
the settings of the collimator jaws will have to be defined
during the squeeze of the new insertion.
Evolution of the IR quadrupole gradients during the
squeeze. The settings of the IR quadrupoles as a func-
tion of β∗ are showed in Fig’s 20(a) to 20(c), concerning
the matching section quadrupoles (Q4, Q5 and Q6), the
dispersion suppressor quadrupoles (from Q7 to Q10) and
the trim quadrupoles (from Q11 to Q13), respectively. The
transition at β =β∗trans =1.5 m is clearly visible while the
evolution of the IR quadrupole settings is rather smooth
on either side of the transition. It is worth noting that
the Q5 and Q6 quadrupoles reach rather low gradients at
β∗= 30cm while Q7 approaches dangerously its nominal
gradient of 200 T/m. At low β∗ some standalone tune shift
quadrupoles (QT12 and QT13 on the right and left side
of the insertion for beam1 and beam2, respectively) must
be operated with a current which is very close to nominal
(550A). Finally, within the nominal gradient limits of the
IR quadrupoles, it is worth mentioning that a matched op-
tics solution can no longer be found below a β ∗ of about
28 cm.
Evolution of the sextupole and octupole strengths
during the squeeze. The squeeze of the new insertions
will then be done in three well-identified steps:
• Step 1. During the first step, β∗ is reduced down to
β∗trans=1.5 m, at constant phase advance from Q13.L
to Q13.R (after the initial phase jump described previ-
ously). During this process the focusing (resp. defo-
cusing) sextupole circuits are powered with the same
current for correcting the horizontal (resp. vertical)
linear chromaticity of the machine. The Landau oc-
tupoles does not need a priori to be powered.
• Step 2. At β∗ = 1.5 m, the specified left and right
phase advance of the insertion can be reached (see
Fig 18). The squeeze of the insertion is then inter-
rupted and the up and down excitation scheme of the
lattice sextupoles (see Fig. 6) is activated in order to
compensate the off-momentum β-beating already vis-
ible at β∗= 1.5 m (20% at δ = 10−3, see Fig. 19(c)).
If needed, the OF and OD octupole families can also
be powered for fine correction of the residual second
order chromaticity Q′′ induced by the sextupole them-
selves (see Eq. 17).
• Step 3. The squeeze of the optics is restarted and
continues down to the collision β∗ of 30 cm, keeping
constant individually the left and right phase advances
of the insertion. For each matched optics in between
β∗=30 cm and β∗=1.5 m, the settings of the differ-
ent sextupole circuits are adjusted in order to correct
both the linear chromaticity and the chromatic aberra-
tions induced by the inner triplets. The residual Q ′′




































































































Figure 20: Evolution of IR quadrupole gradients [T/m]
during the squeeze: the matching section quadrupoles Q4,
Q5 and Q6 (Gnom. = 160 T/m), the dispersion suppressor
quadrupoles from Q7 to Q10 (Gnom. = 200 T/m) and the
standalone quadrupoles MQTL and MQT equipping Q11
to Q13 (Gnom. = 120 − 125 T/m) are showed in Fig(a),
Fig.(b) and Fig.(c), respectively.
can eventually be fine tuned, if needed, by the lattice
octupoles.
The settings of the 64 LHC sextupole families (2 per plane,
per sector and per beam) are showed in Fig. 21 as a func-
tion of β∗. When β∗ approaches 30 cm, half of the de-
focusing sextupole families must be powered with a cur-
rent very close to nominal (550A corresponding to an nor-
malised strength of Kmax=0.38 m−3 at 7 TeV). A possible
usage of the Landau octupole families during the squeeze is
also illustrated in Fig. 21(c) in case a perfect compensation
of the residual Q′′ would also be needed.
Dynamic aperture
This last sub-section will give a summary of the tracking
results obtained at injection and in collision, including or
not the beam-beam effect, and using the new optics and
layout SLHCV2.0 [19]. The three following configurations
will be presented and discussed:
• Case 1. New Injection optics at 450 GeV with β∗ =
14/10/14/10 m in IR1, IR2, IR5 and IR8, respec-
tively.
• Case 2. New Collision optics at 7 TeV with β∗ =
0.3/10/0.3/10 m in IR1, IR2, IR5 and IR8 and a ver-
tical and horizontal normalised crossing angle of 10 σ
(θc =410μrad) in IR1 and IR5, respectively.
• Case 3. Idem except an increase of β ∗ up to 40 cm in
the high luminosity insertions which, combined with
a full crossing angle increased up to 560μrad (∼ 16 σ
at β∗ = 40 cm) still warrants enough beam clearance
in the inner triplet (n1 ∼ 7).
Each of these cases has then been sub-divided into the fol-
lowing sub-cases:
• Sub-Case 1. No beam-beam effect but multipole field
errors assigned to all the magnets of the ring, based on
the magnetic measurements for most of the magnets
except, of course, for the new triplets and separation
dipoles D1 in IR1 and IR5 for which the usual statis-
tical error assignment procedure is applied. The error
tables used for the new triplet and D1 at injection co-
incide with the expected ones and found in Ref.’s [22]
and [23], respectively. In collision, the error table tar-
get10 [26] is used for D1 and specific targets have
been assumed for the low order multipoles of the in-
ner triplet (n ≤ 6) using the formula given in Eq. 19.
Sixty different machines (seeds) are then generated
accordingly. Finally, as discussed previously, the new
inner triplet is assumed to be equipped with the same
set of non-linear correctors as the one implemented in
the existing triplet.
• Sub-Case 2. Idem but with head-on and long-range
beam-beam interactions, assuming in particular 21
parasitic beam-beam encounters on either side of IP1














































































































































Figure 21: Normalised strength [m−3] of the 64 LHC sex-
tupole families as a function of β∗ for beam1 (a) and beam2
(b). Possible non zero settings imposed to the Landau oc-
tupoles for the fine tuning of Q′′ during the squeeze are
illustrated in Fig.(c). The nominal current of 550 A cor-
responds to a maximum normalised strength of K2,max =
0.38 m−3 and K3,max=16.2 m−4 for the lattice sextupoles
and octupoles of the LHC.
and IP5 up to D1. For completeness, five additional
parasitic encounters are added beyond the magnetic
entry of the 8 D1 separation dipoles which equip the
four LHC experimental insertions, till the beam-beam
separation is larger than 50 mm. Halo collision is
only assumed in IR2, in particular beams are collid-
ing head-on in IP8. The head-on collisions are simu-
lated by installing five beam-beam lenses around IP1,
IP5 and IP8. For the time being, these lenses are
still four-dimensional which means that the possible
excitation of synchrotron-betatron resonances by the
crossing angle is not taken into account in the simu-
lations. The beam intensity is assumed to be nomi-
nal (i.e. 25 ns bunch spacing with Nb = 1.15 × 1011
p/bunch).
• Sub-Case 3. Idem but assuming the ultimate inten-
sity (i.e. 25 ns bunch spacing with Nb =1.70 × 1011
p/bunch).
The results obtained are showed in Fig.’s 22(a), (b) and (c).
Injection. The field imperfections of the LHC main
dipoles represent the main contribution to the machine non-
linearities at injection. Any modification of the optics in the
LHC arcs, in particular pushing as much as possible the arc
cell phase advances towards π/2, may therefore be detri-
mental to the dynamic aperture (DA) of the machine at 450
GeV (see e.g. Eq. 21). The reduction of the integer tune
split for 5 to 3 in the new optics SLHCV2.0 [19] is how-
ever found to have a minor impact on the DA at injection
energy. As shown in Fig. 22(a), the dynamic aperture of the
machine is still slightly larger than 10σ for the worst seed
without beam-beam effect, compared to typical values of
the order of 10.5 − 11σ obtained with the nominal injec-
tion optics.
Then, taking into account the long-range beam-beam inter-
actions at injection, the dynamic aperture drops down by
about 1.5−2σ but is still above DAmin ∼ 8.5 σ in the worst
case (ultimate intensity, horizontal plane, worst seed), that
is above the betatron extension of the secondary halo. In
that respect, there is no clear sign of possible intensity limi-
tation induced by the beam-beam effect at injection, at least
up to the ultimate intensity of the LHC beam,
Collision. The situation is then quite different in col-
lision where the machine non-linearities are dominated by
the field imperfections of the new inner triplets and super-
conducting D1’s. As discussed previously the field quality
of these new magnets shall be further optimized in order
to meet a target design dynamic aperture of the order of
11− 12σ in collision, without beam-beam effects.
The beam-beam induced tune spread, when combined with
the long-range beam-beam interactions and the non-linear
field imperfections of the machine, has then a major im-
pact on the dynamic aperture. In this configuration, a mini-
mum/maximum DA (depending on the seed number) of the





Figure 22: 1’000’000 turns average and min/max (error
bars) dynamic aperture [σ] as a function of the phase space
angle [◦], obtained for 60 different seeds at injection (top)
and at 7 TeV assuming two different possible collision op-
tics for IR1 and IR5 (fig.’s (b) and (c)): (β ∗ = 30 cm,
θc = 410μrad) and (β∗ = 40 cm, θc = 560μrad), both
optics corresponding to the same normalised aperture in
the new triplet (n1 = 7.4). For each of the three cases,
simulations have been performed at zero intensity (i.e. no
beam-beam effect in dotted lines, with expected / improved
field quality for the new IT and D1 at 450 GeV / 7 TeV)
or assuming the nominal (solid lines) or ultimate (dashed
lines) beam intensity. Courtesy of E. Laface.
order of 5.5/6.5 σ is obtained at ultimate intensity, con-
cerning the collision optics with β∗ = 30 cm and a full
crossing angle of θc = 10 σ (see Fig. 22(b)). Then, it is
worst mentioning that an even worst dynamic aperture of
the order of 4.5 σ is actually reached when limiting the
chromatic correction of the inner triplet to the only com-
pensation of the linear chromaticity.
Comparing with the nominal machine (for which a com-
plete compensation of the chromatic aberrations is not
available but the field quality of the inner triplet is strongly
optimized), a very similar dynamic aperture of the order
of 6σ is also obtained, which represents one of the well-
known limitations of the present LHC in collision.
In that respect and as already mentioned, the design of
the new triplet, corrector package and separation dipole
shall be made very compact in order to limit as much as
possible the number of parasitic beam-beam encounters on
either side of the IP. Then a robust back up collision op-
tics needs also to be worked out for Phase I, with a more
or less increased β∗ which would restore enough aperture
margin in the inner triplet in order to accommodate a nor-
malised crossing angle larger than 10σ. An extreme case
can then be obtained by working at the limit of strength
for the MCBY orbit correctors at Q4, which corresponds to
a maximum full crossing angle of 560μrad (see Eq. 13).
Under these conditions, β∗ has to be relaxed to 40 cm
in order to restore enough clearance in the inner triplet
(n1 ∼ 7). When the beam-beam effect is not included
at larger crossing angle, the improvement of the dynamic
aperture is rather limited of the order of∼ 1 σ for the mini-
mum DA by comparing the cases showed in dotted lines in
Fig.’s 22(b) and 22(c) (while an improvement of the DA by
15%, i.e. 2σ, is expected at constant crossing angle when
relaxing β∗ by 30%). The benefit is then clearly visible in
the presence of beam-beam effects where a dynamic aper-
ture ranging in between 7.5 σ and 11σ (depending on the
seed considered and therefore on the triplet and D1 field
quality) can be reached at ultimate intensity (see case illus-
trated in dashed line in Fig. 22(c)).
As shown in Tab. 1 and already discussed, this extreme
configuration with a normalised crossing angle of almost
16 σ at β∗=40 cm is at priori quite costly in terms of peak
luminosity (50% reduction on paper compared to the β ∗ =
30 cm optics). However, in the case where the intensity
of the LHC beam would be severely limited by the beam-
beam effect, it is not at all excluded that this back up optics,
or any intermediate optics preserving the triplet aperture
(e.g. with β∗ = 35 cm and θc = 13 σ ≈ 0.5 mrad), will
be the only way to reliably operate the machine at ultimate
intensity and therefore optimize in practice the integrated
luminosity of the LHC.
SUMMARY AND REFLEXION FOR
PHASE II
The LHC insertions upgrade phase I was initially mo-
tivated by the possibility to increase the machine perfor-
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mance by a substantial reduction of β ∗ while still leaving a
certain aperture margin in the inner triplet (e.g. β ∗=25 cm
with 3σ margin per beam [3]) in order to mitigate any pos-
sible intensity related limitations when pushing the beam
up to the ultimate intensity (emittance growth, collimator
impedance requiring a larger than expected normalised IT
aperture in order to open the gap of the collimator jaws,
long-range beam-beam interactions requiring a larger than
expected crossing angle). Most of the efforts then naturally
converged towards the first limitation which is the aperture
of the inner triplet and a robust principle was drawn accord-
ingly: long enough, weak enough low-β quadrupoles can
in principle offer more aperture than actually needed by the
beam, at any given β∗ and regardless of the choice of the
technology chosen for the inner triplet.
Any other limitations possibly hidden by the first one
were however put aside (e.g. matching section aperture)
and other conceptual ingredients were not included in the
analysis, such as the correction of the chromatic aberrations
(i.e. not only Q′ but also the off momentum β-beating and
the non-linear chromaticity). Although of different nature,
each of these limitations can generally be quantified by im-
posing a limit on one single quantity, the peak β-function
βmaxIT reached in the inner triplet, regardless of the char-
acteristics of the triplet itself in terms of layout (to some
extent), operating gradient and technology.
For the current layout of the LHC ring (excluding the
triplet) and nominal strength limits of the LHC magnets,
the following βmaxIT limits shall be kept in mind and com-
pared with the actual peak β-function of 4.4 km reached
for β∗=55 cm in the 205 T/m existing triplet:
• Correction of the linear chromaticity: βmaxIT <∼
17 km depending on the beam energy and on the op-
tics of the LHC arcs (dispersion and β-functions), and
assuming a maximum current of 550A in the defocus-
ing sextupoles of the lattice.
• IR quadrupole limits: βmaxIT <∼ 16 km, assuming
the nominal and quite large cofocal length of the ex-
isting triplet with P ∼ 1 km and independent on the
beam energy since the matching section quadrupoles
Q5 and Q6 goes to extremely low field while other
quadrupoles of the dispersion suppressor reach their
nominal gradient (Q7 and some MQT’s at Q12 and
Q13).
• Matching section aperture: in between βmaxIT <∼
9 km for high-P triplet layout, with substantial mar-
gins for the IR quadrupole gradients (compare with
the limit above), possibly increased up to βmaxIT <∼
13 km for low-P triplet layout with no margin on
the IR quadrupole gradients, i.e. no optics flexibility
(compare e.g. Fig.’s 3 and 4). These limits stands for
the nominal physical emittance of the beam at 7 TeV,
for a normalised crossing angle of 10 σ and following
the standard prescription of n1 =7 for the normalised
aperture of the LHC cold magnets [2].
• IR tunability in terms of left/right phase advance:
βmaxIT
<∼ 12 km in order to reach optimal betatron
vertical phase advances on the left and right side of
the high luminosity insertions in view of the full chro-
matic correction of the inner triplet (see below).
• Correction of the chromatic aberrations: βmaxIT <∼
11 km, only dependent on the beam energy assum-
ing a maximum current of 550A in the defocusing
sextupoles, and also and mainly requesting already a
global modification of the LHC optics.
Only the first limit, that is the less stringent one related to
the correction of the linear chromaticity, was generally ad-
dressed, but corresponding to a minimum β ∗ still far below
the target of Phase-I (see e.g. [33]).
In particular, overcoming the third limit related to the aper-
ture of the matching section is not included in the mandate
of the Phase I project. This therefore imposes a triplet lay-
out with an as short as possible cofocal length (parameter
P ) paying the price of a quite poor optics flexibility (IR
quadrupole gradients close to the limits at β ∗=30 cm).
Finally the most stringent limit (βmaxIT <∼ 11 km) was only
established very recently when a clear strategy was found
for the correction of the chromatic aberrations [18].
Nevertheless, optics solutions down to β∗ = 30 cm
are still accessible to the Nb-Ti technology but with no
aperture margin in the corresponding 120 mm-120 T/m
triplet and leaving only little margin if no margin at all
w.r.t. to the limitations coming from the rest of the ring
(βmaxIT = 10.8 km reached in the new triplet). In particular
such proposal is at the limit for a full correction of the chro-
matic aberrations, and put the low-β insertions very close
to the matchability limit with a low-P optics configuration
imposed by the optimization of the beam clearance in the
matching section.
Several possible measures have then been suggested in
this paper to mitigate if not overcome the βmaxIT limits men-
tioned above, but also to reestablish a substantial aperture
margin in the 120 mm - 120 T/m triplet which is presently
proposed. These measures, summarized below for Phase-I,
shall not be understood as suitable solutions for a further re-
duction of β∗, but as possible directions in order to restore
enough margins and optics flexibility on the non-triplet side
and therefore maximize the probability of a reliable opera-
tion of the machine at a β∗ of 30 cm.
• Flexibility of the optics in the low-β insertions,
and matching section aperture. Recommission the
dispersion suppressor quadrupoles, in particular Q7
(MQM type magnets at 1.9K), at ultimate current
(6 kA, corresponding to a gradient of 220 T/m, as al-
ready tested in SM18 [34]), and/or readjust the lay-
out of the matching section to the length of the new
triplet (basically pushing the D2/Q4 and the Q5 as-
semblies by 15 m and 10 m, respectively, towards the
arc), and/or (re-)optimize the beam-screen orientation
in the D2, Q4 and Q5 magnets, and/or provide larger
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aperture MQY-type magnets to replace Q5 (MQM-
type). All these measures aim to re-increase the cofo-
cal length (parameter P ) of the Phase-I triplet, ideally
from 300 m to about 1 km as for the nominal colli-
sion optics, while preserving enough beam clearance
in the matching section and finding optics solution
well within the gradient limits of the IR quadrupoles.
Presently, it is indeed not granted that the Phase-I col-
lision optics with β∗ = 30 cm could be readjusted in
operation, assuming a β-beating wave larger than 5-
10% leaking from the LHC arcs.
• IR tunability in phase. Re-cable into two families the
tune shift quadrupoles MQTF(D) which are presently
powered in series on either side of each sector of
the LHC ring (one family per plane and per beam
from Q14 to Q22). From the optics point of view,
the principle is to redefine the LHC insertions from
Q22.L to Q22.R, that is embracing the arc tune shift
quadrupoles. As a result, enough tunability in phase
will be restored in the insertions of the LHC and, in
particular, for the left and right phase advances of
the low-β insertions where new matching constraints
are imposed at low β∗ by the correction of the chro-
matic aberrations. In parallel, the squeeze sequence
of the new IR will be much less complex than the one
presently proposed and then shorter (see previous dis-
cussion), which also means a beneficial impact on the
turn around time and therefore on the integrated lumi-
nosity.
• Sextupole strength. Recommission the lattice sex-
tupoles up to the ultimate current (600 A as already
achieved for most of the MSCB correctors in SM18
[34]) in order to gain margin for the chromatic cor-
rection of the inner triplets at β∗ = 30 cm. This mar-
gin will certainly be needed in the presence of linear
imperfections and betatron phase errors randomly dis-
tributed in the LHC ring.
• Crossing angle. Install additional orbit corrector
magnets to reinforce the MCBY dipole correctors at
Q4 in IR1 and IR5 and leave enough provision for
Vernier scans and IP steering when operating the ma-
chine with a crossing angle as large as ∼ 0.5 mrad.
Finally, the new inner triplet itself should still be opti-
mized for several aspects.
• Effective aperture. Reduce as much as possible the
fraction of aperture needed to accommodate the cold
bore and beam-screen (basically the difference be-
tween the coil and beam-screen inner diameters es-
timated to 21 mm for the new triplet), starting by im-
proving as much as possible the manufacturing toler-
ances of the new cold bore.
• Layout. Optimize the compactness of the layout till
D1, in order to reduce as much as possible the num-
ber of parasitic beam-beam encounters on either side
of the IP (triplet service module installed on the non-
IP side of D1 and/or corrector package and D1 com-
pacted in the same cryo-assembly).
• Corrector. Equip the new triplet with as short as pos-
sible double plane orbit correctors and reserve enough
room in the corrector package to accommodate nested
non-linear correctors as in the existing triplet.
• Field quality. Further optimize the field quality of the
new triplet and mainly of the new D1 compared to the
present expectations [26].
In order to complete this summary, it is obviously rele-
vant to draw some conclusions for any upgrade phase of the
LHC. As soon as the aperture budget needed for the beam
is known, and taking into account the present limits im-
posed by the LHC ring for the correction of the chromatic
aberrations, an optimum aperture for the new triplet can be
fully determined (see Eq. 8) regardless of the IT technol-
ogy, of the IT gradient and, to some extent, of the layout
of the new interaction region. More precisely, assuming
the nominal aperture budget for the LHC beam in terms of
emittance, normalised crossing angle and opening of the
collimator jaws (which is a fundamental assumption and
will have to be assessed when gaining experience running
the LHC), and taking into account the most stringent ring
limit of 11 km imposed on βmaxIT , an optimal 100 mm clear-
ance has been found for any new inner triplet. This 100 mm
clearance shall be understood as the inner dimension of the
triplet beam-screen. Below 100 mm, the minimum possible
β∗ is limited by the triplet aperture. Beyond 100 mm, the
minimum possible β∗ is limited by the rest of the machine
(correction of the chromatic aberrations, IR optics flexibil-
ity) and the unnecessarily low IT gradient (i.e. the extra IT
aperture can simply not be used by the beam).
Then, only after having determined this optimum aperture,
the choice of the IT technology plays a role, impacting on
the IT operating gradient and finally on the minimum pos-
sible β∗. This minimum β∗ is then directly given by the
βmaxIT limit imposed by the rest of the machine and by (al-
most) nothing else. More precisely, its scaling is rather
moderate with respect to the IT technology, with the square
root of the critical field, as showed in Eq. 8 and already ob-
served in [35] when comparison between the Nb-Ti and
Nb3Sn technologies were investigated at constant linear
chromaticity. Actually the impact of the technology is
much more relevant in terms of magnet length (basically in-
versely proportional to the critical field when the optimum
IT aperture has been chosen). However, unless the aper-
ture budget foreseen for the LHC beam has been severely
under-estimated, and taking into account the very stringent
current chromatic limit of the LHC ring, the triplet length
limit remains relatively faraway in the case of the LHC.
In that respect, pending a very inspired idea to significantly
relax the βmaxIT -limit imposed by the correction of the chro-
matic aberrations at the 7 TeV design energy of the ring
(and without forgetting the matching section aperture limit
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which is just behind), a change of the triplet technology is
a priori not justified at this stage for the Phase II upgrade:
that is to really gain in β∗min with (at most) the square of
the critical field as derived in Eq. 5.
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Abstract
The design work for the inner-triplet magnets is con-
strained by the baseline planning for the LHC-PP project,
its co-funding by the European Union (PF-7), the use of ex-
isting superconducting cable, and the in-house production
of the model and series quadrupole magnets (using tooling
recovered from the LHC production). We will review the
technical challenges that led to innovative design features
such as more porous cable insulation, a new collar struc-
ture allowing horizontal assembly with a hydraulic collar-
ing press, tuning shims for the adjustment of ﬁeld quality,
a ﬁshbone like structure for the ground-plane insulation, an
improved quench-heater design, and possibly, a cartridge-
like solution for the routing of busbars. The production
will follow established procedures for the curing and as-
sembly of the coils, in order to match the workﬂow estab-
lished in CERN’s large magnet facility.” The design pro-
cess takes full advantage of the recently improved software
tools, featuring quench simulation, 3D coil optimization,
and ROXIE-CATIA interfacing for the making of drawings
and the manufacturing of coil-end spacers. It will be shown
that the design, testing, and series production of the mag-
nets within the time-line deﬁned in the FP-7 work-packages
are challenging. Based on experience from the LHC triplet
magnet development, the in-house production and testing
of a 2-m-long model magnet (using Nb-Ti technology and
cables recuperated from the LHC main dipole production)
will be possible by 2011. In addition, the Upgrade Phase-I
requires the development of orbit and multipole corrector
magnets. The prototype manufacture relies on the same
resources needed for the production of the MQXC model
magnets.
INTRODUCTION
The main parameters of the quadrupole magnets
(MQXC) for the inner triplets were established in 2008 [1].
Extensive heat deposit studies have revealed that the heat-
load to the inner triplet magnets, on the order of 500 W,
requires a minimum inner diameter of the bayonet heat-
exchanger of 95 mm for a maximum vapor velocity of 7
ms−1 [10]. It became clear that this heat exchanger cannot
be placed on the median plane of the magnet cold mass.
This would have resulted in non-acceptable stray ﬁelds and
non-allowed multipole ﬁeld errors due to the off-centricity
∗Thanks to E. Bielert and N. Schwerg for the quench simulations.
of the (ferromagnetic) vacuum vessel of the cryostat.1 In
addition, the stray ﬁelds of 0.8 T would have made impos-
sible to route the superconducting busbar cartridge through
the corresponding holes on the magnet’s symmetry planes.
The iron yoke design had therefore to be revised with re-
spect to the cross section presented in [1]. The present de-
sign also allows for the placing of tuning shims and rods
to compensate for multipole ﬁeld errors. This is particu-
larly important for the small production batch of less than
20 magnets. The cross section of the quadrupole magnet is
shown in Fig. 1. Its main parameters are summarized in
Table 1.
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ROXIE 10.1
Figure 1: Coil and yoke cross section with iso-surfaces of
the magnetic vector potential Az (ﬁeld lines).
The baseline planning
The baseline planning foresees the production and cold
testing of all magnet components by 2014. This takes al-
ready into account the 14 months of delay due to the inci-
dent of Sep. 19, 2008. As can be seen in Table 2, the de-
liverables and milestones in the framework of EU-7 (work-
package 6) were not adjusted accordingly and the produc-
tion of a 2-m-long model magnet by the 4th quarter of
2009 not met. However, a mere shifting of the milestones
by 14 months would be success-oriented; experience from
118 units of b1, 1.4 units of a3, and 0.5 units of b6; all at 40 mm
reference radius.
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the MQXA and MQXB magnet development shows that
it takes two years from the conceptual design to the com-
pletion of the model magnet, and another 3 years until the
completion and measurement of the full-length prototype;
see [11, 6, 7].
Reasons for a reduction of this time include:
• Integrated design and manufacture of coil-end spac-
ers, which require the CNC-machining of the ruled
surfaces with 5-axis machines.
• More sophisticated CAD/CAM tools.
• More advanced simulation tools for the electromag-
netic design and optimization of the magnets, includ-
ing the simulation of quench and time transient ef-
fects.
• Existing speciﬁcations for the LHC magnets, which
can be adapted for the new project.
• Cryostat design and components identical to that of
the LHC main dipole (MB).
Rather neutral are the facts that:
• The cable is available, that is, the inner and outer layer
LHC dipole cables will be used for the inner and outer
layer MQXC coils, respectively. This will save about
one year for the procurement of the cable. However,
it also implies that coil winding, curing, and assembly
have to deal with the relatively rigid cable (in partic-
ular, compared to the cables used in the MQXA and
MQY magnets).
• The magnet has a much larger aperture. This facili-
tates the coil winding but also results in axial electro-
magnetic forces on the same order as in the LHC main
dipoles.
• Experience is available from the LHC magnet produc-
tion. However, 10-m-long magnets have not yet been
built at CERN; in addition experienced personnel in-
volved in the LHC prototype program has retired or
has been relocated to other projects.
• Industrial partners have been qualiﬁed for the LHC
magnet production. However, not all companies are
still available or interested, and tendering procedures
have to be repeated.
Moreover, the design and development of the MQXC
quadrupole magnet has to face challenges stemming from
the LHC beam requirements and heat-deposition:
• A more porous insulation scheme was developed to
cope with the increased energy deposition.
• Beam optics requirements result in a more sophis-
ticated orbit and multipole corrector scheme, with
(nested) magnets yet to be designed.
• The collaring of the 10-m-long coils has to be per-
formed with the coil in horizontal position.
• Tuning of the Q2 magnets requires a nested powering
circuit.
• The need for thorough quench simulation studies and
quench propagation measurements.
• The optimization of the training characteristic in view
of the magnet operation at 83% on the load-line.
THE MQXC ENGINEERING DESIGN
CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED TESTS
The engineering design challenges require model mag-
net assemblies and additional tests:
• Validation of the porous cable insulation, in view of
the coils mechanical (coil size, modulus, creep) and
electrical electrical behavior (break-down voltage) un-
der operational conditions.
• Validation (electrically and mechanically) of a more
porous ground plane insulation scheme.
• Testing of the collaring procedure with the coil-pack
in horizontal position (this is needed for a possible
in-house production of the about 10-meter-long series
magnets).
• Qualiﬁcation of the end-spacer design and machining
techniques.
• Study of the quench behavior in view of a nested
power supply, and for different protection schemes.
In particular, the measurement of heat-transfer, the
quench-propagation velocity, and quench-back which
depends on the protection resistor.
• Validation of the force retaining structure for the axial
electromagnetic forces, which are on the same order
as in the LHC main dipole.
• Validation of tuning shims for the adjustment of nor-
mal and skew multipoles of order < 6.
• Validation of a new design of quench heater, which is
mounted between the inner and outer layer coil.
• Prooﬁng the assembly technique of the quadrupole by
means of a spring-loaded, collapsible assembly man-
drel.
• Validation of a cartridge solution for the routing of
busbars inside the magnet cold-mass.
• Field quality and dynamic effects measurements to
qualify the magnet design for the inner triplet region.
• Testing of the quench-heater connection and instru-
mentation cables.
The porous insulation scheme
The bath temperature of the coolant in the MQXC mag-
nets is estimated to be 1.96 K [10], which is at the maxi-
mum of the thermal conductivity of superﬂuid helium. Be-
cause the thermal conductivity drops sharply above 1.96 K,
the additional temperature gradient to the heat exchanger
has to be kept at a minimum. Therefore a more porous
insulation scheme for the superconducting cable was pro-
posed [4]. It has been shown at CERN that it is possible
to insulate the cable needed for the series production with
adapted wrapping machines. In addition, a new porous
ground plane insulation scheme was developed that guar-
antees the heat transfer through the collar and yoke lamina-
tions to the heat exchanger.
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The porous insulation has a considerably lower elastic
modulus with respect to the proven LHC (main magnet)
insulation scheme. This was shown with so-called 10-
stack tests. These 10-stack tests show, however, an offset
(with respect to the LHC standard insulation) in the thick-
ness of the cable insulation under the assumed pressure
after cooldown to cryogenic temperatures. This is one of
the reasons for the construction of an ”instrumented collar
pack,” which will allow the measurement of the resulting
coil stress under realistic assembly conditions. An artist’s
view of the collar pack is shown in Fig. 2. The instru-
mented collar pack can also be cooled to cryogenic tem-
peratures in order to study the loss of pre-stress. The re-
sults of these tests are crucial for the production of magnet
coils, because both the coil size prior to the collaring and
the elastic modulus must be known in order to calculate the
required coil shimming. This shimming will guarantee the
appropriate pre-stress in the coil after cooldown and excita-
tion. At a later stage the instrumented collar pack can also
serve for heat-transfer measurements.
A low elastic modulus also results in a considerably
larger coil after winding and curing. Thus a sophisticated
spring-loaded, collapsible assembly mandrel had to be de-
veloped.
Figure 2: 120-mm-long instrumented collar pack, showing
the porous ground-plane insulation.
The more porous insulation will be complemented with
a more porous ground-plane insulation. The quench heater
strips have therefore been moved to the space between
the inner and the outer coils. Although sophisticated
quench simulation tools are now available, which have
been used to study the quench propagation in the in-
ner triplet quadrupoles, this protection scheme will have
nonetheless to be tested with a magnet model in a horizon-
tal cryostat. This is due to the fact that the multi-physics
simulation problem of quenching superconducting magnets
involves a large number of empirical parameters, for exam-
ple, the residual resistivity ration (RRR) of the cables, the
amount of conﬁned superﬂuid helium in the cables and the
thermal conductivity of the insulation.
Quench protection
Detailed quench simulation studies have revealed that
it is possible to protect the magnet by either the ﬁring of
quench-back heaters or the switching-in of an extraction re-
sistor. To use of both protection techniques simultaneously
does not yield any reduction of the hot-spot temperature, as
in this case the normal zone in the outer layer cable (with
less stabilizing copper) leads to higher ohmic losses and
thus a higher peak temperature; see Fig. 3.
However, magnet protection with only an extraction re-
sistor (dimensioned such that the terminal voltage at the
magnet does not exceed 400 V) relies on the quench-back
mechanism. Quench-back is a normal zone propagation
due to induced losses from the interstrand coupling cur-
rents. The quench-back mechanism depends on empiri-
cal data (such as the contact resistances between strands
and the residual resistivity ratio RRR) and thus needs to be
measured. Although the cable parameters are known from
the extensive testing of the LHC main dipole magnets, they
will be inﬂuenced by the enhanced cooling, which also in-
ﬂuences the quench heater delay. It has been decided to test
the 2-m-long model magnet in a horizontal cryostat on the
CERN test benches in SM18.
Because of space-constraints in the IR regions of the
LHC, a nested scheme with two power supplies was pro-
posed. If Q1 quenches (inductance L1 and normal zone
resistance Rq) although the current in Q2 is higher, the
switching-in of the protection resistor is inefﬁcient as long
as the free-wheeling diode (forward voltage U4) is conduct-
ing; see Fig. 4. Additional quench simulation studies will
be necessary to exclude potentially dangerous quenches in
the two nested circuits.
Collars and yokes
The collaring of the nearly 10-m-long quadrupole mag-
nets cannot be done with the standard presses used for the
long dipole magnets. The reason is that the four-fold sym-
metry of the quadrupoles has to be guaranteed in order
to avoid non-allowed multipole ﬁeld error in the aperture
ﬁeld. Using a hydraulic press with anvils in horizontal di-
rection would require a 10-m-deep pit and a clearance un-
der a 30-tone crane of more than 10 meters. There is no
workshop at CERN that meet these requirements.
A novel self-locking collar pack design was therefore
developed in 2009. These packs allow the assembly of
the collars in horizontal direction, but require the above
mentioned, spring-loaded and collapsible assembly man-
drel. The collars and assembly mandrel are shown in Fig.
5. The handling and assembly of the coil/collar packs in



































Figure 3: Current decay and hot-spot temperature after a










Figure 4: Nested powering scheme for magnets Q1 and
Q2a. If Q1 quenches (inductance L1 and normal zone
resistance Rq) although the current in Q2 is higher, the
switching-in of the protection resistor is inefﬁcient as long
as the free-wheeling diode (forward voltage U4) is conduct-
ing.
horizontal direction is compatible with the workﬂow in the
”magnet rescue facility,” which is currently commissioned
at CERN for the repair of dipole coldmasses.
The novel collaring scheme needs to be qualiﬁed for the
series production. This can be achieved with the above-
mentioned, instrumented collar pack. The hydraulic press
needed for collaring will be procured from European indus-
try. The technical speciﬁcations and tendering documents
were completed in 2009. An artist’s view of the press is
shown in Fig. 6. The angular position of the collaring keys
of the MQXC magnet is identical to the MQ and MQY
magnets. The press can therefore be used also to refurbish
the MQ and MQY magnets.
The yoke design was already shown in Fig. 1. It leaves
enough clearance for longitudinal heat conduction in the
coldmass as well as for the routing of busbars. With the
large holes placed at the 45 degrees plane it can be envis-
aged to insert a cartridge of busbars for the powering of the
magnet string from a central feed box. However, unbal-
Figure 5: Spring-loaded, collapsible assembly mandrel
with collar pack position prior to collaring.
anced excitation currents can lead to asymmetric saturation
effects around the holes, an effect that must be studied once
the busbar design is ﬁnalized.
End-spacer design and manufacture
The MQXC magnet design takes full advantage of the
features implemented in the CERN ﬁeld computation pro-
gram ROXIE [9]. In particular, the design and manufacture
of the coil end-spacers follows the integrated approach with
data transfer from ROXIE to CAD (CATIA) and the 5-axis
CNC machining of the pieces. The machined surfaces are
developable surfaces, which are described by their base-
curves on the winding mandrel and the Darboux vectors to
this space curve. The Darboux vectors deﬁne the ”rulings”
along which the surface can be unrolled (developed) into a
plane geodesic strip. The coil end design begins with ﬁnd-
Figure 6: Artist’s view of the horizontal collaring press
with a coil-support bench.
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ing the optimal distribution and spacing of the coil blocks
in the ends. A virtual realty preview of the entire coil is
shown in Fig. 7.
Figure 7: MQXC coil with lead- and return-ends.
The shapes of the spacer surfaces are then optimized
with the aim of reducing, as much as possible, the cable’s
deformation energy. For this purpose it is assumed that it
will be much more difﬁcult to bend the cable across it’s nar-
row face than it is to bend it across it’s broad face. The two
bending directions are thus often referred to as the ”hard
way” and the ”easy way”. Because of the torsion, stem-
ming from the cable’s position in the magnet cross section,
it is not possible to avoid any hard-way bend. Its minimiza-
tion is therefore done in an iterative way. The developable
spacer surface and its rulings are shown in Fig. 8.
Figure 8: Frenet-frame (T,n,b) to the cable’s baseline on
the winding mandrel and Darboux vectors d as the rulings
of the developable surface.
A newly developed interface to CATIA allows the trans-
fer of data to the manufacturer in an industrial standard
such as STEP. The main challenge for the programing of
this interface was to avoid a default interpolation of the
vertex points on the cable’s base-curve and free edge by
the CAD program, as this would result in a loss of infor-
mation on the Darboux vectors. A CATIA rendering of the
MQXC end-spacer is shown in Fig. 9.
Figure 9: Rendering of the end-spacers of MQXC by
means of CATIA and according to data imported from
ROXIE.
THE ORBIT AND MULTIPOLE
CORRECTOR MAGNETS IN THE INNER
TRIPLET
In the new triplets the corrector magnets will be grouped
in a dedicated cryo-assembly, the so-called corrector pack-
age (CP). It will contain horizontal and vertical orbit cor-
rectors (MCXB), skew-quadrupole (MQXS), and higher-
order multipole correctors. In addition, a pair of MCXB
magnets will be installed in the Q2 cryo-assemblies. Stud-
ies of the energy deposition from particle debris [2] have
shown that the energy deposition in the CP is generally
higher than in the MQXC. The radiation dose can be re-
duced by a factor of two, if the aperture of the correctors
is increased from 120 to 140 mm in diameter. By adding a
10-mm-thick stainless steel shield between the beam pipe
and coils, the radiation dose can be reduced further by a
factor 3, resulting in a maximum dose of about 10 MGy.
The dose is calculated for the lifetime of the LHC IR Up-
grade Phase-I, which in terms of integrated luminosity cor-
responds to 1000 fb−1. All materials used for magnet con-
struction must comply with the doses. All correctors will
have a coil aperture (or equivalent pole gap) of 140 mm.
The assembly of the CP and Q2 cold masses and cryostats
will be carried out at CERN. The alignment of the magnets
and welding of the stainless steel half-shells, which make
up the helium vessel, need speciﬁc features in the magnet
yoke, common to the quadrupoles and correctors. The iron
yoke laminations of the MCXB and MQSX magnets will
also have the same features for routing the busbars and the
heat exchangers as the MQXC quadrupoles.
MCXB dipoles
The MCXB orbit correctors are used to correct the mis-
alignment of the MQXC quadrupoles and to adjust the
crossing angle and position of the two beams at the IP. The
goal of the orbit correction is to control the orbit at least
down to the level of the BPM resolution [3] and to provide
sufﬁcient strength to avoid frequent realignments of the in-
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ner triplet. In addition, the inner triplet orbit-correction
scheme shall be as local as possible to minimize the use of
the orbit correctors in the matching sections and hence pre-
serving the ﬂexibility of the crossing schemes. The present
base-line lay-out of the triplets includes two pairs of identi-
cal (except for the 90 deg. rotation), individually powered
dipoles for correction in the horizontal and vertical planes.
One pair is located in the corrector package, while the mag-
nets of the other pair are located at the extremities of the Q2
coldmass. To meet the goals of the orbit correction scheme,
it has been proposed that the latter ones be combined H/V
nested constructions. A feasibility study of such a nested
orbit corrector is underway.
The MCXB shall provide an integrated strength of
1.5 Tm, corresponding to a 70 μrad kick of the 7 TeV
proton beam. The MCXB dipoles must be constructed
with the same level of reliability and robustness as the
MQXC quadrupoles. Epoxy-impregnated coils, as used
in the nested orbit correctors of the installed LHC triplet,
are not considered appropriate for the performance goals
of the Phase-I upgrade. An alternative solution, using
Rutherford-type cables, has therefore been taken as the
baseline.
To beneﬁt from the excellent cooling capacity of super-
ﬂuid helium the single-layer coils of the MCXB are wound
with a newly developed Rutherford-type cable. The turns
are grouped in four winding blocks. The 18-strand cable is
based on the LHC strand type 5 to make use of the existing
stock of some 270 km from the LHC production and wound
with a cable transposition pitch of 33 mm, width of 4.37
mm, and a mid-thickness of 0.845 mm. The cable is insu-
lated with polyimide tapes in three layers: 5.5-mm-wide,
25-μm-thick tapes, wound with no overlap and no gap for
the ﬁrst two layers, and a 5.5-mm-wide, 55-μm-thick tape
with b-stage polyimide resin on the outer surface, wound
with a gap of 0.5 mm. The coils are clamped with stand-
alone collars made of 2-mm-thick, high-manganese steel
laminations. The collared coil is aligned with four align-
ment slots to the inner diameter of the yoke laminations.
The magnet’s transverse and longitudinal cross sections are
shown in Figs. 10 and 11.
Each MCXB magnet is powered with a 2.4 kA bi-polar
power supply. The powering circuit also contains an en-
ergy extraction system with a 0.16 Ω resistor and a circuit
breaker. These magnets do not require quench heaters for
protection.
MQXS quadrupoles
The skew-quadrupole corrector MQXS provides cor-
rection for the eld angle imperfections of the MQXC
quadrupoles and for the skew quadrupole imperfection of
the D1 dipole. It shall provide an integrated strength of
0.65 Tm at a radius of 40 mm. The MQXS magnets are
constructed in a similar way as the MCXB dipoles. The
single-layer coils are wound with the same cable as the
MCXB and the turns are grouped in 2 winding blocks.
Figure 10: MCXB cross section.
The mechanical structure, illustrated in Figure 12, follows
the concept of the MCXB: stand-alone collars aligned with
four alignment keys to the inner surface of the yoke lamina-
tions. The collaring keys are located at 25 degrees from the
symmetry plane to make use of the same collaring tooling
developed for the MQXC magnet. Each MQXS magnet
is individually powered with 2.4 kA bi-polar power sup-
ply. The powering circuit also contains an energy extrac-
tion system with a 0.16 Ω resistor and a circuit breaker. The
magnet does not require quench heaters for protection.
Higher order multipole correctors
The correction of the higher order ﬁeld imperfections of
the MQXC and D1 magnets will require local correctors
of the same multipole order as in the LHC. The strength
requirements of these higher order correctors given below
are based on the inner triplet and D1 error tables:
• 0.055 Tm at 40 mm reference radius for the MCSX
(b3).
• 0.055 Tm at 40 mm for the MCSSX (a3).
• 0.035 Tm at 40 mm for the MCOX (b4).
Figure 11: MCXB longitudinal cut.
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Figure 12: MQXS cross section.
• 0.035 Tm at 40 mm for the MCOSX (a4).
• 0.075 Tm at 40 mm for the MCTX (b6).
Except for the MCXT, the baseline requirements for the
higher order correctors can be met with a super-ferric de-
sign with a pole gap of 140 mm. The simple racetrack coils
are wound with single, enamelled superconducting wire
and are impregnated with epoxy or with more radiation-
hard cyanate-ester resin. The advantage of super-ferric
magnets is that the coils are located at a larger radius from
the bore, which reduces the radiation dose on the coil.
Alternatively, the higher order correctors can be similar
in design to the presently installed magnets, whose epoxy
impregnated coils are wound with single, superconducting
wire for current ratings up to 120 A. This concept also
allows combining two windings in nested assemblies and
hence contributes to the minimization of the D1-IP dis-
tance, which reduces the number of parasitic beam-beam
collision.
CONCLUSION
Although using available cable, and building on the past
experience from the LHC magnet construction, the design,
in-house production, and testing of the MQXC quadrupole
magnets is not free of technical challenges. Even with
”unlimited resources” the completion of the 16 magnets
needed for the LHC Upgrade Phase-I, would be challeng-
ing. The critical path is along the procurement and com-
missioning of the necessary tooling, the design and pro-
curement of magnet components, and the requirements for
an extensive cold testing of the model magnets. A particu-
lar challenge is to obtain the necessary pre-stress and ﬁeld
quality (coil size) in the magnet after cool-down and exci-
tation using the new insulation scheme.
Below we list the additional deliverables which were not
previously foreseen in the framework of the EUWorkpack-
age 6. The time frame for this work is realistically 2010-
2011.
• Design and procurement of a horizontal collaring
press.
• Design, construction, and testing of two instrumented
collar packs in order to validate the collaring proce-
dure and to determine the ﬁnal coil size.
• Design and procurement of a spring-loaded assembly
mandrel.
• Assembly of (at least) two 2-m-long model magnets.
• Cryogenic testing of these magnets in a horizontal
cryostat.
• Extensive quench propagation studies on the test
benches.
• Measurement of dynamic effects in the quadrupole
magnets.
• Engineering design of a nested horizontal/vertical or-
bit corrector magnet
We propose to construct and test three 2-m-long model
magnets. The following list summarizes the expected test
results for these magnets:
• Model 1: Assembled from coils wound at CEA or
CERN according to availability. Cold testing in a ver-
tical cryostat. Field quality measurements and train-
ing performance.
• Model 2: Assembled from the second set of coils
wound at CEA or CERN. Full coldmass integration
and cold testing in a horizontal cryostat. Extended
instrumentation for heat transfer, quench propagation
velocity measurements, study of the quench-back ef-
fect with differently sized protection resistors.
• Model 3: Assembled from coils with updated end-
spacers and revised curing procedure to aim at the
ﬁeld quality required by the accelerator.
The proposed deliverables also include the design, man-
ufacture, and cold-test of a model orbit corrector and a
model skew-quadrupole magnet at CERN. CIEMAT will
design and manufacture the model multipole correctors of
higher order, i.e., normal and skew sextupole and octupoles
(b3, a3, b4, a4). STFC will be involved in material and
manufacturing R&D related to the model skew-quadrupole
corrector, comprising the qualiﬁcation of the polyimide in-
sulation and end-spacer development.
In view of a revision of the LHC Upgrade scenarios it
will be important to deﬁne how many additional variants
will be possible and justiﬁed. Ideas include the building
of a model with the LHC standard insulation scheme, the
use of stainless steel end-spacers, and the building of a
MQXC model with a 6-block coil, featuring a special grad-
ing and an intra-layer splice. These kind of conﬁgurations
have been proven for the MQXA and MQY magnets of the
LHC. Furthermore, a conductor more appropriate to such
magnets (with a rating of 6-8 kA) could avoid the nested
power supplies with the additional complication regarding
quench detection and magnet protection.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: MQXC Parameter list
Magnet aperture 120 mm Diameter (coil inner radius)
Magnetic lengths 9160 / 7760 mm MQXC (Q1 and Q3) / MQXD (Q2a and Q2b)
Coldmass length 10080 mm
Nominal gradient 127 T·m−1
Nominal current 13800 A Nonlinear cal. with iron yoke
Max. gradient 149.7 T·m−1 At quench
Max. current 16340 A Nonlinear cal. with iron yoke, in straight part
Yoke outer diameter 550 mm Identical to LHC-MB cold mass
Clearance for heat exch. 106 mm Diameter
Total axial forces 417 kN At nominal current (return end)
Fx kN At nominal current (per pole)
Fy kN At nominal current (per pole)
Work. point on load line OL 78.1 % Nl. calc. with iron yoke, nl. J(B) ﬁt, 2-D
Work. point on load line IL 79.6 % Nl. cal. with iron yoke, nl. J(B) ﬁt, 2-D
Work. point on load line OL 83.2 % Nl. calc. with iron yoke, nl. J(B) ﬁt, Return end
Work. point on load line IL 79.9 % Nl. cal. with iron yoke, nl. J(B) ﬁt, Return end
Temperature margin OL 2.21 K Nl. cal. with iron yoke, nl. J(B) ﬁt, wrt. 1.9 K, 2-D
Temperature margin IL 2.12 K Nl. cal. with iron yoke, nl. J(B) ﬁt, wrt. 1.9 K, 2-D
Self inductance 5.2 mH·m−1 At Iinj. (per unit length)
Self inductance 5.05 mH·m−1 At Inom. (per unit length)
Differential self inductance 4.78 mH·m−1 At Inom. (per unit length)
Table 2: Planning overview, EU-FP7 and Accord Technique (F). C1 = Cryostat prototyping for MQXC, C2 = Cryostat
for corrector package, M1 = Corrector magnets, M2 = MQXC Quench heaters, M3 = Collars for MQXC (Tooling and
manufacture), M4 = Cold bore tubes
Year Q. Deliverables (EU) Milestones (EU) Accord Technique (F)
2009 1 Basic mag. design (6.2)
2 Basic design (6.11) C1 design review
3 Coldmass design (6.3)
4 Model constr. (6.2.1) Cryomagnet design (6.4) C1 production review
C2 design review
M1 design, M4 tech. spec.
2010 1 C2 production review
M2 and M3 tech. specs.
2 Design assesm. (6.2.2)
3 Const. correctors (6.3.1)
4 Prototype MQXC (6.3.2) Corrector test (6.7) C1 tooling install.
MQXC el.test (6.6) C1 comp. delivery
M1 production start
M2 and M3 ﬁrst deliveries
2011 1 Test MQXC (6.3.3) C2 prototype
2 IR design (6.3.4)
3
4 C2 and M1 series prod.
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PLANNED UPGRADE ACTIVITIES IN IR4 FOR THE 2014/15 SHUTDOWN 
E. Ciapala, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Abstract 
200 MHz capture cavities and feedback system 
upgrades are presented, with criteria for identifying 
upgrade needs and lead-times for taking decisions on the 
upgrades options and for preparing Crab cavity 
installations in IR4. 
200 MHZ RF IN LHC – BACKGROUND & 
HISTORY 
200 MHz systems have been planned from an early 
stage in LHC [1]. An original proposal was for a 
longitudinal feedback system (ADL). It made use of four 
cavities per beam, with a total voltage of 225 kV. For 
ultimate beam intensity a total of 250 kW was needed, 
allowing use of a single 60kW tetrode amplifier per 
cavity. The ADL was later considered unnecessary as the 
natural spread in synchrotron frequency inside the bunch 
was considered sufficient to damp single bunch 
instabilities. The estimated cost was 5.2 MCHF.  Before 
the SPS impedance reduction program the emittance of 
the extracted LHC bunch exceeded 1.0 eVs; this could not 
be fully captured in the ACS 400 MHz LHC RF system. 
Two solutions were envisaged. Firstly a passive 400 MHz 
single-cavity SC RF system in the SPS, operating in a 
detuned mode such that the bunch would be shortened by 
variation in cavity impedance across its length [2]. A 
prototype was installed and tested in the SPS but was it 
found to be difficult to handle operationally. 
 The second solution was to install a low-frequency 
200 MHz capture system in the LHC (ACN). This 
proposal [3] dates from 1998. The purpose was to 
improve capture, and minimize losses for large emittance 
beams from SPS with large injection errors. These were 
estimated at up to 1eVs and ±50 MeV and ±15° 
respectively. The system comprises four normal 
conducting cavities per beam, with 3 MV total per beam, 
requiring 240 kW per cavity at ultimate LHC beam 
intensity. This cost was 13.9 MCHF, considerably more 
than the original ADL. With the 2001 budget crises and 
the need to save on LHC construction costs, a  proposal 
was made to initially install only half of the ACS and half 
of the ACN, which would be adequate up to half-nominal 
intensity. However completion of the very successful 
impedance reduction program in the SPS resulted in 
0.6 eVs emittance being obtained up to nominal intensity, 
and even above. The decision was therefore taken to 
install all the ACS, and postpone 200MHz ACN till later, 
once it would be found necessary. 
ACN 200 MHZ RF CAVITIES IN LHC 
The design is based on the SPS 200 MHz Standing 
Wave Cavities (SWC) used in the SPS to accelerate 
leptons during the LEP era. The nominal frequency is 
200.210 MHz. The main design constraints were reduced 
diameter due to 420 mm beam separation, and keeping 
HOM frequencies away from multiples of the 40 MHz 
bunch frequency. This resulted in slightly higher shunt 
impedance and lower Q than for the SPS SWC.  With R/Q 
192 Ω and Qo of 30,000 the power dissipated in the 
cavity at nominal field of 0.75 MV is 49 kW. The design 
called for special cooling channels to evacuate the high 
power. For optimum operation the coupler Qext was taken 
as 5000, giving an impedance of 960 kΩ.  With a 
maximum of 1 MV for nominal 0.58 mA beam current the 
RF power needed is around 250 kW; this allows handling 
of the expected injection transients [4]. Simulation of 
capture [5] confirms that emittances of up to 1 eVs can be 
handled. 
The cavity has four Higher Order Mode (HOM) 
couplers, a high average power main coupler, a piston 
tuner and two passive damper loops (to be brought in 
after capture or in coast) 
 
 
Figure 1: 200MHz ACN Cavity 
 
Eight bare cavities were built by Ettore Zanon, Italy. 
All had been RF tested at low power and accepted by the 
end of 2003 [6]. They are presently in storage under dry 
nitrogen. They have not yet been fitted with the auxiliary 
components and have not seen any RF power.  
ACN AUXILIARY CAVITY 
COMPONENTS 
The (HOM) couplers, tuner (200 kHz range), and the 
two fundamental mode dampers were recuperated from 
the SPS SWC cavities and refurbished. The HOM 
couplers may need tuning for the 50/75 ns bunch spacings 
in LHC. A new power coupler, based on the new SPS 
TWC one is proposed. A low power version has been built 
to validate the geometry. To handle the high power the 
new design needs a special capacitive coupling loop 
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without DC contact and separate water co
body,  inner coaxial line and the coupling loop
The low power tests have proven feasib
design but it needs to be finalized and a prot
For this, and for final production, a 200 MHz
stand is planned in BB3 where the diacrode 
upgrade are to be based.  
ACN 200 MHZ POWER PLA
The RF drive chain is as in the PS and S
tetrode power systems. The final amplifier de
on RS2058 tetrodes as for the original SP
There are 25 remaining amplifiers from SPS 
would be needed. The final amplifie
arrangement is as in the SPS TWC200 power 
Figure 2: ACN Power Layout – Tetrode
 
A circulator prevents reflected power going
final stage. A prototype circulator has a
obtained. The power loads are the same as S
need to be constructed. New Power Conve
needed as the old SPS ones have been used to
systems or are needed for spares.  
An interesting development would be 
diacrodes instead if tetrodes. A single dia
replace the four tetrodes in the output stage
shown in Figure 3. Diacrodes are not y
available, but a diacrode study will start in 
SPS200 TWC upgrade and in the context o
collaboration with the Muon Initial Cooling 
(MICE). The diacrode approach eliminates 
combiners arrangement and has operational
With less power devices it promises reduced m
On the other hand the redundancy of a m
system is lost. The diacrode itself is mor
being designed for a higher power level. T
also needs a completely new power con
35 kV is required instead of the 12 kV for a te
oling of the 
. 
ility of the 
otype tested. 
 500 kW test 
tests for SPS 
NT 
PS 200 MHz 
sign is based 
S SWC200. 
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Figure 3: ACN Power Layout – D
ACN LOW LEVEL RF AND 
Each cavity will need a cavity loops
system. This will be of almost the same
ACS SC cavities. There will be no n
Loops’ of the ACS which are needed 
ripple, but similar RF feedbacks
longitudinal damper, function gener
control facilities will all be required. In




Figure 4: ACN Layout at 
 
The cavities would be installed in 
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the four Beam 1 cavities on the left hand side of IR4 and 
the four for beam 2 on the right. Figure 4 shows the 
layout on the left hand side. The power amplifiers are 
installed in the UL44/46 tunnels. Feedback electronics are 
installed close to the power system, in shielded units, 
since there is no space in UX45 for additional Faraday 
cages. Incorporation of the ACN into the beam control 
system of SR4 would be relatively straightforward. 
Equipment controls would be located in UX45 and SR4. 
COST ESTIMATES 
Table 1 shows overall cost, assuming the baseline 
tetrode power option. Recuperated material including 
tetrodes constitutes a part of the total. A rough estimate 
for the additional cost with the diacrode option is around 
750 kCHF, which would make an estimated total cost for 














(Have 25)  
40 15 30 50 1500 
Drivers 8 3 11 95 1045 
Other tetrodes     140 
Couplers 8 4 12 70 840 
Test benches  1  250 250 
Cavity 
components 
(Have 10 sets) 
8 3 1 150 150 
RF Power 
components 
8 2 10 285 2850 
Power Supplies 8 2 10 350 3500 
Cabling 8 1 9 175 1575 
Cooling Sys 8 2 10 35 350 
Controls & 
LLRF 
8 2 10 120 1200 
Total     13400 
Table 1: ACN Costing (Tetrode Option) 
ACN INSTALLATION PLANNING 
Figure 5 shows a tentative overall planning of the 
various activities needed to prepare and install the ACN 
system. It includes preparation of cavities and RF 
components, construction of a test stand, prototyping (for 
the diacrode option), construction of power amplifiers, 
then installation of all equipment in the LHC. The 
installation work in the machine is scheduled across three 
normal end-of-year shutdowns. This would need to be 
modified for the recently proposed two-year LHC 
operation cycle. The overall time needed is just over four 
years from the time of making the decision to install. 
ADT UPGRADE NEEDS 
In case of lack of kick strength, due for example to 
large injection oscillations, the options would be: 
1) To push system to its limits, +40% could be feasible 
in pulsed mode, but reliability may be compromised 
2) Increase the beta functions at kickers; this would 
need to be studied. 
3) Install additional kickers in IR4. Space is reserved to 
install one extra kicker module per plane per beam, 
bringing this from two to three, giving an extra 50 % in 
kick strength.   This would cost around 4 MCHF 
In case of large instability growth rates due to large 
impedance at higher frequency, e.g. from collimators, the 
present 20 MHz bandwidth could be increased with new 
amplifiers and new matched strip line kickers. If 
significantly more bandwidth were needed, e.g. for 
electron cloud or TMCI, a completely new dedicated 
high-frequency system could be installed in the reserved 
space, complementing the existing systems. This is part of 
ongoing SPS studies on ecloud and feedback systems. 
Completely new signal processing electronics, kickers 
and power amplifiers would be needed, requiring special 
developments and certainly incurring long lead times. 
CRYOGENICS UPGRADES IN IR4 
 Cryo upgrade needs have recently been presented [7]. 
An upgrade is definitely needed for the Phase 2 
10x luminosity upgrade, to supply the inner triplet at IR5. 
It is not considered needed for the IR upgrade Phase 1 (2x 
in luminosity), unless there are larger dynamic losses than 
presently expected, due e.g. to electron cloud. The 
performance of the cryogenics will be monitored with 
increasing beam intensity during the 2010 run. For 
nominal RF, running with gradients approaching 8 MV/m, 
the RF load is 270 W to 430 W/sector. At the limit, 
pushing for higher gradients (50 % more) on the SC 
cavities is still within the allowed capacity. However IR4 
is critical, supplying RF and magnets. The layout of an 
upgrade is still needs study, as does its integration in 
UX45. It would take two years to prepare the upgrade, 
and several months to install and to commission. It may 
be possible to gain knowledge of electron cloud heat load 
(extrapolation) by the end of 2012.  
Nevertheless it can also be noted that independent cryo 
in IR4 would be a major operational advantage for RF. 
Crab cavity requirements are still expected to be within 
the present IR4 cryo capacity. Only simple modifications 
to the QRL RF service module and the RF extension are 
needed to connect the crab cavity. [8] See below. 
 ACN REVIEW 
Ultimate intensity could be captured successfully 
directly in the ACS 400 MHz, if SPS emittance can be 
kept to 0.6 eVs. This is being pursued in an SPS 200 MHz 
TWC upgrade proposal [9]. It would reduce beam 
loading, giving higher voltage hence shorter bunches. 
From 2009 experience, LHC injection seems stable. It 
appears that LHC injection phase errors 




Figure 5: Tentative Planning for ACN Fabrication and Installation 
 
Vary slowly and can be tracked and corrected pulse-to-
pulse. Tests are planned in 2010. 
 The ACN system is technically feasible. Bare cavities 
plus tuners and major components are available but much 
remains to be done, notably on power couplers and the 
high power system. The system would certainly be costly 
to construct and maintain; it would be two new additional 
and substantial high power RF systems in LHC, with the 
increased operational complexity. The system needs to 
either remain on continuously with feedback, or passively 
damped after injection. There is also increased 
impedance. Finally beam still needs to be transferred to 
the 400 MHz RF system at end of filling; if there is there 
is any dilution in 200 MHz bucket over a prolonged LHC 
filling time, lossy transfer and ghost bunches could result 
on the transfer into the 400 MHz bucket. 
Furthermore, like ACS, good performance will not be 
easily achieved above ultimate, due to beam loading and 
RF power limitations in the presence of transients.  
With present beam experience, however it is not 
possible to discount the need for the ACN. Work must 
therefore continue to prepare for an eventual installation 
in a defined time, once the need is confirmed. Beam 
behaviour in will be analysed in 2010 and 2011 to help 
get to a final decision. 
CRAB CAVITY IN IR4 
After the LHC-CC09, 3rd LHC Crab Cavity Workshop 
strongly renewed interest was focused on this option to 
increase LHC luminosity. The outcome of the workshop 
was that a new design of compact SC crab cavity would 
be the best long-term option. The first test would 
nevertheless be with a global scheme in IR4. It was 
established however that this could not be installed in 
time to fit the current Phase 1 upgrade, planned for 2015, 
and would be have to be at a later date. Installation would 
be in either of the reserved spaces for ACN or additional 
ADT. [10] The cryo upgrade proposed [8] is relatively 
straightforward and could be installed during a shutdown 
of only a few weeks. 
800 MHZ IN LHC 
Higher harmonic Landau cavities have frequently been 
installed in high energy proton machines, e.g. ISR, SPS, 
and RHIC, making dramatic improvements in 
longitudinal stability. They can be used in bunch 
lengthening or shortening mode, depending on their 
phasing with respect to the main RF system. A higher 
harmonic cavity introduces a spread in synchrotron 
frequency inside the bunch. Bunch stability thresholds 
depend on both energy spread and synchrotron frequency 
spread; a harmonic cavity is a preferred alternative to 
emittance blow up in presence of instabilities. In LHC 
there is the possibility of bunch instabilities from 
impedances at frequencies outside the range of cavity 




2 Main Power Coupler Prototype
3 Validate low power design
4 Ordoer + delivery of ceramic windows
5 Design loop and main line cooling
6 Machining of all components
7 Assembly of two prototypes
8 Test on test cavity
9
10 Main Power Coupler series production (x8)
11 Machining of all components
12 Assembly of eight couplers
13 Conditioning on test cavity
14
15 Test cavity
16 Design of test cavity
17 Machining of all components
18 Assembly of test cavity and its trolley
19
20 RS 2058 Test stand
21 Design of the test stand
22 Machining of all components
23 Assembly of the test stand
24 Commisioning of the test sand
25
26 Diacrode prototype
27 Design of the power amplfiier
28 Machining of all components
29 Assembly of one prototype
30
31 Diacrode Test stand
32 Design of the test stand
33 Machining of all components
34 Assembly of the test stand
35 Commisioning of the test sand
36 Diacrode tests
37
38 Series production of RS2058 power amplifiers
39 Market Survey + Invitation to Tender process
40 Production of 35 power amplifiers
41 Tests of 35 power amplifiers
42
43 Series production of Diacrode power amplifiers
44 Production of 8 power amplifiers (CERN)
45 Tests of 8 diacrode amplifiers
46
47 Cavities assembly
48 Preparation of all the auxiliaries




53 Construction of infrastructure components
54 LHC civil engineering modification
55 Cabling 
56 Cooling (air and water)
57 Integration of RF power plant
58
59 ACN power plant operational
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J
Half 1 Half 2 Half 1 Half 2 Half 1 Half 2 Half 1 Half 2 Half 1 Ha
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
* Main Coupler Prototypes (x2)
Parts procurement, machining,
assembly, RF test
* Main Coupler Series Production 
(x8) Machining, Assembly, RF 
conditioning
* Main C upler Test Cavity
machining, assembly
* Test Stand (BB3)
Components, Assembly, 
Commissi ning
* Diacr de Amplifier test Stand
Components, Assembly, 
Commissioning, Tests
* Diacrode Amplifier Prototype
Componen s, Assembly
•Series Prod. Tetrode Amplifiers 
(x35) Manu acture, tests.
* Cavity auxiliaries and assembly
* LHC Infrastructure & Installation
CE, Cabling, Cooling (Air & 
water)
•Assembly and test of power plant
Year 2 Year 4Year 3Year 1
Tunnel Work
Y 5
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A study has been done on a 1.2 GHz higher harmonic 
system [11] with three SC cavities per beam, providing 
~3 MV total. An 800 MHz system, with relaxed 
requirements on HOM coupler and power coupler design, 
has also been considered. This would need extensive 
studies and R&D on cavities, couplers and HOM 
couplers. The time scale would certainly be beyond 
2014/15. Time and effort must be invested in a 
preliminary study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The baseline planned upgrades in IR4 have been 
presented, i.e. ACN installation, possible ADT upgrades 
and Cryogenics upgrade. Crab cavity installation in IR4 
depends on a decision to free either the spare ADT or 
ACN space reservations. The 200 MHz upgrade in SPS 
emerges as having a significant potential benefit for LHC, 
and may well be higher priority than the ACN. The SPS 
RF upgrade proposal will be further elaborated to confirm 
this. The higher harmonic system for LHC must also be 
studied and a conceptual design proposal made. 
 Cryogenics upgrade may not be strictly necessary for 
the Phase 1 IR upgrade, but it would bring significant 
advantages for RF operation and will ultimately be 
needed in any case for Phase 2. The proposal and layout 
must be studied. 
Work on all the proposed upgrades will need to 
continue, up to the point where beam experience allows 
final priorities to be set. Beam performance will be 
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SUMMARY OF THE COLLIMATION UPGRADE PLANS  
R.W. Aβmann, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
The LHC collimation system is being implemented 
in a two-phase approach that was defined in 2004. The 
phase I has been fully installed in the machine and is 
presently being commissioned with beam. The system 
will be completed with the installation of phase II and 
performance will be upgraded. The completion and 
upgrade plans are summarized. 
INTRODUCTION 
The LHC collimation project was set up by CERN 
management at the end of 2002 to define and imple-
ment a solution for the LHC collimation problem. A 
phased solution was proposed and approved in 2003. 
Such a phased approach was required due to the tight 
time constraints and the requirement to advance clean-
ing efficiency by 3 orders of magnitude beyond the 
state-of-the-art. The phase I of LHC collimation was 
then implemented from 2003 – 2009 during a six-year 
effort.  
The phase I of the collimation system was optimized 
for robustness while accepting a predicted limitation in 
intensity reach for both ions and protons. The focus 
was put on completion of phase I, however, additional 
efforts and significant resources were invested to pre-
pare the phase II slots already to the maximum (cables, 
supports, space, vacuum, …). 
EXPERIENCE WITH PHASE I 
Before moving ahead with the second and final im-
plementation step for collimation, we wanted to wait 
for phase I performance to be verified. By now there is 
very limited beam experience, all with very low beam 
intensity. However, we can already conclude that the 
experience with LHC beam has now proven the correct 
functioning of the phase I collimation system. An ex-
ample of measured performance with beam in 2009 is 
shown in Fig. 1. The corresponding simulation result is 
given in Fig. 2. We note: 
1. The measured data can be used to define a 
cleaning efficiency, as the ratio between the 
peak loss at collimators and the peak loss at 
any super-conducting magnet. We find a 
cleaning efficiency of 99.98% for the pre-
sented case (or a maximum leakage of 2×10-4 
to a super-conducting magnet). This is in ex-
cellent agreement with 450 GeV simulations 
performed in 2006.  
2. Measurements were performed in 2009 in dif-
ferent planes and for both beams. Efficiency 
varies from 99.975% to 99.994% and should 
be compared to an efficiency of 99.988% that 
is used for LHC performance predictions. 
3. The expected leakage to the super-conducting 
arcs is already seen at the expected level. 
Phase II is designed to address this leakage in-
to the super-conducting arcs. 
 We can therefore conclude that the measured per-
formance is in good agreement with prior simulations 
and surpasses the HERA cleaning performance by a 
factor 100. At the same time leakage of losses is seen 
to the predicted locations, including clear losses in su-
per-conducting magnets. This already proves the va-
lidity and potential of the defined collimation path.  
The already available results provide us with more 
confidence concerning the predicted limitation in the 
required collimation efficiency (5-40% limit for LHC 
nominal beam intensity).  
It was therefore proposed at Chamonix in 2010 to 
now include completion of LHC collimation into the 
medium-term plan of CERN. 
PHASE II PROPOSAL 
The phase 2 R&D work was accelerating since 2008, 
supported by additional white paper resources from the 
CERN member states [2] and EU funds [3]. A solution 
could be presented in 2009 at an international review 
for LHC collimation [4]. The proposal is described in 
detail in [5, 6]. The phase II deliverables are as fol-
lows: 
1. Improve efficiency by a factor 15-90, both for 
proton and ion beams. This is achieved by in-
stalling additional collimators into the warm 
regions and special “cryo” collimators into the 
super-conducting dispersion suppressors. 
2. Reduce impedance by a factor 2 without re-
ducing efficiency. 
3. Complete IR collimation for luminosity-
driven losses, to be ready for nominal and 
higher luminosity. 
4. Address a problem for signal acceptance in the 
ZDC in IR2. 
5. Improve the IR6 protection for the Q4 against 
showers from the TCDQ dump protection. 
6. Allow for automatic collimator setup. 
7. Reduce radiation to most accelerator compo-
nents and increase lifetime of warm magnets 
in the cleaning insertions. 
8. Put in place the prepared handling of radioac-
tive air. 
9. Installs the agreed remote handling.   
This will enable the LHC to handle nominal and ul-
timate beam intensities for proton and ion beams. De-
ciding in 2010 will allow completing the LHC collima-
tion system by 2015.  
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 Figure 1: Example of a measured beam loss distribution around the LHC ring at 450 GeV. Horizontal beam losses were 
generated for beam 2 that goes from right to left. Losses were intercepted at the primary collimators in IR7. Clear losses 
are seen in the cold regions (blue bars) downstream of the cleaning insertions. Black bars indicate losses in collimators 
and red bars losses in room-temperature (warm) magnets. 
 
Figure 2: Simulated inefficiency (“beam loss”) around the LHC ring for beam 2 losses at 450 GeV and with a worst 
case design orbit error. From [1]. 
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The work program has been optimized after the end of 
Chamonix. Work will start only in IR3 and will then pro-
ceed to IR7 and IR2. This minimizes resources, should 
allow for first performance gains in 2013 and implements 
a solution in case of any problems with radiation to elec-
tronics in IR7. It is noted that the collimation upgrade 
program can be stopped or slowed down in case of any 
problems in IR3 or in case of lower than expected beam 
losses. 
DELIVERABLES AND MILESTONES 
The proposed work plan is matched to the presently 
planned major shutdowns, in particular the 2012 long 
shutdown for splice consolidation and the 2014/15 long 
shutdown for connection of linac4. Any shifts in these 
shutdowns will affect the deliverables for LHC collima-
tion phase 2. The following deliverables and milestones 
have been defined: 
• Year 2010:  
o MTP input to CERN directorate. Ap-
proval of construction plan to 2013.  
o Summer: Assessment of feasibility of 
installing cryo collimators in IR3 in the 
long shutdown of 2012. 
o Start of cryo design and production for 
IR3 only. Continue ongoing R&D for 
phase 2 secondary collimators. 
• Year 2011: 
o Summer: Review of lessons with LHC 
beam. Approval of construction plan to 
2015.  
o Continuation cryo work and production 
for IR3 at full speed. 
o SPS and HiRadMat beam tests for 
phase 2 secondary collimators.  
o Start production of additional collima-
tors: industry, CERN, SLAC. 
• Long shutdown end 2011 to beginning 2013: 
o Implement cryo modifications and in-
stall 4 “cryo-collimators” for both IR3 
dispersion suppressors.  
o Implement combined beta-
tron/momentum cleaning in IR3 (install 
10 collimators into the IR3 warm re-
gion). 
• Year 2013: 
o The IR3 cryo collimation is operational. 
Combined betatron/momentum cleaning 
system is available in IR3. 
o Better collimation efficiency and lower 
impedance. Should allow for increased 
p and ion intensity.  
o Losses can be almost fully relocated to 
IR3 in case of IR7 problems with radia-
tion to electronics. 
• Long shutdown 2014/15: 
o Install 4 TCLP collimators in IR1 and 
IR5 (requires removal of TOTEM Ro-
man Pots). 
o Implement cryo collimation in IR7 and 
IR2.  
o Install 30 phase II secondary collima-
tors in IR3 and IR7 (complementing ex-
isting phase I collimators). 
o Install 2 hollow e-beam lenses as scra-
pers. 
o Install 2 new TCT’s in IR2 to solve 
ZDC acceptance problem. 
o Install 2 tungsten collimators in IR6 
(improved cleaning downstream of 
TCDQ, avoid quenches of Q4). 
o Install the agreed remote handling for 
the highly radioactive LHC cleaning in-
sertions. 
o Install missing equipment for IR7 air 
ducts and commission modified ventila-
tion and air conditioning. 
• Year 2015: 
o The phase II of the LHC collimation 
system is completed. 
o Intensity reach of the LHC is max-
imized and should allow ultimate inten-
sity for both proton and ion beams. 
o The operational complexity of the col-
limation system is significantly re-
duced. 
o The high luminosity insertions IR1 and 
IR5 are ready for nominal and higher 
luminosity. 
o The IR2 insertion is equipped for no-
minal and higher ion luminosity. 
o The ALICE ZDC has full signal accep-
tance. 
o The weakness for Q4 in IR6 is re-
moved. 
o LHC is equipped with remote handling 
for highest beam intensities. 
It is noted that the presented work plan is success-
oriented, trying to ensure that LHC luminosity can be 
increased as fast as possible and that collimation solutions 
are available when needed. The plan has unavoidable 
technical schedule risks. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The plan for completion and performance upgrade of 
LHC collimation (“phase II”) has been summarized. After 
the Chamonix meeting the plan has been adjusted to the 
resource constraints over the next years. Technical details 
and explanations of the various ingredients of collimation 
phase II can be found in the references and have not bee 
repeated here. 
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INTEGRATION ISSUES IN THE TUNNEL AND IMPACT ON GENERAL 
LHC SYSTEMS  
 
S. Weisz, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
Planning of the various installation works in 
consideration of the space requirements, radiation levels, 
existing and missing infrastructures, alignment and 
survey, coordination issues for upgrade (e.g. collimation 
upgrade versus IR upgrade) and impact of LHC general 
consolidation work on the LHC upgrade projects. Options 
for implementing some of the upgrade work already 
before the extended shutdown in 2014-2015. 
INTRODUCTION 
Any upgrade of the LHC will require a full study of its 
impacts inside the existing infrastructure. This integration 
process is mandatory to understand the details of what 
needs to be achieved to implement the hardware 
modifications. It is a crucial step before one can start the 
planning of the intervention in the field.  
The case of the IR upgrade phase 1 [1] is now well 
advanced: it will be used to illustrate the space 
requirements, the radio-protection constraints, the existing 
or missing infrastructure and associated equipment that 
need to be considered to organize the replacement of the 
low-β quadrupoles of the high luminosity experiments. 
The mitigation of Single Event Errors (SEE) [2] adds 
another level of complexity since it will progressively 
modify the existing environment. The planning of the 
installation of the IR upgrade reflects all these 
considerations, leading to a first estimate of 9 months for 
the installation of one triplet.  
Other LHC upgrades concern the modification of the 
matching sections of the high luminosity insertions, the 
installation of collimators in the dispersion suppressors or 
the consolidation of the RF system. A preliminary review 
of the corresponding integration issues is presented, 
together with the constraints to be expected on the 
planning of the interventions.  
The paper will not address integration aspects or 
planning impacts of the high priority works related to the 
consolidation or repair of faulty bus-bar interconnects. 
Other works, part of the completion of the LHC baseline 
(Ex installation of additional dilution kickers at Point 6), 
are already prepared to occur during the forthcoming long 
shutdowns and are not discussed here.  
As many of the integration difficulties result from the 
lack of underground space around the high luminosity 
insertions, a first description of possible dedicated 
machine service areas at Point 1 and 5 is provided to 
launch a reflection.  
IR PHASE 1 UPGRADE 
A detailed description of the IR phase 1 upgrade is 
available in the Conceptual Design Report [3] issued in 
November 2008. A short review of the requirements 
relative to the installation of the new low-β triplets is 
given here. 
Space requirements 
The interfaces between the experiments and the LHC 
remain unchanged. The new low-β quadrupoles are longer 
than the actual Q1-Q2-Q3, with a total length of 45.2m 
instead of 32.7m. However the new separation dipole D1 
would be a cryogenic magnet and the length of the triplet-
D1 assembly is almost unchanged. The overall transverse 
dimensions of the new magnets are similar to the previous 
ones, a constraint imposed by tunnel transport limitations. 
There is thus no problem to fit the new cryostats in the 
space occupied by the present triplet-D1 assemblies at 
Point 1 and 5. The interface with the cryogenic 
distribution line would be displaced and QRL extensions 
are required: this raised some problems at Point 5 where 
the tunnel is only 3.8m in diameter instead of the 4.4m 
available in the straight sections around Point 1. The 
identification of conflicting elements and the optimisation 
of the routings, including modification of the service 
modules and of the cryo-feed boxes, took almost a year: 
sound solutions are now available, shown on Figure 1 for 
Point 1 and Figure 2 for Point 5 (work of Yvon Muttoni, 
Alparslan Tursun and Stefan Maridor).  
Figure 1: new low-β triplet left of Point 1 
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 Figure 2: New low-β layout left of Po
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Figure 6: residual dose rate expected at the 
after a 4 months cool-down period
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Figure 8: Preliminary planning of the modification of one 
matching section 
It should be noted that the activities involved are very 
similar to those of the IR upgrade phase 1: magnet 
transport, alignment, interconnections, modifications of 
cryogenics and powering equipment, etc. Full parallelism 
with the IR upgrade phase 1 will be very difficult since 
the same teams would be in charge of both projects.  
ADDITIONAL COLLIMATORS 
The present LHC collimation system provides optimum 
robustness but its ideal performances limit the beam 
intensity to 40% of nominal [6]. A very aggressive 
upgrade program is proposed to reach, and ultimately go 
beyond, the nominal LHC parameters. It includes: 
1. The installation of 2 TCLP collimators at Points 1 
and 5: the collimators are available and the 
corresponding slots are prepared. The collimators 
could be installed during a normal shutdown, to be 
coordinated with TOTEM at Point 5. 
2. The installation of 30 “advanced phase 2” collimators 
at Point 3 and 7: the R&D prototyping is ongoing 
(prototype installed in the SPS in January 2010) and 
the corresponding infrastructure has been prepared. 
The collimators could be installed during normal 
shutdowns as they become available. 
3. Installation of cold collimators in the dispersion 
suppressors on both sides of Points 3 and 7. 
4. Installation of cold collimators in the dispersion 
suppressors on both sides of Point 2. 
5. Installation of 4 additional warm collimators at Point 
1 and 5, associated to a lower β* optic. The 
corresponding infrastructure must be prepared, this 
installation could occur with the modification of the 
matching sections mentioned previously. 
6. Installation of cold collimators in the dispersion 
suppressors on both sides of Points 1 and 5. This is 
not planned at present, but might become needed in 
the future … 
The installations of the cold collimators that appear on 
the items 3, 4 and optionally 6 require displacing the 12 
cryo-magnets of the dispersion suppressors concerned: 
this means disconnecting, transporting, aligning and re-
connecting each of these magnets and the replacement of 
the connecting cryostat.  Most of the remarks made 
previously concerning the modification of the matching 
sections apply here just as well: 
• The integration work is of paramount importance to 
identify all potential conflict: the displacement of the 
DFBA’s and the interferences with the injection line 
left of Point 2 are serious concerns. 
• The work will occur in activated areas, the proposed 
collimators are in fact precisely in charge of 
absorbing the protons losses in these areas. 
• The shift of the DS magnets will require important 
modifications to the infrastructure and the cryogenic 
distribution. 
• The control and powering systems in the RR’s around 
Point 7 will undergo several modifications to mitigate 
the SEE hazards. 
The activities involved in the installation of cryo-
collimators are similar to those of the IR upgrade phase 1 
and reshuffling of the matching sections. The ability to do 
these works in parallel during a single extended shutdown 
clearly depends on the number of teams that can be 
mobilised. 
 CONSOLIDATION OF THE RF SYSTEM 
The RF system will most probably require 
consolidation work as the beam intensity will increase. 
There is also a strong incentive for a dedicated 4.5K 
cooling plant that would bring much more flexibility to 
run the cavities and extra cooling for the triplet left of 
Point 5. Finally, crab cavities at Point 4 offer an 
opportunity to increase the luminosity without increasing 
the beam currents nor the bunch spacing, which is 
particularly interesting when the reduction of β* becomes 
less efficient. The experience gathered with the LHC does 
not allow yet telling the way to go or to set priorities on 
future RF upgrades. Still, one could note that: 
1. Installation of 200 MHz capture cavities: space has 
already been reserved for 4 cavities on each beam 
and the infrastructure will not require important 
modifications. The ACN’s could thus be installed 
during a normal shutdown. 
2. Installation of transverse damping and feedback: 
space has been reserved for one additional module on 
each ring and the ADT’s could also be installed 
during a normal shutdown. 
3. Installation of RF dedicated 4.5K cooling capacity: 
this requires a new underground refrigerator cold box 
and new cryogenic distribution lines. The integration 
work as not started yet, but there is probably enough 
space available in the UX45 cavern. The installation 
of a cooling plant during a single shut down is quite 
challenging, the work could span over consecutive 
shutdowns, and the final modification of the 
cryogenic distribution would occur at the end.  
4. Crab cavities at Point 4: space allocation becomes 
problematic if both the 200 MHz capture cavities and 
the additional dampers need to be installed. The 
temperature of the crab cavities (2K or 4.5K) has a 
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Limitation of underground space around the high 
luminosity insertions is the source of most LHC upgrade 
integration concerns. Dedicated machine service areas at 
Point 1 and 5 would imply very important investments: a 
reflection should start without delay to understand it they 
are a necessity for the long term.  
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PARAMETER SPACE BEYOND 1034 
F. Zimmermann  
 CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
We review the beam parameters available for the LHC 
upgrade (intensities, betas, crossing angles, etc.), their 
constraints, interrelations, and the associated challenges, 
as well as the possible ranges that could be explored for 
each, and different luminosity optimization strategies.  
Leveling of luminosity and/or of the beam-beam tune 
shift is likely to be important at the high-luminosity LHC.  
Formulae are presented for the ideal run time and average 
luminosity that can be achieved with and without two 
kinds of leveling schemes.  
In particular, in this paper we demonstrate that the gain 
in luminosity from raising the beam intensity is much 
higher than from decreasing β*, unless the latter is 
complemented by crab cavities or by smaller transverse 
beam emittance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The parameter space for the LHC luminosity upgrade 
has first been charted in the 2001 LHC upgrade feasibility 
study [1]. It has later been refined and revisited in the 
frame of CARE-HHH [2], through several targeted 
workshops, e.g. [3.4,5,6], and, more recently, within the 
EuCARD-AccNet activity [7].  
This paper reviews the parameters available, constraints 
and challenges for each, some relationships between these 
parameters, possible parameter ranges, and different 
optimization strategies, which either increase the beam 
intensity or decrease the interaction-point (IP) spot size.  
The paper is structured as follows. The first part 
surveys the parameters and also recalls the original 
upgrade plan (the “ultimate” LHC) as well as several 
important constraints. Later, eight example scenarios are 
presented, covering the parameter space and illustrating 
the performance reach. The typical luminosity time 
evolution is presented, for various upgrade schemes. A 
third part of the paper addresses luminosity leveling, 
highlighting its merits and possibilities. We finally 
compute the impact of the turnaround time, of β*, and of 
the bunch intensity on the average luminosity, and 
compare the luminosity gain expected from higher beam 
intensity with the one provided by tighter focusing, 
including, or not, additional measures. 
PARAMETERS 
There are only a few relevant parameters:  
•  β*  - the IP beta function;  
•  βx */βy* - the ratio of the IP  horizontal and 
vertical IP beta functions*,  
• εΝ - the normalized transverse emittance;  
• Nb - the bunch intensity;  
• nb  – the number of bunches (or equivalently, sb, 
the bunch spacing);  
• the longitudinal bunch profile (“flat” versus 
“Gaussian” bunch shape);  
• the number of interaction points (IPs);and 
• Tta - the turn-around time. 
THE ORIGINAL PLAN – “PHASE 0” 
The original plan for boosting the luminosity, as 
described e.g. in [1,9], was, or is, closely tied to the 
ultimate LHC parameters. 
Figure 1 (left) shows that with the nominal LHC beam 
parameters, and the two protons beams colliding at 4 
interaction points (in one of which off-center), the beam-
beam tune footprint just fits into a square of width 0.01, 
which corresponds to the beam-beam limit experienced at 
the S pp S collider. At a total beam-beam tune shift of 
0.01 the betatron tune footprint can be accommodated in 
between resonances of order lower than or equal to 12. 
Reducing the number of IPs from 4 to 2, the beam-beam 
tune footprint shrinks by slightly more than 1/3 (Fig. 1 
centre). This can be used to increase the bunch intensity 
until the tune footprint recovers its nominal size, at 
ultimate bunch intensity (Fig. 1 right). In these conditions, 
the ATLAS & CMS luminosity is a factor 2.3 higher than 
nominal, namely L~2.3x1034 cm-2s-1 [1].  
 
Figure 1: Beam-beam tune footprint up to 6σ for the 
nominal LHC, as defined at the time, with collisions in 
four interaction points (left), with nominal collisions in 2 
interaction points (centre), and with collisions in two 
interaction points at ultimate bunch intensity [1] 
[Courtesy H. Grote]. 
                                                           
* βx */βy* ratios different from one are not further considered in the following, 
but they had been studied for the nominal LHC [ 8] and remain an interesting 
option for the future. 
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Alternatively, the same luminosity could be reached by 
reducing the fractional tune difference Qy-Qx from 
nominal 0.01 to 0.005, which would also allow increasing 
the bunch intensity to the ultimate value while 
maintaining collisions in all four IPs [9].  
Moreover, increasing the crossing angle, to 340 μrad, 
and the bunch length by a factor of 2, one could further 
raise the bunch charge to Nb=2.6x1011, yielding  
L=3.6x1034 cm-2s-1 at β*=0.5 m [1]. 
BUNCH PATTERNS AND LHCB 
Only two or three types of bunch pattern are considered 
for the upgrade: the nominal 25-ns bunch spacing with 
ultimate or slightly higher bunch intensity, or 50-ns 
spacing with about twice this intensity per bunch.  
For Super-LHC, the upgraded LHCb detector requires 
luminosities equal to a few percent of the peak luminosity 
in IP1 and 5 [10].  
It is not easy to deliver this LHCb luminosity for the 
25-ns bunch pattern, without losing potential luminosity 
in ATLAS and CMS in view of the additional tune-shift 
contribution from LHCb. One possibility is arranging for 
“late collisions” with β*~3 m. This might, however, not 
be compatible with all the luminosity-leveling schemes 
[11,12].  
In the 50-ns pattern one could add lower-intensity 
“satellite” bunches 25 ns behind the main bunches, so that 
at LHCb the main bunches would collide with the satellite 
bunches [11,12]. The luminosity in LHCb would be 
determined by the charge of the satellites. Alternatively, 
one could also arrange for the satellite and main bunches 
to collide in ALICE. Two advantages of the scheme with 
50-ns spacing are: 
• insignificant electron cloud (which remains true 
even in the presence of satellites; see later); and 
• almost complete transparency of LHCb (or 
ALICE) collisions for ATLAS and CMS. 
Figure 2 illustrates the various bunch patterns considered 
for the LHC upgrade. 
 
Figure 2: Bunch patterns for the LHC luminosity upgrade 
with and without collisions in (S)LHCb. 
CONSTRAINTS 
The most important parameter constraints are as follows: 
• the total beam-beam tune shift should not exceed 
0.01, based on the SPS p-pbar experience; 
• the long-range beam-beam effect calls for a 
crossing angle larger than  ≥9σ’* (i.e. more than 
9σ separation at the majority of the parasitic 
beam-beam encounters [13]); 
• the arc cooling capacity is restricted by both  
global & local limitations; one important global 
limit arises from the fact that the arc cooling is 
presently shared with the interaction region 
magnets, which at high luminosity receive a lot 
of heat from collision debris; independent cryo 
plants for the interaction regions would much 
improve this limit; the heat load in the arcs is the 
sum of contributions  from synchrotron radiation, 
image currents (mostly resistive wall), and 
electron cloud including photo-electrons; 
• the interaction layout and optics define the 
minimum β*; 
• the event pile up in the detectors should be less 
than  150-300 events per crossing, the exact limit 
depending on the details of the detector upgrade 
and the physics scenario, and 
• the luminosity lifetime should not be too short; 
requiring a value above 5 h appears reasonable.  
CROSSING  ANGLE 
Controlling the effect of the large number of parasitic 
collisions (120) in LHC requires a crossing angle, which 
must increase with the beam intensity and in particular 
scales as 1/β*1/2. The direct effect of the crossing angle on 
the overlap of the colliding bunches and on the luminosity 
is characterized by the so-called Piwinski angle φ and the 
geometric luminosity reduction factor Rφ, 
             
*2 2






  ,              (1) 
where θc denotes the full crossing angle, σz the rms 
bunch length and σx* the transverse rms IP beam size (in 
the plane of crossing).  
 
Figure 3: Geometric reduction factor as a function of the 
Piwinski angle, and operating points for nominal, 
ultimate, and a typical upgraded LHC. 
 
Figure 3 shows the values of these two parameters for 
collisions in the nominal and the ultimate LHC and for a 
typical upgrade scenario. The insert illustrates the origin 
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of the luminosity loss. While for the nominal LHC the 
loss is less than 20%, it approaches 60% for an upgrade at 
φ~2 (or, in other words, without this factor the upgrade 
luminosity could be 2.5 times higher!). 
The accessible range of crossing angles depends on the 
design of the final quadrupole triplet (aperture, gradient, 
length) and on β*. The nominal crossing angle is 285 
μrad; it rises to 315 μrad for the ultimate LHC. Crossing 
angles up to ~410 μrad are considered for the IR “phase 
1” [14] and up to about 500 μrad for some “phase 2” 
scenarios. 
BEAM-BEAM TUNE SHIFT, PIWINSKI 
ANGLE, AND LUMINOSITY 
The total (horizontal or vertical) beam-beam tune shift 
for the case of two interaction points with alternating 
horizontal and vertical crossing is [15] 









where the factor γε represents the normalized emittance, 
Nb is the number of particles per bunch, rp the classical 
proton radius, and Fprofile a form factor, equal to 1 for a 
longitudinally Gaussian bunch shape and 2  for a flat 
profile. 
According to (2) the beam-beam tune shift decreases as 
a function of crossing angle exactly with the same factor 
Rφ as the luminosity (compare Eq. (1)). In addition, the 
form factor Fprofile expresses the fact that a longitudinally 
“flat” profile is preferred since the maximum beam-beam 
tune shift depends primarily on the peak charge density. 
The luminosity can be written in the following two 



























where the first equation is useful below the beam-beam 
limit and the second equation guides the luminosity 
optimization at the beam-beam limit when ΔQbb has 
reached a constant value. In the former case, one aims to 
minimize the Piwinski angle φ, whereas in the second 
case, i.e. at the beam-beam limit, the luminosity can be 
further increased by raising φ and, e.g., Nb or ε at the 
same time. From (2) and (3) one can also deduce that for 
the same bunch charge Nb and the same beam-beam tune 
shift ΔQbb, the luminosity of a uniform (or ‘flat’) 
longitudinal distribution is exactly 2 times higher than 
for a Gaussian bunch profile [16].  
Based on the above relationships, a number of 
luminosity optimization strategies have been proposed for 
the LHC upgrade [3,4,5,6,17]: 
• increase Nb together with ε, e.g. via controlled ε 
blow up at top energy (“Big Emittance”); 
• increase Nb with 1/Rf & “flat” bunch Fprofile~1.4 
(“Large Piwinski Angle - LPA”);  
• vary ε as 1/Rφ  (“Low Emittance - LE”) ; or  
• aim for Rφ ~1 at the IP and minimize β* (e.g. “Crab 
Crossing - CC” and “Early Separation - ES” 
schemes).   
BEAM-BEAM TUNE SHIFT LIMIT &   
THE CROSSING ANGLE 
Several of our optimization strategies, described above, 
assume that the “beam-beam limit” is uniquely 
characterized by a maximum value of the beam-beam 
tune shift ΔQtot, and that this limiting value itself does not 
depend on the crossing angle θc. In lepton colliders this 
assumption is known to be not fully valid: in various e+e- 
colliders the finite crossing angle has lowered the 
maximum value of the beam-beam limit which could be 
achieved, e.g. at DORIS-I, and KEKB. One reason for the 
observed tune-shift degradation is the excitation of 
synchro-betatron resonances by a non-zero crossing 
angle. At KEKB the potential increase in the maximum 
beam-beam tune shift for zero crossing angle has in fact 
been the main motivation for installing crab cavities. 
For colliding hadron beams, we are aware of only a 
single experiment concerning the effect of a crossing 
angle on the beam-beam limit, which was performed at 
the SPS collider about two decades ago [18]. The main 
results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 4. Only a faint 
additional beam-beam effect has been observed in the loss 
rates for the largest φ examined (~0.7). However, the φ 
values explored in the historical SPS experiment did not 
extend to the φ range between 1 and 3, which is being 
considered for the LHC upgrade. 
 
Figure 4: Experimental background rates in the S pp S 
collider as a function of the horizontal tune with and 
without a crossing angle, for a Piwinski angle f around 
0.45 (left) and 0.7 (right) [18]. 
 
CRAB CROSSING  
Crab crossing was first proposed for linear [19] and 
then for circular e+e- colliders [20] in 1988 and 89, 
respectively. Since 2007, crab cavities are in operation at 
KEKB. The principle of the crab crossing is illustrated in 
Fig. 5. A transversely deflecting RF “crab cavity” deflects 
the head and tail of each passing bunch in opposite 
directions so that the beam-beam collision becomes 
effectively “head on” for the luminosity and for the tune 
shift. Whereas the overlap and the field are restored, the 
bunch centroids still cross at a finite angle which allows 
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for easy separation, and minimizes the effect of parasitic 
beam-beam encounters.  
 
Figure 5: Schematic of crab crossing. 
 
The potential merits of crab cavities for the LHC [21] 
include a higher geometric luminosity, the possibility 
easy luminosity leveling, as well as – in view of the above 
considerations – a potentially higher beam-beam tune 
shift limit. 
LARGE PIWINSKI ANGLE  
Optimizing the LHC luminosity at the beam-beam limit 
by collisions with a Large Piwinski Angle (LPA), e.g.  
θcσz >> 2σx*,  and longer, longitudinally flat, and intense 
bunches was first proposed in [1,15]. The concept is 
based on Eqs. (2) and (3). Figure 6 presents a rough 
schematic of LPA collisions. The large value of φ and the 
flat profile both translate into a reduced tune shift, and the 
resulting potential for higher bunch charge, which is taken 
advantage of in the LPA schemes proposed for the LHC. 
To restrict the heat load from electron cloud in the cold 
LHC arcs, the standard LPA scenario for LHC considers 
50 ns spacing. 
 
 




The beam-beam tune shift due to the primary collisions 
introduces a limit on the bunch intensity through (2). This 
is a fundamental limit for crab cavities without leveling. 
Raising the number of protons per bunch, Nb, beyond the 
ultimate bunch intensity of 1.7x1011 requires either a large 
Piwinski angle or a large emittance. In certain scenarios 
restricting the beam-beam tune shift from the primary 
collision points requires even larger crossing angles than 
what would be needed for preventing harmful long-range 
beam-beam effects due to the parasitic encounters.  
Another severe limit for the bunch intensity is imposed 
by the arc cooling capacity. The next section discusses 
this in more detail. 
 Other, less fundamental limits on the bunch intensity 
may come from the injectors, collimation, machine 
protection, radiofrequency system, etc.  
ARC COOLING & HEAT LOAD 
The cooling capacity for the cold LHC arcs is limited 
both globally, by the cooling power of the cryo plants, 
which must also cool the interaction region quadrupoles - 
at high luminosity subjected to large heat from collision 
debris -, and locally, by the hydraulic impedance of the 
beam-screen cooling loops [22-24]. In the LHC arcs 
proper, synchrotron radiation, image currents (together 
with the resistive wall impedance) and electron cloud are 
the main sources of heat load. The heat from synchrotron 
radiation and impedance can be fairly accurately 
calculated [23,24]. The heat load from electron cloud is 
obtained from simulations [25]. The most optimistic 
simulations consider a maximum secondary emission 
yield below 1.3, where beam-induced multipacting is 
largely absent, and where the remaining electron-induced 
heating is dominated by the accelerated primary photo-
electrons. 
Figures 7 and 8 compare, for a bunch spacing of 25 ns 
and 50 ns, respectively (and with different IP beta 
functions), the residual cooling capacity available and the 
simulated heat load from the electron cloud. Here, the 
residual cooling capacity is calculated by subtracting from 
the global limit the equivalent cooling power required for 
the interaction region (depending on the luminosity), and 
the computed heating from synchrotron radiation and 
image currents, and from the local limit only the latter 
two arc contributions, and then taking the minimum value 
of the remaining global and local cooling capacities so 
obtained.  
Both figures, 17 and 18, demonstrate that in order to 
reach any decent bunch intensity at high luminosity 
(actually the first is a precondition for the latter), separate 
dedicated cryo plants are needed for the interaction 
regions. More specifically, Fig. 7 shows that for 25-ns 
bunch spacing, going above Nb=1.7x1011 protons per 
bunch at nominal β* requires dedicated IR cryo plants; if 
such plants are installed the “hard” intensity limit 
becomes Nb~2.3x1011. From Fig. 8, for 50-ns bunch 
spacing, dedicated IR cryo plants are required at bunch 
intensities above Nb=2.3x1011 with an upgraded β*~0.25 
m; again assuming a separate IR cooling, the hard limit on 
the bunch intensity is pushed to Nb~5x1011. 
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Figure 7: Residual cooling capacity for electron cloud per 
aperture and per meter at low and high luminosity at 
β*=0.55 m (or with and without dedicated IR cryo plants) 
as a function of bunch intensity [22-24] together with the 
electron cloud heat load simulated for various values of 
the maximum secondary emission yield and 25-ns bunch 
spacing, with a Gaussian bunch profile [25]. 
 
Figure 9 presents simulated heat loads for the 50-ns 
bunch spacing of the standard LPA scheme with and 
without dedicated LHCb satellite bunches interleaved at a 
distance of 25 ns from the main bunches [25]. The 
satellite bunch intensity is decreased inversely 
proportional to the main bunch intensity in order to 
provide a constant target luminosity in LHCb (determined 
by collisions between main bunches and satellites). The 
figure illustrates that the heat load including the “LHCb 
satellite” does not show a fully monotonic dependence on 
the main bunch intensity, which is consistent with earlier 
studies of other types of LHC satellite bunches [26,27], 
but that the additional smaller bunches only marginally 
increase the (low) 50-ns heat load. 
 
Figure 8: Residual cooling capacity for electron cloud per 
aperture and per meter at low and high luminosity (or 
with and without dedicated IR cryo plants) for a bunch 
spacing of 50 ns and β*=0.25 m as a function of bunch 
intensity [22-24] together with the electron cloud heat 
load simulated for various values of the maximum 
secondary emission yield. A longitudinally flat bunch 
shape is assumed (LPA scenario) [25]. 
 
Figure 9: Simulated electron heat load as a function of 
main bunch intensity for 50 ns bunch spacing with (black) 
and without LHCb satellite bunches (red) for two 
different values of the maximum secondary emission 
yield (δmax=1.1 – left, and δmax=1.3 – right) [25]. In this 
simulation, the satellite bunch intensity has been varied as 
the inverse of main-bunch intensity, as Nb,sat~1.1x1010 x 
5x1011/Nb,main, in order to yield a constant target 
luminosity of about 2x1033 cm-2s-1 in (S)LHCb.  
 
IP BETA FUNCTION  
The nominal LHC IP beta function is 0.55 m. For the 
ultimate LHC a beta function of 0.5 m has been retained, 
e.g. [28]. The proposed “phase-1” IR upgrade with larger 
aperture Nb-Ti quadrupoles allows for beta functions 
between 0.25 m and 0.4 m [14,29]. For a later phase-2 
upgrade based on Nb3Sn quadrupoles, beta functions 
between 0.14 and 0.22 m have been considered at the 
present value of l* equal to 23 m (free length between the 
last quadrupole and the IP). The value of 0.14 m is a hard 
limit from the arc-sextupole strength required by the 
linear chromatic correction. For a reduced l* of about 13 
m, an even smaller IP beta functions close to 0.1 m could 
be envisioned [30].  
In addition to the linear chromaticity, other “softer” 
limitations arise from the physical aperture in the 
matching sections, and from the additional sextupole 
strength required for the correction of the off-momentum 
beta beating in the two cleaning insertions.  
It may be worth noting that some past attempts at 
designing a local chromatic correction scheme, which 
would not rely on the arc sextupoles and not generate a 
large off-momentum beta beating, have not been 
successful, but that this approach could be reconsidered. 
EVENT PILE UP  
One major concern is the event pile up in the detectors, 
LHC studies in the first half of the 1980s had constrained 
the number of events per crossing to less than 1. The 
nominal LHC parameters imply about 19 inelastic 
scattering events per bunch crossing, assuming an 
inelastic cross section of about 60 mbarn. A 10 times 
higher luminosity for the same number of bunches 
translates into about 200 events per crossing, 
necessitating an upgrade of the present detectors. 
The number of events per crossing is equal to the 
product of the relevant inelastic cross section and the 
luminosity divided by the bunch collision rate, where the 
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bunch collision rate is given by the product of the number 
of bunches per beam and the revolution frequency. 
LUMINOSITY DECAY AND LIFETIME  
For the upgraded LHC a fast decay of beam intensity 
and luminosity is expected (with a typical time scale of a 
few hours), which is dominated by proton burn off in 
proton-proton collision. Contributions from intrabeam 
scattering and from gas scattering can be considered 
negligible in comparison. Under these conditions, the 
luminosity decay will not be exponential, but purely 
algebraic, and of the form [31] 
     ( ) ( )2/1
ˆ
efft
LtL τ+=                     (4) 
where τeff denotes the effective initial beam lifetime 





στ ˆ=                          (5) 
and we recognize the number of protons per bunch Nb, the 
number of bunches per beam nb, the number of IPs, the 
initial peak luminosity Lˆ  and the total scattering cross 
section σtot.  
The beam and luminosity lifetimes are proportional to 
the total beam intensity and inversely proportional to the 
luminosity. An LHC luminosity upgrade implies shorter 
luminosity lifetimes unless the beam intensity is increased 
simultaneously. Or, in other words, for a given peak 
luminosity, the luminosity lifetime depends only on the 
total beam current (at least in the absence of “leveling”). 
The beam lifetime is related to the total cross section. 
For the LHC centre-off-mass energy the total cross 
section is quite well known from cosmic ray experiments; 
see Fig. 10. Extrapolation of the inelastic cross section, 
relevant for the event pile up, were experimental data 
exist only at much lower energies, to the LHC appears to 
be more uncertain. 
 
Figure 10: Total and elastic cross sections for pp 
collisions as a function of laboratory beam momentum 
and total center-of-mass energy. Corresponding 
computer-readable data files may be found at 
http://pdg.lbl.gov/current/xsect/. (Courtesy of the 




The parameter space available is spanned by a number 
of scenarios, characterized as follows: 
(1) “nominal LHC”: Nb=1.15x1011 , β*=0.55 m, 
θc=285 μrad, and 25-ns bunch spacing;   
(2) “nominal*”: Nb=1.7x1011, β*=0.55 m, θc=285 
μrad, and 50 ns bunch spacing;    
(3) “ultimate LHC”: Nb=1.7x1011 , β*=0.50 m, 
θc=315 μrad, and 25-ns bunch spacing;   
(4)  “phase 1+” with maximum intensity permitted 
by beam-screen cooling loops and minimum β* 
from phase-1 upgrade: Nb=2.3x1011, β*=0.30 m, 
θc=348 mrad, and 25-ns bunch spacing;   
(5)  “phase 1 with crab”, with an intensity slightly 
below ultimate and crab crossing: Nb=1.6x1011 , 
β*=0.30 m (θc=348 μrad), and 25-ns bunch 
spacing;  
(6)  “phase 2+” with maximum intensity permitted 
by beam screen cooling loop and minimum 
conceivable β*: Nb=2.3x1011 , β*=0.14 m, 
θc=509 μrad, and 25-ns bunch spacing;   
(7)  “phase 2 with crab” again with an intensity 
slightly below ultimate, Nb=1.6x1011 ,β*=0.14 m 
(θc=509 μrad), and 25-ns bunch spacing [we also 
consider this same case without crab cavity to 
reveal the merit of the latter]; 
(8) 50-ns “LPA” scenario, with 50-ns bunch 
spacing, and flat long bunches: Nb=4.2x1011 , 
β*=0.25 m, θc=381 μrad; and    
(9) 25-ns “LPA” scenario, with 25-ns bunch 
spacing, and flat long bunches: Nb=2.6x1011 , 
β*=0.50 m, θc=339 μrad.  
Table 1 compiles numerous parameters for the above 
eight scenarios, including peak luminosity, beam current, 
maximum number of events per crossing, the individual 
contributions to the arc heat load, optimum run time and 
average luminosity for two different values of turn-around 
time (2 and 10 h), and, in the last row, the annual 
luminosity calculated assuming 60% machine availability 
for physics, an average 5-h turn-around time, and 200 
days total run time per year.  
Optimum run time and average luminosities have been 
calculated using the expected algebraic decay (4). At 
other occasions, estimates have been based on an 
exponential approximation to the algebraic shape of the 
form [33] 
( ) ( )efftLtL τ/54.1expˆ −≈    (6) 
Figure 11 illustrates the quality of this approximation. 
In the time interval between 0 and τeff, the exponential 
approximation (6) looks fairly good. However, the merit 
of this approximation is not clear, as neither the 
consumption in collision nor intrabeam scattering, or gas 
scattering, lead to exponential luminosity decay. For 
calculating optimum run times and average luminosities 
without leveling, this paper only considers the algebraic 
luminosity decrease (4). 






































Figure 11: Comparison of the algebraic luminosity decay 
(4) with an exponential approximation for τeff=10 h. 
 
The turn-around time is defined as the time interval 
between the end of one (data-taking) physics run and the 
start of the next. It includes the ramping down of the  







































The LHC Design Report and other sources indicate a 
minimum LHC turn-around time of about 4300 seconds 
(1.2 h) [34,35]. This Chamonix workshop has clarified 
that the minimum actually achievable turn-around time is 
three times longer, i.e. 3 hours [33]. Moreover, from 
experience at other similar machines (Tevatron, HERA, 
and RHIC) it is expected that the actual average turn-
around time in operation will be about three times the 
minimum value [36], which would then translate to about 
10 h for the LHC.  
Figure 12 illustrates the luminosity time evolution 
expected for six of the above scenarios and Fig. 13 allows 
a closer view at four of them, corresponding to some of 
the “phase-2” or LPA scenarios. From Fig. 13 it is evident 
that the scenario with β*=14 cm and Nb=2.3x1011 (phase 
1+) has a very similar performance to the one with β*=14 
cm, the lower intensity of Nb~1.6x1011 and crab cavities 
(phase 1 with crab) , and also to the LPA scheme with 
β*=25 cm, Nb=4.2x1011 and 50-ns spacing (LPA-50).  
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Figure 12: Luminosity evolution as a function of time 
during physics operation for several upgrade scenarios, 
and for the nominal LHC, with a turnaround time of 5 h. 
 
Figure 14 shows the corresponding time evolution for 
the number of events per bunch crossing. Here, all 
scenarios imply peak rates of 100-150 events per 
crossing, except for the 50-ns LPA scheme, where this 
rate is close to 300. The number of events per may not be 
the only relevant quantity. E.g. there might be several 
sub-detectors integrating over more than one bunch 
crossing.     
 
 
Figure 13: Luminosity evolution as a function of time 
during physics operation for some selected phase-2 and 
LPA upgrade scenarios, with a turnaround time of 5 h. 
 
 
Figure 14: Number of events per crossing as a function of 
time during physics operation for several upgrade 
scenarios, and the nominal LHC (all with 5 h turnaround). 
LUMINOSITY LEVELING 
The term “luminosity leveling” designates a controlled 
change of θc, β* or σz during the store in order to reduce 
the maximum event pile up and the peak power 
deposition in the interaction region magnets, as well as, 
for some of the leveling schemes, also in order to 
maximize the integrated luminosity. The radiation 
damping from synchrotron radiation already naturally 
provides some kind of leveling by reducing the beam size 
during a store, though the LHC transverse radiation 
damping time of 52 h at 7 TeV beam energy is much 
longer than the luminosity lifetimes of between 4 and 12 
h expected for the high-luminosity LHC (see Table 1) 
[37]. 
Leveling by squeezing β* in physics had initially been 
proposed for the LHC heavy ion programme, with the aim 
to maximize the physics output without exceeding the 
quench threshold of the most sensitive SC magnets in the 
dispersion suppressors [38]. It is possible that luminosity 
leveling in the LHC will first be tested in heavy-ion 
collisions.  
   Luminosity leveling for LHC proton collisions, by 
varying either β* or the bunch length, was first suggested 
at a PAF/POFPA meeting in 2007 [39].  The idea of 
leveling with the crossing angle using dipole magnets was 
introduced by J.-P. Koutchouk and G. Sterbini for the so-
called early-separation scheme (with dipole magnets 
embedded in the particle-physics detector) [40,41].  
Leveling with the crossing angle could alternatively be 
realized by varying the crab-cavity voltage [42].  
Leveling with the crossing angle has two advantages 
compared with leveling through the IP beta function: 
namely (1) it offers the possibility to actually increase the 
average luminosity and (2) it is operationally simpler. In 
particular, as indicated above, leveling with the crossing 
angle is a natural option for the so-called early separation 
schemes and for crab cavities.  
Two leveling strategies can be identified – an original 
one which is keeping the luminosity constant and another 
one where the beam-beam tune shift is held constant 
during the store. The first scheme has been discussed over 
the last couple of years. If the luminosity is held constant 
by changing the crossing angle, the tune shift increases 
during the store. This is the motivation for the second 
scheme, which is newly proposed in this paper. 
Table 2 compiles analytical formulae for the luminosity 
time evolution, the optimum run time, and the time-
averaged luminosity, without leveling and with either of 
the two aforementioned leveling schemes. It is interesting 
to notice that the second leveling scheme, which 
maintains a constant beam-beam tune shift during the 
store leads to an exponential decay of both beam current 
and of luminosity, with an identical time constant (!), and 
not with a factor 2 shorter decay constant for the 
luminosity as one would expect without leveling, and 
neither with a factor 1.54 difference as in (6).  
Figure 15 presents example time evolutions of 
luminosity and beam-beam tune shift for the scenario 
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called phase 2+ (the seventh column in Table 1) without 
any leveling and with either of the two leveling schemes. 
For the same scenario, Table 3 illustrates the merit of 
leveling in numbers, considering different values of initial 
luminosity and initial beam-beam tune shift, varied via 
the initial crossing angle. Comparing the second and the 
fifth column, leveling here increases the run time by 50% 
and at the same time it raises the average luminosity by 
some 15%, both of which is desirable. Table  4 shows a 
similar comparison for the LPA scenario with 50 ns 
bunch spacing. Comparing the second and fourth 
columns, leveling increases the optimum run time by a 
factor of more than 3, from 7 to 23 h, and it reduces the 
peak pile up from about 280 to 170 events per crossing, at 
the expense of a 20% loss in luminosity. Other leveling 
choices are possible. For example, in the third column, 
the average luminosity is almost the same as without 
leveling, while the peak pile up is still reduced to about 
170, but the run time is only 6 h in this case. 
 
Table 2: Analytical expressions for the time evolution of 
luminosity and beam current, for the optimum run time, 
and for the average luminosity, with and without leveling, 
and considering two different leveling schemes.  
 
 
Figure 15: Example evolution of luminosity [left] and 
beam-beam tune shift [right] without leveling (red), 
leveling with constant luminosity (light blue), and with 
constant beam-beam tune shift (dark blue), considering a 









Table 3: Example parameters without and with leveling 
for the scenario “phase 2+”. 
 
 
Table 4: Example parameters without and with leveling 
for the scenario of the 50-ns LPA scheme. 
 
IMPACT OF TURNAROUND TIME 
Figure 16 illustrates the impact of the turnaround time 
on the average luminosity, for several scenarios spanning 
the available parameter range. Reducing the turnaround 
time Tta from 10 to 2 h increases the average luminosity 
<L> by about a factor of 2, almost independently of the 
scenario. Overall the values of the average luminosity are 
rather similar for all 3 scenarios. 
 
Figure 16: Dependence of the average luminosity on the 
turnaround time, for different values of β*, Nb, and bunch 
spacing, and without (solid lines) or with luminosity 
leveling (dashed). The “leveling” scheme assumed here 
results in a constant beam-beam tune shift. 
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IMPACT OF BETA-STAR & INTENSITY 
Figure 17 is the key plot of this paper. It illustrates the 
variation of the average luminosity with β* and with the 
beam intensity, considering several upgrade scenarios. 
Evidently the beam intensity is much more important than 
β*. Reducing β* only raises the luminosity significantly  
if it is accompanied either by crab cavities [21] or by a 
smaller emittance [43]. The latter two measures have an 
identical effect on the average luminosity [43]. 
Figure 18 presents the transverse emittance needed to 
trace the curve for the reduced emittance scheme in Fig. 
17. The emittance for the low-emittance scheme is 
determined so that the total tune shift does not exceed 
0.01, while the long-range beam-beam separation is held 
constant equal to 10σ. 
 
Figure 17: Average luminosity as a function of β* for the 
nominal LHC and various upgrade scenarios with 25-ns 
and (one with) 50-ns bunch spacing, keeping the total 
beam-beam tune shift below or equal 0.01, and a long-
range beam-beam separation of at least 8-10σ. An 
average turnaround time of 5 h is assumed. 
 
Figure 18: Emittance as a function of β* for the reduced 
emittance scenario included in Fig. 17. For β* values 
above 14 cm the emittance is adjusted so as to yield a 
constant beam-beam tune shift of 0.01. On the left side of 
the picture, for β* values below 14 cm, it is assumed that 
the normalized rms emittance cannot be made smaller 
than 1 μm (3.75 μm being the nominal value). The long-
range separation is held constant, equal to 10σ. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several upgrade scenarios are being proposed, with 
either 25 or 50-ns bunch spacing. For the parameter sets 
presented here, annual luminosities of up to 150-300 fb-1 
could be expected, assuming a realistic run duration (200 
days) and machine availability (60%).   
Separate cryoplants for the IRs in LHC points 1, 5 and 
4 are required for any LHC operation beyond the ultimate 
luminosity. The cooling capacity for the arc beam screen 
then limits the maximum bunch intensity to about Nb 
~2.3x1011 at 25-ns bunch spacing, and to about 5.0x1011 
for 50-ns spacing.  
Reducing the turnaround time from 10 to 2 h increases 
the average luminosity by about a factor of 2 in many of 
the scenarios. Reducing β* by a factor 2 increases the 
average luminosity only by 10-20% unless the β* 
reduction is accompanied by crab cavities or by a smaller 
transverse emittance. Increasing the bunch intensity from 
nominal to ultimate and to the limit set by the cooling 
loops is the most efficient way to increase the average 
luminosity. A factor 2 increase in the bunch population Nb 
translates into 3 times higher average luminosity!  Crab 
crossing increases the average luminosity by between 10 
and 100%, depending on β* and bunch intensity.  
Crab cavities would also allow for easy luminosity 
leveling and greatly expand the operational flexibility. 
Leveling with the (effective) crossing angle can increase 
the physics run time by a factor 1.5-3, and in addition 
reduce pile up by 30-40%, at constant average luminosity, 
or alternatively raise the average luminosity by  ~15%.  
The present approach to luminosity optimization 
assumes collisions in two interaction points, ATLAS and 
CMS, though collisions for LHCb (or ALICE) could be 
provided in an almost transparent manner for the 50-ns 
scenario, through the addition of lower-intensity satellite 
bunches. An official policy or guideline for ALICE and 
LHCb running at the time of the “Super-LHC” would be 
desirable.  
Future research should focus on understanding and 
mitigating other bunch-intensity limits, on minimizing the 
turnaround time, and on a new interaction-region design 
with (much) smaller β* together with crab cavities and/or 
smaller-emittance beams.  
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IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHER INTENSITIES IN THE LHC 
R.W. Aβmann, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
Various upgrade programs are being studied at CERN 
for improving the performance of the injector complex 
and LHC. The final goal is to increase the beam intensity, 
which is injected into the LHC. In the context of an 
overall optimized upgrade plan, the implications of higher 
intensity for the LHC have been reviewed. A simple 
formula has been derived for the limitation of LHC 
luminosity from robustness constraints of the accelerator.  
INTRODUCTION 
The LHC has two sets of design parameters [1]:  
1. Nominal design: The so-called “nominal” 
design lists machine parameters that will provide 
nominal luminosity of 1034 cm-2 s-1 at 7 TeV. A 
total beam intensity of 3.2×1014 protons is stored 
in each beam. The bunch intensity and the 
resulting beam-beam tune shift are compatible 
with collisions in all 4 interaction points and 
with beam-beam limitations observed in previous 
colliders. 
2. Ultimate design: The so-called “ultimate” 
design assumes that beam collisions are only 
occurring in the two main interaction points of 
ATLAS and CMS. The bunch intensity can then 
be increased by 50% while keeping the same 
total beam-beam footprint. Peak luminosity is 
increased by less than a factor 2. 
All technical systems of the LHC had the design goal to 
be compatible with ultimate beam intensity. For many 
LHC systems this was achieved, some others must be 
pushed to their technological limits for ultimate intensity 
and a few systems require completion or upgrades for 
even allowing nominal intensity. This report gives a first 
overview on known issues and work to be done. 
EVOLUTION OF LHC DESIGN GOALS 
In the context of this report it is interesting to review 
the evolution of LHC design parameters. The luminosity 
L can be written as follows: 
 
L = 1
4π⋅ mpc 2 ⋅
frev ⋅ N p ⋅ F
β* ⋅ ε n ⋅ Estored    (1) 
 
Estored = Np⋅ Nb⋅ Eb(GeV)⋅ 1.6022×10
−10 J   (2) 
 
Here, Eb is the beam energy in GeV and Nb are the 
number of bunches. Luminosity is determined by the 
following terms: 
1. A constant factor including the rest mass mp of 
the proton and the light velocity c.  
2. The revolution frequency frev, which is a direct 
consequence from the length of the old LEP 
tunnel used for LHC. 
3. A factor Np F that is determined by beam-beam 
considerations. Np is the number of protons per 
bunch and its maximum value is given by the 
beam-beam limits. The factor F gives the 
luminosity reduction factor due to the crossing 
angles that are required with more than 156 
bunches. 
4. The normalized transverse emittance εn is given 
by the injector complex but is also constrained 
by robustness limits of accelerator components. 
Here we assume round emittances. 
5. The beta function β* at the interaction point is 
fixed by IR optics limits and, in particular, the 
available triplet aperture. 
6. The term Estored described the energy that is 
carried by the beam of protons. It is defined in 
Eq. 2 and depends on the total beam intensity 
and the beam energy. 
Two important insights should be noted from Eq. 1. 
First, it is seen the LHC requires much higher stored 
energy for achieving the same luminosity as previous 
colliders. The revolution frequency is much lower than in 
other colliders, as the circumference is much larger 
(protons travelling at light velocity). Second, it is seen 
that LHC luminosity is most conveniently pushed in the 
design phase by increasing the design stored energy. 
Stored Energy 
The maximum stored energy in a collider has no 
commonly accepted “hard” limits. Limits depend on so-
called “soft” limits like RF transients, assumed beam 
lifetimes, collimation efficiency, vacuum instabilities etc. 
The LHC performance was therefore optimized over the 
years by increasing stored energy per beam.  
The evolution of LHC peak luminosity is illustrated in 
Fig. 1 while the according stored energy per beam is 
shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the LHC aims at 
extending the stored energy records by 2-3 orders of 
magnitudes. The LHC will enter into new territory at less 
than 1% of its nominal beam intensity. 
Extremely high stored beam energies are challenging in 
a number of areas: The RF system must handle large 
transients, beam dumps must be extremely robust and 
reliable, collimation must intercept stray protons with 
efficiencies in excess of 99.99% to prevent magnet 
quenches, radiation protection must handle long tunnel 
sections with high activation, … The transport of high 
stored energy through the 56 mm aperture of super-
conducting magnets (quench limits of 5-30 mJ/cm3) is 
illustrated in Fig. 3. Known issues will be listed in a later 
section with more details. 
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 Figure 1: Evolution of the goal peak luminosity (red) for 
LHC versus time and operational goals (blue). 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the goal stored energy (red) for LHC 
versus time and operational goals (blue). The present world 
record in super-conducting proton colliders is at 2-3 MJ. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the challenge to transport very high 
stored energy through small aperture super-conducting 
magnets with low quench limits. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the goal energy density (red) for 
LHC versus time and operational goals (blue). The damage 
limit for a copper block is about 50 kJ/mm2 and for a fiber-
reinforced carbon block of the collimators about 5 MJ/mm2. 
 
Energy density 
The LHC does not only operate in a regime of high 
stored energy but the energy is also concentrated in a 
small transverse cross-section. The energy density ρE can 
be written as: 
ρE = γ 2⋅ Np
tot
εn ⋅ C       with     C =
mpc
2
π βxβy  (3) 
 
Here, γ is the relativistic Lorentz factor of the protons 
(given by beam energy), Nptot is the total number of 
protons per beam and βx,y are the beta functions at a given 
location. 
For a given location, the energy density increases 
linearly with beam intensity and by square with proton 
beam energy. It also depends inversely on the normalized 
beam emittance. The evolution of energy density for the 
LHC is shown in Fig. 4. 
The damage potential of a charged beam depends to a 
large extent on its power density. Damage limits of a few 
important accelerator materials have been studied in 
experiment and theory. The following damage limits have 
been derived: 
1. Copper block:  50 kJ/mm2 
2. CFC collimator block: 5 MJ/mm2 
The CFC acronym stands for fiber-reinforced carbon. 
This is a highly robust material that has been used for 
primary and secondary collimators in the LHC.  
Survival of the LHC machine elements has been 
established for the specified failure modes of operation. 
For example, the primary and secondary collimators can 
survive an asynchronous beam dump without damage at 
up to 7 TeV, for ultimate beam intensity and for nominal 
emittance. The robustness of the LHC collimator has been 
verified with beam tests of up to 2 MJ/mm2, which is the 
maximum intensity available for such tests at CERN. 
In another example, the LHC beam dump has been 
designed to survive at 7 TeV the extracted ultimate beam 
with nominal emittance. 
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 Figure 5: Possibilities at 7 TeV to achieve different 
luminosities while respecting the robustness limit defined in 
this report (simplified model).  
 
Robustness and Luminosity Limits 
A few simplifying assumptions are being made for 
deriving some practical formulae: 
1. Bunches are spaced equidistantly. 
2. The damage potential for beam dump, protection 
and collimators is limited by total beam intensity. 
E.g. over a 50 ns window the damage potential 
of 1 bunch with 3.4×1011 protons is the same as 
that of two bunches with each 1.7×1011 protons, 
separated by 25 ns. This might be slightly 
optimistic and holds true only up to a bunch 
population of about 5×1011 protons. 
Under these assumptions, the LHC machine can be 
considered sufficiently robust as long as the following 




20  m-1                   (4) 
 
Here, Nb is the number of bunches per beam. It is seen 
that the ratio of total stored intensity over normalized 
beam emittance must be constrained. Therefore, at the 
robustness limit a reduction of normalized emittance must 
be compensated by an according reduction in beam 
intensity. The gain in luminosity due to smaller emittance 
is then at least cancelled. 
We can easily derive the luminosity limit from the 




γ ⋅ f rev ⋅ N p ⋅ F
β* ⋅ 1.3×10
20  m−1    (5) 
 
Evaluating the given factors in this equation and 
approximating F=1 we obtain a simple luminosity limit 
due to the robustness of LHC protection, collimation and 
dump systems: 
 
L ≤1.2 ×1021 cm−1 ⋅ γ⋅ Npβ*                  (6) 
 
At 7 TeV (γ = 7461) this translates into the following 
straight-forward luminosity limitation: 
 
L ≤ 8.7 ⋅ 1024  s-1 cm−1 ⋅ N pβ*              (7) 
 
It is seen that any luminosity upgrade must involve one 
or several of the following measures: 
1. Increase the number of protons per bunch (Np) 
while keeping the total bunch intensity constant. 
2. Decrease the value of the beta function at the 
interaction point (β*). 
3. Improve robustness of the collimation, beam 
dump and protection elements. 
The simple relationship in Eq. 7 is shown in Fig. 5 for 
different target luminosities. Note that the geometric 
factor F is assumed to be one in this evaluation and the 
predicted performance is too high by about 50%. 
However, the derived formulae allow correctly 
constraining and optimizing luminosity upgrades for the 
LHC. 
OVERVIEW INTENSITY LIMITATIONS 
Before listing the detailed issues that were identified in 
the various systems, we show in Fig. 6  a summary graph 
on various limitations and possible working points for 
number of bunches and bunch charge. It can be seen that a 
number of issues must be addressed before the LHC 
would be ready for a luminosity upgrade with 2808 
bunches and 2.3×1011 protons per bunch at 7 TeV. In order 
of urgency (first listing the solutions for the lowest 
intensity limits) the following LHC work should be 
envisaged: 
1. Complete the LHC collimation system with the 
installation of phase 2. 
2. Install 3 new cryo plants in the IR’s, 
complementing the existing 8 plants. 
3. Design and implement major LHC changes on 
the RF system and the vacuum system. Change 
protection and collimator design to increase 
robustness against beam impact. Implement 
required improvements for radiation protection. 
After completion of these steps it is expected that the 
final limits be reached, namely the cryo limits in the main 
magnets. These limits come from the beam screen cooling 
loop and can only be overcome after changing all 
magnets. Such a major rebuild is not considered here and 
we therefore stick to the final limit as coming from the 
beam screen cooling loops. Fig. 6 also shows the 
possibilities with a lower number of bunches and 
increased bunch intensity. 
Next we go through a number of sub-systems and list 
the issues that were identified with system experts.  
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Figure 6: Overview of various bunch intensity limitations in the LHC, evaluated versus number of bunches stored. To 
move above a particular curve, the quoted work must be done (for example phase 2 of collimation must be installed to 
reach more than 5×1010 protons per bunch in 2808 bunches). The dashed lines indicate the maximum bunch intensities 
available from various injector upgrade scenarios. Nominal and ultimate beam parameters are indicated, as well as two 
upgrade proposals presented at Chamonix 2010 [2]. It is noted that this summary shows an optimistic case and refers to 
the ideal machine without imperfections. Realistically, limitations can occur much earlier (up to a factor 10 below than 
shown here). It s also noted that the bunch intensity from the injectors will be lower due to unavoidable beam losses. 
 
ISSUES SYSTEM BY SYSTEM 
Experts were contacted for various hardware systems of 
the LHC and issues were collected. At this stage, this can 
only be a superficial overview of issues that need to be 
addressed with detailed technical work. 
RF System 
The following issues were identified with the help of 
Joachim Tuckmantel: 
1. Handling of transients, e.g. at the edge of the 
abort gap. To go beyond ultimate intensities one 
must increase the available RF power in the 
cavity.  
2. This requires new transmitters and might imply 
civil engineering in IR4. 
3. The power capability of the higher-order mode 
coupler must be assessed for higher intensity. 
4. Already planned upgrades and additional 
installations (as the 200 MHz capture system or 
the 800 MHz HH) are not foreseen for higher 
currents than ultimate. 
It is concluded that currents higher than ultimate will 
require substantial work on the LHC RF systems 
including transmitters, couplers, cavities and space. 
Vacuum System 
The following issues were identified with the help of 
Miguel Jimenez and Frank Zimmermann: 
1. Fast pressure transients can lead to the closure of 
the sector valves during setup of collimators. 
Improvements are required. 
2. Thermal induced desorption must be evaluated 
for higher intensities. 
3. The lifetime of the bake-out material in highly 
radioactive zones might become unacceptably 
low and could need new and more resistant 
bakeout equipment. 
4. The electron cloud heat load will increase with 
higher bunch intensities and low secondary 
emission yields are mandatory. 
LHC Cryogenic System 
The following issues were identified with the help of 
Laurent Tavian and Serge Claudet: 
1. Above ultimate intensity a total of three 
additional cryoplants are required in IR1, IR4 
and IR5. These must be added to the 8 existing 
cryo-plants. 
2. The limitations in the beam screen cooling loops 
are somewhat fundamental if we assume that a 
replacement of all magnets is not part of a future 
upgrade. The limitations must be taken into 
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account and be addressed. A limit at 2.3×1011 
protons per bunch was quoted for 7 TeV. 
LHC Magnets 
The following issues were identified with the help of 
Lucio Rossi: 
1. The magnet system has been designed to 
withstand ultimate intensity with 25 ns spaced 
bunches. Risks are in the limited quench margins 
at high energy. 
2. Limitations in the IR triplets exist and must be 
addressed [3]. 
3. Special magnets might be more critical than the 
main magnets. Critical could be the corrector 
magnets that are potted. 
4. The DSL (super-conducting link cable in 3-4) is 
not far from the quench limit. 
5. Radiation damage to magnets might become a 
limit. 
LHC Injection and Dump Protection 
The following issues were identified with the help of 
Brennan Goddard: 
1. The SPS extraction protection devices TPSG4/6 
are just below their damage limit for ultimate 
intensity. Any upgrade is difficult due to 
constraints in longitudinal space. 
2. The transfer line collimators TCDI, the TDI and 
the injection ring collimator TCLI are at their 
damage limits for ultimate intensity (the MSI 
mask temperature reaches over 990 degree C). 
Devices and concepts require redesign work. 
3. The septum protection element TCDS will 
deform plastically above ultimate intensity. 
4. The dump protection TCDQ requires an upgrade 
even for nominal intensity and will afterwards be 
suitable for up to ultimate intensity. Anything 
beyond requires a redesign and LHC layout 
changes. 
5. The dump blocks TDE are OK up to ultimate 
intensity. Beyond this an upgrade of the dilution 
kicker system is required. Conceptually this can 
be achieved by installing more MKB tanks to 
increase frequency and sweep length. However, 
no technical feasibility or integration study has 
so far been performed. 
6. Any upgrade with super-bunches is strongly 
advised against. 
7. The VDWB and BTVDD devices require study 
before concluding on maximum intensity reach. 
It was concluded that there are lots of potential issues 
with the various protection devices. Most are already at 
their technological limits. Probably one needs to start 
working on “disposable” or “sacrificial” absorbers and/or 
significant layout changes. 
LHC Collimation System 
The following issues were identified [4]: 
1. The phase 1 primary and secondary collimators 
are robust for ultimate intensity. Beyond ultimate 
any abnormal dump is expected to induce 
damage due to thermo-mechanical shock waves. 
2. Damage effects can later be tested in the 
HiRadMat beam test facility and then more 
accurate estimates can be given. In case 
collimators are not robust enough for higher than 
ultimate intensity, 38 collimators must be 
redesigned and replaced. 
3. Radiation damage to collimators and surrounding 
equipment will be more severe. 
4. Collimation efficiency is presently expected to 
be limited at 5-40% of nominal intensity. The 
new limit after installation of collimation phase 2 
will need to be established, also from operational 
experience. 
5. The collimators induce high resistive impedance, 
which will become worse for higher beam 
intensity. The presently expected intensity limit 
is at 40% of nominal intensity. Once overcome 
with transverse feedback, phase II collimators 
and high chromaticity, a new limit must be 
established, also from operational experience. 
LHC Radiation Protection 
The following issues were identified with the help of 
Stefan Roesler: 
1. Dose rates for intensities, which are 10 times 
higher than nominal, can reach 200 mSv/h in 
collimation regions and 20 mSv/h in low-beta 
insertions. Large fractions of the machine will 
then become high radiation areas or even 
prohibited areas. 
2. Remote handling becomes mandatory. Fast 
accesses are difficult or impossible. High 
reliability of equipment is essential. 
3. Additional service galleries could be required. 
4. Additional measures for for air treatment and the 
ventilation system will be required. This includes 
installation of absolute filters and modifications 
or replacements of ventilation systems. 
5. The shielding of accessible underground areas 
might need to be strengthened to protect 
personnel from normal losses (e.g. pp collisions) 
as well as accidental beam losses. Examples are 
the LHCb counting rooms between UX85A and 
UX85B. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ultimate intensity is already challenging for the 
LHC. Many systems are at their technological limits with 
little or no margin. However, on the good side, there is 
presently no show-stopper for increasing LHC beam 
intensity.  
A long (and incomplete) list of work was collected. 
This work would prepare the LHC for increased 
performance. The far goal would be to increase bunch 
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intensity from 1.7×1011 protons to 2.3×1011 protons per 
bunch.  
Finally, a few practical formulae were given for 
describing the achievable performance with the present 
damage limits of the accelerator. 
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CRAB CAVITIES
R. Calaga, R. De-Maria (BNL), E. Metral, Y. Sun, R. Toma´s, F. Zimmermann (CERN)
Abstract
With lower betas at collision points or longer bunches,
luminosity loss due to the crossing angle becomes impor-
tant. Crab cavities could minimize the loss. The scenar-
ios for a crab crossing implementation in the LHC, the
expected performance gain, hardware implications, R&D
plan is presented. Some aspects related to machine pro-
tection, collimation, aperture constraints, impedance, noise
effects to ensure safe beam operation with crab cavities are
also addressed.
INTRODUCTION
Operating at the beam-beam limit, the luminosity up-
grade of the LHC is foreseen to follow two main paths:
• Lattice modification: Simultaneous reduction of β ∗
at the collision point and the Piwinski angle via crab
crossing [1].
• Beam current: Significant increase in bunch intensi-
ties beyond the nominal intensities (x1.5-5) [3] or/and
a reduction of beam emittances (x2 or smaller).
Although, significant challenges confront both path, the
final upgrade is likely to exploit a combination of the two.
Table 1 shows some relevant parameters for the nominal




































Figure 1: Concept of crab crossing scheme using RF cavi-
ties to maximize the bunch overlap at the collision points.
The reduction of β∗ below nominal is attractive and tech-
nically feasible but the presence of the parasitic interac-
tions requires a proportional increase of the crossing an-
gle. Therefore, the full potential of a β ∗ reduction can only
be realized by recovering the geometric loss of the cross-
ing angle either via crab compensation scheme or an early
Table 1: Some relevant parameters for the LHC nominal
and upgrade lattices.
Unit Nominal Upgrade
Energy [TeV] 3-7 7
P/Bunch [1011] 1.15 1.7
Bunch Spacing [ns] 50-25 25
n (x,y) [μm] 3.75 1.0-3.75
σz (rms) [cm] 7.55 7.55
IP1,5 β∗ [m] 0.55 0.14-0.25
Betatron Tunes - {64.31, 59.32}
Piwinski Angle θcσz(2σ∗) 0.64 0.75
BB Parameter, ξ per/ip 0.003 0.005
X-Angle: θc [mrad] 0.3 0.5
Main RF [MHz] 0.4 0.4
Crab RF [GHz] 0.4 0.4
Peak luminosity [1034 cm−2s−1] 1.0 3-5
separation scheme [4]. In addition, the crab cavities offer
a natural luminosity leveling knob to maximize the inte-




































Figure 2: Peak luminosity gain as a function of β ∗. The
effect of the constant separation for parasitic interactions is
taken into account.
The luminosities independent of an intensity upgrade are
listed in Table 2 for different operational scenarios of the
LHC. The cavity voltage required for each scenario can be




2cE0 tan (θc/2) sin (μx/2)
ωRF
√
βcrabβ∗ cos (ψxcc→ip − μx/2)
(1)
where E0 is the beam energy, ωRF is the RF frequency of
the cavity, βcrab and β∗ are the beta-functions at the cavity
and the IP respectively, ψxcc→ip is the phase advance from
the cavity to the IP and μx is the betatron tune. A voltage
of ∼5 MV (single cavity) will suffice with a βcrab of 3-5
km and a local scheme with optimum phase advance.
Table 2: Operational scenarios for different β ∗ and colli-
sion energies in the LHC. The required cavity voltage de-
pends on the final optics and placement of the crab cavities
with respect to the IP. The integrated luminosity assumes
a run time of 10 hr/store, turn-around-time of 5 hrs and a
total run time of 220 days.
β∗ [m] θc [μrad] Eb [TeV] L/L0 [%] Int L/yr
0.25 439 7.0 63% 22%
0.30 401 7.0 40% 19%
0.55 296 7.0 10% NE
10.0 273 0.45 0.12% NE
LHC BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
Superconducting RF is the technology choice to reach
required high transverse kick voltages. Although the exact
cavity voltage depends on the final optics of the upgrade, a
typical kick gradient of ∼5 MV is required for some sce-
narios. This gradient corresponds to a factor of 8 (or 20)
in surface electric (or magnetic) fields in a conventional el-
liptical cavity [8]. Due to physical dimensions and tech-
nological constraints, higher frequencies (0.5-1.5 GHz) are
generally preferred.
The LHC poses two main boundary conditions for the
implementation of crab crossing:
• Long bunches of 7.55 cm (1σz) which confines the
maximum RF frequency to 800 MHz. The effect of
800 MHz RF curvature is depicted in Fig. 3 which
translates to reduction in luminosity compared to lin-
ear kick. Therefore, lower frequencies are preferred
(for example: 400 MHz).
• Beam-to-beam separation of 194 mm along the 27 km
with a few exceptions like the IR4 region.
A conventional elliptical cavity at 800 MHz radially
measures at ∼250 mm making it incompatible in most of
the ring. Therefore, a new design with a compact footprint
is essential (see Table 3).
POSSIBLE SCHEMES
Three crab crossing schemes can be conceived for the
LHC considering only the high luminosity interaction
points.
Figure 3: Imperfect overlap of crabbed bunches at the col-
lision point due to curvature of an 800 MHz RF cavity
(graphic courtesy K. Ohmi).
• A global scheme with a minimum of one cavity per
beam placed in IR4 dogleg region. The IR4 re-
gion has the advantage of larger beam-to-beam sep-
aration (see Table 3) than the rest of the ring allow-
ing room for conventional technology [2]. However,
this scheme poses extreme constraints on the possible
phase advance between IP1 and IP5 and on the cross-
ing scheme.
• A less constrained global scheme can be implemented
with two cavities per beam. However, an additional
dog-leg in another straight section is required.
• A flexible option without phase advance and crossing
angle constraints can easily be implemented via lo-
cal scheme at each IP. This requires new crab cavity
concepts to fit within the IR region constraints (see
Table 3).
Table 3: Aperture specifications for the IR4 dog-leg region
for the global scheme and IR1 and IR5 high luminosity re-
gions for a local scheme.
Magnet Aper-H B1-B2 Outer, R L
[mm] sep [mm] [mm] [m]
IR
4
D3 69 420 395 9.45
Crabs 84 220-300 195 10




D1 134 - - 10
Crabs 84 194 150 10
D2 69 - - 10
IMPEDANCE & RF TECHNOLOGY
The LHC impedance is dominated by the numerous col-
limators [6] but additional impedance (both narrow band
and broadband) from sources like crab cavities need to
be minimized. Tolerances can be set by estimating the
impedance requirements from Refs. [7, ?]. HOM damping
is defined by the 200 MHz RF system at 450 GeV to 60 kΩ.
This is reduced to 10 kΩ for upgrade intensities (1.7×1011
p/bunch). It is estimated that single and coupled-bunch
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Table 4: Frequencies, R/Q’s and HOM damping require-
ments for the two-cell elliptical cavity based on impedance
tolerances.
Mode Type Frequency R/Q Qext
[GHz] [Ω]
Monopole 0.54 35.2 ∼10-1000.69 194.5





longitudinal modes above 2 GHz will be Landau-damped
due to the frequency spread of synchrotron oscillations. In
the transverse plane the impedance threshold is given as
2.5 MΩ/m by the damping time of 60 ms at 450 GeV for
nominal intensity. For upgrade intensities this is reduced to
0.8 MΩ/m. An additional factor of β/〈β〉 is needed to ac-
count for the local β-funtion. The natural frequency spread,
chromaticity, bunch-by-bunch transverse damper and Lan-
dau octupoles should also damp potentially unstable modes
above 2 GHz.
A two-cell elliptical cavity at 800 MHz was developed
as a baseline structure. The nominal voltage for the two-
cell cavity was set at 2.5 MV to allow for additional mar-
gin on peak surface fields. Due to tight tolerances on nar-
row band impedances, the cavity modes need to strongly
damped (see Table 4). Therefore, special coupler designs
targeted at specific modes were developed (see Fig. 4) [9].
Alternative damping designs were also developed for the
two-cell design to meet the damping specifications [10, 11].
Figure 4: Schematic of the two cell elliptical LHC crab
cavity [9] and cryostat [2].
A conceptual design of the cryostat was also developed
for the two-cell baseline cavity-coupler to satisfy the IR4
beam line configuration (see Fig. 4. A modular structure
was adapted for additional cavities if needed. The helium
box contains interconnection ports for the second cavity.
A service port is suggested for the He inlet/outlet ports as
well as for the RF couplers (main, LOM and SOM). The
outer diameter is constrained by the limited space between
Helium vessel and cryogenic line. A design of the main
power coupler which is nominally oriented in the horizon-
tal plane requires a vertical output due to beam line config-
uration. The horizontal length of the coupler is limited to
∼150 mm. A possible solution is a T-connection similar to
the KEK Tristan-type ERL coupler [12].
COMPACT CAVITIES
As a crab scheme local to the collision points offer the
most flexibility in optics and crossing scheme, deflecting
structures with a compact footprint (see Fig. 5) are re-
quired.
Figure 5: Schematic of the beam pipe separation in the
LHC beam lines.
The effort to compress the cavity footprint recently re-
sulted in several TEM type deflecting mode geometries.
Apart from being significantly smaller than its elliptical
counterpart, the deflecting mode is the primary mode thus
giving paving way to a new class of cavities at lower fre-
quencies (400 MHz) which is preferred from the RF curva-
ture point of view (see Fig. 6).
Figure 6: Top left: Half wave double rod cavity [13]. Top
right: Half wave single rod cavity [14]. Bottom left: Dou-
ble rod loaded cavity [10]. Bottom right: Rotated pill-box
Kota cavity [11].
The ratio of the kick gradient to the peak surface fields
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for some designs are lower by a factor of 2 or more than
the elliptical counterpart. Therefore, one may theoretically
expect a kick voltage also larger by a factor of 2, assuming
the surface field limitations are similar to elliptical cavities.
These cavities also have the added advantage of large sepa-
ration in frequency between the deflecting mode and other
higher order modes. Therefore, HOM damping becomes
simpler. Nevertheless, the coupler concepts developed for
the elliptical design are being adapted to achieve the sim-
ilar level of damping in the compact cavities. Prototypes




Due to the immense stored energy in the LHC beams at
7 TeV (350 MJ), protection of the accelerator and related
components is critical. For example, at nominal intensity
and 7 TeV, 5% of a single bunch is beyond the damage
threshold of the superconducting magnets [15]. Approxi-
mately, 200 interlocks with varying time constants ensure
a safe transport of the beam from the SPS to the LHC and
maintain safe circulating beams in the LHC. A worst case
scenario for detecting an abnormal beam condition is 40 μs
( 12 a turn), and the corresponding response time to safely
extract the beams is about 3 turns (see Fig. 7).
Figure 7: Sequence of a failure detection and full beam
extraction [?].
Crab cavity failures can abruptly change particle trajec-
tories and induce unwanted beam losses. Some failure sce-
narios are:
• Single turn failures caused due to sudden cavity
quench, power amplifier trips, abrupt RF phase
changes and other potential causes.
• Slow failures caused by vacuum degradation, IR cav-
ity to cavity voltage and phase drifts and others.
Any crab cavity related failure must fall under the shadow
of the 3-turn extraction time. The high Qext could favor
a slow voltage ramp down, but the voltage slope can be
strongly driven by the beam. Therefore, active feedback
is essential to guarantee machine protection [18]. Detailed
tracking studies are needed to confirm the local and global
loss maps in case of abnormal failure scenarios.
Collimation efficiency is a serious concern for LHC
beams. The impact on collimation with the existing colli-
mators setup in IR3 and IR7 is minimal for a local scheme.
For a global scheme, studies were carried out with a sin-
gle crab cavity placed in the IR4 region to achieve head-on
collisions at IP5 [17]. As a non-adiabatic increase in crab
cavity kick results in emittance growth, the cavity voltage
is ramped over 1000 turns after which the collimators are
input in the tracking simulations. Results show no observ-
able difference in the loss maps between nominal LHC and
that with global crab cavities (see Fig. 8).
With Crabs Global Crabs
Figure 8: Loss maps around the LHC ring (left) for the
nominal LHC and nominal LHC with a global crab scheme
(right).
The impact parameters (physical distance to the edge of
a collimator) are listed in Table 5 for the globally crabbed
beam and compared to the nominal LHC case. A typical
value of 1-2μm is used for nominal beam (on-momentum
particle) based on diffusion studies. The impact parameters
for the crabbed beam in the 1st turn are about a factor of 5
higher. However, for off-momentum particles, the impact
parameters are similar to the nominal case and hence the
effective cleaning inefficiency remains similar.
Table 5: Impact parameters and particles absorbed on
the primary collimator TCP.C6L7.B1 at IR7 with on-
momentum (top) and off-momentum (bottom) from track-
ing 5×106 particles.
Nominal Crab Cavity
2σz 3σz 2σz 3σz
1st turn [μm] 0.78 0.78 3.84 3.84
All turns [μm] 0.153 0.154 0.147 0.147
Part. absorbed. 70.2% 70.2% 68.5% 68.5%
1st turn [μm] 50.61 59.82 76.16 79.03
All turns [μm] 36.1 40.44 66.47 67.03
Part. absorbed 96.5% 97% 99.56% 99.56%
In addition, the hierarchy of the collimator family needs
to be maintained for efficient cleaning. To properly account
for lattice dispersion and crab dispersion, an effective am-
plitude function is defined as
Az =
√
δ2p + δ2z . (2)
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A phase space cut of all collimators was constructed as a
function of the effective δp (with δz set as 1σz) in the pres-
ence of crab cavities to determine the allowed region for
beam. The constructed phase cut is similar to the one of the
nominal LHC and maintains the hierarchy of the primary,



























Figure 9: Phase space cut of all the collimators in the LHC
with crabbed beams. The hierarchy of the primary (red),
secondary (green) and tertiary (blue) collimators
Dynamic aperture studies were also carried out and no
significant impact was visible. A maximum decrease of 1σ
was calculated for the global crab crossing scheme (nomi-
nal DA 13σ). In addition suppression of synchro-betatron
resonances was clearly visible.
PHASE NOISE & KEK EXPERIMENTS
Measurements at KEK-B show the side bands of the RF
spectrum due to modulated phase noise at frequencies from
50 Hz to 32 kHz. This phase noise leads to dynamic off-
sets at the collision point and related emittance growth with











Noise studies were carried which consisted of scanning the
RF phase noise in the CCs and measure the correspond-
ing beam size blow-up. Figure 10 summarizes the scans on
the two rings (LER and HER) at frequencies close to the
horizontal betatron tunes. The first visible effects occur at
about -60dB for both rings without beam-beam. This cor-
responds to about 0.1◦ RF phase noise. Similar scans were
carried out with the beams in collision and observing the
luminosity in the Belle experiment (see Fig. 10). The lu-
minosity is recorded as a function of RF phase noise while
exciting the LER and HER CCs individually. First visible
effects appear at -70dB, which corresponds to about 0.03 ◦.
This value can be extrapolated to the LHC CC tolerances
as a high ceiling, i.e. the LHC cavity phase noise must be



































































Figure 10: Top: Beam size versus RF phase noise when ex-
citing the LER and HER CCs individually (no beam-beam).
Bottom: Luminosities measured at the BELLE detector as
a function RF phase noise amplitude at two different fre-
quencies in the presence of beam-beam.
Strong-strong beam-beam simulations (3D) were carried
out to study phase noise effects and emittance growth of
colliding beams with a local crab compensation at IP5 in
the LHC (β*=0.25m, θc=0.522 mrad). The simulations
were performed with 2.5 million macro-particles per beam,
a 128×128 transverse grid, and 10 longitudinal slices. with
a 400 MHz local crab scheme. These simulations indi-
cate a tolerance of 0.02στ for 10% emittance growth per
hour, where σ is the transverse offset and τ is the corre-
lation time This is approximately consistent with KEK-B
experiments. Weak-strong simulations with a phase error
at varying frequencies observed from the KEK-B cavities
were performed. For the highest frequencies (32 kHz),
the resulting dynamic offset collisions yield a tolerance of
≤ 0.1σ to control the emittance growth below 10% per
hour. With the low-level RF technology it should be feasi-
ble to meet the tolerances but more simulations are needed
to accurately define the specifications. It should be noted
that the phase noise tolerances will be additionally relaxed
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due to luminosity leveling as the crab voltage maybe small-
est when the beam-beam parameter is at a peak.
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
During regular operation, it is mandatory for the crab
cavities to be invisible during injection and magnetic ramp
cycle. The cavity will be nominally detuned from the reso-
nant frequency to stay invisible to the beam unless when
needed. The high-beta optics and “zero-voltage” in the
crab cavities should additionally minimize any perturba-
tion to the beam. As injection oscillations are inevitable,
a controlled orbit feedback system to keep the beam offsets
small (< 500μm) will be in place. Active feedback to com-
pensate any beam loading with the RF amplifier will also
be mandatory.
At top energy, the cavity is re-tuned and adiabatically
ramped to the maximum voltage to avoid any emittance
growth. If luminosity leveling is required, the cavity volt-
age will be ramped as a function of a pre-determined
run time to optimize integrated luminosity for the experi-
ments. To operate beyond the beam-beam limit, a scheme
with a fully anti-crabbed (2θc) to fully crabbed beam dur-
ing a physics store can be implemented. However, phase
noise issues should be studied to ensure minimal emittance
growth due to such a scheme. In addition the beams must
be fully anti-crabbed before collision bumps are removed.
Some luminosity gain estimates are listed in Table ?? for
an LHC beam with crab cavities.
From an operational view, a vertical by-pass (see Fig. 11)
can minimize a prolonged shutdown and maintenance due
to any failures related to crab cavity infrastructure.
Figure 11: Vertical bypass to raise the crab cavities into
the beam-line with the aid of precision motors. Bellows at
either end will allow for safely removing the cavities out of
the LHC beam-line when not needed.
LHC-CC09 & FUTURE
The 3rd workshop on LHC crab cavities (LHC-CC09)
resulted in a conclusive R&D path towards a future im-
plementation of crab crossing in the LHC. The technical
challenge of crab implementation and open issues related
to hadron beams with crab crossing calls for
• Compact cavities for a local scheme compatible with
LHC constrains
• Possible test in another hadron machine (for example:
SPS) to identify the differences between electrons and
protons.
SPS lends itself as an ideal test bench to study the effects
of crab cavities on hadron beams. Other hadron machines
of interest are the Tevatron and RHIC where tests may not
be extremely relevant for the LHC [21]. A working group
identified several aspects including integration, cryogen-
ics, infrastructure and feasibility of a test in the SPS [22].
No show stoppers were found and the possibility of using
KEK-B crab cavities in the SPS can be realized at the end
of 2012. Fig. 12 shows the optics near the LSS4 region
currently hosting the COLDEX experiment. This region
has a horizontal bypass which where the experiment can
be moved in when needed. Such a setup is ideal for crab
cavity tests if the cryostat can be integrated into the current
spacial configuration. The KEK-B crab cavities can be in-
tegrated with some difficulty but precise civil engineering
details need to be worked out to install and precisely move








































Figure 12: Optics in the LSS4 section near the COLDEX
region which can potentially host the test crab cavities in
the SPS.
Tracking studies have been launched to study various as-
pects of the tests in the SPS. Fig. 13 shows first turn trajec-
tories of 1σz particle as a function of longitudinal position.
Two collimators TCSP.51934 and a proposed test collima-
tor from SLAC are positioned such that one collimator sees
maximum excursion while the other with almost minimum
orbit deviation. This setup can aid in beam halo studies
and impact on the collimator jaws. Although, intra-orbit
deviation can be easily detected via the existing head-tail
monitor which has sub-millimeter resolution. If KEK-B
cavities become available for an SPS test, a retuned cavity
to 511 MHz could be tested with a 100 ns bunch spacing at
55 GeV to perform lifetime studies. Other bunch configu-
rations like 25 and 50 ns can be interesting to test bunch by
bunch variations with crab cavities. An active RF feedback
will be needed during the SPS enery ramp as the dynamic
tuning of the frequency is limited to 1kHz/sec.



























































Figure 13: First turn trajectories of a particle at 1σz near the
LSS4 region. Two collimators placed upstream are with the
right phase advance to see zero and maximum orbit devia-
tion respectively.
Machine protection studies pertinent to the LHC will be
studied to determine different type of interlocks based on
RF (fast) and orbit (slow) measurements. Cavity failure
scenarios such as cavity trips, abrupt RF voltage and phase
changes and related effects on the beam will be studied.
General operational aspects such as adiabatic voltage ramp-
ing, cavity transparency and other issues are also of inter-
est.
If crab crossing is successfully implemented in the LHC,
a future upgrade can potentially increase the crossing angle
to accommodate a common yoke separated coil for the Q 1
focusing magnet followed by a separated focusing channel
as depicted in Fig. 14. A magnetic design for such config-
uration with a large aperture (∼100 mm) and high gradient
already exists. Field coupling between the two apertures
are resolved by two types of quadrant design [23]. This
configuration will alleviate long range beam-beam issues
which is one of the limitations for the upgrade of the LHC.
Considerable flexibility can be realized in IR optics to go
beyond any current limitations. However, this geometry
will require crossing angles of 4-5 mrad making the up-
grade to solely rely on crab crossing. Use of flat beams is
preferred to reduce the geometric loss due to crossing an-
gle.
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LUMINOSITY OPTIMIZATION AND LEVELING
J. P. Koutchouk, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland.
Abstract
The Phase II of the LHC Upgrade is very ambitious 
with an increase by one order of magnitude of the 
machine luminosity. In this regime, the proton burning by 
the luminous collisions becomes overwhelming, causing a 
rapid decay of the beam currents and hence luminosity. 
Simultaneously, the beam-beam forces are maximized by 
the search of high performance. This paper focuses on 
mitigations that should provide the requested high 
performance while minimizing the adverse effects of fast 
proton burning and strong beam-beam forces. One key 
ingredient is a luminosity levelling principle that 
potentially increases the integrated luminosity, contrary to 
the usual method contemplated. To minimize the limiting 
effect of long-range beam-beam collisions, wire 
compensation is shown to be effective and mature for 
implementation.  Finally, possible complementary 
provisions are given.
INTRODUCTION
It was quite natural to start the studies of the LHC 
upgrade by specifying the target peak luminosity (1035
cm-2s-1, i.e. 10 times the nominal one)[1].This quantity is 
indeed a predictable beam dynamics parameter that can 
be optimized in a feasibility study, contrary to the 
integrated luminosity that requires machine operation 
scenarios including a large number of qualitative 
hypotheses. This large increase in LHC luminosity
however qualitatively changes the luminosity decay 
regime: it becomes dominated by the proton burning. For 
the target luminosity, the luminosity lifetime becomes 
comparable to the time it takes to prepare the beams or 
carry out mild repairs that operations usually require. A
mathematical optimization leading to shortening the run 
duration may thus not be very realistic. Another approach 
is luminosity levelling. This topic has been occasionally 
mentioned, e.g. [2] and its actual potential generally 
judged rather controversial. Lately, a new principle has 
been proposed [3] and studied in detail for one of the 
upgrade path [4]. Its increased potential and ease in 
implementation allows re-considering luminosity 
levelling.
While the luminosity decay due to proton burning can 
be easily anticipated, the adverse impact of the strong 
beam-beam effect arising from increased performance 
shall be the ultimate performance limit. It is known after a
large number of simulation studies that the long-range 
beam-beam effect is the performance limit for the 
nominal LHC. A compensation scheme was proposed [5]
in 2000. Since then, a number of studies, numerical and 
experimental, have taken place that can now allow 
conclusions for decision making. Other proposals exist
(electron-lens compensation, fully coupled crossing) that 
are mentioned.
OPERATIONS EFFICIENCY
Before considering sophisticated means for upgrading 
the LHC luminosity, it appears worth considering the 
potential in improving the operations efficiency. This 
approach is indeed systematically pursued to improve the 
integrated luminosity of colliders. At the time of the LHC 
upgrade however, we can speculate that the corresponding 
reserve in performance improvement should have been 
exhausted. 
Indeed, given its expected complexity, the LHC has 
been equipped with outstanding beam instrumentation 
and a variety of powerful linear and non-linear families of 
correction circuits. They already allowed to measure and 
understand the LHC at injection in an exceptionally short 
time as compared to former experience. These 
instruments and correctors have the potential of 
automated feedback on all quantities normally controlled 
during operations (and beyond). Therefore, unless 
qualitatively new and not reproducible beam dynamics 
phenomena occur, a turn-around time reasonably close to 
the minimal one should be at hand, excluding down-time.
Automatic injection and acceleration would not be a new 
unexplored field. Already in the 1980’s the ISR beam was 
automatically injected and accelerated at an intensity level 
about 5 to 10 times above its natural stability level. To
recover stability, automatic injection involved automatic 
periodic measurements of the longitudinal beam 
distribution by Schottky scans, and suitable mathematical 
transformations to compute non-linear corrections from 
quadrupole to dodecapole to stabilize on-line the beams 
by effectively keeping quasi-invariant the transverse 
stability diagram.
We can therefore reasonably assume that the reserve in 
performance improvement arising from better operations 
efficiency at the time of the LHC upgrade should only 
offer a modest contribution compared to the ambitious 
goal of the upgrade.
WHY LUMINOSITY LEVELLING IN 
SLHC?
The luminosity decay in many storage rings is 
dominated by parasitic effects, such as the emittance 
blow-up induced by side-effects of the beam-beam
interactions. With operational experience, the luminosity 
lifetime recovers towards its predictable llvel. sLHC 
enters a new regime where a fast unavoidable luminosity 
decay is due to the proton burning in the luminous 
collisions. For example, table I shows the overwhelming 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
342
predominance of the proton burning in a scenario where 
the peak luminosity of 1035 cm-2s-1 is obtained by 
increasing the bunch charge to 2.3 1011 ppb, reducing the 
?*-function and recovering from the crossing angle loss 
by an early separation scheme.
Table 1: Luminosity decay sources for sLHC peak 
luminosity
Source Time constant [hr]
Proton burning 5.8
Intra-beam scattering 46




Figure 1 shows the luminosity lifetime versus the peak 
luminosity for a range of scenarios where the bunch 
current is modified together with the focusing, the number 
of bunches and the beam emittance. The main point is that 
the luminosity lifetime only weakly depends on the 
details of the scenarios and is reduced to a few hours at a 
peak luminosity of 1035 cm-2s-1. This short lifetime entails 
a large variation over the duration of a run (typically 5) of 
the luminosity and related quantities, e.g. of the peak heat 
deposition in the triplet superconducting coil.
Figure 1: luminosity lifetime and decay factor versus 
peak luminosity
This unusually large luminosity decay and decay factor 
over a run calls for luminosity levelling to optimize the 
data taking and minimize the required “over-design” of 
the detector and machine components, due to this large 
decay factor.
METHODS OF LUMINOSITY 
LEVELLING
In a machine with a crossing angle of significant 
impact, it is necessary to consider simultaneously the 
impact of a luminosity levelling scheme on the 
luminosity, on the head-on beam-tune shift and on the 


























If the crossing angle ?c vanishes, the luminosity 
levelling can only be carried out by varying ?* and the 
beam-beam tune shift is independent of the levelling. This 
simple dependence may be violated close to the hourglass 
limit, where the bunch length ?s becomes of relevance. 
When the crossing angle does not vanish, as is the case of 
the sLHC, three levelling methods may a priori be 
contemplated: levelling via ?*, via the crossing angle ?c
and via the bunch length ?s. The bunch charge Nb and the 
emittance ? evidently do not lend themselves to levelling.
Levelling via ?*
Due to the crossing angle, the head-on beam-beam tune 
shift becomes dependent on ?*. It will increase as ?* is 
increased, i.e. reach a maximum at the beginning of the 
run. At least two strategies of levelling via ?* can be 
contemplated with different impacts on the performance:
Strategy of invariant beam-beam effect
The beam-beam problem remains invariant if all
distances, expressed in local rms beam size, are kept 
constant. To achieve this requirement during levelling, the 
crossing angle ?c has to be reduced during levelling like 
*1 ? . Hence, the head-on beam-beam tune shift
dependence on ?* becomes:
2*11 ?kQbb ???
The constant k depends on the specific scenario. For a 
scenario where the levelling would require initially 
increasing the ?*-function from 25 cm to 50 cm, the 
increase of the head-on beam-beam tune shift could 
require decreasing the bunch charge by a factor 1.4 and 
hence the luminosity by a factor of two. This is the 
maximum loss possible. Its exact value will depend on the 
value of the beam-beam limit effectively observed in the 
LHC. If it is 0.01 as assumed so far, the luminosity loss 
inherent to levelling via ?* would exceed 30%.
Strategy of best use of the physical aperture
If one accepts a variation of the beam-beam problem 
during the levelling (beam-beam tune shift, excitation of 
resonances, detuning terms) towards weaker effects, a
strategy of best use of the triplet aperture can be followed.
The physical beam separation is then kept constant and 
the variation of the head-on tune shift becomes:
*'11 ?kQbb ???
In the same scenario as above, the maximum luminosity 
loss is 50% and, for a beam-beam limit of 0.01, the 
luminosity loss related to the peak bunch charge allowed 
would reach 15%.
In addition, and unrelated to the luminosity losses already 
quoted, one should expect another significant loss on the 
luminosity integral due to the clipping of the luminosity 
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below its peak value. This effect has not yet been 
quantitatively estimated in realistic scenarios.
Implementation of levelling via ?*
The significant advantage of levelling via ?* is the 
absence of specific hardware requirements except 
possibly an increased strength of the separation bump 
correctors to allow the second strategy.
In operation, this method is expected to be challenging, 
due to a large number of optical side effects in addition to 
possible variations of the beam-beam problem. The tunes, 
chromaticities, linear coupling, the closed orbits all 
around the machine, especially the beam overlap at the 
crossing points will change and need corrections or 
feedback of high precision without interruption of the 
data taking.
At the Tevatron, this method was contemplated but never 
implemented: given the observed extreme sensitivity of 
the Tevatron beams to optics changes, only one ?* step 
change could be considered, requiring switching off the 
detectors and separating the beams prior to the ?* step 
change. The overhead of the method and required 
development time was considered not rewarding [2].
Levelling via the crossing angle ?c
The fundamental difference between the levelling via ?c
and the levelling via ?* discussed above stems from the 
different dependencies of the luminosity and beam-beam 
tune shift (Eq. 1). The major difference arises in the initial 
phase of the levelling, where the beam-beam tune shift is 
reduced instead of being increased, just like the 
luminosity is reduced with respect to its peak value 
without levelling. This offers a new degree of freedom 
whereby the bunch charge can be increased above the 
maximum value allowed without luminosity levelling. 
This maximum value is defined by single beam intensity 
limit. In other words, this levelling principle allows 
stocking “spectator” protons that will be gradually put 
into operation as the crossing angle is reduced. This 
method has been carefully analyzed as an important 
application of the Early Separation Scheme [6] [4].
Examples of scenarios are given on figure 2. The duration
of the levelled plateau depends on the choice of the value 
of the levelled luminosity and on the implementation of 
the variable crossing angle. All intermediate scenarios are 
possible. One can note that, at the estimated bunch charge 
limit given by the electron cloud effect, a very large 
luminosity can be sustained during about one shift. A 
qualitative advantage of the scheme is apparent on figure 
2: high intensity beams suffer low beam-beam tune shifts 
and vice-versa. This is likely to decrease the overall 
complexity.
The implementation of the levelling via the crossing angle 
requires new hardware: crab cavities [7] have the largest 
potential and detector compatibility. They rely on active 
systems never implemented so far in hadron machines.
The Early Separation Scheme [4] requires the installation 
Figure 2:  Luminosity levelling scenarios via the crossing 
angle.
of dipoles at the end of the detectors. Their potential is 
slightly less but the technology robust and the system 
passive. Background to the detectors can be minimized 
but cannot not suppressed. The standard crossing bumps 
cannot be used for this type of levelling, as the beam 
separation at long-range interaction points and in a good 
fraction of the matching section would be significantly 
modified. For larger angles, larger aperture magnets 
would be required. Smaller angles would unacceptably 
limit the maximum bunch charge.
This levelling method, contrary to levelling via ?* does 
not exhibit any optical side effect for the beams. The 
length of the luminous region is however initially reduced 
[4].
Levelling via the bunch length ?s
In equation 1, the bunch length and the crossing angle 
have an identical effect if they can be varied in the same 
relative range. Levelling via the bunch length has the 
further advantage of an increase of the length of the 
luminous region. However, while the crossing angle can 
be significantly increased and decreased, the range of 
bunch length variations is very limited due to its weak 
dependency on the RF voltage (power ¼). Lengthening 
the bunch by a factor of 2 brings the acceleration in a 
regime dominated by beam loading [8]. The potential of 
bunch length reduction is negligible or would require an
unreasonable increase of the RF voltage. Nevertheless, 
this method could be seen as a complement at the 
beginning of the levelling, given its ease of 
implementation and absence of identified side-effects.
BEAM-BEAM COMPENSATION
Motivations
Levelling is an answer to the very fast decay of the 
luminosity. This is only one aspect of the beam-beam 
problem. All colliders have experienced the operational 
difficulties of approaching the so-called beam-beam limit. 
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The latter is indeed fuzzy, has various expressions in 
various machines and appears to depend on parameters 
that are not controlled, at least at the required degree of 
accuracy. In addition to the “conventional” beam-beam 
issues arising from the head-on interactions, LHC is 
exposed to long-range beam-beam interactions of 
sufficient strength to set the limit of the LHC 
performance, in simulation. If these beam-beam limits 
would be lower than anticipated, the loss in luminosity 
would be fast, quadratic with the beam-beam limit. 
Likewise, a potential gain follows the same fast 
variation...
To illustrate the nature of the beam-beam problem in 
hadron colliders, that remains largely phenomenological, 
a few observations are provided below. They should shed 
some light on the beam-beam effect to be expected in the 
LHC. Figure 3 [9] demonstrates the important side-effects 
of the beam-beam interactions in one of the Tevatron 
stores (store 5155). While the antiproton losses are 
consistent with the luminous proton burning, the loss rate 
of the proton is much higher, showing an example of side 
effects of the beam-beam interaction.
Figure 3: example of beam loss rate in collision, from [9]
Figure 4: Diffusion versus amplitude in the nominal LHC 
[10]
Figure 4 from [10] demonstrates the overwhelming effect 
of the long-range beam-beam interactions at the LHC.
The head-on beam-beam effect alone would be stable at 
the LHC. However, when the long-range beam-beam 
effect is added, a strong diffusion occurs for particle 
amplitudes above 5.5?.
Figure 5 [11],[4] further shows that the optimal tunes are 
different for the head-on and long-range beam-beam 
effects. It stems from recent SPS experiments. The LHC 
long-range beam-beam effect is simulated by powering a 
current-carrying wire at a suitable distance from the 
beam. The tune dependence of the beam loss shows that 
the optimal tune for minimizing the long-range beam-
beam effect (0.285) is significantly different from the 
optimal tune for head-on collisions (0.32). A means to 
compensate one of the two effects would alleviate this 
potential difficulty.
Figure 5: Tune dependence of the LHC long-range beam-
beam effect simulated in the SPS [11], [4].
Long-range beam-beam compensation
A long-range beam-beam compensation scheme using 
wires inside the vacuum chamber was proposed in 2000 
[5]. Figure 6 from [5] shows the layout of compensators, 
Figure 6: long-range beam-beam compensator layout [5]
placed on either side of an interaction point, between the 
D1 and D2 magnets at the position where the beta 
functions are equal in both planes. At this position, the 
betatron phase shift between perturbation and 
compensation is only about 2 degrees. The beams are 
sufficiently separated to allow moving devices between 
them. The corresponding space has already been reserved 
for the nominal LHC optics.
The efficiency and robustness of the compensation
have been studied in detail by several authors in 
numerical simulations, e.g. [5], [10],[12],[13],[14]. A SPS 
experimental set-up was built to simulate the LHC long-
range beam-beam effect and its compensation with 
appropriate betatron phase shift between perturbation and 
compensation. All results obtained from numerical and 
experimental simulations are consistent and show 
significant efficiency and robustness for a dc system 
whose strength can be mitigated to compensate regular 
and pacman bunches [12]. An example from numerical 
simulations [15] is given on Figure 7. Another example 
from recent SPS experiments [11],[4] is given on Figure 
8. In both cases, the significant perturbation produced by 
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Figure 7: Recovery of the emittance blow-up by long-
range beam-beam compensation, from [15].
the long-range beam-beam encounters is fully suppressed 
by the compensation. The technology for a pulsed system 
has not been established yet.
Figure 8: SPS beam intensity (upper curve) and lifetime 
(lower curve) vs time [11],[4]. I1 is the long-range 
simulator while I2 is the compensator. When the wire 
simulating the long-range beam-beam interactions is 
activated (I1=250A), a clear decay of the SPS beam 
current is observed. When either this excitation is 
suppressed, or compensated by the second wire, the beam 
current decay is suppressed.
Other possible approaches
This short communication only allows mentioning two 
other complementary approaches that may have a high 
potential in the LHC and deserve detailed evaluation:
? The electron lens, e.g. [16] could ideally 
cancel the head-on beam-beam effect and in 
practice reduce the detuning and/or resonance 
excitation. It may as well be used as a long-
range compensators for the early separation 
scheme where a few encounters occur at a 
beam separation of 5?, i.e. too close to the 
beam for wire compensators.
? The crab waist scheme [17]. This ingenious 
scheme, by suppressing a class of focusing 
aberrations, allows higher luminosity and was 
demonstrated in Dafne. A collaborative 
CERN-INFN study is scheduled within the 
FP7-EuCARD project.
CONCLUSIONS
The fast decay of the luminosity for a luminosity target 
of 1035 cm-2s-1 clearly calls for luminosity levelling, 
whatever the scenario. Levelling via the crossing angle is 
by far the most promising method. It requires either crab 
cavities or an Early Separation Scheme. Integrating the 
principle of levelling in an upgrade baseline scenario 
changes the project objectives: the target luminosity 
would become 5 to 6 1034 cm-2s-1 stable over 5 to 8 hours, 
with a multiplicity of about 100 for 25 ns spacing. 
Luminosity levelling has the further advantage of 
decreasing the dependency of the performance on 
parameters and scenarios. The long-range beam-beam 
compensation is mature for implementation. A rapid 
implementation would allow the study years in advance 
of the primary LHC performance limitation and possibly 
orient the upgrade strategy. Other methods to act upon the 
beam-beam effect deserve LHC studies, such as the 
electron lens and the crab waist scheme. In most options, 
a better knowledge of the possible impact of a large 
Piwinski angle is required.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
? Is it possible to level via the time of arrival?
With respect to the beta waist, the detector longitudinal 
acceptance of typically ±10cm is insufficient to modify 
significantly the focusing. The control and suppression 
of the beam separation at the crossing would be an 
additional difficulty.
? What is the status of the Early Separation Scheme 
proposal?
A detailed PhD study has been carried out by G. 
Sterbini [4]. Enough information is now available for 
decision making.
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SLHC, EXPERIMENTS DESIDERATA 
M.Nessi, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
Even if the discovery potential of the LHC is not yet 
revealed, the physics community is making serious plans 
for running the LHC experiments up to the end of the next 
decade, aiming of collecting a large sample of statistics 
(~3000 fb-1). The present detectors (ATLAS and CMS) 
will need a major upgrade once today’s inner trackers will 
have been exposed to 300-600 fb-1 of integrated 
luminosity. The unprecedented peak luminosity needed to 
reach such a goal, will seriously challenge the detector 
performance. Various improvements, to most of the 
detector and its trigger system, will become necessary. 
Such a complex plan requires a well established upgrade 




The LHC primary goal is to answer one of today’s 
deepest questions of physics, namely what is the origin of 
the elementary particles’ masses. The Higgs boson is a 
hypothised particle which, if it exists, would give the 
mechanism by which particles acquire mass. The mass of 
the Higgs boson is a free parameter in the Standard Model 
(SM). The design of the LHC collider and of its two 
largest experiments, ATLAS [1] and CMS [2], has been 
tuned to enable the full exploration of the mass range, 
searching for a broad variety of the Higgs production and 
decay processes predicted by the Standard Model.  
 
The timeline for these searches is outlined in the left plot 
of figure 1. It shows the amount of data needed by each of 
the two experiments to establish a 5σ discovery, or a 95% 
CL exclusion, as a function of the Higgs mass. The 
present planning of LHC operations foresees the delivery 
of 1 fb-1 of data during 2011, which will not be sufficient 
to fulfill this task. Instead, with 10 fb-1 of delivered 
integrated Luminosity, the LHC will either discover or 
exclude the SM Higgs and this, probably, after 2-3 years 
of running at 14 TeV and at 1033 cm-2sec-1. 
 
Whatever the results will be, we will be left with a lot of 
new questions and problems to solve. There will be no 
limit to the need of accuracy after that! If the Higgs is 
discovered, among the possible open questions there is: 
Are there more particles in the Higgs sector? Is the Higgs 
boson elementary or composite? What is the origin of 
fermion masses? Following the discovery, the main focus 
will become the quantitative study of the Higgs 
properties. At some point, with high statistics, rare decay 
modes of the SM Higgs will become accessible (H -> 
μ+μ−,H -> Zγ). Hb,Ht, HZ, HW couplings might be 
measured to 10% for mH < 200.  
If the Higgs boson is not found, a radical departure from 
the Standard Model will be needed, and the searches to 
understand what other mechanism is responsible for the 
electroweak symmetry breaking will begin. 
 
Dark matter is an additional puzzle that today’s 
experimental particle physics tries to solve. Various 
models anticipate the existence of a higher level of 
symmetry in nature. In a theory with unbroken 
supersymmetry, for every type of boson there exists a 
corresponding type of fermion with the same mass and 
internal quantum numbers, and vice-versa. Once the 
discovery of supersymmetry is achieved, then it will be 
 
                                        Figure 1: LHC Higgs and Gluino discovery potential at 10 fb-1 
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important to extend the mass reach for new particles. In 
general one will need to continue in the determination of 
SUSY masses and parameters. An increase of a factor 5 to 
10 in integrated luminosity (up to ~ 3000 fb-1) will buy an 
additional 500 GeV on the mass reach. In the same way, 
the mass reach for new gauge bosons, or signatures of 
extra-dimension models will be increased by 30%. All 
this has justified the need to start defining a project for 
running LHC for a longer period (at least until 2030). A 
LHC luminosity upgrade will have a strong impact on 
physics. 
 
DETECTORS REQUIREMENTS AND 
UPGRADE 
 
The requirements on the experiments are driven by the 
nature of the observables that will be of interest at the 
sLHC. These will be defined by the discoveries or lack 
thereof that will emerge after the first few years of data 
taking and once the nature of any new phenomena will be 
more evident. 
 
At this stage of the project, one can not relax any of the 
initial experimental requirements. Whatever the discovery 
scenario will be, the experiments will be required to 
perform lepton and photon identification down to 
rapidities of 3. Jet tagging in the very forward region will 
remain a must, in particular if the Higgs is not found. 
Missing energy will be a fundamental parameter for any 
search for new physics. 
On top of that, luminosity above or equal 4· 1034cm−2s−1 
implies many overlapping hard collisions in the same 
bunch crossing (pile-up). For example, one of the scheme 
considered, the large Piwinski  (LPA) angle scheme, 
allows for much more intense beams, at 1035cm−2s−1  
requiring a longer bunch spacing of 50 ns and a larger 
crossing angle, limiting the geometric loss with a flat 
beam profile. The LPA implies a pile-up of about 400 
hard collisions in the same bunch crossing. This imposes 
a very high density of tracks and photons in the inner 
detector regions, far beyond what the existing ATLAS 
and CMS trackers can effort. The detector occupancy 
would be very high, the challenge being to find all the 
tracks, without also finding many fake tracks from 
random combinations of hits. Picture 2 shows hits in the 
newly designed sLHC ATLAS inner tracker from one 
bunch crossing with 400 pile-up events; only tracks in the 
forward half of the detector were generated. The inner 
tracker gets about 15,000 tracks per bunch crossing and a 
similar number of photons which can produce e+e- pairs. 
A sufficient number of hits per tracks must be recorded, 
the detector granularity will be increased by almost a 
factor 10 to keep occupancy at the 1−2% level for an 
efficient pattern recognition. This can be achieved by 
reducing the pixel size, thr strip dimensions for silicon 
counters, and by adding more detector layers to increase 
the number of precision points per track. The ability to 
reconstruct displaced vertices will also deteriorate, with a 
reduced efficiency to tag b quarks and leptons and a 
larger rate of fake tags. 
In any case, before one moves to the sLHC regime (today 
labeled also as upgrade phase II), the existing ATLAS 
and CMS inner detectors will need to be replaced, 
because fully damaged by the accumulated radiation dose 
during the initial LHC discovery period (600-700 fb−1 
acquired on tape). Whatever the running scenario will be, 
beyond this integrated luminosity, both experiments will 
require new inner detector trackers. ATLAS in particular 
will have to abandon the concept of a TRT (gaseous 
radiation transition) tracker detector and fully rely on 
semiconductor sensors. 
 
Other components might not survive beyond the agreed 
LHC luminosity period. ATLAS might loose the front-
end electronics placed on the forward hadron calorimeter. 
The functioning of the forwards calorimeters might be 
compromised. As an example, the ATLAS LAr forward 
calorimeter might suffer from space charges which might 
break down the original ionization signal and even cause 
boiling of the liquid at the innermost radii. Similarly, the 
CMS endcap and forward calorimeters might suffer from 
radiation damage. ATLAS has estimated the need for at 
least 18 months of shutdown before moving to phase II, to 
replace and commission its new inner detector and 
eventually upgrade its forward calorimeter and change the 
hadronic calorimeter front-end electronics. 
 
Even before worrying about physics performance, the 
experiments will have to worry about the operability of 
their innermost detectors. Already during the phase I 
upgrade shutdown (initially planned after 50-100 fb-1 
delivered to the experiments around 2014-2015), needed 
to install the Linac4 and the new large aperture triplets, 
ATLAS and CMS plan to upgrade their pixel detectors. 
ATLAS will add a new pixel layer, built around a new 
beam pipe, sliding inside the previous pixel detector. 
CMS will replace the entire pixel detector with a new 
low-mass, 4-layers one. Layout drawings of both pixel 
detectors are shown in figure 3. For both detectors this 
will represent on one side a real performance 
improvement (lower mass in the inner most region, better 
vertex tagging capability) and at the same time it will 
anticipate probable risks related to inefficiencies and 
aging effects which this detectors might already 
experience after having operated at 50-100 fb-1 integrated 
luminosity. After all, detectors of such complexity and 
placed in such a difficult radiation environment have 
never been operated up to now and both Collaborations, 
also supported by the LHCC committee, have judged this 
to be a reasonable and safe approach. Doing this, both 
ATLAS and CMS will require to operate the LHC with 
vacuum beam pipes smaller  in diameter with respect to 
the one used today (-15-20%). This put an additional 
requirement on the optics of the beam in the interaction 
regions, to be analyzed and approved by the machine 
experts. 
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The performance of the level 1 trigger (LVL1) system, 
today fully based on hardware, will be the real challenge 
to face once we move into the sLHC regime. The real 
issue is to keep events rejection very efficient as a 
function of transverse momentum. The sharpness of such 
a trigger will be used as one of the main parameters to 
select new physics and therefore reject backgrounds. Two 
approaches have been looked at. 
First one should better combine the information delivered 
at the trigger level by the calorimeters and the muon 
spectrometer. This requires to be able to use all the 
existing cell granularity in the calorimeters and pre-
showers detectors and to improved the spatial resolution 
of the trigger information in the muon spectrometer.  For 
the calorimeters this implies new front-end electronics, 
probably fully digital on the detector. For the muon 
spectrometer, in particular for ATLAS, this requires one 
additional layer of trigger chambers and probably the 
need to insert the existing drift tubes detector granularity 
at the trigger level. All this is under scrutiny in the 
detector community and might imply a sizable amount of 
work and investments on the detector itself (R&D and 
careful shutdowns plans). In both cases new radiation 
hard electronics will need to be designed and 
implemented on the detector.  
 
The second approach will be to incorporate tracking 
information to supplement the reduced rejection power of 
muon and calorimeter triggers, and to maintain an 
acceptable efficiency and purity for electrons, affected by 
the degradation of the isolation criteria. LVL1 triggering 
at the inner trackers level was never done before. It 
requires new electronics and a novel strategy in the design 
of the various levels functionality of the new trackers. 
Both communities, and CMS in particular, are already 
very active on this, but a substantial level of R&D effort 
is still necessary. 
 
In general planning for improved efficiency at the trigger 
selection level is manatory. One needs to plan to keep the 
stored event rate roughly the same as now : ~200 events 
per bunch crossing. The events are much bigger at high 
luminosity because of the increased detector granularity, 
so this is quite a challenge. It means rejecting 10 to 20 
times as many events as now, each of which is about 10 
times as big. To meet this challenge, one can increase the 
latency at level-1 and move forwards in the chain some of 
what is today done in software at high level, such as 
combining trigger objects. All this requires new front-end 
and back-end electronics of a new generation, new trigger 
processors systems and a new generation of high level 
trigger farms. 
 
The upgrade of the LHC experiments will require major 
R&D and construction work, with a likely time line of at 
least 8-9 years for construction and integration. The 
planning has to assume the worst possible scenarios in 
terms of pile-up and radiation environment. While getting 
the financial green light for this new enterprise will 
probably take a few years and will be triggered by the 
first LHC discoveries, the detector community has to act 
now, preparing technology, making choices, testing 
prototypes and going deeply into the engineering design. 
ATLAS AND CMS UPGRADE STRATEGY 
 
Today both experiments foresee 3 distinct moments of 
detector consolidation and upgrade.  
 
1) a first step of consolidation in the next 2-3 years, 
while the LHC finds its way to the design beam 
energy and explore a initial limited luminosity phase. 
Various detectors and infrastructure component will 
need to be debugged and consolidated to gain in 
efficiency and reliability. Components which in 2002 
                           
Figure 2: Picture shows hits in inner tracker from one bunch crossing with 400 pile up events; only tracks in forward 
half of detector were generated. The inner tracker gets about 15,000 tracks per bunch crossing. 
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were staged for financial reasons (CMS: forward 
muon trigger chambers and TDAQ computing power, 
…; ATLAS forward muon precision chambers 
second layer, shielding elements, CPU power,…) 
will need to be restored. All this should happen in the 
shadow of the LHC repairs. An effort will also be 
made to upgrade the forward vacuum beam pipe to 
light material one to prevent additional background 
induced problems and material activation (ALARA 
principle). ATLAS plans a major upgrade already in 
this phase of the external inner detector cooling plant, 
which is today problematic and need a lot of attention 
and care. 
 
2) Before reaching the ultimate luminosity or just going 
beyond nominal, which could happen once the 
injector chain has been upgraded (Linac4, SPS 
consolidation,..), both detectors plan at least an 
upgrade of the pixel detectors or part of it (ATLAS: 
new insertable b-layer). Construction plans for this 
have been already presented to the LHCC and at least 
for ATLAS, internally this project has been launched 
already. This was done also within the logic 
presented few years ago by the LHC machine to the 
experiments and LHCC of having a substantial phase 
I upgrade. ATLAS will request at some point about 9 
months of shutdown to insert this new pixel layer. If 
such a shutdown happens around 2016-2017, then 
there might be enough time and motivation to 
anticipate to that moment part of other components 
upgrade which is now foreseen for phase II. The 
ATLAS collaboration is already revisiting some 
plans in such a direction. Planning an 
upgrade/consolidation shutdown of 9-10 months just 
after the first 20-50 fb-1 of data have been acquired, 
might be a wise move. Anticipating problems and 
repairs that such complex detectors might be facing 
once in operation for 6-7 years is a realistic approach. 
 
3) Once the detectors have been exposed to 300 to 600 
fb-1, the inner detector trackers of both, CMS and 
ATLAS, will need to be replaced. This is a major 
operation, which will require at least 18 months of 
shutdown (detectors request). The old inner detectors 
will need to be removed, the services (cabling , 
piping, …) upgraded in situ, the new inner detector 
installed and commissioned. Given the fact that such 
devices will require new technology and therefore an 
important R&D effort to be mature for construction, 
given the fact that it will be difficult to justify the 
new choices without knowing the new physics 
potential, it will be reasonable and realistic to assume 
that in today’s scenario, green light  for construction 
will not come before 2012-2013. The construction 
time, if we compare it to what was done initially for 
both experiments, will take at least 7-8 years. 
Therefore this phase of the upgrade (phase II in the 
LHC plans) should happen at the beginning of the 
next decade. It is implicit that the 2 detectors will 
have to face at the same time a major upgrade of all 




ALICE AND LHCB  UPGRADE 
STRATEGY 
 
The case of ALICE and LHCb is slightly different from 
the 2 major LHC detectors. 
 
ALICE plans on the long term to increase its statistics 
through an effective peak luminosity increase in Pb+Pb 
by factor five to 5*1027 cm −2s−1 (still compatible with the 
TPC detector operation).  
         
 
 
                                        Figure 3: ATLAS (left) and CMS (right) new phase I pixel detectors 
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For the ‘Phase II’ operation one assumes the typical 
scheme of a yearly ion run together with a (short) period 
of p+p running necessary for data comparison and 
detector startup. For the pp running mode, the luminosity 
has to stay below few 1031 cm −2s−1. This might be 
achieved with displaced beams and/or short dedicated low 
luminosity runs. 
ALICE also plans a major detector upgrade for phase II: a 
2nd generation vertex detector, also using a smaller beam 
pipe; new detectors for forward physics (in particular, 
forward calorimetry); particle ID for pT  in the range 5 to 
20 GeV; increased rate capability of the TPC (faster gas, 
increased R/O speed); upgraded DAQ & HLT. 
 
 
The LHCb plans, on the long term, aim at increasing the 
collected statistics by a factor 10. 
The strategy is to first collect  ~10 fb-1, then upgrade the 
detector read-out to 40MHz (it requires a ~8-10 months 
shutdown) and then collect ~100 fb-1. This requires 
running LHC at a luminosity of 5*1033 at Point 8. LHC 
and sLHC operation schemes must be designed to allow  
the running of LHCb after 2020 with L=5*1033 cm −2s−1. 
 
In general the compatibility of running ALICE and LHCb 
while ATLAS and CMS are running at high luminosity 
regime must be addressed, and clear solutions must be 
presented to the community, before going to far in the 
upgrade plans. The same reasoning is valid for the 
upgrade which might become necessary to these two 
interaction points (compatibility of triplets in IP8 with 




All experiments need to define a plan and a strategy 
towards sLHC. The lead time for major detector upgrades 
can take several years of construction once the green light 
is given. This means that decisions have to be taken in a 
very early stage of the LHC project. The experiments are 
eager to enter now in such discussions and plans, in order 
to be ready once the discovery landscape of the LHC will 
be clear. 
 
It is also evident that such complex and unprecedented 
detectors will need a continuous consolidation and 
upgrades to cope with the challenges they will face once 
the LHC luminosity evolves towards its design value, the 
ultimate reach and later to the sLHC scenario. All this 
will go through a series of installation shutdowns that 
both, machine and experiments, will have to face and 
optimize together, the final goal being the optimal use of 
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COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED LUMINOSITIES 
M. Lamont, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
Luminosity estimates are presented for the LHC in the 
short and medium term. 
INTRODUCTION 
The standard luminosity formula for instantaneous 
luminosity is deceptively simple. However, its 
extrapolation over time to give a realistic integrated 
luminosity is notoriously difficult. Such estimates 
necessarily rely on assumptions of machine availability, 
machine performance, turn-around times etc. For the LHC 
at its present stage of commissioning it is particularly 
difficult. There is no experience of beam behaviour 
during high energy collisions.  
The motivations for making estimates of the potential 
of the machine are clear. In the short term the immediate 
discovery potential needs to be evaluated by the 
experiments. In the medium term, scheduling of 
interventions on the machine need to be planned taking in 
account the experiments’ requirements, and in the long 
term any potential upgrades have to scheduled at 
appropriate times in the luminosity evolution of the LHC. 
This paper aims to provide ranges of potential 
luminosity evolution, with the most optimistic providing 
an upper limit on the potential luminosity delivery of the 




The estimates presented here calculate the peak 
luminosity given the usual inputs: bunch current, number 
of bunches, emittance, β*, crossing angle, bunch length 
etc. The luminosity lifetime is estimated taking into 
account the luminosity, the total cross-section, the beam-
gas lifetime, and intra-beam scattering growth rates. 
Single beam losses to diffusion process are assumed to be 
balanced by damping from synchrotron radiation around 7 
TeV. 
Given an assumed turnaround time, it is then possible 
to optimize the fill length for a given luminosity lifetime. 
Given the fill length and luminosity lifetime it is 
straightforward to the calculated integrated luminosity per 
fill. For a given running period and machine availability a 
figure for the integrated luminosity is obtained. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Turn around time 
A breakdown of the foreseen LHC turn around time is 
shown in table 1. The main components are the ramp-
down from top energy; the injection of beam from the 
SPS; the ramp to high energy; and the squeeze. The ramp-
down, the ramp, and the squeeze duration are given by the 
current rate limitations of the power converters. Of note is 
the 10 A/s limit up and down for the main bends; and the 
need to respect the natural decay constants of the main 
quadrupoles, the individually powered quadrupoles and 
the triplets during the ramp-down and the squeeze. These 
quadrupoles are powered by single quadrant power 
converters and take a considerable time to come down. 
Table 1: LHC turn around time 
Phase Time 
[mins.] 
Ramp down/pre-cycle 60 
Pre-injection checks and preparation 15 
Checks with set-up beam: orbit, tunes, injection 
oscillations, injection losses, lifetime etc.  
15 
Nominal injection sequence 20 






From table 1, one can see that realistically a three hour 
minimum turn around time might be assumed. In the long 
term some second order optimization might be possible (a 
combined ramp and squeeze for example). Herein four 
hours is assumed; this could be regarded as optimistic 
given the enormous complexity of the LHC and the clear 
potential from problems during the turn around sequence. 
The ramp-down/precycle stage represents the presently 
adopted operational strategy for coming down from high 
energy: the main bends, quadrupoles, independently 
powered quadrupoles, inner triplets etc. are ramped down 
to their pre-injection levels, while the other circuits are 
put through their normal pre-cycle which puts them on 
their right hysteresis branch at injection. 
Operational month & year 
The following assumptions are made for an average 
operational month: 
• 30 days per month; 
• 3 days per month technical stop and recovery; 
• around 2 days machine development which is 
absorbed into unavailability for this exercise; 
• 60% machine availability during which operations is 
dedicated to trying to do physics.  
The operational year, will in the medium term, be 
dependent on shutdown requirements for splice 
consolidation, collimator upgrades etc. One should also 
take into account the following: 
• 4 weeks of ion running per year (plus a few days 
setup); 
• other requests for dedicated running e.g. Totem. 
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An estimate of the available time for dedicated protons 
physics over the coming years is shown in table 2. 
Table 2: proton physics – months per year 
Year Comment Months 
protons 
2010 Commissioning, 3.5 TeV  8 
2011 3.5 TeV 9 
2012 Shutdown for splice consolidation 0 
2013 Recommissioning, 6.5 TeV 5 
2014 6.5 TeV 9 
2015 Collimation phase 2, 7 TeV 4 
2016 7 TeV, nominal luminosity 7 
2017-20 Production running 7 
 
Clearly, it is too early to claim much exactitude for the 
above numbers but they are assumed here as the basis for 
the figures shown below. Some optimization is possible; 
in particular a two year operational cycle is presently 
under consideration. This could certainly help shutdown 
efficiency but won’t increase the number of months in a 
year. 
Beam parameters 
The nominal beam parameters assumed in the 
calculation of the luminosity and the luminosity lifetime 
are shown in table 3. 
Table 3: Nominal beam parameters 
Transverse normalized emittance 3.75 μm rad 
Crossing angle - nominal 285 μrad 
Crossing angle - ultimate 315 μrad 
RMS bunch length 7.55 cm 
Beam-gas lifetime 100 hours 
Total cross section at 7 TeV 110 mb-1 
Horizontal emittance growth time 80 hours 
 
The Hübner factor 
A standard method for integrated luminosity estimates 
takes product of the scheduled physics time (minus MD, 
scheduled stops etc.) and the peak luminosity. It 
multiplies the result by the so-called Hübner factor to 
given an estimated integrated luminosity for said period. 
The Hübner factor is an approximation that implicitly 
takes into account luminosity lifetime, turnaround, 
unplanned interventions etc. During the LEP era it was 
usually taken to be around 0.2 
Here the luminosity lifetime and optimal fill length 
have been explicitly calculated. The equivalent Hübner 
factor is around 0.3. This higher value comes from long 
luminosity lifetime, longer fills, the assumed 4 hour turn 
around and 60% machine availability. To perform at all 
the LHC has to be good, here the assumption is made that 
it will be so. 
ESTIMATE FOR 2010 
A proposed staged increase in intensity to a single 
beam energy content of 2 MJ has recently been approved 
[1]. The resultant luminosity and estimates for the 
integrated luminosity are shown in table 2. Here a simple 
Hübner factor of 0.25 has been assumed to give some 
indication of expected performance. The machine will 
still be in a commissioning phase and operations will be 
treading carefully as experience is gained with potentially 
dangerous beams. 
Table 4 covers the first five months or so with a final 
luminosity of 1031 cm-2s-1 being a useful and encouraging 
first phase deliverable. The potential of another factor of 
two number of bunches and concomitantly the beam 
energy content is shown in the final line of table 4. 
The potential steps towards a luminosity of around 1032 
cm-2s-1 are shown in table 5 [2]. Given the above steps to 
2 MJ and a conservative approach to intensity increase it 
is clear that the final steps shown in the table will 
probably not be realized in 2010 and represent target for 
well optimized, well tested machine that one should see in 
2011. 
ESTIMATE FOR 2011 
Hopefully in 2011 the progress made in 2010 can be 
used for production running combined with a gentle 
probing of the foreseen intensity limits [3]. The integrated 
target for 2010/2011 is around 1 fb-1. To deliver this, the 
LHC will have to be pushing 1032 cm-2s-1. Illustrative 
numbers are shown in table 6. The monthly integrated 
luminosity total should range between 70 and 140 pb-1. As 
noted above this represent the final steps of table 5. 
2012 - 2014 
Constraints 
The beam energy of the LHC will be limited to 3.5 TeV 
until after the splice consolidation in 2012. The 
consolidation should open the way to 6.5/7 TeV and here 
it is assumed that if will take around 2 years at 6.5 TeV 
before the necessary training of the dipoles to 7 TeV is 
completed [4]. 
There are beam intensity limits from collimation phase 
one [3]. Briefly these state that the maximum acceptable 
intensity is 40% of nominal into a perfect machine. This 
number drops if imperfections are taken into account. To 
go beyond this limit the collimation system must include 
collimators in the dispersion suppressors (DS) down 
stream of IR3 and IR7 and the full phase two 
implementation [3]. The DS collimators would open the 
way to nominal intensity; the full scheme should allow 
nominal and ultimate intensities. 
The DS collimators require a movement of magnets in 
the dispersion suppressors and this is viewed as distinctly 
non-trivial exercise. Planning has yet to be established. 
Here we assume the 40% limit on total intensity holds 
until the circa 2015 shutdown. This still represents a 
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formidable amount of beam and should not be considered 
a showstopper.  
Performance 
In exploiting 6.5 TeV there will be a learning curve. 
This will see a stepped increase in total intensity and a 
squeeze to a conservative 1 m. and finally to 0.55 m. 
Bearing in mind the collimator limitations highlighted 
above we assume 24% nominal intensity for 2013 and 
27% for 2014. The resultant peak luminosities and 
integrated total per month and per year are shown in table 
7. 
2015 – 2016 
Given the installation of collimation phase 2 and the 
DS collimators the way is opened for nominal, and 
ultimate, intensity from a collimator perspective.  
Following a short run in 2015 and 4 years cumulative 
experience, and assuming there are no fundamental limits 
found during those 4 years one might optimistically hope 
to reach nominal performance in 2016. With the 
assumptions outlined above this should result in an 
integrated luminosity of around 50 fb-1 for a 7 month 
proton run. 
The performance of the LHC might well not reach 
nominal quite as quickly. There is also the possibility that 
peak luminosity gets pinned at a lower level by intensity 
related effects. A illustrative, less optimistic scenario is 
shown in figure 1.  
BEYOND 2016 
Prediction of progress beyond 2016 is difficult. 
Experience must be gained of running the LHC at high 
energy to evaluate its potential. A number of possible 
scenarios might be considered. 
• Achieving and holding steady luminosity production 
at nominal between 2016 and 2020. 
• Pushing intensity towards ultimate in the face of a 
number of challenges [5]. This assumes that 
something like ultimate intensities are deliverable 
from the injectors. Illustrated below in figure 1 is a 
staged increase in intensity between 2017 and 2020 
reaching ultimate luminosity in 2020 and annual 
integrated luminosity of around 100 pb-1. 
• A phase 1 like upgrade after 2-3 years peak 
production rate. This could be a useful option if 
nominal performance proves difficult to achieve. 
 
If the delivery of integrated luminosity is at a near 
constant yearly value, consideration of the statistical error 
halving time shows that a naïve 3 extra years at given rate 
is required to halve the statistical error. The message here 
is that a constant rate of luminosity production soon 
becomes uninteresting. However, it should be noted that 
by 2016, if things are going well, the peak luminosity will 
have just reached nominal and delivery rate of luminosity 
will not have flattened out. It is clear that another major 
shutdown would not be optimal at this stage. 
Increased intensity 
If one were to contemplate increasing intensity above 
nominal after 2016 one would have to make the following 
assumptions: 
• The PS is operation at increased injection energy, 
which together with LINAC4 would enable it to 
delivery around ultimate intensities to the SPS. This 
after a suitable commissioning period following the 
required upgrades. 
• ~1.7 x 1011 can be swallowed by the SPS. Detailed 
requirements for the necessary upgrades and 
planning have yet to be established. 
• The LHC can handle ultimate intensity. The issues 
here were nicely summarized in Chamonix 2010 [5]. 
“Ultimate intensity is challenging for the LHC. 
Many systems at technological limits with little or no 
margin.”   
If one, again optimistically, assumes that the limitations 
can be lifted by 2017 one could imagine pushing beyond 
nominal intensity over a period of years arriving at full 
ultimate intensity in 2019/2020 if things go well. This 
scenario represents the upper limit presented here. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Short and medium term luminosity estimates are 
presented. In the short term the objectives are clear and 
realistic i.e. 1 fb-1 by the end of 2011. After a long 
shutdown for splice consolidation 2 years running at 6.5 
TeV are envisaged with the total intensity limited by 
phase 1 collimation. Installation of phase 2 collimation in 
or around 2015 would allow nominal performance to be 
achieved in 2016 if things go well. Progress thereafter is 
dependent on what is learnt in the previous years and 
could include: running steady at a nominal production 
rate; pushing intensities towards ultimate; or a possible 
upgrade in or around 2018 if conditions dictate. 
The estimates presented here are biased towards the 
optimistic and assume that the LHC can achieve 21st 
century Hübner factors. The errors bars are big and 
numbers should be treated with a modicum of 
circumspection, particularly after 2016. It will important 
to gain some operational experience. 
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Table 4: potential luminosity development during the first 6 months of LHC operation 2010. The last row shows the 

















4 bunches 5 e9 4 0.01 4.5 e27 14 0.001  
4 bunches 2 e10 4 0.05 7.1 e28 14 0.002  
4 bunches 5 e10 4 0.11 4.5 e29 14 0.13 
8 bunches 5 e10 8 0.22 8.9 e29 14 0.27 
4 x 4 bunches 5 e10 16 0.45 1.7 e30 14 0.55  
8 x 4 bunches 5 e10 32 0.9 3.6 e30 30 2.3  
43 x 43 bunches 5 e10 43 1.2 4.8 e30 14 1.5  
8 trains of 6 bunches 8 e10 48 2.2 1.3 e31 14 4.0  
     128  
       
50 ns trains 8 e10 96 4.3 2.7 e31 30 17.2  
 
Table 5: potential stages of luminosity development during first year of LHC operation [from 2]. Steps 9 to 11 are most 






















50 ns 432 7 e10 3 e13 17 9.2 e31 78  
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2010 8 3.5 2 96 8 e10 7.7 e12 4.3 2.7 e31 0.02 - ~0.1 
2011 9 3.5 2 796 7 e10 5.6 e13 31 1.7 e32 0.14 ~1 ~1 
2013 6 6.5 1 720 1.1 e11 7.9 e13 82 1.3 e33 1 6 7 
2014 7 6.5 0.55 796 1.1 e11 8.8 e13 91 2.9 e33 2 14 21 
2015 4 7 0.55 1404 1.1 e11 1.6 e14 160 4.6 e33 3.3 13 34 





Figure 1: Luminosity estimates - summary plot. 3 scenarios shown: running at around nominal after 2016 (to nominal); 
pushing to ultimate after 2016 (to ultimate); hitting nominal in 2107 with a Hübner factor of 0.2 (hf.2). ‘lumi’ indicates 
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SUMMARY OF THE EVIAN BEAM COMMISSIONING WORKSHOP 
M. Lamont, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
An LHC beam commissioning workshop was held on 
the 19-20 January 2010. The goal of this workshop is to 
review the 2009 LHC beam commissioning and beam 
operations experience, and to look forward to the 
continued commissioning and operation of the LHC with 
beam in 2010. 
Beam related experiences from injection to stable 
beams were discussed. Issues addressed covered the 
measurements and observations versus expectations; 
problems encountered; the performance of software and 
controls; and necessary improvements. The readiness for 
3.5 TeV running was also covered. As an outcome, the 
workshop proposed a 2010 beam re-commissioning plan 
for 3.5 TeV operation. This plan addresses the strategies 
for increasing the beam energy, intensity and specific and 
integrated luminosity to the targets required for 2010. 
INTRODUCTION 
The initial beam commissioning of the LHC saw 
remarkably rapid progress in the three and half week 
available in November to December 2009. All main 
commissioning goals were achieved [1]. All key systems 
went through at least their initial commissioning phases. 
Collisions with ‘stable beam’ conditions were established 
at 450 GeV, and the ramp to the maximum energy of 1.18 
TeV was successful attempted. Most beam-based systems 
became operational and LHC operations managed to start 
to master the control of a hugely complex system. 
During this period operations was very much in 
commissioning mode and this initial phase must be seen 
as part of a necessary learning process with a furious 
amount of problem resolution and debugging going on.  
The main aim of the workshop was to review this initial 
commissioning period and draw from it lessons and 
necessary improvements to be made for continued 
commissioning in 2010. The session titles are listed 
below. 
• Review of 2009 LHC beam operation and models 
• Beam diagnostics 
• Injection & Ramp & Squeeze & Adjust & Stable 
beam 
• Machine protection 
• Controls and operational aspects: going from 
commissioning to operational regime 
• 2010 operation 
The speakers were asked to “bury Caesar, not to praise 
him”. 
PREPARATION 
The initial commissioning phase benefited enormously 
from meticulous preparation. This included a full series of 
injection tests, extended dry runs of all accelerator 
systems both separated and combined, and full hardware 
commissioning of the cold magnet circuits. The curtailed 
commissioning with beam in 2008 was also very useful in 
identifying a number of issues that were resolved for the 
2009 run. 
MILESTONES 
The main milestones of the 2009 beam commissioning 
period are outlined in table 1. 
Table 1: main commissioning milestones 2009 
Date Milestone 
20th Nov. Injection of both beams – rough RF 
capture 
21st Nov. Circulating beam 1 
22nd Nov. Circulating beam 2 
23rd Nov. First pilot collisions at 450 GeV 
First trial ramp 
26th Nov. Pre-cycle established 
Energy matching 
29th Nov. Ramp to 1.08 TeV and then 1.18 TeV 
30th Nov. Experiments’ solenoids on 
1st – 6th 
Dec. 
Protection qualified at 450 GeV to allow 
‘stable beams’ 
6th Dec. Stable beams at 450 GeV 
8th Dec. Ramped 2 beams to 1.18 TeV – first 
collisions at 1.18 TeV 
11th Dec. Stable beam collisions at 450 GeV - 4 
bunches with 2 1010 per bunch 
14th Dec. Ramp 2 on 2 to 1.18 TeV - quiet beams - 
collisions in all four experiments 
14th Dec. 16 on 16 at 450 GeV - stable beams 
16th Dec. Ramped 4 on 4 to 1.18 TeV - squeezed 
to 7 m in IR5 - collisions in all four 
experiments 
16th Dec. End of run 
 
The commissioning process can be briefly summarized 
thus: 
• 3 days for first observed collisions at 450 GeV; 
• 9 days for first ramp to 1.18 TeV; 
• 16 days to establish stable beams at 450 GeV; 
• 18 days to take two beams to 1.18 GeV and 
observe first collisions at this record energy. 
A more detailed look at the main operational phases 
involved follows. 
Injection  
The transfer and injection process from the SPS into the 
LHC is delicate and complex but operation was well 
established.  
• The transfer lines were well optimized after a 
rigorous measurement campaign. 
• Re-phasing of the beam in the SPS, synchronization 
between the machines and subsequent capture 
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worked well with only some RF controls and 
procedural issues as negatives. 
• Injection sequencing dealt with requirements of 
multiple injection schemes that covered multi-bunch 
injection, two beams, and collision scheduling. 
• The routine conditioning of the injection kickers (the 
so-called kicker soft start) is now part of the standard 
process. 
• The injection quality check (IQC) process was 
deployed, debugged, and became operational. 
• The abort gap keeper was commissioned (this 
prevents injection of beam into the abort gap). 
A full program of beam-based checks was performed 
including: positioning of injection protection devices 
(TDI etc.) with respect the beam, positioning of transfer 
line collimators, aperture checks, and kicker waveform 
checks [2,3]. 
A number of issues were identified, including:  
• Problems when over-injecting. Here a pilot is kicked 
onto the TDI – this process caused a beam loss 
monitor (BLM) beam abort. 
• The BLM system was observed to pull a beam abort 
during the injection process (beam loss on transfer 
line collimator for example). There is a general issue 
with fast losses at injection and the BLM threshold 
on shorter timescales. 
• Related to this problem is the need to scrape the 
beam in the SPS. The strategy for scraping in the 
SPS needs to be fully defined. 
• The injection kicker was observed not to trigger 
under certain circumstances. 
Generally the performance at injection was good and 
clearly benefited from the experience gained during the 
injection tests. For the moment, however, one would 
worry about routinely injecting unsafe beam. 
It is to be noted that so-called ‘quenchinos’ were again 
observed with two accidental quenches caused by 
intensities as low as 2 x 109 protons. 
450 GeV 
A full set of instrumentation and associated hardware 
and software was commissioned and made more-or-less 
operational. Measurement and control of the key beam 
parameters (orbit, tune, chromaticity, coupling, 
dispersion) was routine. Besides this the BLM system 
performed impeccably. Beam size was measured using 
the synchrotron light monitors and wire-scanners. 
Lifetime optimization via adjustment of tune, 
chromaticity, and orbit became routine. 
Energy matching between the SPS and LHC was 
performed and revealed only small differences between 
the two beams. A full program of aperture checks was 
performed covering the arcs and insertions. 
The experiments’ solenoids were brought on without 
fuss and the coupling and orbit perturbations corrected. 
LHCb and Alice’s dipoles were brought on at 450 GeV. 
There are some issues with transfer functions of these 
dipoles and the associated compensators which are to be 
resolved. 
Two beam operation was established both with and 
without separation bumps. Optics checks were performed 
and the beta beating measured and first attempts at 
correction made. A full program of polarity checks of 
correctors and beam position monitors was executed with 
only a few errors being found [4]. 
The availability of hardware, instrumentation and 
software was very impressive reflecting good preparation, 
very fast problem resolution and the clear benefits of 
leveraging 21st century technology. 
Collisions at 450 GeV 
Although successful, it is probably worth noting that 
the LHC was not designed to do collisions at 450 GeV 
[5]. Nonetheless a full program of machine protection, 
collimation, aperture and beam dump system checks 
allowed ‘stable beams’ to be declared. This permitted the 
experiments to fully turn on their detectors and start an 
intense period of commissioning with beam themselves. 
Multi-bunch and higher intensities were achieved with 
a maximum of 16 bunches and a total beam intensity of 
1.85 x 1011 being brought into collision. Luminosity scans 
were tested gently and successfully [6], and hundreds of 
thousands of events were collected by the experiments. 
8 kHz and the hump 
One clear issue at 450 GeV became apparent: the 
activity in the vertical tune spectrum and associated 
vertical emittance blow-up. The cause of the 8 kHz line 
was tracked down to the UPS, however the source of the 
hump is not understood and systematic investigations as 
to its source will be pursued in 2010 [7]. 
Aperture 
A systematic set of aperture measurements was 
performed of the arcs and insertion regions [8]. The beam 
clearance in general seems to be OK, and is above or 
equal to. Some measured bottlenecks agree with model 
predictions using measured beta functions. 
However the aperture is out of budget due to the large-
beating with n1 < 7 even with reducing the closed orbit 
budget to the measured 3.2 mm peak closed orbit. This 
implies that correcting beta beating is mandatory at 450 
GeV. 
Beta beating 
The availability of measurement and impressive 
analysis tools should be noted. The uncorrected, measured 
beating was good although outside the accepted tolerance 
of ~20% [8]. Several potential sources of error were 
identified with possible candidates including the warm 
magnets in IR3 and IR7 (large corrections required). 
Potential, somewhat large, corrections were also noted in 
the triplets in IR2 & IR8. The correction strategy will 
need to be carefully considered. 
The pre-cycling strategy of certain classes of magnets 
will be revisited for 2010 (e.g. Q6 was not pre-cycled and 
should be) to avoid any potential errors arising from 
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leaving magnets on the wrong branch of their hysteresis 
curves. 
In 2010 it will be important to correct the beating early 
on to avoid having to re-visit collimation and other 
optimization after any beating corrections. 
Ramps 
A fully consistent set of machine settings was deployed 
at injection and for the ramp. These incorporated the 
output of the LHC magnet model (FIDEL) which consists 
of all main transfer functions, dipole harmonics etc. For 
the RF system the necessary parameter space was in place 
including frequency and voltage control in the ramp.  
8 ramp attempts were made (see table 2) with notable 
success [5]. Reproducibility in the ramp looked very good 
enabling tune feed-forward to be deployed successfully. 
Tune feedback based on the continuous FFT mode of the 
BBQ tune system worked pretty much first time and was 
then used systematically during the ramp [7]. 
Real time acquisition of the closed orbit in the ramp 
was immediately available. The orbit clearly moves 
during the ramp but total deviations were small enough to 
allow good transmission. A feed-forward strategy is to be 
established. 
The bare tunes (i.e. those that would have been seen 
had no corrections been applied) were seen to swing 
considerably. The effect is bigger in the horizontal plane 
and for beam 2. The origin of the swing is not yet 
understood. Appropriate 450 GeV trim incorporation 
methods have yet to be deployed. 
 
Table 2: Ramp attempts during 2009 commissioning 
No. Date Energy [GeV] Comment 
1 24/11/09 560 Beam 1 - lost to tune excursions 
2 29/11/09 1043 Beam 1 – tune to third integer 
3 30/11/09 1180 No precycle, feed-forward, no feedback. 
4 8/12/09 1180 B1 lost after 3 minutes at top energy. Feedback on B2 
5 13/12/09 800 Feedback on both beams from here. Lost B2 – BPM interlock 
6 14/12/09 1180 1 hour “quiet beams” – collisions in all 4 experiments 
7 15/12/09 1180 Beam lost to rogue RT packet 
8 16/12/09 1180 Trial squeeze in IR5 
Squeeze 
One successful attempt was made to test the squeeze 
procedure in IR5 [10]. Although not exactly smooth in 
terms of procedure, the attempt managed the three 
planned steps: the shift to collision tunes; squeeze 11 to 9 
m.; squeeze 9 to 7 m. Clearly there is some tidying up to 
do but to get this far on the first attempt was encouraging. 
The settings strategy worked and respected the need for 
smooth round off of power converter functions at the 
intermediate optics points. Single quadrant power 
converter limitations were taken into account – the ramp 
down of some insertion quadrupole in the squeeze defines 
the length of the process. 
Beta beating and dispersion measurements showed 
better agreement with the machine model at the 
intermediate points of the squeeze than at 450 GeV and 
the extrapolated values of beta* were closed to nominal. 
For a full discussion, see [10]. 
SYSTEM COMMISSIONING 
LHC Beam Dump System [LBDS] 
There was a rigorous program of measurements and 
tests to qualify the LBDS with beam [11]. These 
included: 
• beam based alignment of TCDQ and TCS; 
• aperture scans; 
• extraction tests; 
• asynchronous beam dump tests with de-bunched 
beam; 
• commissioning of the various sub-systems i.e. 
Beam Energy Tracking System (BETS), External 
Post Operation Checks (XPOC), internal post 
operation checks (IPOC); 
• interaction with the timing system, 
synchronization with RF (abort gap etc.); 
• inject & dump, circulate & dump mode were 
successfully used operationally. 
A number of issues were resolved and the performance 
of the LBDS was in general very good and experience 
thus far gives confidence in its ability to perform within 
its very tight specifications. 
The only real failures were the synchronous-
asynchronous dumps, which were solved after a TSU 
firmware upgrade. Many tests with beam are outstanding: 
dumps at intermediate energies; precise positioning of 
protection devices; a whole series commissioning 
procedures for increasing energy and intensity. 
Again it was noted that operations need to converge to 
a more standard way of running sequences to avoid 
unnecessary procedural errors. 
Abort gap cleaning 
The undulator and synchrotron light monitor 
successfully commissioned for beam 2 paving the way for 
a first look at abort gap monitoring and cleaning. 
Encouragingly abort gap cleaning had a good first run out 
but needs to be further optimized to clean over the full 3 μs abort gap while limiting the losses outside of the abort 
gap. Around 10 % of the beam in the gap was left in the 
gap. A clear interlock and dump strategy needs to be 
established and thereafter there is the need to commission 
the Abort Gap Monitoring Interlock. 
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Collimation System  
The collimation system saw excellent initial beam 
based commissioning following careful preparation and 
tests [12]. The initial phase include a full program of 
beam based positioning during which the hierarchy was 
established. Encouragingly this appeared to be respected 
in planned and unplanned beam loss tests there afterwards 
- provided the orbit had been corrected to the reference. 
The collimation setup remained valid over six days, 
given orbit reproducibility and optics stability. The 
system works as designed. Expected cleaning and leakage 
processes were seen. It was possible to verify passive 
protection with losses at primary collimators. The 
collimation/protection devices hierarchy was established 
and respected in tests. TOTEM also saw the first 
operational tests of their Roman pots with beam. 
A number of issues were identified. 
• Beam-based settings were different from theoretical: 
this needs to understand in more detail.  
• The wrong sequence has been played leading to 
collimators hitting interlock limits. This is safe but 
not nice. Strict adherence to fully debugged 
sequences is essential. Setup by hand is out of the 
question. 
• Abnormal losses in right dispersion suppressor of 
IR3 were noted – since tracked down to BLM noise. 
• A power cut locked all collimators. They could be 
reset by the piquet reasonably quickly (~2h). This is 
a feature, as collimator controls are on UPS, but not 
the high power drivers. 
• Faster analysis for loss maps, collimator movements, 
interlocks etc. is required. 
Machine Protection System 
The machine protection system (MPS) is mission 
critical and will clearly be vitally important for LHC 
operation over the safe beam limit. In essence it 
comprises the beam interlock system (BIS) and the safe 
machine parameter system (SMP) [13, 14]. The BIS relies 
on inputs from a multitude of users. The SMP relies on 
services from other systems (e.g. the timing system and 
the bunch current transformers).  
Besides this the beam drives a subtle interplay of the 
LBDS, the collimation system and protection devices, 
which rely on a well-defined aperture, orbit and optics for 
guaranteed safe operation.  
The MPS itself worked as advertised, always pulling a 
beam abort when called upon to do so. It has been 
operational since 2006 and the deployed system has seen 
99.996% availability. The system has been externally and 
internally reviewed and will be ready for 2010 operation 
with only minor changes.  
During initial beam commissioning here were some 
issues with the inputs into the SMP but the system failed 
safe. It is clear that the SMP system depends on other 
systems. These dependencies include the bunch current 
transformers for intensity information. Here the 
dependability (safety, reliability and availability must be 
clarified). The timing system is used for transmission of 
the SMP system; here cross checking and failsafe 
mechanism must be fully deployed. In short there are 
known limitations with the 2009 implementation and the 
2009 system for 2010 was reinforced at the start of 2010. 
However, the final LHC SMP system will only be ready 
in 2011 for nominal energy and intensity. 
The first attempt to establish the LBDS, orbit, and 
collimation as safe for the given aperture and optics was 
successful at 450 GeV and tests with beam demonstrated 
that the system setup was effective. Guaranteeing this at 
all phases of operation has yet to be demonstrated. 
Beam Instrumentation 
Details of the individual systems are presented in 
proceedings of the Evian workshop. A brief summary of 
the performance of each system is given in table 3. 
Table 3: overview of BI performance in 2009 
System Performance overview 
BPM [14] In general very good, FIFO mode as used 
as in the injection tests. Capture mode 
was commissioned enabling multi-turn 
acquisition and analysis. 
BLM [15] Excellent performance following full 
deployment during injection tests 
delivering a close to fully operational 
tool. Some issues with the SEMs; some 
thresholds to be adjusted. 
DBCT 
FBCT 
Along with lifetime measurement, the 
systems were commissioned and 
operational. Some calibration & controls 
issues. 














Beam 2: undulator commissioned, 
operational at 450 GeV and 1.2 TeV. 
Beam 1: undulator not commissioned, 
operational at 1.2 TeV 
Tune BBQ FFT used routinely from day one: 
tune, coupling, and chromaticity. Used for 
tune feedback in the ramp. 
MKQA tune kickers operational 
PLL – good progress, feedback to be 
tested, radial modulation tested. 
Chromaticity Measured using: standard delta RF 
method; semi-automatic BBQ peak 
analysis; and radial modulation. Some 
effort required to ensure fast reliable 
method is available. 
Orbit 
The closed orbit was observed to be very stable 
(vertical drift ~ 15µm/h) [4]. Time should be devoted in 
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2010 to establish a better global correction (and avoid 
strong local corrections) before setting up the collimators. 
Open issues include: the observed rifts between IP7 and 
IP1; the vertical offsets observed in arcs 23, 34, 45 
(aperture to be checked with beam to see if orbit is 
centred or not); the switch of BPM high/low sensitivity 
with beam intensity to be tested. The orbit feedback is 
basically operational, but time is needed for testing; it is 
view as essential for a fully operational ramp and 
squeeze. 
BLMs 
The BLMs correctly removes the beam permit if 
measurements are over threshold. No reliability issues 
were observed. The system is well understood since it has 
been up and running for more than a year [15].   
There were some availability issues (false dumps) at 
energies higher than the injection; thresholds are to be 
adjusted in some regions. Continuous monitoring of noise 
is required. Sequencer initiated tests will be enforced to 
be run regularly. 
More tests to verify and adjust the threshold values are 
needed and investigation of spurious signals from the 
SEMs are ongoing and first corrections are being 
implemented. 
Magnet Model 
A long and thorough magnet measurement and analysis 
campaign [17] meant that the deployed settings produced 
a machine remarkable close to the untrimmed model. In 
terms of tune and momentum, remarkably small 
discrepancies between the model and the measure 
machine were observed. For example, the largest 
momentum offsets by sector seen were: -0.27 per mil in 
sector 56 for beam 1 and +0.32 per mil in sector 78 for 
beam 2. 
The precycle was fully deployed with precyling 
prescriptions in place for nearly all circuits with only a 
handful still missing. The result was very good 
reproducibility. Some optimization of total length is still 
possible; it was taking over an hour for the full precycle. 
There were a number of trips of circuits during the 
process and it’s clear that the precycle stressed the quench 
protection system (QPS) and power converters. 
Future priorities include: trying track down the origin 
of beta beating; the spectrometers and compensators 
transfer functions; correction of the snapback at 6 kA – 
new equations to be implemented; the origin of tune drift 
during ramp; better understanding of tune and Q’ trims 
used at injection; implementation of hysteresis in LSA; 
continuation of measurements on dipoles to characterize 
them with the 3.5 and 5 TeV precycle. 
The careful crosschecking of the large parameter space 
by the FIDEL team proved invaluable and must be 
continued. 
Power Converters 
Superb performance of the power converters was 
observed with excellent tracking between reference and 
measured and excellent tracking between the converters 
around the ring. 
Radio Frequency 
In general, there was good performance from the key 
RF systems: power, beam control, low level and 
diagnostics. Establishing capture was fast and efficient, 
the frequency and voltage ramps passed on the first 
attempts. Cogging worked well with the interaction point 
being re-positioned to the satisfaction of the experiments. 
There were, however, a number of controls issues with 
the de-synchronization/re-synchronization process being 
particularly problem prone. The interaction of the power 
converters, klystrons and associated circuit breakers was 
opaque from the CCC. This issues and other are being 
addressed [18]. 
• Power system: minor hardware problems have been 
understood and addressed. 
• There is concern over klystron collectors, which 
have been limited to around 80% of nominal power 
because of overheating due a collector design fault. 
• Time is needed to commission variable cavity Q. 
• Controls & software: the major operational problems 
have been solved. 
• Low level and synchro: various causes for 
synchronisation problems are understood and 
resolved. 
• Readiness for unsafe beam: addition of interlocks on 
cavity sum, frequency and synchro. 
The to-do list includes: commissioning of change of Q; 
one turn feedback, longitudinal feedback, and emittance 
blow-up. 
Commissioning of the transverse damper with beam 
started. Dedicated time in 2010 is still required. 
Control system 
The numerous elements of the control system were 
deployed and tested in good time. A non-exhaustive list 
of the systems and components follows. 
• LSA provided the core high-level software (settings 
generation, trim, drive, cycle management etc.). 
Given the deployment on the SPS, transfer lines, 
LEIR during the previous years, the whole product 
was remarkably mature. 
• Logging did a remarkable job of capturing and 
making accessible the huge amount of data 
generated. Again a long rollout and mature product. 
• YASP provide orbit correction and lot more besides, 
a powerful and mature tool. 
• Sequencer was heavily used. The cut and thrust of 
full operations revealed some features that are being 
addressed. 
• The on-line model was successfully deployed and 
used routinely.  
• Management of critical settings (MCS) was 
deployed. 
• Role base access control (RBAC) having been 
deployed progressively over the last couple of years 
was operational but not in ‘strict’ mode as of yet. 
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• The alarm system was operational but not used 
systematically. 
• The timing system performed very well following a 
staged deployment and thorough testing over the last 
few years. 
• Oasis (analogue acquisition system) was heavily 
used and worked well. 
• The post mortem system was in place, although 
beam based features have not been extensively used 
as of yet. 
• Fixed displays were fully deployed, although they 
appear not to be fixed enough for nominal operation. 
• Injection Quality Check (IQC) which serves to 
check beam loss, injection efficiency etc. was 
available. 
• The communication between the LHC and 
experiments  (DIP/Handshakes) was well used and 
despite some hiccups performed OK. 
• The standard middleware (CMW/JMS) solutions 
struggled with the huge load. It is questionable as to 
whether or not the chosen technical solutions are 
fully appropriate to the foreseen data rates. The 
control group is addressing the issues. 
• Similarly, proxies suffered. These were put in place 
to help shield the front-ends from becoming over-
subscribed. 
• The concentrators of the copious BLM and BPM 
data work well, although there were some issues with 
re-publishing of the data. 
• The electronic logbook (eLogbook) deserves special 
mention for firstly dealing with everything the 
operation crews threw at it, and also, importantly, 
allowing browsing of the data by a large number of 
interested parties around the world. 
The heavy load that commissioning put on the system 
exposed a number of issues [19]: 
• Infrastructure – disk space, console performance 
• CMW – proxies, subscriptions, … 
• FESA – front-end instabilities 
• RBAC – introduction of STRICT policy 
• JMS – data publishing 
• BE-CO Development Process 
All are being address by the controls group. 
OPERATIONS  
It should be noted that control systems for equipment 
and instrumentation that are not safety related may also 
contribute to safety and should be properly designed, 
operated and maintained.  
Where their failure can raise the demand rate on the 
safety related system, and hence increase the overall 
probability of failure of the safety related system to 
perform its safety function, then the failure rates and 
failure modes of the non-safety systems should have been 
considered in the design, and they should be independent 
and separate from the safety related system.  
The LHC in general does not rely on the control system 
for machine protection (networks, front-ends, software, 
databases, timing system etc.), however, it is already clear 
from the initial commissioning period that operations and 
the interplay with controls, hardware, and 
instrumentation, is capable of unnecessarily stressing the 
machine protection system. 
Operations and controls can help machine safety. 
• They can reduce the load on machine protection by 
catching errors, enforcing procedures, catching 
problems by appropriate surveillance and software 
interlocks. 
• They can impose limits and secure settings. 
• They can provide diagnostics: post-mortem, logging, 
and alarms. 
• They can ensure full monitoring of the status of the 
MPS and critical components. 
• They can ensure reliability via XPOC, checking 
functionality with test sequences of acquisition 
system, system response etc 
• They can impose procedural standards. 
On the other hand operations and high-level controls 
can hinder the process. 
• They can lower availability, losing time to problem 
resolution; 
• They can reduce reliability by loss of diagnostics. 
• Failures of gateways, networks (band width, 
response), servers, databases, timing can cause loss 
of critical signals, displays, functionality etc. 
• They can be a source of false manipulations. These 
can be bugs in software, poor ergonomics, poorly 
conceived sequences, errant feedback loops etc. 
As well as the positives, it is clear that LHC operation 
saw all the negatives listed above [20,21]. The issues are 
too numerous to list here. They all must be resolved 
before the LHC goes much beyond the safe beam limit. 
2010 
The main objectives of LHC operation in 2010 are 
itemized below [22].  
• Beam commissioning continued with the main, final 
objective of this phase being colliding, safe, stable, 
squeezed beams. 
• This will be followed by consolidation and routine 
“pilot” physics at the safe beam limit for an extended 
period with machine development periods as 
required. 
• Increased intensity phase one and associated 
machine protection qualification. The aim is to 
establish secure and reproducible operation under 
these conditions. This phase will move the total 
beam intensity above the safe beam limit. 
• Consolidation and routine physics, again for an 
extended period. 
• Increased intensity phase two and associated 
machine protection qualification etc. 
Machine protection is clearly hypercritical once the 
safe beam limit is passed, as is fault free operations and 
operational procedures. It could take some time to fully 
establish the latter. 
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Commissioning 
The breakdown of beam commissioning is given 
below. 
• Global machine checkout 
• Essential re-commissioning and checks with beam at 
450 GeV. Machine settings will include the updated 
FIDEL model and minor optics modifications. 
Injection setup will be the standard operational 
configuration with separation bumps on. A golden 
orbit will be re-established and the energy matching 
between the machines checked. Beam 
instrumentation commissioning will continue. 
• The outstanding issues from 2009 will be addressed. 
In particular, the origin of the “hump” should be 
identified [7]. 
• Optics correction and verification. The aim is to 
bring beta beating within tolerance before detailed 
optimization of collimation and LHC beam dump 
system (LBDS). 
• The collimation, LBDS, and machine protection 
systems must all be re-qualified with beam. 
• The above step will precede provision of two to three 
shifts of colliding beams at 450 GeV. 
• The ramp will be commissioned directly to 3.5 TeV. 
This will include commissioning of beam 
instrumentation and feedback systems (Tune, Q’, 
coupling, orbit, feedback systems) and other systems 
(beam dumps, collimators, RF). Beating 
measurements will be made during the ramp to 
quantify dynamic optics changes. 
• For the ramp and 3.5 TeV, in the first instance, 
machine protection appropriate for safe beam will be 
re-verified: fast magnet change monitors (FMCM), 
power interlock controller (PIC), collimators, 
protection devices, beam loss monitors (BLM), beam 
position monitors (BPM), interlocks, safe machine 
parameter system (SMP), RF frequency, and LBDS. 
• Flat top parameter and optics checks at 3.5 TeV. 
• Establish stable safe beams at 3.5 TeV un-squeezed 
as a necessary perquisite for colliding beam at this 
energy. 
• First collisions at 3.5 TeV (see below). 
• Commission squeeze including collimation, 
feedbacks, apertures checks etc. 
• Parameter and optics checks at final squeeze values. 
• Established stable safe beams at 3.5 TeV squeezed 
• Collisions with stable beams at 3.5 TeV squeezed 
Planning 
An estimate of the time required for the above phases in 
shown in table 4. Detailed shift-by-shift planning will be 
drawn up covering the first 4 weeks.  
Given that first collisions at 3.5 TeV will be a media 
event, commissioning of ramp (and possibly squeeze) will 
be done with non-colliding bunches. Stable beams will be 
established with non-colliding bunches. The first attempt 
to deliver colliding beams to the experiments under stable 
beam conditions will need to be planned some days in 
advance. 
Table 4: time estimate for 3.5 TeV beam commissioning   
Phase Days Key objectives 
Circulating beam 2 Essential checks 
450 GeV 
commissioning 7 
Injection, tune, Q’, C-, orbit, 
collimators, LBDS, 
instrumentation 
450 GeV optics 
checks 3 
Beating, energy matching 
tuning 
450 GeV two 
beams 1 




Experiments on at 450 GeV, 
stable beams. 
Ramp to 3.5 TeV 5 
Commission essential 
machine protection, bring 
experiments' dipoles on in 







Orbit and tune feedback, 
collimation, aperture, 
bumps, machine protection 
checks, beam dumps etc. 
Collisions 
squeezed 7 




The pre-requisites and detailed planning for increasing 
intensity should be revisited and formally reviewed. 
Existing planning foresees: 
• Aperture fully mapped; 
• Orbit established and locked down; 
• Beam dump and associated protection devices fully 
locked down; 
• Collimation hierarchy established, tested and fully 
locked down; 
• Injection protection (TDI & TCLI) and the injection 
process fully optimized; 
• Multi-bunch behaviour of all beam instrumentation 
tested and guaranteed; 
• All systems tested with unsafe beam at 450 GeV; 
• Transverse dampers commissioned and operational; 
• Reproducible transverse and longitudinal emittances 
and intensities from the SPS. Blow-up available as 
required; 
• Beam quality check system (BQC) in the SPS fully 
operational; 
• Injection quality check system (IQC) in LHC fully 
operational; 
• Intensity limit interlock fully operational; 
• Scraping in SPS as required; 
• Abort gap monitoring and cleaning commissioned 
and operational; 
• BIS, BIC, WIC, PIC, SIS, SMP all fully tested and 
absolutely guaranteed with no interlocks masked; All 
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user inputs fully tested; Logging and post mortem 
fully tested; 
• All other machine protection tests performed as 
specified; 
• Management of critical settings (MCS) locked down; 
• Role based access control (RBAC) locked down; 
• RF and associated interlocks locked down; 
• Beam dump, collimation, and beam loss monitors all 
fully qualified throughout all operational phases; 
• BIS implications of safe beam at 450 GeV, unsafe at 
3.5 TeV fully checked; 
• Tune feedback operational – failure modes tested; 
• Orbit feedback operational – failure modes tested. 
 
This list is not exhaustive. Resolution of all procedural, 
operation, controls, MPS, instrumentation, hardware 
issues that have been raised at this workshop must have 
been addressed. 
Phased intensity increase 
It is clear that above will not happen overnight and that 
a full and careful program of tests and checks is required. 
An extended operational running period (i.e. physics) at 
safe beam limit with all prerequisites in place should be 
pursued. This will allow confirmation that all operational 
procedures, controls, and instrumentation are fully and 
faultlessly functional.  
Working at the safe beam limit of 3 x 1010 at 3.5 TeV is 
around 17 kJ. Circulating unsafe beam variants at 450 
GeV can be explored to test key systems and behaviour of 
feedbacks, and instrumentation.  
Obviously machine protection must be fully qualified 
before any step up in intensity. The first steps up in 
intensity will involve ramping safe beam at 450 GeV that 
is unsafe at 3.5 TeV. For example 1 x 1011 at 3.5 TeV is 
56 kJ; 7.5 x 1011 at 3.5 TeV is 0.5 MJ. Each step up must 
be followed by an extended running period. 
2010 POTENTIAL 
The details of the potential variation in intensity, bunch 
configuration and optics are covered in detail elsewhere 
in these proceedings [2]. Suffice to say: 
• Start with crossing angles off; 
• Target betas: 2/10/2/2 m. in IPs 1,2,5,8 respectively; 
• Rapidly move to around the safe beam limit;  
• A proposed staged increase in intensity to a total 
single beam energy of 2 MJ has recently been 
approved. The resultant luminosity and estimates for 
the integrated luminosity are shown in [mike]. Here a 
simple Hübner factor of 0.25 has been assumed to 
give some indication of expected performance. The 
machine will still be in a commissioning phase, 
treading carefully as experience is gained with 
potential dangerous beams. 
• The first 5 months will hopefully deliver a final 
luminosity of 1031 cm-2s-1 - a useful and encouraging 
first stage deliverable.  
The potential steps towards a luminosity of around 1032 
cm-2s-1 are shown in [23]. Given the proposed steps to 2 
MJ and a conservative approach to intensity increase it is 
clear that the final steps to over1032 cm-2s-1 will probably 
not be realized in 2010 and represent target for a mature, 
well optimized, well tested machine that one might hope 
to see in 2011. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A lot of hard work over the years has enabled a truly 
impressive period of initial commissioning with beam. 
Given initial indications, the LHC is reproducible; is 
magnetically well understood; is optically in good shape. 
It is armed with a powerful set of instrumentation, 
software, and hardware systems. 
It is also clear that the devil’s in the details and we’ve 
still considerable detail to sort out. There is still a long 
way to go in 2010 before we are ready for unsafe beam. 
If things go well, it will take about 4 weeks to establish 
stable, safe, squeezed beams at 3.5 TeV. The clear point 
here is the demand for stable beams, allowing the 
detectors to turned on fully.  
This will be followed by an extended running period at 
or around the safe beam limit to bed in machine 
protection and operations. Blocked machine development 
periods will be taken as required. 
Intensity increases will be a judicious and stepwise 
process. Each step will be followed by an extended 
running period. 
A formal review of the machine protection system and 
its coupling to the full machine cycle is strongly 
recommended before exceeding the safe beam limit by an 
significant amount. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many thanks to Malika Meddahi for making it happen; 
to Sylvia Dubourg for taking care of the logistics and 
Indico; to Brennan Goddard for editing the proceedings; 
and to Steve Myers for his support. 
The chairman and scientific secretaries did an excellent 
job as did the speakers who made a considerable effort in 
analyzing data from the commissioning period despite the 
short notice. 
REFERENCES 
[1] M. Lamont, Overview of operations, LHC Injection 
and Transfer lines, Proceedings of Evian beam 
commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[2] M. Meddahi, LHC Injection and Transfer lines, 
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[3] W. Bartmann, Injection and dump protection, 
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[4] K. Fuchsberger, Orbit system including feedback and 
stability, Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010.  
[5] L. Evans, Ppbar experience including beam-beam and 
intrabeam scattering, Injection and dump protection, 
Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
365
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[6] S. White, Luminosity optimization, Proceedings of 
Evian beam commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[7] R. Steinhagen, M. Gasior, Tune, chromaticity, feed-
forward and feedback, Proceedings of Evian beam 
commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[8] R. Thomas, LHC optical model and necessary 
corrections, Proceedings of Evian beam 
commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[9] W. Venturini,  Ramp: experience and issues, 
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[10] S. Redaelli, Squeeze: strategy and issues, 
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[11] J. Uythoven, Beam Dump Systems and Abort Gap 
Cleaning, Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[12] C. Bracco, Collimators and beam cleaning: first 
results and future plans, Proceedings of Evian beam 
commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[13] B. Todd, BIS - BIC – SMP, Proceedings of Evian 
beam commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[14] J. Wenninger, Overall MP and operation and scaling 
to 2010, Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[15] C. Zamantas, Beam loss monitor system, 
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[16] T. Lefevre, Profile monitors, BSRA, BSRT, Injection 
matching monitor, Proceedings of Evian beam 




[17] E. Todesco, Updated magnetic model for ramp and 
squeeze, Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[18] A. Butterworth, RF - performance & operational 
issues, Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[19] W. Sliwinski, Controls issues, Proceedings of Evian 
beam commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[20] B. Goddard, What are the weak point of operations?, 
Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[21] R. Alemany, How to improve operational 
efficiency?, Proceedings of Evian beam 
commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[22] M. Lamont, 2010 commissioning plans, Proceedings 
of Evian beam commissioning workshop, January 
2010. 
[23] M. Giovannozzi, 2010 beam parameters, machine 
performance to be reached in 2010, Proceedings of 
Evian beam commissioning workshop, January 2010. 
[24] W. Herr, Separation and crossing scheme, minimum 
beta star, Proceedings of Evian beam commissioning 
workshop, January 2010. 
[25] M. Lamont, Luminosity estimates, Proceedings of 














Proceedings of Chamonix 2010 workshop on LHC Performance
366
CHAMONIX’10 SUMMARY 
S. Myers (Chair), F. Zimmermann (Scientific secretary) 
 CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract 
The summary session of the LHC Performance 
Workshop in Chamonix, 25-29 January 2010, 
synthesized one week of presentations and intense 
discussions on the near- and long-term strategy for the 
LHC. In particular, Chamonix’10 developed a road 
map for establishing 7-TeV beam operation, estimated 
the luminosity evolution over the coming decade, and 
critically reviewed plans for a future high-luminosity 
upgrade, including various scenarios for the LHC 
injector complex. Other workshop themes included the 
preconditions for operation at 5 TeV, future magnet 
and splice consolidation, optimized interventions and 
future recovery from collateral damage, safety for 
personnel underground, access systems, radiation 
monitors, and radiation to accelerator electronics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The LHC Performance Workshop was organized in 
nine sessions, covering the preconditions for operating 
at 5 TeV in 2010, the consolidation of magnets and 
splices during the 2010/2011 shutdown, optimised 
interventions and recovery from collateral damages in 
cold sectors, safety for personnel underground and He 
evacuation, access system and radiation monitors, 
radiation to electronics, future upgrade scenarios for 
the injector complex, LHC upgrade plans for the “first 
long shutdown”, and additional LHC upgrade 
scenarios. These were followed by a summary session 
featuring a presentation on the outcome of the “Evian 
workshop” on the LHC beam commissioning, which 
had taken place a week earlier, and an overall synthesis 
of the Chamonix workshop. The latter synthesis is 
summarized in this report, where we describe the 
discussion topics more or less in the order of the 
corresponding workshop sessions. 
SPLICE MONITORING 
The new Quench Protection System (nQPS) allows 
for continuous measurements of the cold splice 
resistance (in units of nΩ) during “coast”. Two 
questions which arise are:  
• what is a critical resistance increase? and 
• do we have the software for the analysis? 
A related question concerns observations made 
during a quench and if these would permit extracting 
useful information about the copper-stabilizer state [1].  
For the nQPS, a potential problem is related to the 
radiation weakness of the latest version of the field-bus 
chip (MicroFipTM), which however affects only the 
supervision, but not the protection function [2,3]. A 
temporary workaround for the QPS boards is available. 
A long-term solution is required for all QPS 
systems. 
SPLICES AND BEAM ENERGY 
The updated simulations for the safe magnet current 
are based on rather pessimistic input parameters (e.g. 
RRR values), but they include no other safety margins. 
For 2010, operation at 3.5 TeV is safe. The RRR 
value of the bus should be measured a.s.a.p., using 
the nQPS, to confirm the safety margin for 3.5 TeV 
per beam and possibly allow a small increase in the 
beam energy. 
Without repairing the copper stabilizers, operation at 
5 TeV is risky [4]. For confident operation at 5 TeV, 
the “outlier” splices should be repaired, and a better 
knowledge of the input parameters is needed (i.e. RRR 
values for the cable and the bus). With the present input 
parameters the “limit” splice resistances at 5 TeV are 
43 µΩ (RB) and 41 µΩ  (RQ). These values are close 
to the resolution limit of the measurements for the RBs 
at 300 K. 
For confident operation at 7-TeV beam energy all 
“outlier” splices must be repaired by re-soldering and 
new clamps and shunts [4,5,6] must be added to all 
existing inter-magnet splices. Experimental validation 
of the proposed solution from the “Splices Task Force” 
through a test in FRESCA should be foreseen. 
Figure 1 compares measured and simulated thermal-
runaway curves for the three splice samples so far 
studied in FRESCA [4].  It has been conjectured that 
this figure might indicate a pessimistic bias of the 
simulation at low currents, e.g. below 8 kA. 
 
Figure 1: Thermal-runaway time for three splice samples 
tested in FRESCA as a function of current [4]. Solid and 
dashed lines refer to simulations with or without He cooling, 
respectively. The plotting symbols represent the measured 
values. 
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Tables 1-3 summarize the maximum allowable splice 
resistances for safe operation at 3.5, 5, and 7 TeV, 
extracted from simulations using the model 
benchmarked at FRESCA [4]. For 5 TeV a better 
knowledge of RRRbus might provide another 10 μΩ 
margin. For operation around 7 TeV, excess resistances 
of Raddit,RB<11 μΩ for dipole splices, and Raddit,RQ<15 
μΩ for quadrupole splices are required. At this energy, 
a better knowledge of RRRbus will hardly increase these 
tolerances [4]. 
 
Table 1: Splice excess resistance requirements at 3.5 TeV [4]. 
 
 
Table 2: Splice excess resistance requirements at 5 TeV [4]. 
 
 
Table 3: Splice excess resistance requirements at 7 TeV [4]. 
 
 
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS (2010-11) 
Two possible scenarios for 2010/11 have emerged at   
the workshop:  
1) Running at 3.5 TeV/beam up to a predefined 
integrated luminosity with a date limit. Then 
consolidating the whole machine for an energy 
of 7 TeV/beam. 
o For this scenario, it will be necessary to 
determine the detailed needs for the 
shutdown (resources, coactivity etc).  
2) Running until the second half of 2010. Then 
doing the minimum repair on the splices to 
allow 5 TeV/beam in 2011 (in this scenario 7 
TeV/beam would come much later). 
o Should one add the missing DN200 pressure 
release valves at the same time as the splice 
repair for 5-TeV operation? 
o Will one need to warm up all sectors in 
order to re-measure splice resistances? The 
answer seems to be yes, as re-measurements 
appear to be mandatory for the dipole 
splices in 7 octants and for the quadrupoles 
in all 8 octants. (See the measurement 
results presented [7] and refer to Table 4.)  
o How many splices would need to be 
repaired to reach the “limit” copper 
stabilizer resistances? In particular, what 
should be done about the RQ’s? 
 
Table 4: RB busbar-segment resistances measured in five 
sectors at room temperature using the “biddle”. The worst 
splices were opened up and repaired. The numbers show the 
situation after these repairs [7]. 
 
 
Comparing the two scenarios it is clear that the first 
scenario entails the minimum risk, and that it probably 
represents the more effective approach when 
considering the lifetime of the LHC. In addition it is 
preferred for reasons of minimizing the radiation dose 
to workers (As Low As Reasonably Achievable, 
ALARA, principle). This scenario implies a re-design 
and testing of the splices, for which sufficient time 
should be allocated. 
The second scenario implies a higher risk. It would 
require a reduced running in 2010 followed by a long 
shutdown 2010-2011, and it would delay the LHC 
operation at the highest energy. It is in conflict with 
ALARA, and it urgently needs development of the new  
technique for the measurement of the warm resistance 
(thermal amplifier) which is not yet available.  In 
addition, due to the choices to be made and the 
uncertainties in the decisions, it may require as much 
(or even more) shutdown time as for scenario 1, in 
order to allow a lower energy of only 5 TeV per beam. 
Moreover, the additional inherent risk associated 
with an inadvertently “missing” bad splice needs to be 
seriously considered [8]. 
The workshop participants expressed a unanimous 
preference for scenario 1. 
A related question is how to respond to any 
unforeseen stop, caused e.g. by a degrading S3-4 
vacuum. 
Comments and discussion on the 2010-11 
scenarios: The experiments are in favour of scenario 1 
[9]. A target value for the integrated luminosity at 3.5 
TeV of 1 fb-1 has been given as an indication. At this 
luminosity the LHC physics would be more than 
competitive with the Tevatron’s, and LHC would be 
firmly established as the energy frontier machine. To 
obtain the maximum (required) integrated luminosity 
over this period, the machine parameters should be 
carefully evolved while maintaining operational 
efficiency [10].  
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Concerning the response to an unforeseen stop, in 
such a case the electronics in Point 8 could be 
addressed [11]. 
 
DEFINING THE RISK AT 3.5 TEV 
A question which should be answered to better 
define the risk is:  
what (in detail) will be the sequence of events if the 
“allowable” values for the splice resistance are exceeded 
while running at 3.5 TeV/beam?  
The situation in 2010 is much improved with respect to 
2009. There are now additional pressure release valves, 
faster energy extraction (new dump resistors), and a 
new QPS including fast inter-magnet splice protection, 
as well as asymmetric quench protection. The potential 
damage and the repair time in case of an accident 
should be evaluated for this new situation. 
 
BEAM LOSS MONITORS 
The beam-loss monitor (BLM) system is crucial to 
reach the full protection level. Beam tests are required 
to determine the safe setting of the threshold levels. 
And the specified procedures must be fully applied.   
An impressive system performance has already been 
demonstrated [12]. One of the most important results 
from the early LHC beam commissioning is that 
scraping in the SPS is mandatory and that a clean 
injection is critical. The injection efficiency did not 
receive any attention until now, but it will be optimised 
(using the injection damper etc.) for higher injected 
currents. 
 
MACHINE PROTECTION & FUTURE 
HARDWARE COMMISSIONING 
The maximum stored beam energy achieved in 2009 
was 30 kJ. For the goal peak luminosities in 2010 
(~2x1032 cm-2s-1)., a beam stored energy of around 35 
MJ is needed. Collimation protection is crucial to avoid 
beam-induced damage. Following MD studies, the 
beam parameters must be restored to the physics 
operational conditions to avoid subsequent damage by 
the beam.  
Proposals, authorization mechanisms and procedures 
are needed, in particular for the following:  
• operational strategy for the beam intensity 
increase,  
• authorization procedure for masking and 
unmasking of interlocks [13].  
Pertinent proposals will be presented at the LMC. 
Concerning the organization of hardware 
commissioning (HWC) in 2010 and beyond [14], a new 
working group will be established (chaired by Rüdiger 
Schmidt), which will report to the LMC. 
OPTIMIZATION OF RECOVERY FROM 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
In general, reducing the nitrogen part of the cool-
down, if this were possible, would shorten the time 
needed for interventions [15].  
Following the accident in September 2008, the 
vacuum group had to develop a super clean vacuum 
cleaner [16]. A new methodology was introduced and 
applied for the clean-up process of Sector 3-4. Now 6 
sets of tooling are available “on the shelf” to intervene 
in case of need. The vacuum group hopes that these 
tools will now remain on the shelf forever. 
Fast valves for the LHC need further development 
work. Additional rupture discs to limit the collateral 
damage in the beam-vacuum chambers are envisaged 
for the arcs and/or for the experimental areas [17].  
Repairs with localised warm up of cold sectors are an 
appealing option. Indeed local warm up is part of the 
LHC baseline [18].  It allows for local repairs, while 
avoiding a thermal cycle of a whole arc. The method 
must be adapted with regard to the possibility of PIM 
(plug-in module) buckling. 
The example of a repair of the insulation vacuum 
using localised warm up produces a saving of 17 days 
(69 versus 52 days in total).  
The X-ray tomography which has recently become 
available represents a huge leap forward, by avoiding 
systematic beam vacuum venting and endoscopy to 
check the PIMs after an intervention. 
The answer to the question “can we change a magnet 
without warming up the full arc?” is probably yes, but 
it still requires the development of suitable tools and 
procedures. 
UNDERGROUND SAFETY 
The safety session was interesting and raised many 
points to pursue. As a follow up of the task force on 
underground safety [19], the experimental areas are 
now sealed. Still outstanding are the sealing of service 
areas from the tunnel, the alternative He release path, a 
proposal to link access with powering system, and the 
question of a 5th safety coordinator. 
ACCESS SYSTEM AND RADIATION 
MONITORING 
No problems have been found with the personnel 
safety, but some issues with the availability of the LHC 
have been highlighted [20]: 
o There is the never ending story of the Material 
Access Device (MAD). 
o The access is very slow when there is a large 
throughput. 
A detailed proposal was made for the consolidation 
of the access system, with some open question: 
o Reduce the size of the sectors? (more doors) 
o Should the Safety System (LASS) be extended 
to include other hazards such as electricity, 
high pressure, and lack of oxygen...? 
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A new procedure for access requests – AET (“Avis 
Execution Travaux”) – was introduced.  
One question concerned the need for more people 
who are trained to give access. 
A working group should be set up to provide the 
functional specifications for a new access system. 
RADIATION TO ELECTRONICS 
The detectors attacked the problem at the right time 
(>10 years ago) [21]. For the LHC machine, the present 
situation is difficult: mitigation is mandatory. The 
mitigation will involve one or several of the following 
possibilities [22]: shielding, relocation to existing 
areas, redesign of electronics, and relocation to newly 
generated areas (civil engineering). The implied lead 
times are long, calling for an evolutionary approach. 
The cost could be very high for the generation of new 
underground areas. Superconducting links may help for 
the relocation of power converters. 
A first rough estimate of the required material and 
manpower resources for the various mitigation steps 
has been presented [23]. The perfect solution is still 
being looked for. 
UPGRADES - FOREWORD 
Studies on the upgrade strategy have been launched 
about one year ago and are ongoing. The performance 
aim is to maximize the useful integrated luminosity 
over the lifetime of the LHC. Targets set by the 
detectors are 3000 fb-1 (on tape) by the end of the life 
of the LHC, which translates to 250-300 fb-1 per year in 
the second decade of running the LHC. The goals of 
the present upgrade studies are to assess the  
performance of the current upgrade plans, and to check 
their coherence with respect to the accelerator 
performance limitations, the detectors, the manpower 
resources, shutdown planning, etc. 
UPGRADE OR NOT 
Figure 2 illustrates schematically that it takes several 
years to profit from an upgrade. Recent examples from 
the HERA and Tevatron Run-1 upgrades are shown in 
Figs. 3 [24] and 4 [25].  
 
Figure 2: Schematic evolution of integrated luminosity with 
no upgrade (blue), one upgrade (red), and two upgrades 
(green) [Courtesy R. Bailey]. 
 
 
Figure 3: Integrated luminosity over the lifetime of HERA 
[24]. The upgrade from HERA I to HERA II happened from 
2001 to 2003. 
 
Figure 4: Weekly integrated luminosity reported by CDF for 
Tevatron Runs 1a and 1b. Between these two runs, the 
injector linac was upgraded to 400 MeV, ultimately leading 
to a bunch intensity increase in the Tevatron by a factor 2-3 
[25] [Courtesy V. Shiltsev]. 
INJECTORS: PERFORMANCE, 
CONSOLIDATION, AND UPGRADES  
From the LINAC2 to the SPS the LHC injectors are 
aging machines. Consolidation or replacement is 
needed. The proposed scenario in the “White” Paper, 
(2006) was to replace LINAC2, PSB and PS by 
LINAC4, SPL, and PS2 [26]. A recent study has shown 
that the time scale for first operation of the PS2 is at the 
earliest 2020 and likely 2022. The conclusion is that we 
need to aggressively consolidate the existing injector 
chain to allow reliable operation of the LHC until at 
least 2022. A consolidation task force had been set up 
late in 2009 [27]. It is also clear that the resources 
needed for the consolidation of the existing injectors 
are in direct competition with those needed for the 
construction of SPL/PS2. 
 On the other hand, the required consolidation of the 
existing injectors [27] will already provide an improved 
reliability. And the present performance limitation, in 
terms of intensity limit is in the SPS (or perhaps in the 
LHC itself), as illustrated in Table 5. The presently 
known bottleneck is the SPS, where e-cloud 
instabilities, transverse instabilities driven by high 
impedance and RF limitations, limit the present 
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intensity to about 0.7 of the ultimate needed for the 
LHC [28].  
A “new” idea/scenario was presented. By 
maintaining the existing injector chain (and including 
LINAC4), and increasing the extraction energy of the 
PS Booster to 2 GeV, intensities of up to 3x1011 
protons per LHC bunch with 25-ns spacing may be 
possible at the extraction of the PS [29]. This scenario 
may be a faster and cheaper way to attain the needed 
LHC intensity. 
Therefore, an alternative upgrade scenario to 
SPL/PS2 is to consolidate the existing injectors for the 
life of the LHC (2030), and during the same 
consolidation, improve the performance of PSB/PS as 
injectors for the LHC, e.g. by increasing the extraction 
energy of the PSB.  
Reliable running of the existing injector chain for 
another >20 years will require serious consolidation of 
many of the components. A detailed study of the 
consolidation requirements covering the machines, the 
experimental areas, the services and the infra-structure 
is already under way.  
The preliminary presented time line for the 
implementation of a new PSB extraction energy is of 
the order of three to four years (design and construction 
of new hardware [29]. The hardware concerned 
includes for the PSB, the main magnets, the main 
power supply, RF, septa and kickers, and for the 
transfer lines, the magnets, septa and kickers, and 
power converters. In addition the PS may need new 
injection septa, injection kickers and a slow bump 
scheme for the higher injection energy [29]. 
Other areas of study in view of additional injector 
improvements are the PS working point control, a 
faster pulsing of the PS (26 GeV/c in 1.2 s), and 
reduction of the losses at the PS extraction (new thin 
septum or additional thin septum) [29].  
  
Table 5: Summary of present and forecast LHC proton-beam 
intensity limitations (protons per bunch). 
 
 
Comments and discussion on the injector upgrade: 
The cost & resources should be discussed separately, 
but the estimate presented is considered correct [30]. It 
is a good idea to optimize the performance of existing 
machines, e.g. by raising the PSB energy. However, the 
pertinent performance estimates presented at this 
workshop may not be based on the same degree of 
realism, compared with the numbers shown for PS2 & 
SPL [30], while it does represent an interesting option.  
Indeed, the results presented for the PSB study had 
been reached on a different, much shorter time scale 
and with quite a different level of resources compared 
with the PS2 study [31]. Nevertheless certain elements 
seem to indicate the feasibility of this option. Some 
components required or helpful for this option could be 
included in the injector consolidation programme [31]. 
The extraction energy of the PS would be  a factor of 
2 lower than that from PS2 [32]. The present space-
charge tune shift at SPS injection is 0.07, much less 
than the 0.3 value which is common in the PSB or PS 
[33], and, therefore, this does not seem to be a 
fundamental limitation. Past beam experiments at SPS 
injection did not reveal any space-charge (SC) related 
lifetime reduction at least up to SC tune shifts as high 
as 0.2 [34]. The 2-GeV upgrade of the PSB will allow 
much faster tests of intensity limits in the SPS [35]. 
The number quoted for the SPS intensity limit might 
be on the pessimistic side [30]. The primary intensity 
limitations in the SPS for the LHC beam need to be 
clearly worked out [36]. The quoted bunch intensity 
limitation of 1.2x1011 in the SPS refers to the fact that 
at this intensity the value of the transverse emittance 
approaches the limit of what can be accepted for the 
LHC. In this sense the electron cloud represents the 
most important limitation [37]. In fact, the transverse 
emittance can presently not be maintained at this 
intensity [38]. A programme is underway to mitigate 
the electron cloud [39]. A general concept for the entire 
accelerator chain should be developed so that actions 
launched for the various machines fit together [40]. In 
particular, the fundamental limits for the SPS and the 
LHC should be identified. At the moment three SPS 
limitations (as well as their mitigation) are known: 
electron cloud (vacuum chamber coating), transverse 
mode coupling instability (impedance reduction and/or 
transverse feedback), and RF effects such as beam 
loading etc. (redesign of existing RF system or build a 
new system) – it is hoped to solve all these issues [41]. 
The next limit beyond these is not known presently. 
Immediately after Chamonix a task force has been set 
up to investigate the removal of the SPS bottleneck. 
There is currently no proposal to operate the sLHC 
with more than 2.3x1011 ppb at 25 ns spacing [42], so 
that the LHC plan will never be coherent with 4x1011 
protons per bunch, which would be available from the 
PS2. Even to reach and go above the ultimate intensity 
of  1.7x1011 ppb (at 25 ns spacing) may require 
substantial upgrades of many LHC components [43]. 
The future of the laboratory might require something 
else, e.g. a new machine, that is not closely tied to the 
LHC performance over the next ten or twenty years. 
The ~2030 perspective might determine the right 
decision. For Fermilab the Main Injector had proven to 
be the right decision [44]. While this argument is 
important and will be considered by the CERN top 
management, the Chamonix workshop focuses 
specifically on the LHC performance [45]. 
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INSERTION UPGRADE PLANS  
The goal of the Inner-Triplet (IT) upgrade [46] is to 
ensure reliable operation at 2x1034cm-2s-1 at beam 
intensities below ultimate and above nominal. The 
improvement offered by the pertinent upgrade optics 
[47] with respect to the present optics has not yet 
become entirely evident.   
As for IR4 upgrades, the justification for 200-MHz 
(ACN) cavities appears very weak [48]. In contrast, a 
cryo-upgrade for IR4 to allow autonomy of the sc RF 
cavities seems very useful. Crab cavity studies are 
ongoing. The space which might accommodate such 
cavities in IR4 should be reserved.  
A clear proposal for collimation phase 2 has been 
presented [49]. The present intensity “limitation” from 
collimation is soft, and needs to be confirmed by beam 
studies during the next years. The collimation phase 2 
proposal implies the displacement of a total of 48 sc 
magnets to free the needed space for new collimators. 
An approval of this installation phase is required soon. 
The break point is summer 2011 for completion by 
2014-2015.  
A possible integration issue in the tunnel has been 
highlighted [50]: the planning is presently assumed to 
require 9 months for IT phase 1, idem for the matching 
sections (modification of the region from D2 to Q6). 
The activities for the matching sections are very similar 
to the installation of the new triplets, requiring the 
same expertise, and implying intense and tightly 
dependent co-activities. In view of these conflicts, 
successive modifications of the matching sections 
should be minimized by implementing a solution that 
would remain valid for the later phase-2 upgrade of the 
triplet.  
Perhaps more seriously, the splice consolidation and 
the IT upgrade also compete for resources.  
Two tough questions were raised:  
1. Will the phase 1 IT upgrade produce an 
increase in the integrated luminosity? Here the 
installation time and the re-commissioning 
time needed afterwards for the “new” machine 
should be taken into account. 
2. Are sufficient resources available to complete 
IT phase 1 on a time scale which is reasonable 
with respect to IT phase 2? 
A task force has been set up immediately after 
Chamonix to answer above questions within 4-5 
weeks. 
 
Comments and discussion on the IT upgrade plan: 
It might be “unfair” to compare the phase I upgrade 
plan with the ultimate LHC parameters [51]. The 
luminosity evolution forecast now is much slower than 
what had been expected before.  
How much the present collimation is limiting the 
luminosity needs to be investigated [52].  This will 
indeed be done, and analyses of loss rate have already 
started [53]. However, the 2009 experience is 
insufficient to draw any definite conclusions. 
The initial goals of phase-I upgrade had been two-
fold [54]: to take advantage of the available sextupole 
strength in order to decrease beta* to 25 cm, and to 
relax the collimator impedance issue through an 
increased triplet aperture.  Two types of difficulty had 
been envisioned: an intensity limitation, and the 
constrained emittance budget (translating into an 
aperture budget). Now it was a good time to re-evaluate 
how close the present phase-I plan is to meeting the 
initial goals for this upgrade. For example, initially the 
time of installation had been assumed to be 6 months; 
meanwhile this had increased to 1 year [54]. 
Cryo-collimators are also strongly motivated by the 
heavy-ion programme, independently of the triplet 
upgrade, but with a similar installation plan. In IR2 an 
initial set of cryo-collimators is required for heavy-ion 
collisions, but only half as many as called for by the 
proton luminosity upgrade [55]. 
There may be a severe resource conflict for the 
upgrade of the Inner Triplet, the injector consolidation 
(and upgrades), and the splice consolidation [56]. 
FUTURE UPGRADE SCENARIOS 
“PHASE 2” 
The parameter space beyond 1034cm-2s-1 has been 
explored [57]. Beam intensity was identified to be the 
most important parameter for higher luminosity. 
Reducing β* does not significantly change the average 
luminosity unless it is complemented by crab cavities 
(or by smaller emittance).   
Numerous limitations exist on the path towards 
higher intensities (important reality check!) [58]. 
Indeed, there are many, many problems with higher 
intensities. As a result it was concluded that the 
upgrade should be presently limited to about ultimate 
beam intensity. 
Alternative luminosity scenarios should be 
developed for limitations either in total intensity or in 
intensity/bunch (2nd reality check) [59]. 
Crab cavities are only efficient for low β* values 
around 0.25 m and below [60]. Conversely they 
represent almost the only efficient way to operate at 
such low beta values. The crab-cavity studies should be 
continued (with regard to machine protection, etc.). 
For LHC high luminosities, the luminosity lifetime 
becomes comparable with the turn-around time, 
implying a low efficiency. In this situation luminosity 
leveling would be an asset [61],  and allow for very 
efficient operation. Preliminary estimates show that the 
useful integrated luminosity is greater with a maximum 
luminosity of 5x1034 cm-2s-1 and luminosity leveling 
than with 1035 cm-2s-1 and a luminosity lifetime of a 
few hours. Leveling could be accomplished by varying 
β* or the crossing angle, or, quite elegantly and less 
invasively, through the use of crab cavities, and finally 
possibly via changes of the bunch length. 
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The LHC high-luminosity experiments wish to 
collect a lifetime total integrated luminosity of 3000 fb-
1
 on tape, as well as to receive a clear plan for the 
technical developments over the next 5-6 years [62]. In 
addition, after 2020 the (s)LHC operation scheme 
should allow running LHCb with a luminosity of 
5x1033 cm-2s-1 and provide higher luminosity with lead 
ions in ALICE. 
Rough and very preliminary estimates of the 
integrated luminosity for the next decade (“crystal 
ball”) suggest that LHC may reach between 9 and 24 
fb-1 by 2014, 40 to 100 fb-1 by 2016, and a rate of 100 
fb-1/year by about 2019 [63].  
Better estimates for the coming five years should be 
available at this time next year. These estimates will be 
developed in a more formal way via the LHC Machine 
Committee, and the numbers for future runs will be 
proposed in Chamonix each year.  
The luminosity targets set by the detectors are 3000 
fb-1 (on tape) by the end of the life of the LHC 
implying an integrated luminosity goal of 250-300 fb-1 
per year in the second decade of LHC running.  
 
Comments and discussion on future upgrade 
scenarios: 
Concerning luminosity levelling, the bunch length 
could be doubled, by a factor 16 reduction in RF 
voltage [64]. 
An increase in intensity beyond ultimate is not 
excluded from first principles. A rather fundamental 
limit is set only by the beam screens [65]. This hard 
limit corresponds to a bunch intensity of about 2.3x1011 
at 25 ns spacing, and ~5x1011 at 50 ns spacing [66].  
Splice consolidation and collimation (soft limit) must 
be addressed with high priority, while it is difficult to 
see how the phase-I upgrade increases the integrated 
luminosity. Therefore, the latter was a “very difficult 
sell” [67]. 
 If the interconnects are anyhow opened there might 
be a possibility to also consolidate the PIMs at the 
same time [68]. Most of the suspicious PIMs have 
already been replaced, however. And there is no clear 
reason for a systematic repair [69]. 
What could be done during an unforeseen shutdown?  
Are there ideas what to do in parallel [70]?  The 
scenario 1 should be defined very clearly [71]. The 
repair time with a local warm up was 52 days. This 
down time should not be extended more than 
necessary. And therefore only those activities should be 
executed that could be completed within this time [71]. 
During LHC shutdowns there would be plenty of work 
on the injectors [72]. 
The importance of the upgrade for the particle-
physics community should not be underestimated [73]. 
An upgrade decision or plan in 5 years from now is too 
late; the detector-upgrade project now underway has 
1/2 the size of the initial detector construction. A 
project of this size cannot be based on a very weak 
assumption. There should be a clear plan and goal 
providing the motivation [73]. On the other hand, the 
money should not be wasted either [74]. The present 
plan must be refined. The need for a clear sign is 
agreed by everybody involved. The learning experience 
from operating the machine will be important. A 
concrete plan will be presented sooner than in 5 years’ 
time [74]. At this Chamonix workshop two very large 
upgrade proposals have been discussed (SPL & PS2, IT 
upgrade phase I). The ultimate plan is a phase-II triplet. 
The plan which had been pursued so far had resulted in 
a pile up of the same people having to do an incredible 
amount of work. 
UPGRADE CONCLUSIONS 
The luminosity targets set by the detectors are: 3000 
fb-1 (on tape) by the end of the life of the LHC 
translating to 250-300 fb-1 per year in the second 
decade of running the LHC. The upgrades needed to 
attack these goals are: 
– SPS performance improvements to remove the 
bottleneck; 
– aggressive consolidation of the existing injector 
chain for availability reasons; 
– performance improvement of the injector chain 
to allow phase 2 luminosities; and  
– a newly defined sLHC which involves 
luminosity levelling at ~5-6x 1034cm-2s-1 (crab 
cavities etc…), and at least one major upgrade 
of the high luminosity insertions. 
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